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Japanese were not taking the advantages of their 2-engined fighters as much as it was the case for the Western types. Neither Ki-45 nor J1N were adopted to carry some meaningful bomb load like it was the case with Bf 110 or P-38.
Compare the Ki-45 to the Bf 110C. The Ki-45 had two 12.7mm mgs to the 110s four 7.9 guns. Germans did stuff 1000rpg in which was a little excessive. Germans were using the MG/FFM cannon like the ones in the Zero, JAAF didn't have them. They used a heavy 20mm gun that was rather slow firing.
From an aircraft designer point of view they put in close to the weight of armament that the 110 used (perhaps a little light on ammo). The guns chosen were not as effective as wanted but that is the Armies problem. They are the ones providing the guns.
The Ki-45 was finally provided with a pair of 250kg bombs, but the 110 only got to carry a pair of 250kg bombs with the C-4/B version which got DB 601N engines, The C-7 got the pair of 500kg bombs but got a stronger undercarriage. As the engines were upgraded in power the 110F came into service with DB 610Fs. Wing racks were into introduced for small bombs.
with the 110G and the DB 605 engines you could put some big bombs on the 110. Meanwhile the Ki-45 was stuck with same Ha-102 engine it had stared it's service life with in early 1942. granted this was a significate improvement over the 9 cylinder scaled down Mercury engines it started with.
The Army tells the aircraft maker what guns they want, not the other way around. For some strange reason the Japanese Army and the Navy hardly ever (if ever) agreed on guns.Army was also specifying the guns? The MG FFM was firing at higher MV than the FF or the early Zero's cannons. For resons that I'm not aware, seems like Ki-45 was without drop tanks??
I'd like to point out again to what Zero was doing on one engine, and compare it with what Ki-45 was doing on two engines of comparable power. Army could've specified a Zero-sized fighter instead of a twin, powered by Kinsei or Ha-41( or a tad bigger fighter powered by Kasei), to cover the long-range job while sporting at least 4 HMGs. These engines were in series production in 1941.
True but the C-7 had the 1270hp engines and a beefed up landing gear to handle the weight.Petrick and Mankau note up to 2 x 1000 kg bombs already for the 110C-7, and wing drop tanks. The Ki-45 can't compete with the 110 in the payload department.
Very true. But the very nice 1500hp engines don't show up until 1943/44Japanese bigger and better engines that might've fit on the Ki-45, like Kinsei or Ha-41, were the types sorely needed for the Zeros and Ki-43s.
Agreed. I would also add that the 19 to 1 claim to loss ratio includes ALL Japanese aircraft. The F6F certainly didn't shoot down 5100 Zeros.You're right but it's still been well established that those numbers are CLAIMS and the actual kill ratio between the F6F and A6M will never be known as with other aircraft that dominated the Zero
It didn't ?????The F6F certainly didn't shoot done 5100 Zeros.
The point is that Pearl Harbor was completely unprepared which was the key to the Japanese success. The brain trust at US high command did a whole lot of nothing to put Pearl Harbor on alert. They did not even put the Philippines on a war footing until after the Pearl harbor raid. As for MacArthur, he knew of the Japanese attack on Pearl harbor before the Japanese had even taken off to attack. He had 9 hours to react in some way.I have to disagree. The US high command weren't fools. They fully expected a war.
To be fair, in 1941 almost everyone on the planet knew war between Japan and the US was imminent, but the expected attack was in the Philippines, not Hawaii. The US even had early warning that an attack was happening but chose to ignore it.
However, even when the US was expecting an attack, thanks to MacArthur, they were not able to adequately defend against the Japanese air raids. MacArthur's micromanagement and poor leadership methods lead to a command chain that was in disarray. They had ignored the radar reports of incoming Japanese strikes and then lost almost all of their air force on the ground. Had MacArthur not been in charge, it's likely they would have held the Philippines for much longer. Perhaps they may have prevented the brutal Japanese occupation? They did have hundreds of aircraft and a numerically larger ground force than the Japanese had.
EDIT: Getting back to the original discussion: Jack vs. Tojo, I did some more reading and the Zero's designer explained why the Japanese favored light-engined aircraft: they were cheaper. There's one big consideration that we haven't been taking into account in this discussion. The Tojo was less expensive to manufacture and develop, compared to the Raiden, which explains the production differences. Based on the evidence, I've got to say that the Tojo's ease of construction (which was incorporated into the Frank) and cheap maintenance is likely what made it a better choice for mass production compared to the Jack. The Jack was just too advanced and too costly to be a reliable field interceptor.
Lundstrom lists the Marine F4Fs claims at 170.5 with an estimated actual score of 61. The USN was overclaiming by a factor of around 2 while the Marines were a little more enthusiastic at closer to 3.The Wildcat was not bad in the Solomons. As with any plane, it boils down to how technology, tactics, and doctrine interact.
Lundstrom lists the Marine F4Fs claims at 170.5 with an estimated actual score of 61. The USN was overclaiming by a factor of around 2 while the Marines were a little more enthusiastic at closer to 3.
Lundstrom doesn't summarize Marine F4F losses however the USN Publication "View attachment 696027" lists 75 F4Fs lost in air-to-air combat in WWII. The majority of these would have been lost on Guadalcanal as the last Marine F4F combat mission was flown on April 7, 1943. The Marines did lose 2 F4Fs at Midway. It would appear that the again the Zero held a slight advantage although some of the F4F s may have been lost to bombers. From what I have been able the glean the death rate for the Zero pilots was higher. I was going through the individual combat reports in Lundstrom's book but haven't completed the task.
