Kursk MkII - The Air Battle

[Erich]

curious Nik and Juha can you both elaborate further on Bergstroms "overally represents" statements ?

 

[Juha]

Hello Eric
for ex Bergsröm claims that Uman encirclement was the first encirclement executed solely by air power. Now having read some divisional histories, I know, can't remember which did what, but lets say that the point Kampfgruppe (army ad hoc formation) of 14th PzD was stopped because of Soviet resistance just N of one of the railways that run E from Uman , they saw fully loaded Soviet trains runnig to E out of the pocket, LW declared that it could not help, so the KG sent at night a Pioneer det. with PzGren and tank support to blow up a stretch of the railway to stop the traffic, further east the point of 16th PzD came across a railway line running E from Uman, at first it had a easy job to blast a couple trains coming from W but then the tank troop nearest to the railwayline was wiped off by a attack from the W by heavy Soviet tanks. Now trains are the easiest land transport to stop, one simply cut the rails, trains do not made detours through fields around the cuts.

Now nad then while reading CB's books one get an impression that ground forces were just spectators of air war. He seems to have very little understanding of the importance of artillery, which was the cornerstone of Heer's defensive systems and especially Soviets saw it as the king of the battlefield.

Juha

 

[Nikademus]

curious Nik and Juha can you both elaborate further on Bergstroms "overally represents" statements ?

I don't personally think that he did. The statement was a rhetorical one, sort of an 'auto-Devil's advocate' acknowledgement that different points of view can convey different impressions. Bergstrom's books naturally focus on the 'air-war' so they emphasis (naturally) the important roles that they played in the overall campaign. It might also be said that being focused on the air war exclusively there was more room to recount specific indicents where airpower was critical just as books focusing on the Panzer arm do.

There "is" support for Bergstrom's writings in other sources, including Glantz for one. His new volumes on the situation revolving around the 1942 summer offensive convey a new sense of profound respect for the tenacity and tactical/operational skills of the Werhmacht against a foe that at times would commit so many resources simotaniously to try to overwhelm the opposition. Fortunately the Soviet skill sets, particularily those of their leaders tied in with their Command and Control were not yet equal to the large masses they would throw into the fray. Sometimes the STAVKA would commit large army/corps sized operations just to hold down or distract the Germans from other active theaters.

It is easy to tie these sometimes desperate situations, with overstretched German resources, reserves (particularily their armor) and air assets with some of the issues Bergstrom cites for the Luftwaffe aka...competing priorities including what the German airmen themselves called "Flying Artillery" missions.

One could also say that the author of Pars.' article is exercising a bit in the art of "Sour Grapes" as its pretty clear from numerous readings that the Germans were much ahead of the curve when it came to effective CAS vs. the Western Allies, until later in the war.

 

[parsifal]

I agree with Niks assessment of the article. The good major has a point that is only partially valid, but stretches the argument a bit too far to remain in th main stream.

Are there any other articles that support this notion that the LW concentrated too much on "flying artillery" missions in the battle???? I have to say that I always assumed direct support to be a good thing, and one that the Germans excelled at to be honest. i cant help thinking that if the germans had concentrated their efforts on Interdiction, we would be saying why did they mis-use their equipment and concentrate on a mission that under-utilized their specilised direct support skills and equipment.....

 

[Erich]

good points Gentlemen I appreciate your comments very much, and not to take away from this thread but may I ask does Berstrom over the Ju 88 Destroyer staffel following up in the Soviet rearguard areas destroying trains ? As this does indeed have to be included with flying artilliere the Ju 88's were quite effective in their role.

 

[Rivet]

Blasting railroad ties by explosives by air had its momentary effect, but the Russians became quite adept at rapid repair of the damage. Certainly were enough stretches of railroad for bombers to hone their skills on, the Moskow-Don line served the Kursk area and various feeder lines to the smaller towns.

The mention of Soviet pilot recruits being set lose on active operations with only 13 hours of powered training is on the P-40 Lend-Lease site. This bit of NKVD induced madness did not make it into 1942 and the assecion of Novikov to leadership of the VVS.

