Ju-87 Stuka vulnerability to fighter attack

Hi Crumpp,

>It very nicely illustrates the fact the aircraft is designed to do a job and unless the design team is incompetent, it will perform that design task.

Interesting that you mention that - Mike Crosley, Fleet Air Arm Seafire pilot and military test pilot, heavily criticized the Barracuda too ... but not for being a poorly designed aircraft, but for being an aircraft designed for poorly conceived specifications. Seems to be right on your line of thinking!

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

being an aircraft designed for poorly conceived specifications

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That is a major cause of designs being shelved.

All the Best,

Crumpp

Hi Henning,

Thanks for the Gen on the Stuka's diving profile.

HoHun said:

"Now a dive angle of 90 deg is a pretty palpitating experience

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Regards the experience of flying a dive-bomber mission, it must have been an exhilarating and hypnotic? experience. David Donald's Airplane part work No.152...

"US Navy legend has it that pilots (of SBDs) were prone to 'target fascination' which could lull them into failing to pull out of the dive in time."

HoHun said:

Barracuda (which was dive-bombing capable as well, though I understand the expected attack mode was to dive, level out and then make a torpedo run).

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Until today I thought the same, but I revisited some of the 'standard' British references and it appears to be the opposite…

British Naval Aircraft since 1912-Owen Thetford pp 158;

"It was, in fact, as a dive-bomber that the Barracuda figured most prominently: it used the torpedo rarely."

The British Bomber since 1912-Peter Lewis pp 320;

"Relatively little use was made of the Barracuda as a torpedo-carrier during the war, but the type was spectacularly successful in the role of dive bomber…"

The British Bomber since 1914-Francis Mason pp 342;

"As previously stated, the Barracuda's service did not include torpedo operations, principally owing to the diminishing opportunities in European waters during the last two years of the War. For such operations in the Far East, the Fleet Air Arm increasingly depended on the excellent Grumman Avenger."

Barracudas of 831 and 829 Squadrons practised dive-bombing on a full size dummy of the Tirpitz prior to the famous attack. After three weeks of dive-bombing practice the strike force had attained a remarkable degree of proficiency-on their penultimate practice run, 24 Barracudas dropped 96 practice bombs on to a target 600 ft by 40 ft in less than 30 seconds; of the 96 bombs dropped 90 were direct hits.

An early production Barracuda Mk I demonstrating the Fairey-Youngman flaps being deployed in dive-bombing. The slipstream created when the flaps were at a negative angle necessitated a high-set tailplane. Also visible is the navigator's starboard window.

Graeme...

from "Hitler's Stuka Squadrons" by John Ward pg 39-41

Pilots converting to the Ju 87 from the Hs 123, with which most of the Stuka units had previously been equipped, found operating the new aircraft straightforward enough. ....Acceleration was good, the Stuka becoming airbourne after a run of about 475m at a speed of 116kmh. Initial climb was at 215kmh, the supercharger being moved from low gear to the automatic position at an altitue of 3500m. The climb was laborous, the aircraft taking some 20 minutes to reach 5000m.

Before entering a dive, the Stuka pilot went through the following checklist: landing flaps at cruise position, elevator trim at cruise position; rudder trim at cruise position; propellor pitch set at cruise; contact altimeter ON; contact altimeter set to release altitude; supercharger set at automatic; throttle fully closed; cooler flaps closed; dive brakes open.

The action of opening the dive brakes made the Stuka nose over under the influence of the pull-out mechanism, which was itself activated by opening the dive-brakes. To enable the pilot to judge the correct dive angle - not an easy thing to do without some form of artificial aid - a series of graduations was etched on the front starboard side of the cockpit canopy. Speed in the dive built up rapidly to 540 kmh after descending 1370m, increasing relatively slowly to a maximum permissable speed of 600kmh.

As the Stuka dived, the pilot kept an eye on a warning light on the contact altimeter; when this illuminated, he pressed a knob on the control column, activating the automatic pullout. The aircraft required 450m to recover to level flight, being subjected to 6 g in the process. The pilot could override the automatic pullout and complete the operation manually, although this required considerable strength and careful use of the elevator trimmer. As the nose came up through the horizon, the dive brakes were retracted, the propellor pitch set to take off/climb, and the throttle and radiator flaps opened.

