my appologies on the late date. as far as Luftwaffe victories, perhaps they were mistaken on the # of russian sorties(?).
Kursk MkII - The Air Battle
- Thread starter parsifal
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
- Thread starter
- #22
parsifal
Colonel
This is some stuff of a general nature on the development of the VVS that I thought might be of interest:
"In April 1942, STAVKA appointed General A. Novikov as commander of the VVS and Deputy Commisar for Aviation. Novikov immediately set about rejuvenating the Red Air Force. He combined Front and Army Air Units into combined Air Armies. These large operational formations maximised the effective use of frontal aviation, concentrating air strength in support of ground operations. Each Air Army was allocated to support an Army Front. Close cooperation was ensured by placing the Air Army's deputy commander and his staff with the HQ of the Army Front to enable direct contact. The Front and Air Army commander's jointly worked out opearational plans, with the Army Front commander determining the priority of missions. The first Air Armies were formed in May 1942 with others following in June, July, August and November, by which time 13 separate Air Armies had been formed. Each Air Army consisted of two fighter air Divisions, each formed from four Regiments, two mixed air Divisions, each formed from two fighter and two ground attack Regiments. In addition to this was added a bomber Regiment, an air reconnaissance Regiment, a night bomber Regiment and a training Regiment. Air Regiments were also based around dedicated types of aircraft, helping to eliminate the logistical difficulties that arose from trying to maintain a variety of different aircraft types. The strength of the Air Regiment was increased from two squadrons to three, operating a total of 32 aircraft per Regiment. The centralisation of air Regiments also simplified operational planning, logistics, training, maintainence and command. Particular efforts were made to destroy German forward airfields and concentrate air resources against key areas involving increased liaison with ground forces. For the first time during the campaign the Red Air Force gained numerical superiority over the Luftwaffe. The quality of its aircraft and the proficiency of its pilots had also greatly improved.
In April 1943 the VVS began a series of long range raids on targets in East Prussia, using both Il-4's and Pe-8's. However the aircraft were soon reallocated to missions against tactical targets nearer the front line.
Following the battle of Stalingrad, aircraft of the Northern Caucasus Front air force and the Black Sea Fleet air force supported the Russian ground offensive against the Kuban bridgeheads in the Crimea. By the end of June 1943, Russian aircraft enjoyed air superiority over the Kuban region. Ground attack aircraft were employed in large formations against ground targets as were tactical bombers and fighter forces were co-ordinated by a series of ground control radio stations.
In preparation for the battle of Kursk the Russian air force took the initiative and launched a series of air strikes against German airfields, troop concentrations and supply depots, mounted by six air Armies. The result of these concentrated attacks forced the Luftwaffe to move its airfields further from the front and disperse their aircraft more thoroughly. Strenuous efforts were also made to upgrade forward airfields prior to the battle. During the battle itself the Red air force engaged in an intense air battle with the Luftwaffe. It also carried out concentrated attacks against ground targets with IL-2's taking a heavy toll against German armoured forces. Russian aircraft gradually wrestled control of the air from the Luftwaffe, which no doubt helped stall the German offensive which gradually came to a halt in mid July.
on"
From:
redairforce
"In April 1942, STAVKA appointed General A. Novikov as commander of the VVS and Deputy Commisar for Aviation. Novikov immediately set about rejuvenating the Red Air Force. He combined Front and Army Air Units into combined Air Armies. These large operational formations maximised the effective use of frontal aviation, concentrating air strength in support of ground operations. Each Air Army was allocated to support an Army Front. Close cooperation was ensured by placing the Air Army's deputy commander and his staff with the HQ of the Army Front to enable direct contact. The Front and Air Army commander's jointly worked out opearational plans, with the Army Front commander determining the priority of missions. The first Air Armies were formed in May 1942 with others following in June, July, August and November, by which time 13 separate Air Armies had been formed. Each Air Army consisted of two fighter air Divisions, each formed from four Regiments, two mixed air Divisions, each formed from two fighter and two ground attack Regiments. In addition to this was added a bomber Regiment, an air reconnaissance Regiment, a night bomber Regiment and a training Regiment. Air Regiments were also based around dedicated types of aircraft, helping to eliminate the logistical difficulties that arose from trying to maintain a variety of different aircraft types. The strength of the Air Regiment was increased from two squadrons to three, operating a total of 32 aircraft per Regiment. The centralisation of air Regiments also simplified operational planning, logistics, training, maintainence and command. Particular efforts were made to destroy German forward airfields and concentrate air resources against key areas involving increased liaison with ground forces. For the first time during the campaign the Red Air Force gained numerical superiority over the Luftwaffe. The quality of its aircraft and the proficiency of its pilots had also greatly improved.