I've thought of you're posing the question of "too much" flying artillery in the LW, Pasifal. Udet wanted all the aircraft, including the heavies to have dive bombing capability. The only dedicated horizontal bomber was the He-111. Though heavy strategic bombers existed in small numbers German inventory they were never used as such and only seen in the Russian theater in a transport capacity. Regards

 

[Juha]

Hello Rivet
In which LL P-40 article
a quick look on this serious article on P-40s in Soviet service, The P-40 in Soviet Aviation
did not reveal that kind of info, but some interesting point on VVS training

Quote: "Reserve air regiments served a dual function in the Soviet VVS: They were training centers for the transition of air regiments and individual crews to specific types of aircraft (analogous to the German C-Schule), and they also were depots for the distribution of these same types of aircraft to the frontal air regiments to replace losses. A reasoned caution was displayed with the Tomahawks. Despite a critical shortage of fighters, those in charge decided initially to train on these aircraft in the rear.
The 27th ZAP was formed in August 1941 specifically for training on the Tomahawk and Hurricane aircraft and was stationed at Kadnikov airfield (along the Arkhangelsk-Vologda railroad line, 140 km from Vologda). In 1941-42 this regiment was the gateway through which Tomahawks were delivered to VVS KA air regiments. The 126th, 154th, 159th, and 964th Fighter Air Regiments (IAP) and scores of individual crewmen were trained here. The regiment was reformed on 2 November into a 2-squadron composition (TOE 105/177) and on 27 December 1941 it had 15 Tomahawk IIBs (AN974, 978, AK172, 197, 243, 247, 250, 258, 321, 327, 342, 345, 363, 388, and 493), 4 two-seat Yak-7 training aircraft, and 2 UTI-4s. Despite the difficulties of utilizing these aircraft during the winter (malfunctioning engines, generators, and other components were the cause of a number of accidents), the instructors of 27th ZAP considered the Tomahawk a relatively simple aircraft to fly and fully within the grasp of pilots of average qualification. Thanks to its durability it withstood the clumsy landings and even forced belly landings that were unavoidable in the training process. Over the 14 months of its intensive exploitation, only five aircraft (AN974, AK316, 196, 243, and 321) were written off. Beginning in July 1942 the 27th ZAP began training on the Kittyhawk, but on 25 September it was disbanded and all the personnel and aircraft were transferred to the 6th Reserve Air Brigade.
The first regiment to arrive at 27th ZAP for training was the 126th IAP, on 15 September 1941. This regiment had fought in the I-16 and MiG-3 from 22 June and had good combat experience, attested to by the presence in the regiment of two Heroes of the Soviet Union (hereafter HSU)-Senior Lieutenants S. G. Ridnyy (Ukrainian) and V. G. Kamenshchikov received this rank by an order dated 9 August 1941...The Tomahawk was not complicated to transition to, and by 1 October 1941 the regiment was undertaking training flights. By 12 October the regiment had to return hurriedly to the front. Under the command of Major V. M. Naydenko, the regiment comprised of two squadrons (20 aircraft) flew to Chkalov airfield and began combat duty for the defense of Moscow"

in later part of that article they describe training with more details

Quote: "All aircraft were delivered to the 25th ZAP on Soviet territory (Adzhi-Kabul, Azerbaydzhan [near Baku]). This regiment was formed on 30 October 1941 for training in the LaGG-3, and with the opening of the southern route was re-profiled for foreign fighters. The training in the Kittyhawk began here on 19 November 1942 when the first three P-40Es arrived in the regiment (nos. 1533, 1547, and 1548 [23]). Almost immediately (23 November 1942) they were assigned to the 45th IAP for training. Because of a lack of sufficient numbers of aircraft of a single type, the regiment was trained in two types: Airacobras and Kittyhawks. The instructors and students were in training almost simultaneously, but in a wholly serious manner. 32 pilots completed 671 hours of training, including 1,682 landings, 155 training aerial engagements, 112 passes at ground and 98 at air targets, and 134 routine cross-country and 113 instrument flights."

That is appr 20 hours IN SERVICE TYPE but that is late 42. And Soviets constructed 2-seat fighter trainers also from LL a/c which show some emphasis on training, even before WWII they had produced 2-seat versions of I-16 just for training and Yak-7 began its life as a 2-seat fighter trainer.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

View attachment Bergstroms deployment map.pdfI finally have a copy of Bergstroms Book....very impressed. No wonder you guys sing its praises

I thought I would post his deplyment map to claify where the various air units were

 

[Altea]

View attachment 174339I finally have a copy of Bergstroms Book....very impressed. No wonder you guys sing its praises

I thought I would post his deplyment map to claify where the various air units were

Nice map in colors, but there are no mention to the 5th VA of the Steppe front, in the rear. Of course it did not participated to the defence operations, but was a kind if inssurance as some other independent stavka reserve units in case of german breakthrough.