Thanks Njaco. Appreciate your effort.

Hi Graeme,

>"US Navy legend has it that pilots (of SBDs) were prone to 'target fascination' which could lull them into failing to pull out of the dive in time."

Hm, I believe "target fixation" is a real technical term and is still applied to all kinds of attack during which you fly a collision course (with the ground).

>"It was, in fact, as a dive-bomber that the Barracuda figured most prominently: it used the torpedo rarely."

Quite possible - if I remember his book correctly, Hadley's squadron was mainly trained for torpedo attacks (and he actually flew torpedo trials with a "dud" against a ship underway, protected by torpedo netting), but his actual combat missions turned out to be bombing attacks on the oil refineries on Sumatra and similar targets.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

HoHun said:

Since the question if the Stukas we are looking at were actually armoured (and to which degree) is of overriding importance, a detailed discussion of the 8-wing-gun fighter versus the 2-nose-gun fighter is not going to help us much, though.

That doesn't mean it couldn't have done better against the A6M2 the SBD-3 faced. The rear guns of the Ju 87D had a 50% higher rate of fire than those of the SBD-3, and the A6M2 had only 50% of the firepower of a Spitfire, and 25% of that of the four-cannon Hurricane.

The SBD-4, 5 and 6 had twin Browning 30's plus two cowl mounted 50's while the comparable Ju-87D has two fast firing rear 7.92's plus two wing mounted 7.92's. Do you consider the two 'equal' or 'one clearly inferior'??

And how do either perform with a very nimble fighter (even compared to Yak, Laag, Hurricane or Spitfire?) with 20mm cannon plus two 7.7mm shooting them at close range?

Also, the versions up to (but not including) the Type 52, that were in operations from Pearl Harbor through Midway, had two 7.7mm nose guns plus two 20mm cannon. The later version Type 52 had three 13mm (one nose/two wing) plus two 20mm in the wing. How does that translate to 50% of a Spit and 25% of a Hurricane?

Well, then my observation that the Ju 87D's opponents fielded heavier firepower than the SBD-3's should have some relevance to the assessment of the two dive bombers' relative vulnerability

But the 'observation' seems to require more proof points?

As I see it, the one thing that we can say for certain is that the SBD-3 tended to face unarmoured, unprotected, low-firepower fighters while the contemporary Ju 87D met well-armoured and protected fighters of generally superior firepower and speed.

That same 'unprotected, low fire-power Zero had its way with aircraft much more formidable that either an SBD or the Ju 87, as well as far better armed and armored than either.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

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Not very 'certain' in comparing either survivability or results.

Pilots like Rudel and Vejtasa are not 'average' dive bomber pilots.. the others were hammered by Zeros, Hurricanes, Mustangs, Spitfires, etc - neither aircraft was seemingly more survivable than the other in an environment in which enemy fighter were present and escorts weren't.

HoHun said:

So it's not about 'fuzzy doubt of machines' but rather reasonable doubt about the actual effect of particular plane differences on combat outcomes. (My emphasis - HoHun)

Basic text comprehension, again - my comment was referring to your "Spitfire" example, applied clearly stated to the Spitfire, and I didn't mention the Stuka with a single word.

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My point is that the examples are parallel, and there are many similar examples. On the *Stuka* case, now the discussion has gone on to much detail about armor weights, and rear gun rates of fire etc. This is all interesting and getting the particular facts right is important, but any attempt to quantify how much those facts would or wouldn't affect actual Ju-87 and SBD vulnerability to fighters, is still almost completely speculative IMO. *Like* establishing from the best sources what the relative theoretical speeds of Spitfire V and A6M2 were can be an interesting and somewhat factual exercise (the 'somewhat' comes in the fact that measures like speed were not always the same in operational conditions as official stats, whereas say armor weight would be). But saying how, if really much at all, such a speed difference influenced combat outcomes is much more speculative. So it's an *analogy* between two cases, and I think a valid one applicable to many other such comparisons.

