Ju-87 Stuka vulnerability to fighter attack

[V-1710]

As some of the earlier posts pointed out, I don't think it was a case of the Stuka being vunerable to enemy fire. On the contrary, I think it was a particularly rugged aircraft. However, I have read on many occasions that it was not a pleasent aircraft to fly. Terms like slow, ungainly, difficult to handle, and poor in turns are common in Stuka reports. Those are characteristics that make a plane a good target. Though well armoured, it was still an aircraft, not a tank. 8 .303 Brownings, 20mm cannon fire, or 6 .50's will tear a Stuka up. So, I think it is accurate to say that a Stuka was one of the easier planes to take down. I think the Dauntless was not a good target, as it was small and handled well.

 

[Nikademus]

You callin me funny?!!

Erich and Nik, I must submit to your far superior resources than mine. My only take on the Stuka is that if the plane was so bad, the design poor, the power awful, why was it kept on operations throughout the war? It had to have some redeeming value about it. Yes there were "Stuka parties" and it was at times, meat for the butcher but there just was something that kept it flying (besides engines ).

I think it did well, considering.

I agree. It did have value....and it was vulnerable too. After tossing the idea around here or there and browsing a few sources for more tidbits.... The below passage helped me put it into more perspective as well as provide a last piece that also helps answer your question of why they were kept around;

"Goring's unwavering belief in the Stuka troubled his commanders, too. Unrivaled in precision-bombing and close infantry support when the Luftwaffe held the sky, they now made up one third of the Luftwaffe's bomber force.-for maximum success at minimum cost of material, [my italics] the Reichsmarschall saw them as unbeatable. Yet to most, heavy losses of August 8 presaged the shape of things to come."
-Collier, Eagle Day, The Battle of Britian

So in conclusion, I personally feel that both viewpoints are essentially correct. Yes, the Stuka was probably more vulnerable than an SBD....or put another way, as vulnerable as often described. However, in terms of the "big picture", its also to a degree irrelevent as any land power that employs a 1E precision weapon as 1/3 of their striking power is going to suffer heavier losses vs. a power that relies fully on 2E light and medium bombers (as well as 4E "heavies") in the absence of complete air control.

The above passage helps to also spread more light on why Germany embraced the DB as a primary component of their airforce while other nations did not. It was seen as a means of delivering maximum success at minimal cost in economic terms. It could also be built up rather quickly as well. Other nations, less bent on an offensive posture, but also not surrounded by landbased enemies, embraced the bomber concept from a more strategic angle, thus invested in 2E and 4E designs. While not as accurate, and in some cases, not all that much protection without good fighter protection, ultimately the type could be developed and woven into a doctrine of operational and tactical support of the land battlefield without sacrificing survivability on the modern battlefield. Plane for plane it might not be as accurate as a Stuka, but numbers and repeated attacks can make up for it and more trained men get home at the end of the day. The portents were there, but like with the Bf-110, it would take actual combat to make all realize this truth. Even after that however, with 1/3 of your airforce made up of these dive bombers....you can't simply stop using them. You work with what you have. Thus, the Stuka went to war in the Balkans, Russia and the Western Desert. When the Luftwaffe could dominate the air, the Stuka could regain some of it's early success, but faced with any decent fighter defense such as with the WDAF at times....the result was "Stuka-Parties"

SBD's would probably have fared better, but losses would still have been higher vs. the employment of 2E's.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Nikademus,

>Yes, the Stuka was probably more vulnerable than an SBD....

Hm, I don't see how you concluded that. In your last post, you seemed to leave that question entirely open ...

With regard to the SBD's success, note that the Spitfire VB used in the desert had two times the firepower of the A6M2, and the cannon-armed Hurricane had four times the firepower. Additionally, the western fighters were armoured, had protected tanks and featured a bullet-resistant wind screen, factors reducing the effect of the Stukas' return fire.

The firepower factor alone can easily account for any perceived differences in Stuka and SBD vulnerability.

