Intriguing Midway discussion - IJN Point of View

taly01 · Jun 1, 2019

Whether by design or luck the almost continuous arrival of strikes from Midway that day stopped the Japanese carriers from been able to service aircraft at normal speeds. I suspect Midways small airfield made the mini-strikes necessary.

The main Japanese carrier force "Kido Butai" had never faced this kind of attack and it exposed its weaknesses, and lack of doctrine in how to face such attacks. Still its luck held out until the later Dauntless strikes.......who performed exceptionally well. I think the J-carrier seamen were already fatigued after some 6 hours of attacks.

The Basket · Jun 1, 2019

Japanese fire and damage control was certainly a thing. But it wasn't every member of the crew but a specialist crew. This meant that in a Western navy all hands were trained in damage control but not in the IJN. So if the specialist crew were themselves killed or stuck then pretty much game over. The Taiho is a good example of poor damage control. Although Shokaku was badly damaged at Coral Sea and did survive.

Prince of Wales was not fighting fit and Hood was past its glory days. The Germans knew they were up against a King George V but thought it was KGV not PoW.

The battleship King George V was available but Hood and PoW was sent. PoW was beset with mechanical issues and had suffered losses.

Anyhoo the main strategic weakness of Japan wouldn't have been solved. Even if the Americans were damaged at Midway they could always replace their losses. The Japanese were always at a disadvantage as they couldn't.

fliger747 · Jun 1, 2019

POW continued to shadow Bismarck and they traded a salvo or two about the time that Prinz Eugen broke away. Perhaps Lutjens was correct, maybe he could have finished off POW, but she wasn't seriously damaged and it was after all hits from POW that really sealed her fate. Any kind of serious damage to Bismarck would certainly seal her fate, making a return home unlikely and her Raison d'être was commerce raiding.

Back to Midway... The Japanese could probably have still taken the field as it were, the US carriers were not really much of a threat after the battle. Despite their tendency to make heroic almost suicidal charges, the Japanese showed examples of what we called in my climbing days of being "Pysched out" and snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. US Grant might get "whooped" but he didn't skull off the battlefield as was the tradition. In the morning he was still there.

Midway was logistically unsupportable for the Japanese and was quite useful to the US, but not critical, much like Wake, could be left to rot.

Shortround6 · Jun 1, 2019

fliger747 said:
Midway was logistically unsupportable for the Japanese and was quite useful to the US, but not critical, much like Wake, could be left to rot.

Or used as target practice. The US built an a air strip on Tern Island at French Frigate shoals after Midway as an emergency field for planes flying between Midway and Hawaii. Perhaps another island could have held a larger airfield. The US has a much greater capability to mount attacks (ship bombardments and airstrikes) than the Japanese do to repair damage and resupply. Sort of a reverse Guadalcanal but with the US holding a lot more advantages.

The Basket · Jun 1, 2019

There are 2 battles top of my head where the IJN had advantage but didn't push.

Battle of Samar and Battle of Savo Island. But all in hindsight where we know every fact and decision.

Easy to be critical when we can see the cards.

Unless you could park a Japanese tank on the front lawn of the White House and dictate terms then all the battles of the Pacific were pointless.

The Basket · Jun 1, 2019

The Japanese learnt the wrong lessons from Tsushima and went for the big pot finish in the Mahan decisive battle winner takes all strategy which mirrored their own foibles.

Had they played it attrition warfare like when Lexington and Hornet were lost then they could have done so much more damage than sacrificing 4 carriers.

pinehilljoe · Jun 2, 2019

fliger747 said:
Back to Midway... The Japanese could probably have still taken the field as it were, the US carriers were not really much of a threat after the battle. Despite their tendency to make heroic almost suicidal charges, the Japanese showed examples of what we called in my climbing days of being "Pysched out" and snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. US Grant might get "whooped" but he didn't skull off the battlefield as was the tradition. In the morning he was still there.

Midway was logistically unsupportable for the Japanese and was quite useful to the US, but not critical, much like Wake, could be left to rot.

Even if Nagumo had won a Naval Victory, its questionable if the IJN could have taken Midway, it was heavily fortified, and the IJN had nothing comparing to the assault forces the USMC would have on later landings.

There are so many what ifs for Midway. One of the more plausible, what if Hornet's SBD squadrons had formed up and followed the Enterprise Group, the additional SBDs might have meant all 4 IJN carriers would have been sunk in the first strike.

Peter Gunn · Jun 3, 2019

I posted this in the P-38 "What if" thread about a dive bombing version of the Lightning, I repost it here to make myself feel important...

