Intriguing Midway discussion - IJN Point of View

[The Basket]

Royal Navy lost plenty carriers so not a great example.

Illustrious had armoured decks.

The reason was they were to operate in North Sea and English Channel where they would expect bad weather and enemy shipping and land based bombers. So would expect heavy damage so had to be built accordingly.

There was a test where RN fighters could not intercept incoming bombers in time to prevent attack so had to be prepared to take its lumps. This was before radar.

Japanese carriers were designed for the vast waters of the Pacific far away from land bombers and probably enemy surface vessels The only viable air threat would be carrier bombers which at the time of mid 30s carried very small payloads at slow to going backward speeds. Hardly a threat.

Apples to Oranges? Maybe maybe not but navy strategy is built strategy and getting it wrong is a glacial task to get right.

 

[Kevin J]

Royal Navy lost plenty carriers so not a great example.

Illustrious had armoured decks.

The reason was they were to operate in North Sea and English Channel where they would expect bad weather and enemy shipping and land based bombers. So would expect heavy damage so had to be built accordingly.

There was a test where RN fighters could not intercept incoming bombers in time to prevent attack so had to be prepared to take its lumps. This was before radar.

Japanese carriers were designed for the vast waters of the Pacific far away from land bombers and probably enemy surface vessels The only viable air threat would be carrier bombers which at the time of mid 30s carried very small payloads at slow to going backward speeds. Hardly a threat.

Apples to Oranges? Maybe maybe not but navy strategy is built strategy and getting it wrong is a glacial task to get right.

Royal Navy lost most of its original carriers based on WW1 designs. Courageous(WW1 converted heavy cruiser, torpedo), Glorious(WW1 converted heavy cruiser, gunfire), Eagle(WW1 converted battleship, torpedo) then Hermes (unarmoured, air attack) and Ark Royal (first armoured design, torpedo, bad damage control). Later Audacity(converted merchantman, torpedo) and Dasher(converted merchantman, catastrophic av gas explosion). No subsequent losses although 2 more merchantman based carriers were torpedoed and damaged beyond economical repair. Its not a bad record, about 10% of all carriers operated. No armoured carriers were lost other than Ark Royal. The armoured carriers were design to operate in contested waters close to land based opposition, such as North Sea and Mediterranean Sea. Losses proportionally about the same as USN.

 

[Bad-Karma]

Thank you all for this discussion. It sparked a lot of interesting research on my part. My interest has always been ETO but I'm always happy to be exposed to more PTO discussions.

One thing stood out to me when looking at all of the carrier battles leading up to the battle of the Philippine Sea. It seems like American CAP was extremely ineffective (even with early radar) while IJN CAP was fantastic. What was the biggest change from late 42 until the Philippine Sea where American CAP was devastating? The most obvious was the F6F became the standard fighter but in terms of an interception was it's performance that big of an improvement? Better radar perhaps? Tactics and numbers (ie: lessons learned from previous battles)? I also realize by then IJN pilot quality was on a downward slope but not sure how big of an impact that was in comparison to the rest of these factors.

 

[GrauGeist]

What was the biggest change from late 42 until the Philippine Sea where American CAP was devastating?

You pretty much answered your own question in your post.

Between 7 December 1941 and late 1942, the USN had a steep learning curve against Japan, who at the time, was numerically superior and had several years of combat experience on the US Navy.

The USN CAP early on, comprised of the F4F and SBD with inexperienced pilots against veteran pilots that had greater numbers - add to that, instances where IJA participated with IJN elements against the USN, too.

As 1942 came to a close, the USN was gaining in experience, men and material at a rapid pace that Imperial Japan could not match.

 

[Kevin J]

You pretty much answered your own question in your post.

Between 7 December 1941 and late 1942, the USN had a steep learning curve against Japan, who at the time, was numerically superior and had several years of combat experience on the US Navy.

The USN CAP early on, comprised of the F4F and SBD with inexperienced pilots against veteran pilots that had greater numbers - add to that, instances where IJA participated with IJN elements against the USN, too.

As 1942 came to a close, the USN was gaining in experience, men and material at a rapid pace that Imperial Japan could not match.

From what I've read the USN did pretty well from Day 1 of conflict. It was the USAAF that got caught off guard at Pearl, and blundered in the Phillipines. Perhaps you can enlighten me on your belief that the IJN was a superior force from Day 1.