However, if we don't know the number of opportunities for large-scale dive bomber slaughter both in the desert and in the Pacific theatre, there is actually nothing we can learn from the number of Stukas shot down on such occasions anyway.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[Soundbreaker Welch?]

The firepower factor alone can easily account for any perceived differences in Stuka and SBD vulnerability.

Interesting point.......

 

[JoeB]

Hm, I don't see how you concluded that. In your last post, you seemed to leave that question entirely open ...

With regard to the SBD's success, note that the Spitfire VB used in the desert had two times the firepower of the A6M2, and the cannon-armed Hurricane had four times the firepower. Additionally, the western fighters were armoured, had protected tanks and featured a bullet-resistant wind screen, factors reducing the effect of the Stukas' return fire.

I mainly agree, this situation somewhat resembles 'Spit outclassed Zero' in that there might be a general tendency to conclude something based on general reputation of each plane in different theaters. But in Spit v Zero case there were real meetings showing a surprisingly different result than the standard reputations would imply; whereas here we just can't say for sure.

The SBD had somewhat of a reputation for being able to take care of itself against fighters at least in USN, while Ju-87 had the opposite reputation, as least in West. But not only did they face different fighter opponents, but SBD's just didn't come under heavy fighter attack all that many times. In most of the 1942 carrier battles the Japanese carriers' CAP system failed to bring heavy attacks to bear on divebombers; one exception was the Marine SBD's at Midway which suffered pretty heavily, and another was Santa Cruz were VB-8/VS-8 came under heavy attack unescorted, and suffered several losses though did actually down a couple of Zeroes (the only Zeroes downed by SBD's in 1942 per Japanese accounts AFAIK; some other claims by SBD's to have downed Zeroes, as at Coral Sea are still celebrated even on TV shows etc. though it's long been known they aren't confirmed as losses in Japanese accounts). In the Guadalcanal campaign SBD's rarely came under landplane Zero attack, one notable exception being the day of the landing when an SBD gunner wounded Saburo Sakai. And after 1942 the losses of all USN attack types to enemy fighters were pretty limited, and almost non-existent from 1944, because of USN fighters.

The SBD didn't have a good reputation v fighters in the USAAF though. In New Guinea Zero's (also including Sakai it so happened) almost wiped out a small formation of A-24's (SBD's) July 26 1942, after which the USAAF made a point of keeping A-24's away from enemy fighters: that one incident cemented a pretty different reputation about its survivability.

I agree we might not find much to choose among planes like Ju-87, SBD, Type 99 Carrier Bomber (Val) in the same circumstances, though couldn't rule out that the greater manueverability of SBD and Type 99 might bail them out sometimes.

Joe

 

[Njaco]

Nik, you may have part of the puzzle. I totally forgot how obsessed Hitler, Goering and such were with dive bombing. So that would be one major reason for its continued operation and the failure of High Command to recognize its obsolecence.

The above passage helps to also spread more light on why Germany embraced the DB as a primary component of their airforce while other nations did not.

That point you may be mistaken on is the failure of other nations to develop DBs: as the previous posts state there was the SBD, the Vengence, etc. Other nations did not ignore the dive bombing concept but instead recognized its limitations. Germany and the Stuka were a litmus test for the DB for all nations and the Allies caught on real quick. You don't bring a knife to a gunfight. This is only my opinion.

 

[Udet]

I said it before and i´ll say it again...

Had Germany won the war then we would be reading on the "perfect" nearly "unbeatable" ground attack plane in history.

That´s precisely the sort of tale sold by the Soviet Department of Mythology Affairs regarding their ultra-overrated IL-2 "Shturmovik".

Also you have the other allied fairy tale, the one that affirms the Stuka became obsolete "early in the war"....go tell Pinocchio stories to kindergarten kids when tucking them into bed...the fact a plane not designed for air-to-air combat might endure high losses when caught by enemy fighters will not make it obsolete, at all.

