Is this Galland Memo Authentic? Because if it is...

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Oct 6, 2009
This can't be authentic. It can't be. It just can't.

Galland's plea for the immediate production of the Me-262 is well known...

But look at part 'b' in the Conclusion! In May 1943, Galland recommended total fighter production be converted over to the 213A Jumo powered FW-190-D9 and the DB-603 Ta-152C.

Galland seems to be saying, "End the Me-209 program immediately, the Messerschmitt product is not as good as the favoritism and political pull that is backing it AND stop screwing around with the Jumo 213A / DB 603 pissing-match and give us both right now.

But NO, the RLM dithered another year and a half!! What in-the-hell were they thinking??


Adolph Galland's report regarding the Me 262

Berlin, 25 May 1943​

Most esteemed Herr Generalfeldmarschall!

On Saturday, the 22nd of the month, I tested the ME 262 at Augsburg in the presence of Oberst Petersen and other persons from the Technical Office. I would have preferred to report personally to the Generalfeldmarschall and also elaborate on other matters, however I was so occupied after my visit to Sicily that there was simply no time. The Reichmarschall has ordered me to report today.

Concerning the Me 262, I beg to state the following:

1.) The aircraft represents an enormous leap forward, it would give us an unimaginable lead over the enemy if he adheres to the piston engine.
2.) In-flight handling of the airframe is impressive.
3.) The power plants are fully convincing, except during take-off and landing.
4.) The aircraft offers entirely new tactical prospects.

I beg to submit the following proposal: The Fw 190 D is under development, its performance should match the Me 209's in all respects. The performance of the two types, however, will not be superior to the enemy's models, particularly at altitude. The only progress seems to be in armament and higher speeds.

Conclusion: a) Me 209 be discontinued
b) Total fighter production to switch from the Fw 190 with BMW 801
to the Fw 190 with DB 603 and Jumo 213 respectively.

c) The construction and industrial capacities thus released to be
concentrated on the Me 262, with immediate effect.

I shall report immediately on my return.

Heil Hitler! Herr Generalfeldmarschall your most obedient servant.

It is consistent with the version presented in Me262 Vol I p108


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This is the German copy that you can see off to one side of the previous post, I'm sure one of our German members can verify it


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Adolf Hitler wanted to approve of the Me-262 project personally, and he wanted to know if the plane could carry bombs.
The designers said yes (- no one took the idea of the 262 carrying bombs seriously), and so Hitler wanted the Me-262 to be made into his dream plane, the "Blitz Bomber", as a supplement to the army in case of an Allied invasion.
Hermann Göring wanted Der Führer's full approval for starting production of the Me-262, and he couldn't get that, as Herr Hitler wanted the plane to be a bomber.

Unfortunately the Luftwaffe and Hermann Göring had disappointed Hitler a few times too often in the previous years before this, where Göring promised new technical innovations, designs and improvements, so Hitler was a tad sceptical about whether or not the Luftwaffe and Göring could be trusted with such an important and expensive project.
Hitler decided not to rush the Me-262 project, and nothing could be done before he alone had given his go-ahead, that was the way it was.

Hitler personally forbade that any of the designers and other personnel involved in the development of the Me-262 did any other thing than perform a few tests with a couple of prototypes, and that no prepaprations for mass production of the jet fighter whatsoever were allowed, unless Hitler himself ordered it.
This delayed the plane another six months, on top of the two-year delay that the project had already encountered since autumn 1940, when Hitler put the development of the Me-262 to a temporary halt.

Later, when the Me-262 finally went into production, Hitler visited the factory and asked Milch about how many bombs the plane could carry.
Milch answered truthfully that it couldn't carry any as it was a fighter aircraft, and then Hitler blew his top. Again, the accusations of Göring and the Luftwaffe not telling the truth and messing with Hitler flew through the air, and Milch was relieved of his post.
And Hitler's dislike and distrust of Göring and the Luftwaffe grew a tad more, to put it mildly.
Hitler then personally took over the control with the project and kept a close eye on production numbers, he even took each individual aircraft and allocated them personally, his distrust in the Luftwaffe had gotten that bad.

