We have a long thread about this, the most important part of a plane is it's pilot, planes can be replaced, experienced pilots cannot and the lack of protection gave the Japanese aircraft long range and good low speed agility but at the cost of everything that made a warplane a warplane. The IJN had some of the most skilled pilots in the air in 1942 but once that top tier was lost the quality was lost with it. As for the endurance, A6M pilots prefered the 20mm cannons and would land as soon as possible once it was expended, as mentioned it in Shattered Sword the carrier decks were kept clear so the CAP fighters could be re-armed as required so having the endurance to fly around and around watching surface ships fire in the direction of incoming attacks to then only have about 10 seconds worth of ammunition for your primary weapons once you engage is not really a war winning strategy. The A6M could have had pilot armor and armoured tanks, even alloy double skin armour like the RAF fighters to protect it's pilot while still having a performance advantage over the F4F.
Jack vs. Tojo - Which was better? Why?
- Thread starter Conslaw
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Maybe...but bear in mind, adding those items entails more weight gain than just the added weight of the items themselves. According to his book, Horikoshi and company lightened the airframe to the point it was already stretching minimum safe strength standards at its original design weight. Any increase in weight would require additional structural weight, and the A6M was still at a power disadvantage vs the F4F-4. Also, protecting the fuel tanks both increases weight and reduces capacity. The A6M2 sat atop a very narrow peak of efficiency, which history shows, dropped dramatically when any of its basic parameters were tampered with.
Which is why I have never rated it, Saburō Sakai is quoted as saying ''no one takes an aerobatics plane to war" when describing the A6M, your response mirrors that.
Reluctant Poster
Staff Sergeant
- 1,466
- Dec 6, 2006
I agree that pilots are hard to replace, and that the Japanese lost a lot of aircrew in 1942. That being said it wasn't the Zero pilots taking the heavy losses, it was the bomber crews. I would agree that the bombers should have been better protected as they had to absorb punishment in order to successfully complete their missions. As I have pointed out in past posts the USN claims for Zeros shot down was greatly exaggerated. The losses suffered were not so significant that a decent training program couldn't have made up the losses, which was the real issue. USN aircrew losses in 1942 were very high as well. The life expectancy of a torpedo bomber crew was basically 1 mission. The difference was that the Americans were training their replacements. The other advantage the American had was their emphasis on air sea rescue. A Japanese pilot who was lost on a strike mission was lost forever, whereas the USN tried to rescue as many as possible. As an example, at Midway, of the 10 pilots from VF-8 that had to ditch 7 were rescued and lived to fight another day.
According to Lundstrom the Japanese lost 3 AM97 and 13 Zero pilots in air-to-air combat with F4F in 1942 up to and including Miday. The USN lost 7 F4F pilots to Zeros. Some of those Zero pilots could have been rescued. How many of those pilots would have been saved by self-sealing tanks or armor? Plenty of pilots on both sides died after ditching or bailing out. Regardless, the 9 extra dead pilots that may or may not have been saved by better protection is irrelevant in the overall scheme of things. I don't have the numbers, but I would wager the Japanese lost more Zero pilots when their ships were bombed than in the air-to-air combat. I would also wager that they lost more Zero pilots in training.
In any event the real problem wasn't its performance advantage over the F4F, it was the need to climb fast enough to intercept bombers. USN action reports are chock full of complaints about the F4Fs being unable to climb fast enough to intercept before the bombers attacked. Naval fighters had two main roles in 1942 (fighter bombers weren't a thing at that time in naval warfare,) destroying enemy bombers before they could hit your ships and protecting your bombers from being destroyed so that they could sink the enemy. Fighters playing knights of the air jousting with one another was very romantic, but it isn't the real business of war. Fighters existed because bombers existed.
The Japanese were limited in aircraft design due to their lack of powerful engines. They had to make compromises in design and the case can be made that they made the right choices for the Zero. In addition to their fast rate of climb which would have been tremendous advantage in defense if they were properly directed, their long range and great endurance was a big advantage in strike missions.
Reluctant Poster
Staff Sergeant
- 1,466
- Dec 6, 2006
I tried to pick the best numbers for both aircraft. If you have better data feel free to correct the table.
Greg Boeser
1st Sergeant
Both the USN and USMC used F4Fs as fighter bombers in the early days of the war. VMF 211 sank a destroyer and damaged several other ships repelling the first attack on Wake Island. Bomb laden fighters were also used during the early carrier raids against the Marshall Islands, as well as against the Japanese landings at Lea and Salamaua.