It should be pointed out that the F4Fs on Guadalcanal held a significant home field advantage. The Zeros were land based and were flying long distance missions that no other single engine fighter could accomplish at that time. In this case the Americans had a tremendous advantage in having an airfield to return to in an emergency. Any damaged Zero had a long way to go to get to safety. A badly damaged Zero either ditched or the pilot bailed out. In addition, the American had an excellent early warning systems in the form of the coast watchers as well as radar which negated the F4Fs very poor climb. The home base also helped the F4F with its short endurance.
I was just making a point about the Japanese Aces being able to mix it with superior aircraft in the Zero, unfortunately they were the only ones..Agreed. I would also add that the 19 to 1 claim to loss ratio includes ALL Japanese aircraft. The F6F certainly didn't shoot down 5100 Zeros.
I have to disagree. The US high command weren't fools. They fully expected a war.
To be fair, in 1941 almost everyone on the planet knew war between Japan and the US was imminent, but the expected attack was in the Philippines, not Hawaii. The US even had early warning that an attack was happening but chose to ignore it.
However, even when the US was expecting an attack, thanks to MacArthur, they were not able to adequately defend against the Japanese air raids. MacArthur's micromanagement and poor leadership methods lead to a command chain that was in disarray. They had ignored the radar reports of incoming Japanese strikes and then lost almost all of their air force on the ground. Had MacArthur not been in charge, it's likely they would have held the Philippines for much longer. Perhaps they may have prevented the brutal Japanese occupation? They did have hundreds of aircraft and a numerically larger ground force than the Japanese had.
EDIT: Getting back to the original discussion: Jack vs. Tojo, I did some more reading and the Zero's designer explained why the Japanese favored light-engined aircraft: they were cheaper. There's one big consideration that we haven't been taking into account in this discussion. The Tojo was less expensive to manufacture and develop, compared to the Raiden, which explains the production differences. Based on the evidence, I've got to say that the Tojo's ease of construction (which was incorporated into the Frank) and cheap maintenance is likely what made it a better choice for mass production compared to the Jack. The Jack was just too advanced and too costly to be a reliable field interceptor.
Great point. From the perspective of the strategy that US decision makers pursued, the P-51 offered the Allies a far better cost-to-performance ratio than the P-47, even as remarkable an engineering feat as the P-47 was. I think the P-47 per-mission-loss rate was similar to the Hellcat, which was astoundingly low, but it cost double that of the P-51. I wouldn't put a price on human life so I won't factor in the cost of training a pilot, but if the loss rate was about equal to a P-51, I'd say the P-51 was a more effective aircraft. Would I rather fly a P-51? No way, I'd take the Jug ANY DAY over the 'stang. But in terms of the importance to the war effort, the war planners would probably take the P-51 over the P-47.Too advanced and too costly?
Think is was more advanced and more costly than one of the most effective fighters of the war, the P-47, which had a complex turbo-supercharger system and remained one of the most effective fighters produced by anyone during the war?
And that's probably why there were 2.5 times more Ki-44 aircraft made than the J2M.
The simplest, though not the only, explanation for the greater number og Ki-44's, is that it was earlier, being in production before Pearl Harbour and entering (limited) service shortly after. The J2M was at least a year behind, and then the innovative features caused teething troubles.
If reason also dictates that there is no N1K1-J but instead the navy adopts the Ki-84 as land based fighter, we may give the job of designing it to Kavanishi.
While I'm at it, drop the Ki-61 and have Kawasaki fokus on getting the Ki-96/ Ki-102 into production as early as possible, so we can bash them instead of the poor Ki-45. Though with two engines, we should get a better bomber destroyer than the A6M, with more range than the Ki-44, and a neat ground attack option available.
The irony of the P-47 is that the role it is most notable for is ground attack in which the turbocharger was an unnecessary expense and in fact added weight. A Corsair optimized for a land-based role would have been less expensive and in view of the much, much lower take off distance would have required less airfield preparation and without the complexity of the turbocharger maintenance would have been simpler.Too advanced and too costly?
Think is was more advanced and more costly than one of the most effective fighters of the war, the P-47, which had a complex turbo-supercharger system and remained one of the most effective fighters produced by anyone during the war?
War is very much about putting a price on human life. Generals make those kinds of decisions all the time.Great point. From the perspective of the strategy that US decision makers pursued, the P-51 offered the Allies a far better cost-to-performance ratio than the P-47, even as remarkable an engineering feat as the P-47 was. I think the P-47 per-mission-loss rate was similar to the Hellcat, which was astoundingly low, but it cost double that of the P-51. I wouldn't put a price on human life so I won't factor in the cost of training a pilot, but if the loss rate was about equal to a P-51, I'd say the P-51 was a more effective aircraft. Would I rather fly a P-51? No way, I'd take the Jug ANY DAY over the 'stang. But in terms of the importance to the war effort, the war planners would probably take the P-51 over the P-47.
And that's probably why there were 2.5 times more Ki-44 aircraft made than the J2M.
It would be interesting to speculate on how Midway would turned out if the Japanese had the equivalent of USN radar and fighter direction.Right: how technology, tactics, and doctrine interact.
Unless you can compare the documented maintenance requirements for both aircraft, that's just a guessA Corsair optimized for a land-based role would have been less expensive and in view of the much, much lower take off distance would have required less airfield preparation and without the complexity of the turbocharger maintenance would have been simpler.
The irony of the P-47 is that the role it is most notable for is ground attack in which the turbocharger was an unnecessary expense and in fact added weight. A Corsair optimized for a land-based role would have been less expensive and in view of the much, much lower take off distance would have required less airfield preparation and without the complexity of the turbocharger maintenance would have been simpler.