I can recommend that you get hold of a copy of Adolf Galland's book, "The First And The Last", either from a book store or from a library, as one of the chapters is fully dedicated to tell Galland's side of story of the development of the Me-262, or lack of same.
That particular chapter will give you a more detailed account of the Me-262 project and the reasons why it was so badly delayed.
Bad news for the Luftwaffe, good news for the Allies, I guess. ;)
It's amazing to see just how inept the promotion development of aircraft became in Germany during those years...

If the RLM had been a little better focused and Hitler stopped meddling in the affairs of development, they would have seen that in 1940, they had two jets available to them within a year...and both could have complimented each other:

The He280 as a fighter and the Me262 as a heavy fighter/interceptor

Fortunately for the Allies, this did not happen...but talk about an amazing opportunity lost.
Fw190D prototypes were tested with DB-603 engines as well as the Jumo, particularly as the full 213E version had protracted development, and this was happening alongside Ta152 development. Early Ta152C prototypes were fitted with 603G motors (later 603EB and EC when available) whilst at least three Fw190D prototypes were fitted with early 603AE motors prelimenary to plans of D-14 and D-15 production with 603LA and 603EB motors.
The DB-603 was essentially further along in development and the Jumo 213E/F supercharger was a never ending headache, I think by the time the 213A was available the 603 was already in the G version.

Galland was talking about Doras fitted with both 213A and F motors and 603EB and LA motors, which were all proposed Dora/engine variants (not Ta152C), respectively for low altitude and high altitude performance (ie. 213A/603EB low and 213F/603LA high), all these types were due for production, all running on B4 fuel with MW50 (the 603EB put out something like 2300hp and was roughly en par with an R-2800 or Napier Sabre).

By late 1944 it was proposed that production of Jumo engine Doras would be halted in favour of later variants fitted with the DB-603 and these would supplement Ta152C and H production. By early 1945 it was proposed the Ta152H would also switch over from Jumo to DB-603 motor.

The pissing match between 213 and 603 can really best be characterised by their development. Following figures are all without the use of MW50 or any boosting system. Off the top of my head, the 213A (1943), E (1944) and F (1945) all retained around 1780PS Start u-noltleistung at sea level whilst the 603A (1942) was 1750PS, the 603G (1943) was 1900PS and the 603EC (1944) was 2100PS. The 603L/LA and EB around somewhere around the 2000PS mark.
I believe the RLM had been expecting around 1900PS from the 213E Start u-notleistung, but it just didn't do it. They weren't also expecting the 603 two stage performance to be quite so superior between 7-10km alt, although Kurt Tank had predicted this back in 1942.

The two ways to get really good high altitude performance is cubic inches and multiple stages or a very complicated supercharger and multiple stages. I think it's like the popular saying in motorsport, you can't beat cubic inches. The good thing about the Jumo though is that whilst its supercharger is troublesome the block itself is super strong and can handle WEP outputs for an easy ten minutes, this was done in service without failures. The castings are so thick it just takes ages to overheat it and it doesn't warp easy even when you do (so it doesn't blow seals). The Jumo is like a big block casting with small block internal dimensions, whilst the Daimler is a big block with big cylinders and big everything (the 603A supercharger was used to produce the 605AS high altitude motor for the Me-109G-6/AS special interceptor because the blower is so damn big).

So whether to be fitting Doras with Jumos or Daimlers was still hot talk in 1943 and the controversy never really died down. Meanwhile the Me209 was really stillborn anyway, the Messer needed more than some minor aerodynamic improvements and had to be redesigned for the 603 (Me309) yet this takes away all the benefits of the initial proposal which was to make use of existing production facitilities (which the Dora did do, being based on A-6/8/9 airframe production lines).

The only fix Messerschmitt proposed was to have high parts commonality between the Me309 and Me262, the Me309 used the cockpit, gear and tailplane of the Me262, used a ducted and retractable rear radiator mounting, proposed the then current 603G motor and had a zerstörer armament in common with the Ta152C. Some have said the disappointing performance of the prototype with the 603G fitted caused the idea to be dropped but I don't believe this to be the case. If this was the only issue then the 603EB available in mid44 or the 1945 603LA definitely solved it. I think it was the fact that it cannibalised Me262 production and new tooling jigs for the central airframe and wings would have to be made which killed it.
The Me309 was still more complicated to place into production than the Fw190D-series (regardless of engine fitted) for no appreciable gain in performance compared to a D-15 or Ta152C. Plus the Focke Wulfs cannibalised older model production (190A) rather than newer models (Me262).
The Me209 was just plain out of contention by 1943 I think, I don't think anyone intimately associated with German fighter development at the time seriously thought the DB-605 engine was going much further. You might say that project sort of defaulted to the Me109K and even that was just the final attempt to make use of existing Me109 production facilities because of the war climate.

