Lend Lease for Britain (1 Viewer)

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

I'll be interested to see that. I would suspect that this was mostly in the second half of 1941 after Lend-Lease was passed, when the US FDR taking the lead against Japanese aggression.
I certainly can't see them extending much help from July - Oct 1940 after they've shut down the Burma road.
Nor will financial help do much good at the beginning of 1941, without the ability to buy US armaments.

Freebird,

British financial contributions to China are discussed in a 1991 essay by Philip Richardson '"Plucking the China Brand from the Burning": Britain's Economic Assistance to China and Sir Otto Niemeyer's Mission, 1941-42', China Quarterly No. 125, pp. 86-108. I made a mistake in my original statement - British financial aid outstripped all others, including the US, through the end of 1940. One addition, however, was that the UK-based loans were made on far more favourable terms than those of the US.

KR
Mark
 
[
It took a few days for me to consider the implications of this scenario. Though not apparent its fundamentally different from Ctrians theory. Ctrian was basically arguing that Britain could not survive without Lend Lease, and (by extension) that the US was the sole source of military production that made any difference to the allied fortunes. Clearly I do not agree with that basic position.

Parsifal, I'm very much agreed with almost all of your post

Parsifal said:
I would argue until the cows came home that Britain had the capacity to survive indefinately from Germany, she did not have the means to defeat her. Put as eloquently as I can, Britain was the instrument of Allied survival, but the US was the instrument of victory. Without the US onboard, there could be no thought of defeating the Germans.

Thats a strong possibility but its also possible that without lend lease the Eastern front could drag on for years ending in a stalemate like Iran Iraq..

There are actually quite a few "endgame" possibilities, but the UK would be hard pressed to avoid a Nazi or Soviet domination of Europe. Don't forget the US may well change course again after the Nov 1942 congressional elections. :confused:

But let's take this one step at a time
Parsifal said:
What this hypothetical is asking, is what would happen if the Len Lease Act were not enacted. By extension, I suppose we also need to spend some time on what would happen if the US remained neutral, and Japan also did not enter the war.

Indeed, let's concentrate on 1940/1941 before we move on to the later years.

Lets deal with these three 40/41 questions first:

1.) Japan Pacific strategy

2.) Economics Production in 1941

3.) Commonwealth steel production. - How many tons of steel did the CW produce in '41? and how much did they import from the USA?
 
Sorry Free if I don't have the grey matter to really respond intelligently to your post - at least for the next month! :) But a few have surmised about no Lend-Lease. Could US manufacturers have moved operations into Canada vis-a-vis GM and Mexico and thereby by-passed the neutrality restrictions?
 
Sorry Free if I don't have the grey matter to really respond intelligently to your post - at least for the next month! :) But a few have surmised about no Lend-Lease. Could US manufacturers have moved operations into Canada vis-a-vis GM and Mexico and thereby by-passed the neutrality restrictions?
GM and Ford were both im Canada amd pumped out 800000 military vehicles 2nd only to US , Canada also delayed declaring war so that they could order militray stuff from US without messing up US neutrality stance
 
If the Japanese enter the war and the US does not, thats end of game in my opinion. If Japan enters the war and US does as well, with the US stronger than she was historically because of no Lend lease, but the British weaker, also because of no Lend lease, I see no great change occurring to the final outcome. The details however might be intersting. If Australia and the other Pacific CW nations are taken off the Lend Lease drip feed from the beginning of the war, you are goiung to see a lot more indigenous innovation...Boomerang fighters instead of P-40s, CA4 Bombers instead of A-20s, AC! and AC4 tanks, Battle Class Destroyers, home built shipping etc, Because British technical assistance would end with tizard, the US will not have quite as marked an advantage over the Japanese in certain fields.....for example the introduction of VT shells might be delayed a couple of months, they might not have quite as advanced radar, they may not have benefitted froom British experiences in the desert war or BoB experiences in air technologies as they did. Stangard US air armaments might remain 2 x 30cal and 1 x 50 cal instead of 6 x 50 cal. Its hard to say what the outcome might be....though the overall outcome of the war would be unnaffected.

Insofar as war production is concerned, wiki has an intersting article on Axis vs Allied GDP. Allied advantage historically reaches its nadir in 1941, with an advantage of just 1.51. By 1942 it has jumped to about 2.92:1 and thereafte just continues to climb, to a high of 5.02 atr the beginning of 1945. Thereafter Allied demobilzation starts to have an effect, and of course the Axis are surrendering. I dont see Lend Lease affecting that much, execpt in 1941, when military imports from the US drops. Overall that affects British income by about 6%, but CW income will go up, possibly by about 4% or so. So the nett effect of no Lend Lease in 1941 is about a drop of 0.2, so the allied adfvantage in GDP drops to about 1.47 or so....nothing to worry about at all IMO.