And actually there is some direct relationship between those two cases. Because Zero and Spit V have been given as examples of fighters attacking SBD's and Ju-87's. But you do seem to be making fairly strong judgements based on analysis of one factor that happens to lend itself to quantitative analysis, firepower (and which was less for the Zero, though more than 1/2 that of the Spit V). But considering all factors, ie in actual practice, Zero units had lots of 'parties' v. Allied non-fighters in 1942 with few losses of their own to flexible gunner fire (eg. even v B-17's; very few Zeroes were actually downed by them in contrast to the claims of the B-17's at the time, and the Zeroes inflicted unacceptable % losses on unescorted B-17's in many cases 1941-42, though absolute numbers small by ETO standards).

I would say again that the SBD's reputation for relative low vulnerability to fighters might be mainly because it didn't come under really heavy and prolonged fighter attack very many times. (Re: Nik, I share your interest in the USN v French combats at Casablanca, but again that wasn't really intense numerous, or necessarily totally determined fighter opposition, ie. mixed emotions of the French fighting Americans though trying to do their duty as they saw it). So I'm on you general side of the Stuka SBD debate, but I doubt it's a closely quantifiable product of the analysis of fighter and rearward firepower plus armor, which does harken back to my analogy I think.

Back to specifics of SBD's and Ju-87's the rear firing gun of the Ju-87's in notable high loss cases was mainly a single gun with cyclic rof ~1500, later on (frm ca. '42) double barrel gun with rof ~3000. The SBD-3 had a pair M2 .30 calibers, cyclic rof~1200 per gun (faster rof than M1919 ground Browning .30's or M2 .50 a/c guns); and as noted the SBD had a much heavier fwd firing armament which in some noted cases was relevant (eg. SBD scout sections escaping outnumbering Zero attacks at the Battle of Santa Cruz, claiming Zeroes in the process: they did escape by acting like 'fighters with guns at both ends', even though those claims don't check out).

But how much immediate effect did 1500, 2400 or 3000rpm of rifle caliber mg bullets have on determined WWII fighter attackers? My impression from first hand accounts is not a lot, or perhaps binary, some pilots deterred by the show of tracers at any of those rof's, but the more determined ones not, and determined pilots inflicted the lion's share of all fighter successes. And the chance of actually hitting the fighter pilot, armored windshield or not, was pretty low (though not zero, eg. Sakai case). And it seems from first hand accounts such return fire did sometimes end up downing the attacker, particularly a liquid cooled one, but usually after he'd completed his attacks.

Also consider how rearward armament interacts with numbers. Single passes by a few fighters against a tight formation using their rear guns in unison were one thing (again see Sakai v SBD case Aug 7 1942, that was two Zeros v. a bunch of gunners firing together). A bunch of fighters continuously attacking a small formation of divebombers was another matter.

Ju-87 and SBD vulnerability to same opposition, interesting discsussion, but no direct evidence of actually comparable outcomes, the main bottomline IMO.

Joe

Hi Joeb,

>But you do seem to be making fairly strong judgements based on analysis of one factor that happens to lend itself to quantitative analysis, firepower

Joe, would you please show me the sentence which I typed in this thread which you think contains my fairly strong judgement? Thanks in advance!

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Also, the versions up to (but not including) the Type 52, that were in operations from Pearl Harbor through Midway, had two 7.7mm nose guns plus two 20mm cannon. The later version Type 52 had three 13mm (one nose/two wing) plus two 20mm in the wing.

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That would be only for the Type 52c of which ~90 were built.

The 52b change one of the cowl 7.7mm mgs to a 13mm mg and the cannons were belt fed instead of using drums. ~470 built

The 52a had 2 7.7mm mgs and 2 20mm cannons. ~390 built

HoHun said:

Hi Nikademus,


Roger that - you could even have beat me over the head with my own post in the "Centreline Armament Thread". The Spitfire armament was even worse than the Hurricane armament since the outer guns were really very far from the centreline.

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Hi Henning. Sorry for the delay....real life and the need to earn money for the Internet connection must be served. LoL....Don't you love threads where you almost seem to find yourself arguing against a point you made in an earlier thread?

Since the question if the Stukas we are looking at were actually armoured (and to which degree) is of overriding importance, a detailed discussion of the 8-wing-gun fighter versus the 2-nose-gun fighter is not going to help us much, though.

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Perhaps not. It is puzzling though. The armor discussion below though may have made it less so.

The Betriebsanleitung lists the standard Ju 87B-2, and the Ju 87B-2 "with armour". That might be simplified language, but the "with armour" version had its weight increased by 130 kg. I don't think that in June 1940, Stukas were considered for the Schlachtflieger role already, but I might be wrong.