Shattered Sword actually supports Pinsog's contention (in that thread) that IJN AAA was not very good, in fact, the authors point out that flak only accounted for one SBD (maybe) out of all the attacking aircraft, all losses were to Zeros. It's just that the IJN did not have a very good AAA doctrine at the time, nor a cruising formation that would enhance AAA capability of the fleet. In fact, IJN doctrine at the time was using the ship's maneuverability to evade bombs and torpedoes, something that actually threw off firing solutions on attacking aircraft.

Also, the flak and fighters were NOT down low handling the TBD attacks when the Enterprise/Yorktown strike forces arrived, flak and fighters were aimed at the attacking force that put down the first three carriers. The timing of the attacks supports the fact that most of the TBD attacks were well and truly over when the kill force arrived.

Also, the authors make a good case that the Zero was NOT very good at handling high or low speed threats once the 20mm ammunition was expended, the two LMG's weren't a major threat to many US aircraft, especially heavy and fast medium bombers. Even the TBD was reasonably resilient v. the Zero's two LMGs.

USN AAA was pretty deadly even at this stage of the war, the USN had a defensive ring around Yorktown that literally shredded the Hiryus' attack force both times.

There are many myths surrounding the Battle of Midway, Shattered Sword puts all of them to rest with painstaking research of source documents. A must read.

Bad-Karma · Jun 3, 2019

Peter Gunn said:
As to your question on whether the Japanese were discounting the danger that this sighting meant based on the previous American attacks, you may very well be correct. There was much discussion at certain levels of the IJN regarding American doctrine, equipment and training and none of it was flattering. I think there was a certain element pervasive in the Japanese Navy at the time, that held American training, equipment etc. with more than just a little bit of contempt.

Part of that contempt that morning was probably being borne out by the uncoordinated and almost haphazard attacks that had been thrown at them by the Americans, not realizing that they were just that, haphazard. No B-26 crew had been trained to drop torpedoes, Henderson's boys were green as can be, no coordination between any of the incoming attackers etc. For all they knew, that was the best the U.S. had to throw at them, so perhaps there was a bit of feeling that even if the ten ships included carriers... so what? They may have figured they could deal with whatever TF 16 & 17 could throw at them, come out fine, and then deal a crushing blow on the American ships. Reading what some of the officers had to say leading up to Midway leaves no doubt to me they didn't think the U. S. was very good and that they were so much better than the Americans that the battle and the war was all but won.

I thought it significant that Yamamoto and his team thought they had to come up with a plan to coax the U.S.N. into a battle, never even dreaming that in fact, the U. S. Navy was SPOILING for a fight. Talk about totally misreading your opponent.

I doubt they realized what they were actually up against right up until 10:20 a.m.

Have not had a chance to watch the video yet but I thought the idea of the Japanese Navy holding the USN in contempt was fascinating. The USN was guilty of this in a lot of those early naval battles and it had catastrophic consequences. The loss at Midway by the IJN due to similar thinking would be equally devastating. Goes to show never to underestimate your enemy!

The Basket · Jun 3, 2019

If you look at the Naval aviation threat in the 1930s its wasn't that good and so slacking on AAA is forgivable. The TBD Devastator or Swordfish are good examples of this. The main issue was reliance on the 25mm which was at best average and at worst awful.

Good example is every major warship that came in for a refit always upgraded the flak at first opportunity.

The Zeros were out of position when the Dauntless appeared and this isnt the era of light the burners and climb.

pinsog · Jun 3, 2019

The Japanese didn't have radar, apparently there was at east some cloud cover, the US carrier SBD's came in at 19,000 feet. With no radar, having Zero's in a position to intercept on a day that had cloud cover at all would be nothing but luck. I believe every book I have read on the subject said the SBD's were not spotted until already in there dives.

As I recall, the same thing would have happened at Coral Sea, but the commander of the SBD's there wanted to wait until the US torpedo bombers were also attacking, so while he waited, he was spotted and the carriers began evasive action as the Zero's climbed up to intercept. The fortunes of war are definitely finicky. If he had struck immediately he should have disabled both Japanese carriers instead of one. The returning Japanese planes would have had no where to land and they would have lost ALL of their aircraft and would have been defenseless against follow up strikes by the Yorktown (which was also damaged and probably wouldn't have known the Japanese damage, and would probably left the battlefield anyway...who knows!!)

The Basket · Jun 3, 2019

The Royal Navy ran tests in the late 1930s which formulated that there was no defence of a carrier against a high altitude bombing attack.
If you saw the bomber you launch fighters to intercept and the bomber has been and gone well before the fighter has got at the same altitude and speed.

Radar changed this but not the outcome. USN carriers had better flak and better damage control and radar and still had losses.

Even Yamato in 1945 was desperately vulnerable to air attack.

Can you imagine Swordfish torpedo bombers at Midway? It would have been a feeding frenzy. The Zero pilots would have thought it was a dream come true. Look at the Devastator torpedo bomber losses. Getting on for 100% and no hits.
I'm sure the surviving torpedo crews would say Japanese naval airpower was plenty effective.