With proper fighter cover or in conditions of nearly complete air superiority in the sector, the Stuka is something like the ultimate tool of destruction any year of the war. (Ask the Royal Navy commanders and sailors operating off the coast of Crete in 1941)

Following such allied logic then the B-17 and B-24 were "obsolete" considering the period of time prior to mid-1944 when they flew deep into Germany without fighter escorts and were slaughtered by the Bf 109s and Fw 190s.

Also Erich hit the nail, how come that "superb" soviet air force that allegedly re-emerged from 1943 through the end of the war proved uncapable of wiping out the presence of "obsolete" Stuka units operating in the eastern front....

 

[HoHun]

Hi Joeb,

>this situation somewhat resembles 'Spit outclassed Zero' in that there might be a general tendency to conclude something based on general reputation of each plane in different theaters.

You fallacy in the Spitfire vs. Zero and the Hurricane vs. Zero threads (where you should keep it!) is that you look at the results achieved by men in their machines, and then use that to fuzzily doubt the quality of the machines.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[HoHun]

Hi Njaco,

>Other nations did not ignore the dive bombing concept but instead recognized its limitations.

Based on their early-war experience, Germany actually specified, developed and deployed a Stuka successor far superior in performance and self-protection to the earlier model. It was a twin-engined aircraft with internal bomb bay, wing-mounted dive brakes, a defensive armament arrangement that allowed the rear gunner to cover the lower rear sector as well, and a top speed close to the Mosquito's.

I'm sure you know the type - it's the Messerschmitt Me 210.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[Njaco]

I may have mispoke about the obsolete part and I was saying it was only one part of the equation, this being Hitler's insistance. And I agree with Erich on the all mighty Red AF.

HoHun, I wasn't saying it was given up on. I was trying to point out that while Germany slowly came to realize that the DB concept would only work within certain limitations, The Allies recognized that early and conducted opeations with the type within those limits.

Dive-bombing without aerial supremecy is just being a bullet magnet.

 

[AL Schlageter]

That´s precisely the sort of tale sold by the Soviet Department of Mythology Affairs regarding their ultra-overrated IL-2 "Shturmovik".

Also you have the other allied fairy tale, the one that affirms the Stuka became obsolete "early in the war"....go tell Pinocchio stories to kindergarten kids when tucking them into bed

Do we need this type of posting?

Also Erich hit the nail, how come that "superb" soviet air force that allegedly re-emerged from 1943 through the end of the war proved uncapable of wiping out the presence of "obsolete" Stuka units operating in the eastern front....

Could it be that there was enough LW fighters around to escort the Ju?: shock:

Following such allied logic then the B-17 and B-24 were "obsolete" considering the period of time prior to mid-1944 when they flew deep into Germany without fighter escorts and were slaughtered by the Bf 109s and Fw 190s.

What is with this use of the word 'allied'?
Yes the B-17 and B-24 could be considered obsolete as they couldn't operate without escorts.

 

[JoeB]

You fallacy in the Spitfire vs. Zero and the Hurricane vs. Zero threads (where you should keep it!) is that you look at the results achieved by men in their machines, and then use that to fuzzily doubt the quality of the machines.

I respectfully disagree and think it's actually a theme that runs across most if not nearly all debates about plane characteristics v operational results. In this case there are in fact some 'plane' differences between Ju87's and say SBD-3's (speed, agility, fwd and rear firing armament, etc) that suggest the SBD might be more survivable. The problem is judging how significant those differences would really be to outcomes against a given fighter opposition. So it's not about 'fuzzy doubt of machines' but rather reasonable doubt about the actual effect of particular plane differences on combat outcomes.

In this case we don't have comparable outcomes to say the SBD's apparently better qualities against fighters would really make much difference in a given situation (either that SBD's would survive better than Ju87's in ETO/MTO situations as they were, or that Ju87's wouldn't have survived as well as SBD's in PTO situation as they were). Whereas in the Spit/Hurricane/Zero case we have a real outcome that at least casts doubt, to the open minded IMO, whether the plane differences held up as making the Spit 'outclass' the Zero, or 'Hurricane a better fighter than F4F' etc. were really that important in determining outcomes, though I agree that doesn't tell us which factors were most important in their exact rankings (more subtle plane differences, pilot factors etc).

