You callin me funny?!!
Erich and Nik, I must submit to your far superior resources than mine. My only take on the Stuka is that if the plane was so bad, the design poor, the power awful, why was it kept on operations throughout the war? It had to have some redeeming value about it. Yes there were "Stuka parties" and it was at times, meat for the butcher but there just was something that kept it flying (besides engines
).
I think it did well, considering.
I agree. It did have value....and it was vulnerable too. After tossing the idea around here or there and browsing a few sources for more tidbits.... The below passage helped me put it into more perspective as well as provide a last piece that also helps answer your question of why they were kept around;
"Goring's unwavering belief in the Stuka troubled his commanders, too. Unrivaled in precision-bombing and close infantry support when the Luftwaffe held the sky, they now made up
one third of the Luftwaffe's bomber force.-
for maximum success at minimum cost of material, [my italics] the Reichsmarschall saw them as unbeatable. Yet to most, heavy losses of August 8 presaged the shape of things to come."
-Collier,
Eagle Day, The Battle of Britian
So in conclusion, I personally feel that both viewpoints are essentially correct. Yes, the Stuka was probably more vulnerable than an SBD....or put another way, as vulnerable as often described. However, in terms of the "big picture", its also to a degree irrelevent as
any land power that employs a 1E precision weapon as 1/3 of their striking power is going to suffer heavier losses vs. a power that relies fully on 2E light and medium bombers (as well as 4E "heavies") in the absence of complete air control.
The above passage helps to also spread more light on why Germany embraced the DB as a primary component of their airforce while other nations did not. It was seen as a means of delivering maximum success at minimal cost in economic terms. It could also be built up rather quickly as well. Other nations, less bent on an offensive posture, but also not surrounded by landbased enemies, embraced the bomber concept from a more strategic angle, thus invested in 2E and 4E designs. While not as accurate, and in some cases, not all that much protection without good fighter protection, ultimately the type could be developed and woven into a doctrine of operational and tactical support of the land battlefield without sacrificing survivability on the modern battlefield. Plane for plane it might not be as accurate as a Stuka, but numbers and repeated attacks can make up for it and more trained men get home at the end of the day. The portents were there, but like with the Bf-110, it would take actual combat to make all realize this truth. Even after that however, with 1/3 of your airforce made up of these dive bombers....you can't simply stop using them. You work with what you have. Thus, the Stuka went to war in the Balkans, Russia and the Western Desert. When the Luftwaffe could dominate the air, the Stuka could regain some of it's early success, but faced with any decent fighter defense such as with the WDAF at times....the result was "Stuka-Parties"
SBD's would probably have fared better, but losses would still have been higher vs. the employment of 2E's.