In regards to Steel production I dont have great figures, mostly because I dont any figures for the minor players. Of course the US has the lions share of production, with about 80m tons of steel production per annum. British production hovers at the 12.3m tons pa, Canadian is at about 3m tons. Australia in 1940 had recently completed two additinal blast furnaces (bringing the total to 6) and and additional steel manufacturing facilities. According to the official History:

Though much had been done in the way of preparing the steel industr y for the emergency of war, a great deal remained to be done after war broke out . No one could have predicted exactly what the demands on it would be. The completion at Whyalla of a sixth blast furnace, which began operation in May 1941, was a major step in the wartime expansion of the industry. It brought the total capacity for producing pig iron up to 1,764,000 tons a year ; the maximum output of 1,543,973 tons was achieved in 1941, but thereafter, owing to the inevitable decline in manpower available for industry, and, after 1943, the decline in demand, production
fell. The output of iron and steel from 1938 to 1944 is shown in the accompanying table . To keep pace with the increased output of pig iron it was necessary to build more open-hearth furnaces for making steel: one was built at the Newcastle Steelworks, and two at the works o f Australian Iron and Steel at Port Kembla . This step did not of itself guarantee an increased supply of steel . There remained the problem of obtaining the raw materials used in the conversion of pig iron to steel

Pig iron(tons)/Ingot steel (tons )
1938-39 1,104,605/1,171,78 7
1940-41 1,475,707/1,647,10 8
1941-42 1,557,641/1,699,79 5
1942-43 1,399,306/1,632,82 5
1943-44 1,305,357/1,527,564


With regards to South Africa, I dont have good information. However there were two Blast furnaces at the end of WWI, plus major expansions occurred in her steel industry in 1934. Today South Africa outproduces Australian Steel production by a considerable margin....we produce 7.9m tons per annum, they produce 10.6m tons. Canada produces 14m tons by comparison. If that basic relationship existed in 1940-41, then South Africa probably produced about 2m tons in 1941.

India is a complete enigma, but a reasonable gues might be 1m tons of steel.....do you have any information, because I dont.

The rest of the Commonwealth probably amounted to less than a million tons.....again have no information, I am just guessing on that one


Taking into account all this, we can say for sure that the british CW output was definately at least 16.8m tons, , has a high probablity of producing at least 18.8m tons, and a possibility of producing about 20.5m tons. German steel production was 21.5m tons in 1940, and 28.2m tons in 1941. They had access to the French steel making capoacity as well as the rather limited capacities of the rest of occupied Europe. Italian steel production was about 2.1m tons in both 1940 and 1941. Total Axis steel production in 1940 was 24.6m tons and 31.1m tons in 1940 and 1941
 
Thanks Neil, but would it be a possibility to increase production there to meet UK demands? And Boeing and Curtiss, etc moving to Canada for the same ?
They basically did supply the UK with motorized transport. A surprising thing and little known is the amount of Canadian women that worked the assembly line from Canada at both Curtiss and Bell no green card required at the time and they are close to border. Niagara Falls on both sides of the border was very heavy into abrasives due to the proximity of power sources
 
".... So my gut feeling from this is that the Russians will come out of this as the sole power in control of Europe...."

I agree. And for Stalin the ultimate target was to take on the US - as it was for Hitler BTW :). His game began when Stalin triumphed over the "internationalists" in the Party and began building 'Communism, In One Country'. The technology transfers with Ford, Austin, PacCar to name a few - came after 1930. But from 1922-33 Stalin was tightly focused on Germany - training for tanks and Air in Russia, bought and paid for by Germany. Of course all ended after Hitler took complete power in 1933, but by then Stalin had purchased the factories to build an industrial (military and agricultural) economy.

So yes - given the climate of the '30's in Europe and the world - had it not been for Britain - the Commonwealth - and then the US .... Stalin would have got to Brest by 1950. And he would have had the help of European intellectuals who were Red Tolerant .... :)

MM
 
Last edited:
Freebird,

British financial contributions to China are discussed in a 1991 essay by Philip Richardson '"Plucking the China Brand from the Burning": Britain's Economic Assistance to China and Sir Otto Niemeyer's Mission, 1941-42', China Quarterly No. 125, pp. 86-108. I made a mistake in my original statement - British financial aid outstripped all others, including the US, through the end of 1940. One addition, however, was that the UK-based loans were made on far more favourable terms than those of the US.

KR
Mark

Interesting find Buffnut.
I can't seem to access the full article (without paying $$$ lol ) but I found this abstract of the article

Plucking the China Brand from the Burning': Britain's Economic Assistance to China and Sir Otto Niemeyer's Mission, 1940–42
Philip Richardson
For over four years from the Marco Polo Bridge incident to Pearl Harbour China fought alone against Japanese military expansionism in the Far East. Both Britain and the United States recognized China's strategic importance but gave relatively little in the way of material help. On the one hand sufficient aid had to be given to ensure that China continued to act as a bulwark against Japanese imperialism and to keep China from gravitating to the Soviet Union (whose aid programme was more immediate, more generous and took the form of military supplies). On the other hand assistance was limited by British resource constraints, by American isolationist public opinion and by the fear, on both sides of the Atlantic, that overt military aid would provoke Japan into widening the conflict into their own respective spheres of interest.

