Intriguing Midway discussion - IJN Point of View

[Peter Gunn]

There's no doubt USN damage control was top notch. I agree, Essex with the large strike group, hit them sooner and harder than they can hit you.

 

[Glider]

It is interesting that not a single Essex class carriers was sunk, despite absorbing some tremendous damage. One advantage of the non armored flight deck was it's repairability. Often the damage control crew could have it re planked in a very short time. Not a perfect system on some 30,000 odd tons, but somewhat matching the philosophy of the opponent in emphasizing attack. Indeed in carrier to carrier battle, the Nathan Bedford Forrest philosophy of who "git's the'r fustust wit the mostest" will win. Fletcher realize this at Coral Sea, recon wasn't great, always a gamble shooting your bolt.

On an armoured deck the normal result of a direct hit was a dent in the deck and we were trained to use quick drying cement as a fix. Regarding the ability to survive damage I am not so sure. Yes the Essex class survived significant damage, but often the weapons that caused the damage was light. The very serious losses on the Franklin were caused by I think it was two or three fairly light bombs.

Regarding tactics one that the USN used was radar pickets, normally destroyers operating some distance from the main fleet giving warning and of course precious time to allow the fighters to intercept.

 

[The Basket]

The Franklin was hit by two relatively small bombs and the major cause of the damage was armed fueled aircraft exploding just like at Midway.

Franklin did not sink but the Japanese carriers didn't sink due to damage but were scuttled. So all the same.

Franklin suffered huge loss of life and injuries so hardly an example.

 

[Schweik]

I thought that video was terrific, kudos to that kid who did it whoever he is.

 

[The Basket]

The video and quality are very good.

He has other stuff on his channel well worth a look.

 

[pinehilljoe]

It is interesting that not a single Essex class carriers was sunk, despite absorbing some tremendous damage. One advantage of the non armored flight deck was it's repairability. Often the damage control crew could have it re planked in a very short time. Not a perfect system on some 30,000 odd tons, but somewhat matching the philosophy of the opponent in emphasizing attack. Indeed in carrier to carrier battle, the Nathan Bedford Forrest philosophy of who "git's the'r fustust wit the mostest" will win. Fletcher realize this at Coral Sea, recon wasn't great, always a gamble shooting your bolt.

The USN had excellent damage control, as I said in an earlier post, IJN ships of all classes damaged as badly as similar USN ships didn't survive.

 

[GrauGeist]

...but the Japanese carriers didn't sink due to damage but were scuttled...

The Hiryu eventually sank on her own.
They did a half-hearted attempt at scuttling (two torpedoes fired, one missed, the other hit the bow with no damage) and just when they thought they might tow her back to Japan, she slid under the waves.

 

[The Basket]

The Franklin was hit in 1945 so the USN would have learnt already about damage control.

But the Franklin example has merit. In 1945, the USN would have been monstrous with best fighters and flak and radar the whole nine yards plus against a weakened enemy. And suffered severe damage with massive loss of life.

Vastly powerful in comparison to IJN in 42.

 

[fliger747]

The most dangerous item on any warship is her own munitions. Hood wouldn't have been destroyed by the small bursting charge of an AP shell, Arizona likewise was destroyed by a AP shell dropped as a bomb, small bursting charge. When the Essex was designed, Kamakaze was not envisioned, on balance the decision to emphasize offensive power was probably best. To get to an effective armored deck carrier, the 45,000 ton Midways had to arrive. Perhaps the RN Armored deck carriers needed them given the smaller air groups available for defense.

 

[pinsog]

I thought the Royal Navy armored deck WAS part of the reason for the smaller air group? (From memory so I may be wrong) Also, no US fleet carriers were lost to bombs alone. Lexington, Yorktown and Hornet were all crippled or sunk by aerial torpedoes. Enterprise was hit by bombs several times and although damaged, was never in danger of sinking. Yorktown was damaged by bombs at Coral sea but partially repaired, damaged by bombs at Midway, partially repaired, under way and then crippled by torpedoes.

 

[VBF-13]

All four carriers had their hangar decks full of aircraft being prepped for a strike.

The main deck of all four carriers was kept clear, per IJN battle doctrine, to recover and launch CAP elements.

Here's a photo of the Soryu taking evasive maneuvers during the battle - look to the stern and you'll see an A6M waiting to launch from an otherwise empty main deck.
View attachment 539984

Still, that's one pretty risky doctrine, you ask me. Entering a battle like this, they need some planes on deck, ready to deploy. One 500# bomb on an elevator shaft, and where are those hangar planes going?

 

[VBF-13]

And that's what the SBDs are aiming for on the carriers, the elevator shafts.

 

[GrauGeist]

Still, that's one pretty risky doctrine, you ask me. Entering a battle like this, they need some planes on deck, ready to deploy. One 500# bomb on an elevator shaft, and where are those hangar planes going?

Agreed...the IJN's policy was to maintain a clear deck during battle for CAP priority while keeping strike aircraft prepped and on standby belowdecks.
When discussing the battle with a friend (who's long since passed), he said he was using the "meatball" as his aimpoint, as the elevators weren't defined well enough from his point of view when he started his dive.
He was an SBD driver with VS-6 and delivered a hit on the Kaga.

 

[The Basket]

A carrier while under attack will be manoeuvring violently so would be hard lined to get carrier aircraft airborne especially heavy bombed up kites.

That's the 45 minute reason.

The CAP reason is perfectly valid. I would assume CAP Zeroes are low fuel tanked to give maximum agility since they're literally flying over there own carrier.