I tend to think in this case the difference in survivability among Ju87, SBD and Type 99 in exactly the same cirumstances wouldn't have been dramatically different, but it's possible they may have been different. I believe the main point is not to make statements as if of clear fact when speculating about such things, which in at least this case you seem to agree.

Joe

 

[Erich]

I still go back to the Panzerjäger staffeln of SG 2, 3 77 as examples who had a staffel of Ju 87G's and did terrible work on Soviet armor, and yet the crews time after time sortie after sortie did their work, where was the Soviet A/F ? even in the final weeks of the war. Soviet AA was responsible for 9/1-ths of the losses known.

back to the origins even in 45 the Stuka was of use

 

[drgondog]

I respectfully disagree and think it's actually a theme that runs across most if not nearly all debates about plane characteristics v operational results. In this case there are in fact some 'plane' differences between Ju87's and say SBD-3's (speed, agility, fwd and rear firing armament, etc) that suggest the SBD might be more survivable. The problem is judging how significant those differences would really be to outcomes against a given fighter opposition. So it's not about 'fuzzy doubt of machines' but rather reasonable doubt about the actual effect of particular plane differences on combat outcomes.

In this case we don't have comparable outcomes to say the SBD's apparently better qualities against fighters would really make much difference in a given situation (either that SBD's would survive better than Ju87's in ETO/MTO situations as they were, or that Ju87's wouldn't have survived as well as SBD's in PTO situation as they were). Whereas in the Spit/Hurricane/Zero case we have a real outcome that at least casts doubt, to the open minded IMO, whether the plane differences held up as making the Spit 'outclass' the Zero, or 'Hurricane a better fighter than F4F' etc. were really that important in determining outcomes, though I agree that doesn't tell us which factors were most important in their exact rankings (more subtle plane differences, pilot factors etc).

I tend to think in this case the difference in survivability among Ju87, SBD and Type 99 in exactly the same cirumstances wouldn't have been dramatically different, but it's possible they may have been different. I believe the main point is not to make statements as if of clear fact when speculating about such things, which in at least this case you seem to agree.

Joe

Great Post Joe.

Doctrine, applied tactics, lethality of environment all are major influences to results - without taking into account Performance and Training and Experience.

We have a tendency to extrapolate way too much based on flight tests and published results.

Regards,

Bill

 

[HoHun]

Hi Joeb,

>In this case there are in fact some 'plane' differences between Ju87's and say SBD-3's (speed, agility, fwd and rear firing armament, etc) that suggest the SBD might be more survivable. The problem is judging how significant those differences would really be to outcomes against a given fighter opposition. So it's not about 'fuzzy doubt of machines' but rather reasonable doubt about the actual effect of particular plane differences on combat outcomes. So it's not about 'fuzzy doubt of machines' but rather reasonable doubt about the actual effect of particular plane differences on combat outcomes. (My emphasis - HoHun)

Basic text comprehension, again - my comment was referring to your "Spitfire" example, applied clearly stated to the Spitfire, and I didn't mention the Stuka with a single word.

You are not actually discussing things with HoHun, but with a mental mirage of your own making that results from you not really reading my posts.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[HoHun]

Hi Erich,

>I still go back to the Panzerjäger staffeln of SG 2, 3 77 as examples who had a staffel of Ju 87G's and did terrible work on Soviet armor, and yet the crews time after time sortie after sortie did their work, where was the Soviet A/F ? even in the final weeks of the war. Soviet AA was responsible for 9/1-ths of the losses known.

Good point - that the Stuka was replaced by Fw 190 Jabos in the Schlachtflieger role was really a result of the continuous increase of the Soviet anti-aircraft artillery (along with aggressive use of infantry weapons for air defense).

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[Nikademus]

Hi Nikademus,

Hm, I don't see how you concluded that. In your last post, you seemed to leave that question entirely open ..