In April 1943 the VVS began a series of long range raids on targets in East Prussia, using both Il-4's and Pe-8's. However the aircraft were soon reallocated to missions against tactical targets nearer the front line.
Following the battle of Stalingrad, aircraft of the Northern Caucasus Front air force and the Black Sea Fleet air force supported the Russian ground offensive against the Kuban bridgeheads in the Crimea. By the end of June 1943, Russian aircraft enjoyed air superiority over the Kuban region. Ground attack aircraft were employed in large formations against ground targets as were tactical bombers and fighter forces were co-ordinated by a series of ground control radio stations.
In preparation for the battle of Kursk the Russian air force took the initiative and launched a series of air strikes against German airfields, troop concentrations and supply depots, mounted by six air Armies. The result of these concentrated attacks forced the Luftwaffe to move its airfields further from the front and disperse their aircraft more thoroughly. Strenuous efforts were also made to upgrade forward airfields prior to the battle. During the battle itself the Red air force engaged in an intense air battle with the Luftwaffe. It also carried out concentrated attacks against ground targets with IL-2's taking a heavy toll against German armoured forces. Russian aircraft gradually wrestled control of the air from the Luftwaffe, which no doubt helped stall the German offensive which gradually came to a halt in mid July.
on"
From:
redairforce
Hello Parsifal
on your message #16, in my copy of Zetterling's and Frankson's Kursk 1943 (2000) p.124 the text is:
"Thus, the German forces operating in the vicinity of Kursk lost 193 aircraft shot down while performing 27,221 sorties. OF COURSE, FURTHER AIRCRAFT MAY HAVE BEEN (emphasises mine) written off when damaged..."
To me, not a native speaker, the meanings are different, may meaning the possibility and in your version it is given as a fact.
I'll check later what are the sources used by Wood and Gunston, I have a copy of their book which is a bit popular, plenty of big photos and a bit doubtful colour profiles and published by Leisure Books. Gunston is a great popularizer but sometimes a bit cavalier with his facts. On the other hand I respected greatly Tony Wood. IIRC the book did not have notes but I'll check is there info on from which they have got their loss figures.
On your message #10, I have doubts that VVS aircrews entered combat with only 20 hours flying time. when I'll have time I'll check my copies on FAF intelligence reports on VVS training, which IIRC are translations from LW intelligence reports.
Juha
on your message #16, in my copy of Zetterling's and Frankson's Kursk 1943 (2000) p.124 the text is:
"Thus, the German forces operating in the vicinity of Kursk lost 193 aircraft shot down while performing 27,221 sorties. OF COURSE, FURTHER AIRCRAFT MAY HAVE BEEN (emphasises mine) written off when damaged..."
To me, not a native speaker, the meanings are different, may meaning the possibility and in your version it is given as a fact.
I'll check later what are the sources used by Wood and Gunston, I have a copy of their book which is a bit popular, plenty of big photos and a bit doubtful colour profiles and published by Leisure Books. Gunston is a great popularizer but sometimes a bit cavalier with his facts. On the other hand I respected greatly Tony Wood. IIRC the book did not have notes but I'll check is there info on from which they have got their loss figures.
On your message #10, I have doubts that VVS aircrews entered combat with only 20 hours flying time. when I'll have time I'll check my copies on FAF intelligence reports on VVS training, which IIRC are translations from LW intelligence reports.
Juha
Last edited:
- Thread starter
- #24
parsifal
Colonel
Hi Juha
It can take a number of differnt meanings in English but in my opinion in the context of this passage, it signals uncertainty in the figures quoted, and suggests a likelihood of further losses not included in the account. Its called the "you understood" principal. English is such a user friendly language.....for every rule ther is an exception, and there are differences of emphasis between nations etc....its a minefield.
Zetterling seems to confirm his uncertainty in his other statements, which i have also quoted. But then again loss figures may need to be looked at very closely, and still we may not get to a set of numbers we can agree on. It happens. Should not come as any surprise, or be the cause of too much angst.
With regard to Post number 10, there are three separate sources that i know of that make reference to Soviet training times. You can get a bit of an overview from one of the wiki articles that I saw, it is also referred to in both Hayward and Hardesty in their books. I am reasonably confident this is an accurate representation of VVS training hours up to Kursk. Just be mindful that almost imediately after Kursk the russians began to take steps to improve their aircrew training which inevitably increase flying hours. As I suggested, i am pretty sure that by years end their rookie pilots were receiving closer to 150hours of training before committment.....and this is reflected in the much improved exchange rates the VVS was enjoying by that time.....around 3:2
It can take a number of differnt meanings in English but in my opinion in the context of this passage, it signals uncertainty in the figures quoted, and suggests a likelihood of further losses not included in the account. Its called the "you understood" principal. English is such a user friendly language.....for every rule ther is an exception, and there are differences of emphasis between nations etc....its a minefield.
