Japanese Radar-Equipped Bombers

[Conslaw]

I stumbled across a page at combinedfleet.com describing a combined Japanese Army and Japanese Navy night raid on Task Force 38 in October 1944 which comprised of 101 radar-equipped bombers. I had no idea Japan had radar-equipped aircraft in such quantities. I knew they had anti-submarine aircraft with radar but not conventional bombers. Can anyone else elaborate on Japanese bomber radar? Below is a quote from the page.



12 October 1944:
Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Task Force 38 carriers launch 1,398 sorties against shipping, air fields and industrial plants on Formosa. Mitscher's force destroys Second Air Fleet's headquarters and about one third of its fighters. Task Force 38 loses 48 aircraft.

In the afternoon, an elite combined Japanese Navy and Army force of 101 radar equipped twin engine torpedo bombers of the Tkōgeki Butai take off from Kyushu and Okinawa to launch a large scale radar assisted night torpedo attack on TF 38 – the first ever attempted by the Japanese. The attackers include 23 new Army Mitsubishi Ki-67 Hiryu ("Peggy") bombers of Sentai 98, Navy Type 96 G3M2 ("Nell") and G4M Rikko ("Betty") bombers and Nakajima C6N Saiun (Painted Cloud)("Myrt") two-seat night fighters launched from Kanoya and refueled on Okinawa.

The Navy Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" bombers are fitted with the 150 to 160 MHz Air Mark VI search radar, while the Army Ki-67 "Peggy" bombers carry the 200 to 209 MHz Taki-1 search radar. By this time, the 762nd NAG's crews have completed at least six months of sea training. [1]

At 1300, Navy K501 Squadron launches 23 P1Y Ginga ("Frances") bombers (12 carrying torpedoes, 10 carrying bombs and one carrying flares). K703 Squadron launches 18 G4M Rikko ("Betty") and P1Y Ginga bombers (all torpedo equipped) and K708 Squadron launches seven torpedo bombers. Army Sentai 98 also launches 20 Ki-67 Hiryu ("Peggy") bombers.

The Japanese arrive in the area of the warships and find heavy rain squalls which prevent effective torpedo attacks. However, the weather does not hinder radar-fitted Grumman F6F "Hellcats" of night fighter squadron VFW-41 operating from Captain Edward C. Ewen's (USNA '21) USS INDEPENDENCE (CVL-22). USS CABOT's (CVL-28) night fighters also engage the Japanese. The fighters fight a running battle with the torpedo bombers and claim five shot down. Captain (later Rear Admiral) William W. Behrens light cruiser USS HOUSTON (CL-81) claims four aircraft shot down by her AAA batteries, while other Japanese aircraft fall to other ships' gunfire. Altogether, that night the Japanese lose 42 aircraft.

 

[Shinpachi]

That is true.
Even the IJN's T-kogeki butai (T-攻撃部隊 = Attacker unit T. T for torpedo) held about 130 planes for the night attacking purpose.

 

[vikingBerserker]

I had no idea either, great info!

 

[Conslaw]

This had to be demoralizing to the Japanese: they send out their 101 of their best radar-equipped planes at night, with the best crews, figuring this is their best job to get the most results for the fewest losses, and they lose 40% with minimal to no accomplishments. One thing they managed to do was expose a new radar to the Americans. The Americans couldn't jam Japanese low frequency radar with their existing jammers, but they were able to get to work on a new jammer that would be available within a few months.

 

[Admiral Beez]

This had to be demoralizing to the Japanese:

Everything from about Coral Sea onwards had to be demoralizing for the Japanese, especially the IJN air arm and IJAAF. The IJA land forces have to be the most frustrated, as they've done their part, and taken much of China and much of British, French, Dutch and American territory in SEA, but from then onwards their aircraft equipped brethren can't win any significant air campaigns.

 

[Conslaw]

Everything from about Coral Sea onwards had to be demoralizing for the Japanese, especially the IJN air arm and IJAAF. The IJA land forces have to be the most frustrated, as they've done their part, and taken much of China and much of British, French, Dutch and American territory in SEA, but from then onwards their aircraft equipped brethren can't win any significant air campaigns.

Yes, but also the Japanese Marines probably thought the Army should have been carrying more weight on the Pacific Islands, because what happened in the Far East was practically irrelevant to the American threat to the home islands.

Really Japan did not have enough economic muscle to go toe-to-toe with the US, much less the US, China, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand as well as some French and Dutch remnant forces and Filipino guerrillas. And of course - towards the end, the Soviet Union.

 

[taly01]

The daylight losses of G4M "Betty" in the Solomons campaign is why IJN began using night attack. The P1Y Ginga "Frances" was a dedicated high speed attack bomber to replace the multi-role G4M "Betty", the Ginga is similar to the Mosquito or Pe-2, its a 350mph+ bomber that used speed rather than defensive guns. If Ginga was combat ready in mid 1943 it could have had an effect on Solomons campaign.

Anyway the chances of penetrating USN fleets without interception by 1943 was incredibly low, even with mass attacks the USN could put up enough planes in the right place to make it a one shot chance.

The Japanese arrive in the area of the warships and find heavy rain squalls which prevent effective torpedo attacks

A circling torpedo may have been good for night fleet attacks, especially against the huge fleets USN had by 1945.

 

[Dimlee]

Altogether, that night the Japanese lose 42 aircraft.

I wonder how many were confirmed by the Japanese side.
If figure 42 is based on claims only, then around 20-25 would be the safe assumption of real losses? Or even less considering night, weather conditions and probably unavoidable double count by fighters and AAA?

 

[Shinpachi]

According to the official report summarized in the postwar by IJN dated October, 1947,
54 planes in total did not return on the day of October 12, 1944.

Source: (JACAR)
Japan Center for Asian Historical Records
Reference code: C19010075300 (page 12)