These tactics were dropped when it became obvious that there were not enough shipboard fighters to accomplish all the tasks imagined.
These tactics were dropped when it became obvious that there were not enough shipboard fighters to accomplish all the tasks imagined.
Reluctant Poster
Staff Sergeant
- 1,466
- Dec 6, 2006
i stand corrected.
Shortround6
Major General
The bomb laden F4Fs at that stage in the war were using a pair of 100lb bombs.
The pre-theory was that the bomb laden fighters would be used for AA suppression against the big ships before the dive bombers and torpedo bombers got there.
We all know how well plans worked out when in contact with the enemy
I Believe (but could very well be wrong) that there was an element of luck with VMF 211 sank the Japanese destroyer.
Reports differ. Hit on the stern into the depth charge racks which exploded or a hit closer to midships which also resulted in an explosion.
Destroyers have a large amount of ammo stored in different places and the boiler rooms which take up a lot of space.
Without the 100lbs the chances of a secondary explosion are very slight. But the 100lb bombs need a secondary explosion to sink even a ship of this size.
Tactics changed fairly soon. F4Fs that were trying to bomb/strafe ships weren't in a good position to hold off Zeros. F4Fs didn't need the drag of the even the small bombs.
Greg Boeser
1st Sergeant
Agreed. Which is why by Coral Sea the idea had been abandoned.
The Wake Island defense was a case of "this is the best we can do." Kisaragi sank after fires set off a secondary explosion. What exactly happened will never be known as there were no survivors.
The USN pilots were highly critical of fighters carrying bombs after Lea/Salamaua because the damage potential of the bombs (30 lb. frags) was considered not worth the decrease in performance.
The Wake Island defense was a case of "this is the best we can do." Kisaragi sank after fires set off a secondary explosion. What exactly happened will never be known as there were no survivors.
The USN pilots were highly critical of fighters carrying bombs after Lea/Salamaua because the damage potential of the bombs (30 lb. frags) was considered not worth the decrease in performance.
Both the British and American forces went to great lengths to save their pilots, knowing that not only is your aircraft giving you protection against enemy fire as well as having air sea rescue forces looking for you if you are shot down would have an enormous effect on you as a pilot both mentally and physically, RAF pilots all looked upon "stuffy'' Dowding with great affection because of his personal intervention regarding armored windscreens and rear pilot armor, in the Pacific didn't one commander order all his ships to turn their spot lights on so returning pilots could find the fleet in the dark?, men would follow those commanders to hell and back, the Japanese pilots on the other hand knew if they went down no one was coming for them. The Allies used a holistic approach to fighting the war, and the results show the effect of that.
Greg Boeser
1st Sergeant
Not only was no-one coming for you, if you did somehow make it back to friendly lines, you could find yourself unwelcome, as it was a huge loss of face for a commander to have to rescind a "posthumous" promotion.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The Germans put a great deal of effort into rescuing downed pilots, too.
The Seenotdienst program also included rescue bouys in the channel (often referred to as "lobster pots").
The Seenotdienst program also included rescue bouys in the channel (often referred to as "lobster pots").
After the Battle of France the pilots of JG26 demanded that armor is to be fitted to their 109's before they fought over the channel.
Snautzer01
Honourably banned
- 40,187
- Mar 26, 2007
Luftwaffe Airfield equipment
Nice pics paul. Not sure, but the one of the He111 might be at Aalborg, Denmark. Wonder what the ceremony in the hangar is? Very interesting shot of some formal occassion. Thanks Terry, Hopfully they will help for some one making a Diarama.
ww2aircraft.net
As usual it was not so black and white, e.g. after sinking of Shoho the surviving 3 CAP Zeros flew to Deboyne atoll and ditched there because it was arranged that an IJN DD would go there later to check out if there are any survivors and the pilots were rescued.
AerialTorpedoDude69
Airman 1st Class
- 150
- Mar 1, 2022
You are right and I've over simplified. My basic, low-level understanding of the mechanics isn't great, but Japanese aircraft that were equipped with manuevering flaps always deployed them during landing but I do not think they used them always on take-off. My point was that stall speed is a good-enough proxy for comparing the take-off and landing characteristics of two aircraft. Is the Tojo better suited than the Raiden for carrier operations? Probably, given the comparison in stall speeds (which as you rightfully pointed out, might not have translated well).We really do have to be careful we are comparing the same things. Especially with translations from other languages.
Stall speeds are often quoted at different weights (full load, mean weight or light)
but the next step up is often called different things like landing speed or alighting speed .
Which is different from approach speed.