The type overview Ju 87D lists "basic armour" in the column "Variant and differences" emphasized in bold type. "Basic armour" doesn't sound like ground attack armour, and that it's listed in the "differences" column appears to indicate that the B was not equipped with basic armour off the factory lines. The Betriebsanleitung for the B-2 leaves open the possibility that it was retro-fitted, though.

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Interesting. I can't really dock the Stuka though...as the Wildcat and Dauntless also saw earlier varients retrofitted with armor. F4F's with makeshift boiler plate for armor actually fought in early 42 vs. A5M4's. Worked nicely against 7.7 ammo despite it's humble origins.

It might have had increased armour, but the RAF fighters had greatly increased firepower for certain.

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Point. The only counterbalance that comes to mind quickly is that unlike the Germans, the WDAF had a great deal of inexperienced pilots flying reducing their ability to put the cannons on target to a degree. Yet they continued to ove facing the Stuka. The recorded incidents of Stuka Parties did go down though "claims" remained high.

That doesn't mean it couldn't have done better against the A6M2 the SBD-3 faced. The rear guns of the Ju 87D had a 50% higher rate of fire than those of the SBD-3, and the A6M2 had only 50% of the firepower of a Spitfire, and 25% of that of the four-cannon Hurricane.

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Optimally yes. As mentioned though, the good Zero (and Oscar) drivers were adapt at riddling the target with their rifles. The Cannons were trickier. In some ways I think that gave the Oscar an edge....i'd almost rather have the two 12.7's centerline vs. the outboard 20's with limited ammo. Then again I'm one of the worst flight simm pilots on the planet and still have bad memories of trying to hit anything with them. (I also may be in the running for King LawnDart trying to fly a Bf-109 without falling into a spin)

Well, then my observation that the Ju 87D's opponents fielded heavier firepower than the SBD-3's should have some relevance to the assessment of the two dive bombers' relative vulnerability

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Depending on the form of attack, yes. The A6M's success against SBD's shrank with each carrier battle, mainly due to tactics employed. The SBD crews quickly learned to close in and mass their defensive firepower making low deflection shot runs from behind very perilous. Recall too the comment from Shores regarding the tendancy of Stuka formations to loosen up into small groups when attacked or closing on a ground target. This may help explain in part why the "Parties" occured.

I think it's rather difficult to determine any difference at all since there is no comparable situation which shows the success of both types in similar circumstances.

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True. I was/am only offering a speculation. Facinating subject though. Much better than Matrix based threads where the Stuka was simply lampooned as a kill waiting to occur.

As I see it, the one thing that we can say for certain is that the SBD-3 tended to face unarmoured, unprotected, low-firepower fighters while the contemporary Ju 87D met well-armoured and protected fighters of generally superior firepower and speed.

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I agree the SBD faced a less lethal environment though I look at it more from the # of sorties/# of fighters PoV. One reason is that while acknowledging the less than optimal ballistic qualities of the 20's in the A6M, the crack pilots none-the-less knew how to make good use of them and for the time period (1940-1) the overall Zero firepower was fairly good. By this same period the (1941) over Malta the Hurricane I drivers with their 8 rifles were having difficulties against armored targets lowering their kill value. (I can quote the source if you want Kurfurst....don't have a cow man )

However in the end I don't question that the Stuka, as a principal land attack platform equipping 1/3 of an airforce's bomber OOB, would end up facing much more combat situations. mentioned even if one (in theory) concluded the SBD was somewhat more survivable based on all facets, it would still suffer heavily just like the Stuka without good fighter protection. A D3A is in trouble despite it's nimbleness.

Kurfürst said:

'Seems'? Excuse moi, but to me it *seems* these statements of yours are appearantly based on nothing. Where are the bloody facts....?

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On the prior pages I think. If you mean "technical stats" I could link for you a couple websites I've browsed while looking through my own sources detailing the combats. I didn't post the technical info because anyone can google after all. Sorry for offending your sensibilities.

It`s just kept being repeated that the Stuka had some sort of mythical vulnerability, while the SBD had some sort of mythical survivability. The Stuka was 'slow'. It had 'poor armament'. It was 'not so rugged'. 'Not so survivable'. Not invented here.