 

[Rivet]

Thanks for the inclusion of the deployment map, Parsifal. It works well with the two maps included on page one of this topic. Regards

An observation regarding Georgy Zhukov. That fellow certainly had luck on his side, both in his operational career and dealing with his fellow Soviet Russians. Zhukov missed most of the purges, only running into personal flak post-war when Beriev tried using air commander Novikov as a foil to try and get him. Beriev did not succeed and was shot some time later, after Stalin's death. Regards

 

[Erich]

Gentlemen my reference was in effect shooting up locos and trains not bombing tracks and stationery rail targets

will be curious Parsifal on your thoughts on Bergstrom's work as you progress..........

 

[Nikademus]

I agree with Niks assessment of the article. The good major has a point that is only partially valid, but stretches the argument a bit too far to remain in th main stream.

Are there any other articles that support this notion that the LW concentrated too much on "flying artillery" missions in the battle???? I have to say that I always assumed direct support to be a good thing, and one that the Germans excelled at to be honest. i cant help thinking that if the germans had concentrated their efforts on Interdiction, we would be saying why did they mis-use their equipment and concentrate on a mission that under-utilized their specilised direct support skills and equipment.....

Good direct support "is" a good thing but like other airforces of the time, the Luftwaffe personell and leaders did not want to end up a glorified artillery brannch of the Army, subject to it's whims and demands. They saw their primary mission as establishing superiority over the enemy airforce and completing vital operational tasks such as those previously mentioned. There was even a small strategic component as well.

The CAS missions though were vital, not the least of which was due in part because unlike the lavish army of the US and the later war Soviets, the Army didn't have enough ground support of it's own (aka "Artillery" etc) to be able to assist the infantry at all times hence the Luftwaffe got called in to shuttle run CAS missions, sometimes many times per day for the same aircrews. As mentioned, it also had the negative effect of wearing down the Luftwaffe making it that much harder for it to conduct it's broader scope of operations.

But yes....the CAS was important.....even vital at times. Of particular note was the oft maligned Ju-87's were critical in this theater for their ability to provide pinpoint support, and the Zerstorers which came into their own as effective fighter-bombers. (Despite the reletive obsolecence of the opposition initially, here as elsewhere the 110's utility as a straight up fighter was limited)

One of the best books on this aspect and the conflicts between Luftwaffe and Army requirements is James Corum's "The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940" This is a facinating work on the development of the Luftwaffe, it's doctrine, polices and training. Corum's central argument is that the Luftwaffe was a fully developed Operational airforce vs. the "tactical" (aka Ground support) airforce it is often portrayed as. I highly recommend the book.

 

[Juha]

On VVS training, some pilot memoirs, giving info on their training, the first pilot completed his training in Spring 43 the second late Winter 43/44

Interview with Vladimir Mukhmediarov

"— Did you apply yourself, or were you sent by a directive?
I did it my self. When I finished aeroclub, I was younger then 18 years old, and because of this I was not accepted to a military flight school. Later, from winter 1940, I started flying in Zheleznodorozhniy aeroclub.
…
— What did you study in aeroclub?
There was a program in aeroclub. Theory at first, then flight practice. We flew Po-2 with instructor, take offs-landings. Then maneuvers in the zone. Loops, all kinds of combat turns, zooms. That's with instructor. Then instructor would allow solitary flight. A bag of sand would be placed in the rear cabin in order not to change weight balance…
— How many flights did you make before your first solo flight?
About fifteen with instructor. In the second aeroclub I flew solo on the sixth flight already.
In the beginning of 1941, in February, perhaps, instructors from Chernigov military flight school came. They examined how everyone was flying, and the best were listed as candidates.
After that my file was sent from the Voenkomat to the flight school. I came to Chernigov flight school in the beginning of April.
I passed medical commission, but at vesting commission they said:
— You are not 18 years old yet. You should go home.
I replied:
— I will be eighteen in the end of April.
— Fine, we will accept you.
And they allowed me to pass. I studied from 1941 until 1943. When the War broke out, we begun studying with increased speed, by a shortened program…
At first we studied on I-15bis and I-16. There also were I-5, but we did not fly them, only taxied and trained holding direction on take offs and landings. The fabric from the wings was torn away, so that no one would take off. It was done because we had no twin control I-15Bis…
…I finished the flight school in 1943. Instead of supposed four years of training in took two years. Training was weak. Only piloting, in general. At first I-16. UTI-4. I almost completed full program. In 1942 we received Yaks. They were built in Saratov. I finished Yak-1 training program, again take off-landing, and zone practice.
…
During training time, how many flights did you make?
Before I got to the front? A few. They are listed in my logbook. Here: U-2, 57 hours flown. UTI-4 – 24,5…
I finished the school in March 1943."