Looking at the reports for the Hurricane I prototype we can find
Stalling speed (weigh not given unless full weight) but with flaps open
Stalling speed with flaps shut (notice not up or down
Landing speed.
Gliding speed.
You can find other ones.Hurricane K-5083 Trials Report
WWII Aircraft Performance, wartime flight trials and reports of Hurricane aircraft. Hurricane data.www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org
Stall speed is exactly that, the plane stalls (stops flying and drops quickly) and is dependent on weight/wing loading and flaps.
there is sometimes a suggested landing or alighting speed ( just enough extra above stall to allow for control with a margin of error but not so high that the landing run is excessive.
Landing speed is variable as it may be a somewhat declining speed. You want to cross the fence or threshold with more speed than you touch at so that you don't run out of airspeed too soon.
Sometimes you have to guess as to what is meant.
And sometimes landing stall speed is not the same as take-off stall (different flap settings) and if you drop the flaps too much for take-off the increased drag increases you take-off roll.
I appreciate your commentary and quantitative analysis (and am frankly surprised that anyone agreed with me on this point). By the way, the first dedicated Japanese recon aircraft was the Suisei Type C/Judy, which was first fielded at Midway, ironically. In other words, an aircraft that might have freed up Japanese fighters and bombers from recon duty was available, they just weren't available in large numbers.
I think another failing of the Zero was its 100-round drum with low velocity 20mm. They just didn't have the staying power or range to reliably take down wave after wave of bomber, as (I think) you pointed out earlier. The Tojo's quad 12.7mm would have probably been more effective for breaking up bombing runs at a distance, even though the Japanese 12.7 had shorter range compared to the M2. And while the Tojo's climb to 20k was only a couple minutes better, that might have made the difference between a carrier getting flattened and it escaping with just minor damage.
I've heard the claim that (low level) torpedo bombers were instrumental to success at Midway. But IMO this seems like postwar propaganda which tried to paint what was essentially a suicide mission in a more favorable light. From what I can tell, Torpedo bombers were only great when the ships weren't well defended. Otherwise they tended to be little more than kamikazes flying into a steel maw fanged by large caliber tracers and clouds of flak. As you've mentioned before, 200% agree that a fast climbing interceptor would have been useful during Midway.
Torpedo bombers seemed to have done badly even against the most rudimentary of defenses. While Avengers were able to absolutely crush shipping, they didn't seem to perform as spectacularly when faced against CAP and capital ships. And the Avenger is probably one of the best torpedo bombers of the war. If the real threat to carriers were dive bombers, then rate of climb seems to have been the most important performance stat for interceptors.
Shortround6
Major General
The Early Zeros only had 60 rounds of ammo.
The problem with the Army 12.7 guns is that ran out of ammo fairly quickly also. Nowhere near what the 20mm cannon did but the Japanese Army pretty much standardiezed on 250rpg for the 12.7mm. no real reason they could not have used more except for weight.
Wing guns were supposed to fire at around 900rpm or 15 rounds per second so you have around 16-17 seconds of firing time. Cowl guns a lot longer but the rate of fire is low.
Problem is you need to get a lot more hits to shoot down the dive/torpedo bombers.
The Japanese 12.7mm gun had less range because it used a lighter, slower bullet.
The Japanese HE 12.7mm bullet held about 0.8 grams of HE, the Japanese Navy 20mm guns used shells with 10 grams of HE.
The Japanese 12.7mm non HE bullet had around 60% of the force of an American .50 cal bullet.
The idea that any fighter could "stand off" and use their guns at long range (or longer than the defensive guns would work) was popular but rather misguided. One of the main limits of accuracy in air to air firing was the time of flight. We don't have good information on the Japanese weapons but the German 7.9mm and 13 mm ammo had times of flight that were only 0.06 seconds apart at 600 meters at sea level (and the 7.9mm was faster). the time was about 1.2 seconds and a 200mph airplane could move about 360ft in 1.2 seconds so you have to be aiming quite a bit ahead at 600 meters or wait to get closer. Firing at long range uses a lot more ammo.
For the American rear gunners a pair of 1200rpm (2400rpm total) .30 cal guns might have been more effective than a single 800rpm .50 cal. They were also easier to aim.
3 pilots rescued out of how many?, have you looked into what happened to the survivors of the Kutai Butai after they returned to Japan?.
It was the grievous injuries sustained by the Luftwaffe bomber crews that resulted in armor being fitted to them.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I'm outside so I can't check my battered copy of Shattered Sword. I believe the book points out that most of the aircrews were picked up. The heavy blow was the loss of the plane handling crews. That was the irreplaceable loss of experience.