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Well....I happen to believe, and believe strongly that the factual opinions of those men who actually fought in, against, or beside the device in question have merit. I also believe in some of the accredited author's who've done a hell of a lot more total research on the subject that involves the device in question. I'll at least assume they've studied the matter before printing their opinion.

Claims were not supported by any facts, references or serious sources so far, basically most claims in this thread *seem* to have no relation to the technical facts - actual speed, actual defensive armament, actual level of armoring the plane had - just personal bias and preconceptions is present.

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Well....I know i've cited at least two "serious" sources so far. I can cite some more if you wish. They won't be technical manuals though so by the sound of it you'll probably just dismiss them as ancedotal nonsense.

It`s a pointless excercise, nothing can be learned from it by anyone.

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[/quote]

I don't agree that it's pointless. I'm actually having fun tackling the question. What else is a site like this for?

JoeB said:

Back to specifics of SBD's and Ju-87's the rear firing gun of the Ju-87's in notable high loss cases was mainly a single gun with cyclic rof ~1500, later on (frm ca. '42) double barrel gun with rof ~3000. The SBD-3 had a pair M2 .30 calibers, cyclic rof~1200 per gun (faster rof than M1919 ground Browning .30's or M2 .50 a/c guns); and as noted the SBD had a much heavier fwd firing armament which in some noted cases was relevant (eg. SBD scout sections escaping outnumbering Zero attacks at the Battle of Santa Cruz, claiming Zeroes in the process: they did escape by acting like 'fighters with guns at both ends', even though those claims don't check out).

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Hi Joe,

I don't recall any instance offhand where an SBD claimed a Zero with it's foward guns, but against enemy bombers they did when acting in the role of anti-torpedo fire. They bagged 5 at Coral Sea (and got one D3A) But also suffered heavily to Zeros as a result of being caught singlarily. SBD rear gunners got from 1-2 A6M's at Midway, and 3 at Santa Cruz.

(Re: Nik, I share your interest in the USN v French combats at Casablanca, but again that wasn't really intense numerous, or necessarily totally determined fighter opposition, ie. mixed emotions of the French fighting Americans though trying to do their duty as they saw it). So I'm on you general side of the Stuka SBD debate, but I doubt it's a closely quantifiable product of the analysis of fighter and rearward firepower plus armor, which does harken back to my analogy I think.

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No, it doesn't especially as the campaign was quickly concluded. Thought it might be interesting to post. The USN pilots agreed with you in stating that the French pilots were not very aggressive, 'but' doing a good job. They summed up their tactics as "Very World War I"

Rough summary so far shows 7 F4F's traded in the air for 11 French fighters. Not too shabby an exchange given the challenges faced by the French pilots, some having to take off while under ground attack by straffing fighters. An interesting skirmish showing a rare land situation with SBD's facing ground defenses and enemy fighters while unescorted for the large part.

HoHun said:

Hi Al,

Pilot armour: Armour glass windscreen, armoured seat with 8 mm back armour, 4 mm side armour, 8 mm shoulder and head armour (above the armour seat). The side armour is a triangle designed to protect hips and thighs from oblique rear shots. The head armour is labelled "head rest" in the drawing, but I suppose it was the customary cushioned armour plate.

Cockpit armour: 4 mm armour floor, 8 mm rear armour bulkhead.

Some bits and pieces of rear gunner "side and head armour" that I can't make out clearly in the drawing.

8 mm armour floor below the main oil tank aft of the engine.

"Additional side armour (external)" for the cockpit sides - I think this may be our Schlachtflieger bolt-on armour. Unfortunately, no thickness is given.

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Great stuff!

Hmm...An opinion i've often seen toted is that 8mm of armor won't impress a HMG round like a .50cal. depending on deflection angle. Against rifle caliber though it should be adequate. Of course if your sitting in a full stream of bullets for very long......

Is there any info on the quality of the fuel tank protection?

(SBD)
Pilot rear armour weight is listed as 45 kg, forward armour as 17 kg, rear gunner armour as 14 kg. The total is 76 kg. No armour thickness figures are given.

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The thicknesses appeared enough to provide the same "ping" effect described by Wildcat pilots who recounted their experiences being riddled by gunfire.