Hi HH,

I left the question a little open because I don't feel that there's a simple Black or White answer here. Both sides of the argument have merit and after looking back and forth between them and re-going over the detailed accounts I currently have combined with more operatoinal/strategic focused books, I felt this is one of those situations, like many others were there are elements of truth in both, dependant on what aspects one wants to focus on or interpret.

With regard to the SBD's success, note that the Spitfire VB used in the desert had two times the firepower of the A6M2, and the cannon-armed Hurricane had four times the firepower. Additionally, the western fighters were armoured, had protected tanks and featured a bullet-resistant wind screen, factors reducing the effect of the Stukas' return fire.

Yes.....later in the war. However the worst of the Stuka Parties I documented occured during times when there were no cannon armed UK planes conducting the slaughter. The terrible vulnerability of the Stuka to even rifle caliber only armed opponents, many of which only had rudimentary training in gunnery is one of those factoids that had me scratching the chin. Yes, the A6M had less rifle caliber guns to spray the target yet there were more than one case documented where the SBD was riddled with them by skillful Japanese pilots and yet the plane continued to fly. (F4F had a similar effect....one pilot once commenting that the best place to have an A6M on you if it had to be was on your six. the centermounted rifle guns could spray you good but would just ping off the armor plate)

The firepower factor alone can easily account for any perceived differences in Stuka and SBD vulnerability.

I have to disagree. At least on a plane for plane basis. However, I agree that if there are massive numbers of fighters present, then yes, all that firepower is going to take a toll. Balanced against this though, is the fact that even with tremendous numbers of escorts.....the Stuka's remained vulnerable. SBD's could be vulnerable, but tended to suffer more marginal losses when adequate escorts were present.

However, if we don't know the number of opportunities for large-scale dive bomber slaughter both in the desert and in the Pacific theatre, there is actually nothing we can learn from the number of Stukas shot down on such occasions anyway.

I think there's enough commentary and battle accounts to at least make an educated guess. Going back to the "open question" The specific accounts of SBD vs Stuka combats, and author's comments do show a difference, however when looking at the "big picture" again, such as the situation in the Desert where the Luft faced a large if often inexperienced airforce, the chance for fighter attack was far greater. If an SBD is a tougher kill than a Stuka, its equally arguable that a Wellington or Ju-88 is a tougher kill than an SBD. Thus, I think in the "big picture" the better estimated toughness of the SBD is largely moot. Either plane, put in such a situation is going to suffer heavy losses. If the SBD suffers less than the Stuka but is still classified as being heavily attritted, its largely moot. A different solution is needed.

On a related note.....I've just finished a day by day account of Operation Torch. The Cassablanca landings saw SBD's employed, sometimes without fighter escort against land and port targets in a situation where complete air superiority was not fully established. The Vichy French fighter force put up a spirited defense using Hawk 75A's and D.520's. There were no "SBD Parties" Worst incident i've documented so far was a couple interceptions of unescorted SBD strikes. Both were undeterred from striking their targets. One with a TBF was reputedly flown like a "fighter" and was not downed. None of the SBD's were shot down from the first element despite being attacked by 8 French fighters. The 2nd flight suffered several losses but still bombed their targets. French fighters got 2 SBD's here. So far this is the worst single incident loss i can find.


Regards,

Henning (HoHun)[/QUOTE]

 

[Nikademus]

Nik, you may have part of the puzzle. I totally forgot how obsessed Hitler, Goering and such were with dive bombing. So that would be one major reason for its continued operation and the failure of High Command to recognize its obsolecence.

That point you may be mistaken on is the failure of other nations to develop DBs: as the previous posts state there was the SBD, the Vengence, etc. Other nations did not ignore the dive bombing concept but instead recognized its limitations. Germany and the Stuka were a litmus test for the DB for all nations and the Allies caught on real quick. You don't bring a knife to a gunfight. This is only my opinion.