Main issue is cannon rounds since they had few of them so would have to land constantly to get new shots. So leaving the decks clear makes sense to me.

If you take say battle of Britain that was played out in weeks while this battle was played out in minutes. So getting it wrong and getting unlucky means bad news.

 

[VBF-13]

Agreed...the IJN's policy was to maintain a clear deck during battle for CAP priority while keeping strike aircraft prepped and on standby belowdecks.
When discussing the battle with a friend (who's long since passed), he said he was using the "meatball" as his aimpoint, as the elevators weren't defined well enough from his point of view when he started his dive.
He was an SBD driver with VS-6 and delivered a hit on the Kaga.

I'd be stuttering so much in the presence of someone like that I wouldn't be able to get out my questions intelligibly. Wow. As for the old man, he carrier-qualified on the SBD, and of course took all the hours of training, before they then switched him to train on the F6F. This was early 1945, well-after Midway, of course. I think they knew the central shaft was located about a third of the way down from the bow. I think I might have heard that from one of the old pilots in his "retirement club." I call them "old pilots," here. They were really young boys, that turned into men, really, really quick. That club was so much fun, I really miss it. I feel honored at just having had the chance to sit there with my mouth shut and listen.

 

[davparlr]

As to your question on whether the Japanese were discounting the danger that this sighting meant based on the previous American attacks, you may very well be correct. There was much discussion at certain levels of the IJN regarding American doctrine, equipment and training and none of it was flattering. I think there was a certain element pervasive in the Japanese Navy at the time, that held American training, equipment etc. with more than just a little bit of contempt.

Part of that contempt that morning was probably being borne out by the uncoordinated and almost haphazard attacks that had been thrown at them by the Americans, not realizing that they were just that, haphazard. No B-26 crew had been trained to drop torpedoes, Henderson's boys were green as can be, no coordination between any of the incoming attackers etc. For all they knew, that was the best the U.S. had to throw at them, so perhaps there was a bit of feeling that even if the ten ships included carriers... so what? They may have figured they could deal with whatever TF 16 & 17 could throw at them, come out fine, and then deal a crushing blow on the American ships. Reading what some of the officers had to say leading up to Midway leaves no doubt to me they didn't think the U. S. was very good and that they were so much better than the Americans that the battle and the war was all but won.

I can't believe that the attack by the Henderson's TBFs/B-26s was reassuring to the Japanese. With only ten aircraft, six TBFs and four B-26s, and without air cover, were able to penetrate the Japanese defenses and reach torpedo launch. Yes they lacked training, yes the torpedoes were faulty, but the attacks were pressed and every man in that fleet knew the Americans were going to fight. It had to be disturbing for Nagumo to see a B-26 fly down his flight deck straffing as it went and another one almost kill him as it went crashing right by the ships island. A few more feet closer an the battle would have been different. While these attacks were going on the ships were twisting and turning, unable to receive aircraft, or launch aircraft, or refuel aircraft, or arm aircraft. According to Shattered Sword, this attack caused Nagumo to authorize a re-attack on Midway, an important decision in the battle. We tend to accept this fight as a side show for the main event but in reality it helped set the stage for the final act. This important attack was done by heros of the highest order, both Army and Navy.

 

[VBF-13]

Interesting in view of it's rather typical to look at it as uneventful...

 

[RCAFson]

The most dangerous item on any warship is her own munitions. Hood wouldn't have been destroyed by the small bursting charge of an AP shell, Arizona likewise was destroyed by a AP shell dropped as a bomb, small bursting charge. When the Essex was designed, Kamakaze was not envisioned, on balance the decision to emphasize offensive power was probably best. To get to an effective armored deck carrier, the 45,000 ton Midways had to arrive. Perhaps the RN Armored deck carriers needed them given the smaller air groups available for defense.

Compare Essex and Taiho. These two carriers were about the same size and Taiho in USN service would have operated at least as many aircraft as Essex. The RN Implacable class were smaller but their operational airgroup was proportionally about the same size as an Essex. There were USN designs for an armoured flight deck Essex, which were slightly shorter but with wider beam than historical Essex and I suspect the armoured flight deck design would have gone into production if the designers could have seen the Bunker Hill and Franklin disasters.

 

[The Basket]

Midway was the curiosity until a lot of combat aircraft came from Midway and started firing. Then it has their full attention.

I doubt the IJN knew the USN torpedoes were poor. So any torpedo attack is hair raising.

Armoured decks carry less aircraft so its not a no brainer. Less combat aircraft mean that you need something like 3 Armoured carriers against 2 unarmoured to carry same air power. It's all about the numbers.

 

[RCAFson]

It is interesting that not a single Essex class carriers was sunk, despite absorbing some tremendous damage. One advantage of the non armored flight deck was it's repairability. Often the damage control crew could have it re planked in a very short time. Not a perfect system on some 30,000 odd tons, but somewhat matching the philosophy of the opponent in emphasizing attack. Indeed in carrier to carrier battle, the Nathan Bedford Forrest philosophy of who "git's the'r fustust wit the mostest" will win. Fletcher realize this at Coral Sea, recon wasn't great, always a gamble shooting your bolt.

The USN had a massive sea superiority at the time that Franklin and Bunker Hill were attacked. However, if we replace Lexington or Yorktown or Hornet with an Essex class, they would probably have been scuttled (Franklin for sure) if they suffered their late war damage in 1942, when the USN often lost sea control at the end of their various carrier engagements.