Zetterling seems to confirm his uncertainty in his other statements, which i have also quoted. But then again loss figures may need to be looked at very closely, and still we may not get to a set of numbers we can agree on. It happens. Should not come as any surprise, or be the cause of too much angst.
With regard to Post number 10, there are three separate sources that i know of that make reference to Soviet training times. You can get a bit of an overview from one of the wiki articles that I saw, it is also referred to in both Hayward and Hardesty in their books. I am reasonably confident this is an accurate representation of VVS training hours up to Kursk. Just be mindful that almost imediately after Kursk the russians began to take steps to improve their aircrew training which inevitably increase flying hours. As I suggested, i am pretty sure that by years end their rookie pilots were receiving closer to 150hours of training before committment.....and this is reflected in the much improved exchange rates the VVS was enjoying by that time.....around 3:2
Hello Parsifal
clearly Zetterling and Frankson are uncertain with the real loss figures and after all they are ground war specialists who relied on secondary sources on air war questions, but IMHO one should faitfully repeat quotes between quotation marks, I accept some shortening for ex a/c in place aircraft etc.
And back to the topic, IMHO 20hours is simply too little, maybe they mean 20 hours after elemantary flight school in heavier types or even 20 hours in solo, even the latter sounds rather unbelieveble.
Juha
clearly Zetterling and Frankson are uncertain with the real loss figures and after all they are ground war specialists who relied on secondary sources on air war questions, but IMHO one should faitfully repeat quotes between quotation marks, I accept some shortening for ex a/c in place aircraft etc.
And back to the topic, IMHO 20hours is simply too little, maybe they mean 20 hours after elemantary flight school in heavier types or even 20 hours in solo, even the latter sounds rather unbelieveble.
Juha
- Thread starter
- #26
parsifal
Colonel
A short interview with a Soviet Fighter Ace
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJdTH8I6ub8
A film put out for training purposes by the VVS for the LA5...two parts
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHfEnNPp6Ds
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgXnzVCpA6Q
And one further vid on the La5 and LA7
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJzm4VoouLY
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJdTH8I6ub8
A film put out for training purposes by the VVS for the LA5...two parts
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHfEnNPp6Ds
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgXnzVCpA6Q
And one further vid on the La5 and LA7
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJzm4VoouLY
Last edited:
michaelmaltby
Colonel
Thanks for that, Parsifal. Another P-39 fan. 
MM
MM
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
The closest LW OB I can get for Kursk is from Price's "The Luftwaffe Data Book".......
17 May 1943
Luftflotte 4
Unit......Total/Servicable
II./JG 3........40/24
III./JG 3.......35/20
Stab./JG52....4/2
I./JG 52........38/17
II.JG 52.........28/14
III./JG 52.......37/22
15./JG 52.......10/6
10./ZG 1........12/7
Stab./SG 1.....6/6
I./SG 1..........51/41 (mixed a/c)
II./SG 1.........46/34
Stab./SG 2.....3/1
I./SG 2..........12/11
Panzerjaeger Staffel./JG 51......16/14
Stab KG 3......1/0
II./KG 3.........37/27
III./KG 3........31/13
Stab./KG 27....2/0
I./KG 27.........34/13
III./KG 27.......23/15
14./KG 27.......9/6
III./KG 51......21/11
Stab./KG 55....4/4
I./KG 55.........19/13
II./KG 55.......30/19
III./KG 55......33/20
I./KG 100.......37/35
Stab./StG 2.....9/8
I./StG 2.........30/23
II./StG 2........26/20
III./StG 2.......34/27
Stab./StG 3....2/2
I./StG 3.........38/22
III./StG 3.......33/16
Stab./StG 77.......9/8
I./StG 77............39/33
II./StG 77..........39/24
17 May 1943
Luftflotte 4
Unit......Total/Servicable
II./JG 3........40/24
III./JG 3.......35/20
Stab./JG52....4/2
I./JG 52........38/17
II.JG 52.........28/14
III./JG 52.......37/22
15./JG 52.......10/6
10./ZG 1........12/7
Stab./SG 1.....6/6
I./SG 1..........51/41 (mixed a/c)
II./SG 1.........46/34
Stab./SG 2.....3/1
I./SG 2..........12/11
Panzerjaeger Staffel./JG 51......16/14
Stab KG 3......1/0
II./KG 3.........37/27
III./KG 3........31/13
Stab./KG 27....2/0
I./KG 27.........34/13
III./KG 27.......23/15
14./KG 27.......9/6
III./KG 51......21/11
Stab./KG 55....4/4
I./KG 55.........19/13
II./KG 55.......30/19
III./KG 55......33/20
I./KG 100.......37/35
Stab./StG 2.....9/8
I./StG 2.........30/23
II./StG 2........26/20
III./StG 2.......34/27
Stab./StG 3....2/2
I./StG 3.........38/22
III./StG 3.......33/16
Stab./StG 77.......9/8
I./StG 77............39/33
II./StG 77..........39/24
Last edited:
I wouldn't quote it as a good source. At best a point of view between the others. It seems to use W. Murray numbres that are much less complete compared with quatermeister archives in Frieburg and Coblenz ones. Moreover ther'e a lot of blanks in german archives in the automn of 44.