Still you never know with people like Hitler, he might just turn around and demand the Me209 enter production when you've got an airfield of Ta152 and Fw190D prototypes, saying WTF Fuchsie, are you mad? I mean the whole let's make a schnellbomber jet thing was what, the little Corporal is a pilot now? I'm honestly surprised Galland didn't shoot him with his service pistol as it is.
Galland certainly wanted the 262 earlier. The engines weren't ready for production until 1944, though.

As to Hitler's role, he first asked about bombs when inspecting prototypes in November 1943. He was told the 262 could carry bombs. Development work continued on the fighter version and nobody paid any attention to fitting bombs to the 262.

Hitler's interference didn't begin until 23 May 1944. He asked how many of the 50 or so Me 262's produced could carry bombs. He was told none, and that no work had been done in fitting bombs. It was at that point they began work on fitting bombs to the the 262. That didn't halt fighter production, but it did of course divert some production to the fighter-bomber version.

The net result is that the small number of fighter-bomber 262s operating in autumn 1944 could instead have been fighters. The 262 was extremely unreliable at this point, though, and the fighter versions were not exactly achieving much, so the end result on the course of the war of a few more fighter 262s would have been negligible.
I agree more or less with Hop. IIRC the latest articles on Me 262 which I have read, the effect of Hitler's dictate on 23 May 44 was a bit greater during the summer 44 but otherwise I agree. Kommando Novotny showed in late 44 that Me 262 and fighter tactics used with it weren't yet mature enough for combat deployment.

And OKL didn't see need to jet in 41 and 42, which wasn't surprising, most of JGs being operating from primitive strips in Soviet Union and in North Africa, not the places for jets with underwing jet engines. At the Channel front the two JGs assigned there doing very well against RAF and abilities of USAAFwere badly underestimated.

For the Me 262 story, there are much better sources around than old memoirs of Galland.

Galland certainly wanted the 262 earlier. The engines weren't ready for production until 1944, though.
The real issue is that Germany decided to forego production of the Jumo 004A jet engine during 1943 due to a shortage of chromium and nickel. Reversing this decision would require cancellation of some other program that uses a lot of these raw materials.
For the Me 262 story, there are much better sources around than old memoirs of Galland
I think that pretty much goes without saying
the theme of the thread wasn't so much concerned with 'the 262 story' as it was with an 'old memoir of Galland' however :)
If I'm not mistaken, the FW-190C prototype (V13) with the DB 603A was flying in mid-1942 and the D-0 with the
Jumo 213A was flying in October, 1942. 1942!

A precious year goes by....

On May 25th, 1943, Galland issues this memo and several days later Milch orders the Me-262 into series production.
BUT, Milch and everyone else ignores the more immediate issue of canceling the Me-209 in favor of the Jumo/DB powered 190's.

Over a freakin' year goes by and finally the D-9 is ordered into series production...

But by then it's too late, way too late... I'm utterly amazed by this sequence of events.

Hello Bronc
I wonder why you are so surprised. First Tempest proto flew IIRC early Sept 42 and first production Tempests went to operational sqns mid-Spring 44. They made prototypes just to get a/c right before beginning of series production, and that final tuning of design usually took its time. And IIRC Willy fought hard to preserve Me 209 in production plans, even used his high placed connections to that purpose.

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The key issue is engine production. How many DB603 and Jumo213 engines were produced during 1943? I suspect not nearly enough to power all the new Fw-190, Me-410, Ju-88 and Do-217 aircraft designs.
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Aircraft Division Industry Report
I count about 2,300 DB603 engines produced during 1943.