For comparison, the difference between standard Ju 87B-2 and Ju 87B-2 "with armour" was given as 130 kg in the Betriebsanleitung, but what exactly is included in that amount is not clear. (It might be different from the Ju 87D-3 layout described above.)

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130kg-400kg. Interesting. interesting. interesting.




Regards,

Henning (HoHun)[/QUOTE]

Hi Nikademus,

>Interesting. I can't really dock the Stuka though...as the Wildcat and Dauntless also saw earlier varients retrofitted with armor.

It's an open question, no doubt. Did you catch the recent cannon article Micdrow posted? It made a comment like "Machine guns have served us well since the Germans have not provided their aircraft with armour yet, but as that is bound to happen soon, we should give 'shell-guns' serious consideration" - with "shell guns" being Flight's term for rapid-fire cannon. The article remarked that "cannon" sounded too much like Trafalgar for their liking

>The only counterbalance that comes to mind quickly is that unlike the Germans, the WDAF had a great deal of inexperienced pilots flying reducing their ability to put the cannons on target to a degree. Yet they continued to ove facing the Stuka.

They wouldn't have hit other types any more accurately either And more seriously, since there were no comparable types around, we can't really use this for a comparison.

>True. I was/am only offering a speculation. Facinating subject though. Much better than Matrix based threads where the Stuka was simply lampooned as a kill waiting to occur.

Definitely! It's always a learning experience to go and critically examine the familiar stereotypes that have been printed again and again for decades! You'd think by now, they should be water-tight - but far from it

>As mentioned though, the good Zero (and Oscar) drivers were adapt at riddling the target with their rifles. The Cannons were trickier. In some ways I think that gave the Oscar an edge....i'd almost rather have the two 12.7's centerline vs. the outboard 20's with limited ammo.

I think it was Richard Dunn who recently wrote an article on Oscar armament ... apparently, there were few (if any) Ki-43 fighters with 2 x 12.7 mm, the norm being 1 x 7.7 mm and 1 x 12.7 mm. Surprisingly, the pilots did not like the 12.7 mm gun since it synchronized rather badly, suffering from a major loss in rate of fire as a result. That did of course detract from the advantages of the centreline gun, on which I agree with you!

>Then again I'm one of the worst flight simm pilots on the planet and still have bad memories of trying to hit anything with them.

The low muzzle velocity and the wing position really makes the A6M2 cannon short-range weapons, and their destructiveness doesn't compare to Western 20 mm cannon. I don't think you were such a bad pilot, but merely that you struggled with their objective disadvantages

>The A6M's success against SBD's shrank with each carrier battle, mainly due to tactics employed. The SBD crews quickly learned to close in and mass their defensive firepower making low deflection shot runs from behind very perilous.

For an un-armoured A6M2 that had to close in to bring its cannon to bear effectively, I'd add. The same tactics might not have worked so well against Spitfires with armour glass windscreen, re-inforced cowl, self-sealing fuel tanks and a pair of cannon that enabled it to open fire effectively at a longer range. That might have influenced the development of different Stuka tactics ...

>Recall too the comment from Shores regarding the tendancy of Stuka formations to loosen up into small groups when attacked or closing on a ground target.

Hm, if tight formations of B-17s couldn't slug it out with Luftwaffe fighters and win, asking the Stuka to go and try to defeat the RAF that way seems optimistic. The way I read Shores' comment was that splitting up made it harder for the escort fighters to cover the various groups, but I suppose the Stukas only split into their Vic formations when they had to evade fire ...

>I agree the SBD faced a less lethal environment though I look at it more from the # of sorties/# of fighters PoV.

Hm, I fear I have not fully understood that line of thinking. What are these numbers for both?

>One reason is that while acknowledging the less than optimal ballistic qualities of the 20's in the A6M, the crack pilots none-the-less knew how to make good use of them and for the time period (1940-1) the overall Zero firepower was fairly good. By this same period the (1941) over Malta the Hurricane I drivers with their 8 rifles were having difficulties against armored targets lowering their kill value.

Having cannon is quite a bonus over a pure machine-gun armament, no doubt. With regard to the period, the SBD-3 entered combat in the first half of 1942, by which time the British 8-gun-fighter was no longer a first-line aircraft (as far as I can tell), so it's really the pitting cannon-armed RAF fighter vs. Ju 87D that is the contemporary parallel.