AND

Interview with P.Ovsyannikov

"…Then we moved on to the Yak-7. In July 1943 they graduated us; we "chased down" the group that had already completed in the Yak-7, but after the I-16. Well, we were like the guinea pigs—test animals. In July they commissioned us with officer rank—junior lieutenant. Before this they graduated as sergeants.
…
Upon graduation, how many total hours had you flown?
Altogether 100 hours, including the aero club. About ten hours in the Yak at flight school. The program was local flight—circuits around the airfield and in the local area. One time we flew cross-country as a pair.
…
Well, we went to Moscow. We arrived at the personnel department and, instead of the front, they sent our entire group to Ivanovo—to be transitioned to the Cobra. On the one hand it was unfortunate, but on the other hand perhaps we were lucky. Initially we were upset. Well, we were officers and we were eager to get into the fight.

We arrived in the town Ivanovo at the 22nd Reserve Air Regiment. We went through another "terka" and transition training. There were no dual-control Cobras. They checked us out in Yaks. The food was worse in the reserve regiment than at flight school. I don't remember the norm number. At the front, you could eat as much as you wanted for dinner. At the training regiment you could eat only as much as they gave you. Don't ask for more! We were young then, and constantly wanted to eat.
…
Describe the program for transitioning to the Cobra.
What did we do in the Cobra? First, circuits around the airfield, then a program of flights in zone where we worked out the techniques of piloting the airplane. We did as our instructor directed—there was no dual-seater.
Before the completion tests, that is, toward the end of the program, I had an assignment: fly out, then go to a [gunnery] range and fire my machine guns at ground targets…"

Sometime in February 1944 he was assigned to a first-line fighter regiment

"…Tell us, did you conduct any practice aerial engagements?
Both coordination and training aerial engagements. They trained us well. We fired at both ground and aerial targets. The aerial target was a fabric sleeve towed behind an airplane. They used Cobras to tow it. They rolled it up in a ball, then cast it out, and it fully deployed."
…
Did you consider your overall training, including that which you received in the aero club, in the reserve regiment, and later in the regiment before combat, sufficient or barely adequate?
Of course, it was not enough. When I went to the front, I had only 12 flights in a Cobra…"



Juha

 

[Rivet]

Interesting bit of journalism included by you here, Juha. Both Germany and the Soviet Socialist Republics realized the importance of the role aviation would play in their efforts to force their political creedos on the rest of us. Civil aviation in both nations was developed as a springboard to developing military aviation. Both political systems nurtured manufacturing and development efforts by subsidizing efforts. The long-term effects of the efforts were the results seen at the Kursk conflicts, and beyond.

I include here article extract mention of pre-war Soviet Civil aviation efforts.:

By 1935 Russia had 140,000 glider pilots, and in Dec. 1936 the government's youth newspaper called for training 150,000 aircraft pilots, all state-paid and of course quite expensive. By 1941 there were 121,000 'civilian sports'-trained pilots. The other pilots were of course trained, and then mass-trained, by the Russian Air Force. The number of flight schools in the Russian Air Force increased to 12 in 1937, to 18 in January 1940, to 28 in Sept. 1940, and to 41 in early 1941. Russia trained military and para-military pilots and paratroopers at an enormous cost and at an incredible rate which even dramatically increased in 1939 and then even further in 1940, far beyond any reasonable defensive need.

regards

 

[parsifal]

I'm still intrigued with the loss figures for both sides. Bergstrom gives figures for the Luftwaffe as those written off or lost straight away, and those subsequerntly scrapped by the LW QM. I wonder are the first totals part of the second, or are the second additional to the first. Also does the QMs write off figures include those aircraft slated for repair, but lost or scdrapped anyway as a result of Soviet territorial; advannces, or logistic difficulties at the front. I have a good source now, but this only seems to raise more questions for me than are answered.....

The elephant in the room are Soviet losses. Bergstrom appears to give figures that pretty much align to other sources that I have, but I wonder if these represent total losses, from all causes, or if there are attritional losses that we have to add to those figures given by Bergstrom. I was hoping Altea or someone with a better grasp of the VVS might share some of their knowledge in this area.....If you need Bergstroms loss figures for the Soviets, I can post thyem if you like....