 

[Bad-Karma]

You pretty much answered your own question in your post.

Between 7 December 1941 and late 1942, the USN had a steep learning curve against Japan, who at the time, was numerically superior and had several years of combat experience on the US Navy.

The USN CAP early on, comprised of the F4F and SBD with inexperienced pilots against veteran pilots that had greater numbers - add to that, instances where IJA participated with IJN elements against the USN, too.

As 1942 came to a close, the USN was gaining in experience, men and material at a rapid pace that Imperial Japan could not match.

Thanks for the reply, if you had to choose one factor that made the most impact what would it be? It always seemed like the American CAP was in the wrong position for an intercept as well. Was this a training issue or a technology issue (early radar?) or just plain bad luck?

 

[Conslaw]

While it is true that Japanese radar played no role in the Battle of Midway, Japan did have radar - kind of. Just days before sailing as part of the Aleutians covering force, battleships ISE and HYUGA were fitted with experimental Type 21 radar sets. These two ships were from BatDiv 2 and sailed together. Monday-morning-quarterbacking: could these ships have been split up, with one going to the the Aleutians force and one to Midway? Perhaps theoretically, but their top speed was only around 23 knots, scarcely better than the American "slow battleships". Combinedfleeet.com says that HYUGA's radar was unsatisfactory, and the captain had it removed. By the way Combinedfleet.com also says that the carriers that didn't participate in the Midway battle, the SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU received rader in 1942, with Shokaku getting its receiver in late June and Zuikaku in December.

Speaking of radar, at least some of the PBYs stationed at Midway were equipped with ASE radar. I can't remember this fact being included in any text on the battle that I read through the 1990s, so I wonder if it was originally classified information that was omitted from original sources.

 

[pinsog]

At Coral Sea, Shōkaku absorbed 3 1000 pound bombs and survived. It certainly helps survivability when you don't have 36 fully fueled and mostly armed aircraft in your hanger when your hit. (I believe Shōkaku was nearly empty of aircraft when hit, unlike Hiryu, Soryu, Kaga and Akagi at Midway)

 

[pinehilljoe]

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One thing stood out to me when looking at all of the carrier battles leading up to the battle of the Philippine Sea. It seems like American CAP was extremely ineffective (even with early radar) while IJN CAP was fantastic. What was the biggest change from late 42 until the Philippine Sea where American CAP was devastating? The most obvious was the F6F became the standard fighter but in terms of an interception was it's performance that big of an improvement? Better radar perhaps? Tactics and numbers (ie: lessons learned from previous battles)? I also realize by then IJN pilot quality was on a downward slope but not sure how big of an impact that was in comparison to the rest of these factors.

All of the above. In the 1942 Carrier engagements, generally 1 Carrier had the ability to sink 1 Carrier. The offensive strike and defensive capabilities were about even. The battles, except Midway were somewhat equal exchanges in carrier losses. Even at Midway, the first US strike, 3 vs 4, 3 IJN carriers sunk, the strike from Hiryu to the USN, 1 vs 3; one USN carrier sunk; one carrier had the offensive capability to sink one carrier.

By 44, the defensive capabilities swung to the US. Not just better aircraft, the make up of the Carrier Wings mix of fighters to bombers was changed. The Air wings at Coral Sea had 20 fighters, Midway 27, Philippine Sea 40, by Okinawa it was 70 to 80 fighters for 30 bombers.

Orders of Battle - Battles of the Pacific - World War II - NavWeaps

 

[GrauGeist]

From what I've read the USN did pretty well from Day 1 of conflict. It was the USAAF that got caught off guard at Pearl, and blundered in the Phillipines. Perhaps you can enlighten me on your belief that the IJN was a superior force from Day 1.

Perhaps you can enlighten me on how well the USN performed at Pearl Harbor, then, which happened to be primarily a USN facility?
If memory serves me right, it was several USAAC elements that got airborn to challenge IJN aircraft.
Where were the Navy's F4F and F2A fighters? I don't seem to recall any getting up to challenge the Japanse...

 

[Kevin J]

Perhaps you can enlighten me on how well the USN performed at Pearl Harbor, then, which happened to be primarily a USN facility?
If memory serves me right, it was several USAAC elements that got airborn to challenge IJN aircraft.
Where were the Navy's F4F and F2A fighters? I don't seem to recall any getting up to challenge the Japanse...