>even if one (in theory) concluded the SBD was somewhat more survivable based on all facets, it would still suffer heavily just like the Stuka without good fighter protection. A D3A is in trouble despite it's nimbleness.

Absolutely - the lack of armour really disqualified some otherwise promising Western types ... they were just not considered fit for combat duty. It were only the Japanese who carried on regardless (and even the Japanese Army undertook steps to armour their aircraft). However, the old saying that "there are just two types of aircraft - fighters and targets" really means that whatever type you fly, if it's not a fighter you'll be in trouble.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Hi Nikademus,

>Is there any info on the quality of the fuel tank protection?

Such information is hard to find regardless of the type. You might have seen the Me 110 analysis Micdrow posted - one example was analyzed in detail by US aircraft companies, and they concluded that while the self-sealing fuel tanks was not quite up to the then-current US standards, it was two years old by the time of the analysis and superior to the contemporary US designs when it was new. They also mentioned that the design of the fuel tank compartent was excellent as techniques and materials had been chosen to minimize the danger for the rubber cell in the compartment when the compartment metal skin was pierced by bullets. (That just applies to the Bf 110 of course, but I thought you might find it interesting anyhow.)

>An opinion i've often seen toted is that 8mm of armor won't impress a HMG round like a .50cal. depending on deflection angle.

It seems the Mustang was armoured with a 1/4" plate (at least in some models), which would be equivalent to 6.35 mm. I have checked the Mustang manual, but it lacks the usual legend "protected against .30 in fire ... protected against .50 in fire" the armour and protection angle diagrams usually have. It shows different sectors in the overhead diagram, but they are not explained. It looks to me as if the legend was just forgotten, so the sectors would indicate that 6.35 mm was considered worthwhile protection against 12.7 mm rounds, but with the missing links in the logical chain, it would be better to find another example where thickness and protection level are stated more clearly.

One thing to keep in mind is that - as pointed out by Tony Williams ("Rapid Fire", "The Flying Gun") - rounds that penetrate light aluminium skin tend to tumble and lose a good part of their armour penetration ability. The British estimated from an analysis of the first Fw 190 they captured (they couldn't actually make firing trials as they needed the aircraft for further flight evaluation that from a dead astern position from 200 yards, even 20 mm semi-armour piercing rounds would be unlikely to wound the pilot unless they hit the armoured head protection through the canopy (avoiding tumbling that way). The Fw 190 had a 8 mm armour seat and a 5 mm back plate behind it.

In firing trials against a Me 109F, a 22 mm laminated duralumin bulkhead in combination with an 8 mm back armour was penetrated by 30% of the 12.7 mm armour-piercing shots fired from 200 yards and 5° off. This shows the statistical nature of the process - a good proportion of the hits were stopped, but there was no safety, and taking a prolonged burst would be certainly lethal.

>The thicknesses appeared enough to provide the same "ping" effect described by Wildcat pilots who recounted their experiences being riddled by gunfire.

Hm, do you know the actual thickness for the SBD? I didn't find anything on that, I'm afraid.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Nikademus, if you're interested in the air combat between the USN and Vichy France over Casablanca I would advise reading this old thread - our resident USN expert gives a great account of kills and losses (and I add a minute amount )

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/av...e-mk-iib-vs-grumman-f4f-4-wildcat-1550-2.html

1/4" steel plate was the common denominator for all US fighters.

The P-51B/C/D all had a 10 1/2"x19 1/2" by 1/4" plate on the rear of the seat and nothing forward except thick windscreen glass and the Packard Merlin. I vaguely remember some steel plate aft of radiator core but NOT sure of that.

Would not stop a 50 cal round under normal circumstances at 200 yards... and the existence of a 85 gallon fuel tank between the shooter and the armor plate, while self sealing, is not necessarily a 'comfort'.

Allegedly it was effective against the 7.92mm as Bob Johnson (same rear armor in P-47) and others experienced but I know a lot of fighter pilots that were ambivalent about the value and ultimately kept it because of flak fragment protection (none of them would admit to possibility of a German fighter getting on their tale - but I was talking with survivors)

Nikademus said:

1. I don't recall any instance offhand where an SBD claimed a Zero with it's foward guns, but against enemy bombers they did when acting in the role of anti-torpedo fire. They bagged 5 at Coral Sea (and got one D3A) But also suffered heavily to Zeros as a result of being caught singlarily. SBD rear gunners got from 1-2 A6M's at Midway, and 3 at Santa Cruz.