Before criticising Groeler as Calwin does, it should have been cool 8) to provide his numbres first. They are difficult to find now.
Olaf Groeler biaised in fact, AFAIK because he quoted for german losses in West only from 70% destruction rates and from 30% in the East. Showing this way the Red Army as the main factor od destruction on the Lufwaffe.
There are similar examples from Murray's book in favor the opposite side founded by other authors browsing german archives, so he's far from being irreproachable too.
At least O.Groeler arranged the history but did not invented anything, and he wrote during iron curtain aerea, this was certainly the condition for a ticket to freedom in W. Germany public archives and green light to publish his works.
For me he's excusable and very usefull, once due precautions taken...
Regards
Last edited:
Sorry Juha, it was my sentence first, from Khazanov's book.
Maybe it's "20 to 30 training hours in advanced trainers *and combat* planes, as UTI-4, Yak-7V, and single seats?
* lost in translation from russian to french j suppose.
An omission in fact, but still not very impressive compared to 200 -300 flying hours of a german rookie of that time...
Last edited:
Rivet
Airman 1st Class
One historical scenario new to me certainly formed conditions on the Russian ability to rebuff the robust onslaught Hitler's troops posed. On October 1940 the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) under its new chief Lavrenty Beria began a series of purges of the Soviet Russian military. Over three hundred military commanders, several manufacturing functionaries and party military liason personnel were arrested on various, often bogus, charges. Confessions were induced under torture and the accused were summarily executed. These executions, coming as they did after the Stalinist purges of the late 1930's, certainly thinned the herd of many experienced military and civil leaders at a time when all were needed to counter the invasion from the West. This said, Soviet aircraft production actually increased manyfold during the last few months of 1941 under the threat of NKVD intimidation. Any mention of the effects of the purges on the military effort, Soviet or German, appreciated. This scenario certainly affected conditions well into the time period and areas we are considering here. Regards
Rivet
Airman 1st Class
Regarding the flying hours of Soviet aviation trainees, I have read mention of as little as 13 hours of powered flight training given to recruits. There are Lend-Lease sites on the internet that will confirm this figure.
- Thread starter
- #35
parsifal
Colonel
An interesting thesis that I found from a USAF Major dated 1980. I had difficulty scrolling through the article because its one of those facebook attachments, and I dont use facebook. Nevertheless I saw enough of the paper to conclude it might be of interest. Basically it argues that the germans put too much emphasis on the close air support mission at the expense of the interdiction mission, and that this mistake was a crucial factor in the air battle. Not sure if I agree totally with the major, buts still an interesting read.
Like I said, I found it difficult to navigate through the document, but it might be of interest just the same
Luftwaffe at Kursk
Like I said, I found it difficult to navigate through the document, but it might be of interest just the same
Luftwaffe at Kursk
Last edited:
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Sorry, hadn't seen the link before.
- Thread starter
- #37
parsifal
Colonel
These German OBs are unlikley to involve the 2100 aircraft attributed to the Germans for the Kursk operation. Any ideas why that figure is so oftyen quoted, and yet when detailed OBs appear, the numbers are much less than that???
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
That link doesn't include all the transport and recon Gruppen involved - just conbat active. Might change the numbers. Price also has numbers for those involved from Luftflotte 6 if interested.
Rivet
Airman 1st Class
In answer to your enquiry of post #37, Pasifal. There might be a discrepency in numbers due to including the number of all aircraft in a given unit against an official return which would include aircraft unservicable as such and not included in an effective strength tabulation. Regards
- Thread starter
- #40
parsifal
Colonel
Ill have a look as well, but in the meantime, is this figure of 2100 bogus. Total numbers is usually just that, and would include serviceable and unserviceable crates. At the moment, just doing a rough headcount, we might be lucky to see 500 LW aircraft in the lineup. Surely ther has to be a closer correlation in the numbers than that