WWII German Aircraft Production During 1943. These aircraft would benefit from the use of DB603 engines if enough had been available.
German aircraft production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
504 x Do-217 bombers. 2 engines each.
157 x Do-217 night fighters. 2 engines each.
2,171 x Fw-190 fighters.
11 x He-219 night fighters. 2 engines each.
271 x Me-410 light bombers. 2 engines each.
20 x Me-410 recon aircraft. 2 engines each.
706 x Ju-88 night fighters. 2 engines each.
394 x Ju-88 recon aircraft. 2 engines each.
2,160 x Ju-88 bombers. 2 engines each.
165 x Ju-188 bombers. 2 engines each.
105 x Ju-188 recon aircraft. 2 engines each.
415 x He-177 bombers. These would have been produced as the 4 engine He-277
The RLM / Luftwaffe needed a Fred Trapnell kinda guy--big time needed--a Fred Trapnell.

( From Wikipedia-)

"Frederick Mackay "Fred" Trapnell (July 9, 1902 - January 30, 1975) Trapnell was considered the best, most experienced naval test aviator of his generation..."

"So respected was Trapnell's knowledge and ability that, in 1942, he was personally requested by Roy Grumman to evaluate the new Grumman F6F Hellcat, the Navy's answer to the lethal Japanese Zero. Circumventing the usual testing procedures, Grumman had Trapnell take the fighter on a crash program. "He came to the factory and flew the prototype F6F. It suited him, as I remember, except for the longitudinal stability — he wanted more of that. We built it in and rushed into production without a Navy certificate on the model. We relied on Trapnell's opinion. His test flight took less than three hours. I'm not sure we ever got an official OK on the Hellcat design."[2] Trapnell would later gain valuable knowledge of what the Hellcat and its predecessor, the Wildcat, were up against after performing extensive tests in a captured Zero recovered from a crash that same year. Trapnell's unit continued to test a host of American and British aircraft and was responsible for many innovations. Following Trapnell's recommendations after months of testing, engineers at Vought Aviation extensively redesigned a new fighter already under development, the famous F4U Corsair. Of the F7F Tigercat, Trapnell is reputed to have exclaimed: "It's the best damn fighter I've every flown."[4]"

I've read that after months of delay in a "normal" flight testing program, Trapnell cut through all the bull in the F7F prototype with just one flight. He landed, asked for a list of specific changes, signed off on series production subject to those changes, and flew away in the F7F.

With the assistance of his flight test staff, one (1) man named Fred Trapnell was allowed to (had the absolute authority) to make prompt, critical decisions on the F6F, F4U and F7F and look at the results.

Hello Bronc
F4U Corsair, IIRC first flight May 40, first combat deploymement early 43, so it simply took time to get a/c from proto stage to combat employment.

Hello Davebender
at least there was lack of DB 603s in 1943, many factory-fresh Do 217s were enginelessly waiting for their engines.

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A bit more
One must remember that Tank didn't have very high regard on Jumo 213, which he saw as a bomber engine. He probably would have preferred the DB 603 engined 190C over the 190D but as Dave and I wrote 603 was on short supply even without 190C production. Tank also saw 190C/D as a stop-gap before the definite Ta 152/153.

Also 190D-9 wasn't the first D project, D-2/-3 high altitude fighter with pressurized cockpit was the first development, only after it was abandoned focus moved to D-9. IIRC at least one, maybe two D protos was/were destroyed in crashes and the two D-9 protos were damaged in USAAF bombing, one seriously, All these factors slowed down development.

I suspect that a shortage of DB603 engines was the primary reason for ending the Do-217 and Me-410 programs. Otherwise these excellent aircraft would have remained in production through the end of the war.
Hello Dave
I doubt that. Bomber production was anyway run down from say August 44 onwards. And I'd not call Me 410 as excellent, competent maybe. Do 217 was good/very good when E subtype emerged in later part of 41 but while being rather fast and having good bomb carrying capacity it was underarmed as medium day bomber if compared a bit later B-26B Marauder or later B-25 Mitchells. As Dieppe showed, it could not operate as a daybomber in NW Europe without very heavy losses. Probably its undercarriage could not cope well enough in East, at least Do 217J night fighters had problems with that in the East.

So IMHO Mustang's arrival ended Me 410's role as Zerströrer and as high speed bomber or as recon plane it could do nothing what Ju88S or T couldn't. Also as night bomber or night recon plane Do 217M didn't have any significant advance over Ju 88/188 so it was only logical to discontinue Me 410 and Do 217 production and produce more Ju 88s/188s, especially because of in any case Ju 88G production continued.

Hello Milosh
an excellent link; thanks a lot!


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