IIRC the USAAF was responsible for the defence of Pearl Harbour just as in the UK, primary responsibility lay with the RAF.

 

[pinsog]

Everybody dropped the ball. A few army fighters getting aloft doesn't change the fact that everyone got caught with their pants down

 

[The Basket]

Akagi and Kaga were also converted into carriers.
Taiho was a better protected carrier but still sank. Only so much you can do.

Armoured carriers could carry less aircraft and also spent more time in drydock if they were badly damaged. So swings and roundabouts.

Main issue with IJN is that they couldn't replace the losses they suffered. So even when they won it was a strategic defeat.

Who da thunk it?

 

[Shortround6]

Pearl Harbor may have been a split command.
Yes it was a Navy base, but the defense of the Island (or Islands) as a whole was the responsibility of the Army.

Army coast defence guns, Army AA guns, Army interceptors, even the infamous radar belonged to the Army. Army troops, not marines manning the other shore defences.

navy fighter squadrons at Pearl may have been secondary. They were often there just when their carriers were being worked on or performing other duties (like ferrying aircraft to Wake)

So in some cases squadron X was there for one or two weeks and then gone for a number of weeks. It might be replaced (or not) by a squadron from another carrier if that carrier needed to put it's planes ashore. It is hard to integrate the Navy squadrons into the defence plan if their availability is questionable from day to day (or week to week) and you rare dealing with different squadrons month to month.

 

[The Basket]

According to the video the torpedo attacks were on going when the Dauntless appeared and also the torpedo strike was escorted with Wildcats so more Devastators got through sucking in more of the CAP Zeroes. So the Kido Butai was getting it all over.

 

[pinsog]

At Midway, I believe only 1 torpedo squadron was attacking when the SBD's arrived. If I recall correctly, the Torpedo 8 attack had been over for a while. I'm not at home right now, but Shattered Sword has the time lines pretty well nailed down.

 

[The Basket]

A torpedo attack was ongoing.
This drew the CAP low as nearly all the Devastators had survived the initial Zero thrust and the Wildcats were busy too. This was the first time the Thatch Weave was used and David Thatch was actually there!

So a few Zeroes were getting shot down and the Devastators were lining up. This drew the remaining CAP away from the carriers.

VT-3 was attacking Hiryu pretty much concurrently with the dive bombers attacking the others. All torpedoes missed and losses were heavy.

Any torpedo attack would have been fatal so the carriers would have to take evasive action even if they were not the target.

 

[PAT303]

Thanks for the reply, if you had to choose one factor that made the most impact what would it be? It always seemed like the American CAP was in the wrong position for an intercept as well. Was this a training issue or a technology issue (early radar?) or just plain bad luck?

The Japanese CAP aircraft attacked, landed, rearmed and refueled and attacked again as per their fighting doctrine, they could do this because of the Zero's performance, the wildcats on the other hand were tough birds but heavy making climbing from sea level or even while in the air to get into position or to gain an advantage almost impossible. The Zero sacrificed protection, communications, pilot safety and hitting power to wring every last ounce of performance out of the limited power all planes of that era possessed.

 

[Peter Gunn]

SBD attacks lasted from 1020 to 1030.

From Shattered Sword page 242:
"Finally, just after 1035, VT-3s torpedo aircraft reached a position where they could begin a series of runs against Yamaguchi's flagship that would last until 1040"

Lem Massey's twelve aircraft were attacking Hiryu at the time, Zeros accounted for ten and IJN AAA splashed one Zero.

So yes, there was a last torpedo attack going on as the SBD's plastered the Akagi, Kaga and Soryu, but they were well to the north but it would seem that much of the CAP was perhaps engaged in chasing VT-3.

 

[fliger747]

It is interesting that not a single Essex class carriers was sunk, despite absorbing some tremendous damage. One advantage of the non armored flight deck was it's repairability. Often the damage control crew could have it re planked in a very short time. Not a perfect system on some 30,000 odd tons, but somewhat matching the philosophy of the opponent in emphasizing attack. Indeed in carrier to carrier battle, the Nathan Bedford Forrest philosophy of who "git's the'r fustust wit the mostest" will win. Fletcher realize this at Coral Sea, recon wasn't great, always a gamble shooting your bolt.