It could be the carriers were overwhelmed by constant air raids rather than poor doctrine choices.

GrauGeist · Jun 4, 2019

It was the IJN's poor doctrine that allowed the USN to get the upper hand during the battle.

Poor AAA training, poor fire containment procedure and the practice of keeping all carrier decks clear during battle for CAP ops (instead of alternating) only created a recipe for disaster.

The Basket · Jun 4, 2019

This is the same Kido Butai that sank battleships at Pearl Harbour. Sank Royal Navy warships off Sri Lanka and won at Coral Sea and Santa Cruz. Sank Lexington, Yorktown and Hornet and almost did Enterprise. So not a failure of doctrine as such.

Just a usual failure of bad luck, bad planning and getting trapped in an ambush and paying a high price for it.

Major, major weakness is lack of radar. They don't see the dive bombers and then only when they are in a dive. It's not like the loss of the Glorious where good old fashioned stupidity and incompetence were responsible for the loss.

USS Tennessee is a good example of dumb luck. Arizona next to it explodes and West Virginia gets all the Torpedoes. Gets hit by 2 armour piercing bombs that don't explode properly. 5 dead. Compared to 1, 177 on the Arizona.

taly01 · Jun 4, 2019

There are 2 battles top of my head where the IJN had advantage but didn't push.
Battle of Samar and Battle of Savo Island. But all in hindsight where we know every fact and decision.

The IJN was fixated on enemy warships rather than commerce. More on the great battle than attritional war, ironic as the loss of commerce ships caused major problems for the Japanese themselves.

The main issue was reliance on the 25mm which was at best average and at worst awful.

25mm is a compromise calibre even in aircraft it never found favor. Not effectively better than 20mm but less rounds and velocity. Even the USN gave up on its chosen 1.1" (28mm) AAA very early. How much Seamans AAA training and regular practice USN and IJN had would be something really interesting to know

GrauGeist · Jun 4, 2019

Let's keep in mind that the exalted Kido Butai of Pearl Harbor fame was never tested defensively during that battle. They laid off to the north of Oahu and sent in their airstrikes.

How would that have changed, historically, if the U.S. Carriers that were out to sea on 7 December, happened to come across them during the attack?

How would the IJN's task force handled attacks differently between Pearl Harbor and Midway? The answer is simple: there would not have been any difference...the legendary Kido Butai was not put to the true test until Midway and they fell like a house of cards under pressure.

Shortround6 · Jun 4, 2019

Things changed a lot in 4 years.
Pre-war and early war AA was laughable compared to late 1944-45 AA.
The Yamato traded two triple 6.1in gun turrets for six 5in twin AA guns. not to mention scores of 25mm guns being add.
Unfortunately for the Yamato the attacks by dozens of aircraft had been replaced by attacks by hundreds of aircraft.

American AA was ahead of the Japanese AA from the start and the gap just got wider.
The 5in/38 fired faster than the Japanese 5in/40 and the American ships, in general, carried much more ammo per barrel.
Peace time weapons development was often slow and deliberate. And automatic cannon are not easy to develop into mature reliable weapons.
Against aircraft many weapons that might have been effective against 100-200kt fabric covered biplanes were of little use against much faster, more rugged all metal (metal covered) monoplanes.
This was one of the US dive bombers during the mid/late 30s when the Japanese adopted the 25mm gun.

one 500lb bomb, one .30 cal gun in the cowl. top speed (without bomb?) 205mph at 8.900ft. Cruise was 122mph (?)

All navies seemed to fall down on the job (it took the US navy about 10 years to get the 1.1 gun and mount into production. Great as it might have been against 1929-1933 aircraft it was a bit lacking in 1939-43).

The Basket · Jun 4, 2019

It's hard to argue that the Japanese carriers were not vulnerable but most militaries get very complacent or criminally negligent in the good times. Navies are no different.

The Japanese carriers had suffered damage and losses in air attack such as Shoho and Shokaku before Midway so not new news. In my view the lessons either had no time to learn or they were to gung-ho to listen.

One point is the Doolittle raid may have forced the IJN hands to get at the carriers early doors regardless of cost.

PAT303 · Jun 5, 2019

The Japanese carriers did seem to have glass jaws when hit compared to Illustrious as an example, who took one 1000kg direct hit, 6 500kg direct hits plus a further 500kg near miss, and she then sailed into Grand Harbour under her own steam, she was one tough girl with a crew to match.

pinehilljoe · Jun 5, 2019

The USN had excellent damage control. IJN ships damaged as badly as Yorktown (CV5), Pittsburg, Franklin and the other Essexes around Okinawa, just didn't survive. I list CV-5, since she was on her way to being saved from the air attacks, until the submarine got her.

Intriguing Midway discussion - IJN Point of View

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