Hi Njaco,

I probably should have worded that better. What i meant by the previous was that none of the other nations embraced the DB as a principle instrument of ground support for the army. The US was weded mainly to the idea of strategic level bombing and also developed a string of 2E type bombers for army support. They did toy with the DB in the form of the A-24 but it died a quick death. It didn't help that the A-24's were an early version of the SBD and I don't think they were armored or had self sealing tanks. Combined with a harsh envirnment with few recognizable targets they didn't do so well and were replaced by 2E's and saturation bombing. (The Austrailians however did develop a better more precise ground support system using Wirraways though)

The RAF was very resistant to the idea of the DB and this impeeded the development and eventual deployment of the Vengence.....it being used in more distant theaters like Burma where it operated well under conditions where enemy fighter defenses were intermittant. Like the USN, the DB mainly saw development and service in naval orgs like the FAA. The DB was a good weapons platform vs. naval ships. Land ops though....the Western Allies mainly used the LB and fielded some very tough designs in quantity.

 

[Nikademus]

Hi Erich,

>I still go back to the Panzerjäger staffeln of SG 2, 3 77 as examples who had a staffel of Ju 87G's and did terrible work on Soviet armor, and yet the crews time after time sortie after sortie did their work, where was the Soviet A/F ? even in the final weeks of the war. Soviet AA was responsible for 9/1-ths of the losses known.

Henning (HoHun)

I may have a partial answer for that. IIRC, Glantz (Kursk) mentioned that a large majority of Soviet airpower was subordinate to the ground commanders for the purpose of that huge clash with the Germans. As such the bulk of the Red Airforce ops tended to be devoted to the task of supporting the Red Army ops, not fighting the Luftwaffe directly. They didn't appear to devote a large amount of their efforts to fighter sweeps (Freie Jagd type ops) and a defensive patrols though admitedly they had the numbers to do it all at times. According to that book, it was only by mid-late 43 that the Red Airforce finally began to become competetive in direct conflict with the Luft which had owned the sky prior to that. Even at Kursk though, Soviet air achievements appeared more a matter of numbers and a willingness to edure horrendous losses vs. any general indication of skill. The Germans were also quoted in the book as having one key advantage in their radar nets which could provide enough warning of incoming strikes to vector the fighters (when available) to intercept them.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Nikademus,

>Yes, the A6M had less rifle caliber guns to spray the target yet there were more than one case documented where the SBD was riddled with them by skillful Japanese pilots and yet the plane continued to fly.

The A6M2 had two machine guns compared to the Spitfire's and Hurricane's eight - again, the Stuka was facing four times the firepower.

>the centermounted rifle guns could spray you good but would just ping off the armor plate

Armour is a good keyword here - the Betriebsanleitung for the Ju 87B-2 dating from June 1940 gives a weight table for a B-2 without armour, noting that the weight table for an armoured B-2 "is currently being pepared". Maximum take-off weight was indicated to increase from 4870 kg to 5000 kg for the load condition fully fueled and armed, two-man crew, 1000 kg bomb due to the addition of armour.

Until the armour condition of the Stukas "slaughtered" in 1940 is determined, it's not possible to conclude anything from it since obviously, an unarmoured aircraft would indeed be terribly vulnerable regardless of the qualities of the specific aircraft type.

If comparing the Stuka to a SBD-3 that fought in the first line from the Battle of the Coral Sea in mid-1942 to the conclusion of the Guadalcanal campaign in 1943, it would be better to use an armoured example of the Ju 87B-2 or even a Ju 87D. The latter seems to have featured "Grundpanzerung" as a standard ('basic armour' - probably to differentiate it from more elaborate ground attack armour). The Ju 87D entered service in March 1942.

>I have to disagree. At least on a plane for plane basis.

Oh well - firepower is directly related to the killing ability of any aircraft, even on a plane-for-plane basis. I never heard of fighter pilots discounting firepower either - and they sure were focused on their personal aircraft.

>The specific accounts of SBD vs Stuka combats ...

I don't think SBDs ever fought Ju 87s - you surely meant to write something different

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)