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
what is wrong with the Khazanov's numbers 2800 a/c lost by VVS incl the losses of the participating ADD and PVO units, timeframe 5 Jul - 23 Aug 43 and LW losses of 1463 a/c of 4th and 6th Air Fleets written off, timeframe 1 Jul - 31 Aug and because 4th Airfleet suffered losses also on its southern wing Khazanov thinks that LW losses during the Kursk battles (5 Jul - 23 Aug 43) were 2000 destr and dam a/c. Now Khazanov isn't the most highly regarded aviation historian with Russian specialists but neither hopeless one.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

Nothing, I guess, but LW losses seem high and VVS losses seem low, plus we just dont know from any source whether all losses are included in their list, or if it omits or overlooks some of the loss figures. 2800 to 2000 seems like a reasonable number, but that is a lot closer than would have assumed.......

 

[Altea]

The elephant in the room are Soviet losses. Bergstrom appears to give figures that pretty much align to other sources that I have, but I wonder if these represent total losses, from all causes, or if there are attritional losses that we have to add to those figures given by Bergstrom. I was hoping Altea or someone with a better grasp of the VVS might share some of their knowledge in this area.....If you need Bergstroms loss figures for the Soviets, I can post thyem if you like....

Frankly, i would have like to keep it for the end, in the conclusion, as a kind of Hitchkok's suspense...8)
It should have been better to study the battle first, and then conclude...
However, now if it can help you, even if the effect is lost:

Originally Posted by Ratsel
...According to Christer Bergström, VVS losses amounted to 1546 a/c

Bergstorm is using compilated Krivosheyev's data.

Juha:According to Khazanov, VVS losses during the Battle of Kursk as Russians definite it (5 July - 23 Aug 1943) were 2800 a/c, that incl. ADD and PVO losses which occured during the sorties connected to the battle.

Khazanov is using raw war diaries data. In this case the real amount can even reach up to 3300.

What's the truth? Who's right?
Both are right!

In fact raw data losses list are just the arithmetic sum from war diary losses. Much of them are redundant, that mean the same plane and pilot can be lost several times ahead. Some lost planes and pilots written-off in diaries can be later recovered, and much later you go in time, the much lower are definite losses. But once soviet diary counts are finished in 17:00 by regiment and sent at 19:00 to the division, even the later in the day, recovered planes pilots after 17:00 are not mentionned inside.

Moreover one plane due to complicated and plethoric soviet maintenance chain (5 levels AFAIR) could be written off several times, one at each level: W.O. in régiment and then sent to division, then W.O. in division and sent in corps, W.O. in corps and sent to the Air Army maintenance workshops , in PARMs etc, and even that, being finally restored by industry or mobile factry workshops! That mean WO by military authority, but restored by the Ministry of Industry means!!!
That makes up to 5 artificially increased losses (write-offs in fact) accounts for zero lost plane at final count!

Complilated data were mainly written after the war by HQG, using all available sources. Published first in 1993 by a team leaded by col Krivosheyev, after perestroika and glasnost time, and the first of all, end of the 50 years legal moratory period.

Well, balance = 0 at 2-3% tolerance error. Account is good. Nothing else to say...

Regards

 

[Juha]

Nothing, I guess, but LW losses seem high and VVS losses seem low, plus we just dont know from any source whether all losses are included in their list, or if it omits or overlooks some of the loss figures. 2800 to 2000 seems like a reasonable number, but that is a lot closer than would have assumed.......

Hello
Khazanov's VVS figure is for total losses, LW figure 2000 is total losses and damaged, but as Altea wrote, K's VVS number might well be too high, on the other hand LW damaged incl those which could have been repaired at the unit level, so even the LW 2000 isn't comparable to VVS 2800. Maybe appr.1150 LW total losses vs 1546 VVS total losses if the Bergström's figure is for 5 Jul - 23 Aug 43 and incl the losses suffered by ADD and PVO units that participated to the Kursk Battles, you have a copy of CB's book, so.. And the 1150 is only my guess made in 30sec, nothing too serious.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

Guys, great work, and thankyou for your patience. I apologise for not being much help other than to ask the questions I guess.....


So, our figures for losses are 1546 for the Soviets to maybe 1150 for the LW, July to end of August.....does anyone wish to challenge or add to that estimate.....we might as well try and reach concensus on this interesting subset, before moving on.