2. Rough summary so far shows 7 F4F's traded in the air for 11 French fighters.

Click to expand...

1. Several 2 plane scouting sections VB and VS-10 at Santa Cruz that separately made contact with the Japanese CAP claimed 7 Zeroes without loss, at least one to fwd guns in a 7 v 2 encounter by the VS-10 CO, though none of those claims check out apparently. The team of Strong and Irvine did however score at least one 500# hit on Zuiho, following by a several on 2 where their rear gunners claimed a Zero each, and both returned safely. Even aside from the aerial claims, it's hard to imagine pairs of Ju-87's of any model pulling off those missions, though I don't offer it as positive proof.

I read Lundstrom as verifying fewer victories for SBD's than you mention and the only clear Zeroes IMO were two of the CAP over Shokaku and Zuikaku v formation of VS and VB 8 at Santa Cruz.

2. I'd comment on R Leonard's tally of F4F-4 air combat losses at Casablanca(on the thread linked by Plan D above) as follows based on the detailed blow by blow in Cressman "Ranger":
"In aerial combat:
...
F4F (VF-41) Ens CE Mikronis to H75A, WIA, POW (said his engine was ko'd by AA in the strafing/air combat encounter over Cazes 11/8 )
F4F (VF-41) Lieut.(jg) CA Shields to H75A, POW (yes)
F4F (VF-41) Lieut GH Carter, ditched due to damage from H75A (yes)
F4F (VF-41) Lieut. MT Wordell to H75A, POW (downed by warship AA later the morning of 11/8 )

to AA fire
...
F4F (VF-41) Lieut.(jg) CV August, POW (like Mikronis could have been AA or fighter bullets over Cazes, but August didn't claim to know which)
..."

and I'd add
probable air combat loss:
F4F (VF-9) Ens CW Gerhardt of VF-9 ditched after an oil leak that appeared following the 11/9 combat with GC I/5 H75's.
possible air combat loss:
F4F (VF-41) Ens AD Conner, was in the 11/8 VF-41/GC II/5 combat, claiming an H75, ditched after the mission but cause not given in any source I know.
non air combat loss:
F4F (VF-9) Ens LA Menard: implied combat loss in the 11/9 combat in Lambert, but seems purely operational in Cressman.

The French plane losses in the two well known combats aren't certain AFAIK, from French sources in Lambert GC II/5's losses 11/8 were 5 pilot KIA, 1 WIA parachuted, 1 WIA 'landed roughly', 1 WIA plane fate not given, several other planes inoperative. The losses of GC 1/5 11/9 are given in Cressman as 2 pilot KIA, 1 pilot 'seriously burned', 2 'force landed'. French sources say the Armee de l'Air didn't use its Dw.520's though VF-41 claimed some in the first combat.

Another victory is found in comparing "La Bataille de Casablanca" by Mordal with Lambert. VGF-26 F4F's off Sangammon in the Northern Task Force claimed 1 + 2 probable French fighters w/o loss morning of 11/8 at Port Lyautey, but were not officially credited. However an Aeronavale Dw.520 failed to return at the same time and while the French assumed it was downed by AA of US warships, there's no matching warship claim.

So F4F-4 v French fighters could be 12~14+:3~6, but I'm not aiming to quibble over a small difference, especially in view of the uncertainty.

The one known SBD aerial victory in Morocco was a DB-7 credited to fwd guns of a VGS-29 SBD-3 off Santee in the Southern TF, actually a Potez 63.

Joe

ALL bombers have flaws and without fighter support its will greatily decrease the chances of sucess. The stuka was an excellent dive bomber at the start of the war. BUT as the war goes on the number of planes in the air increases and makes the Stuka more difficult to handle. The Stuka has fixed landing gear. Which means that it has a lot of drag. Vulnerable from the bottom and the front with little protection from the back. The Stuka could only do so much. AND as the war goes on it only gets more obsolete and the number of more and better enemy fighters increases. The Stuka could only do so much