This seems to be going in the direction I was thinking, the UK would like to prevent total Japanese domination, provided that they could do so without provoking a war. It also confirms that "relatively little" material help could be given, as Britain really had very little to spare in the way of armaments. The term "UK based loans" in 1940 also likely includes US money sent through the UK, as while the US neutrality act allows Cash Carry, it forbids loans or credits to belligerents.

However I think there are three points to remember here:

A.) While the British would like to avoid having Japan in complete contol of China, having either of the alternatives in total power is not desired either.
~They obviously don't want the Communists to win (The Red Plague) especially as Britain and the Soviet Union are enemies at this point
~The KMT is also seen as a dangerous nationalist organization, it's been banned in British Malaya since the late 20's, and is somewhat allied with Nehru and the Indian nationalists seeking to overthrow British rule.

B.) At the beginning of 1941, the Japanese seem to be stalled and on the defensive, while the communists KMT often seem to be fighting each other. The two most significant actions are the CPC completing the "Hundred Regiments offensive", inflicting serious damage disruption on Japanese transportation and coal producing assets, while the KMT on the other hand seem to be fighting the CPC, with the "New Fourth Army Incedent" taking place in Jan 1941.

C.) The British under Churchill have shown little hesitation to put British interests first, as in attacking (former allies) the French, or sacrificing Polish independance to Soviet control.
If the cost to provide support to the KMT (of questionable benefit) would be conflict with Japan I just don't see them doing it.



The end result (IMO) would be that British ( Dutch) position wouldn't change from Nov '40 through the end 1941, they would continue to sell oil metals to the Japanese. Without US leadership there would be no embargo or much in the way of arms provided, although they would turn a blind eye to some low-level smuggling of arms to the KMT through Burma.

Without the embargo LL arms flowing to China the Japanese will start to improve their position in the second half of 1941, however as they do so the will most certainly face stiffer resistance from the CPC KMT, as the two will have to stop fighting each other and concentrate on the Japanese.

End result: While the Japanese position in China will improve through '41-'42 with no Pacific war, I don't think they have enough strength to take control of China in this period.
During 1942 the danger posed by a more powerful Japan and the economic damage caused by strict neutrality will become a central question in the 1942 Congressional elections, so one might expect that US positions could change significantly after Nov 1942
 
One must also remember the political aspect - Churchill was willing to employ pretty much any tactic to draw the US closer into the war on the side of the Commonwealth. In that context, Lend Lease was a major victory for his political strategy.

The only powers who could stop Japan were Britain and America. Without Britain, America had to do it all alone, which simply wasn't conceivable. When it became apparent that British gold reserves were running out, making it difficult for her to continue buying US armaments, the options were to leave Britain hanging out to dry or to find some way of helping. Lend Lease was the implementation of the latter approach.

Buffnut, you are correct, however it's only part of the story. Most people think of L-L as FDR offering an altruistic helping hand to the British.
In fact, L-L and related deals helped out the US as much as it did the UK.
The armaments under L-L helped to jump start the US economy into high gear, and it also allowed the US to try evaluate new designs before putting it into production.
It was finally able to leave the Great Depression behind.
(US unemployment remained above 15% until 1940)
It also provided a reason to get the British on board with the US Pacific strategy.


Now, had the US decided to go into full isolationist mode it would result in the UK shifting production to the Dominions (mainly Canada), although somewhat more difficult than using US production, could still be done.

There are several benefits to using Canadian production vs US, one of the main ones is removing the requirement to pay for supplies in hard currency.
It looks like Churchill vastly overestimated the help that the immediate help US could give to the UK, while he badly underestimated the potential short-term harm that US entry to the war could bring.

Despite the advent of L-L, the UK was still forced to pay cash for most of it's aircraft vehicles delivered in 1941. Only 100 of 2,400 aircraft and 6,000 of 14,000 vehicles that arrived in 1941 came through Lend-Lease.
 
Last edited:
Without the economic and military support of the U.S. in the Pacific I still could not envisage a south-east Asia completely dominated by the Japanese because the naval power can only be extended so far inland; places like India and China would not be fully conquerable simply due to the overwhelming numbers faced by a small Japanese invasion force. The Japanese push into India was a massive upset, to put it lightly; a stalemate might ensue but I think the battle in the Pacific (without the U.S.) would have been dominated by the outcome of Europe after the intial phases of the conflict. Could the British and Soviet Empires overcome the Axis in Europe then turn on Japan...I don't know.
As for the economic implications, I must add that during the First World War Britain considered itself the economic and naval powerhouse of the Entente, while France were considered the military might... maybe without the U.S. Britain would hold a border at India, pour considerable resources into North Africa to hold and then use the Commonwealth as the power house to support the Soviet Union ...using them as the hammer. As for the Lend Lease helping the U.S. there's lessons to be learnt here across the world...stop cutting back and start providing money to build an economy again! The British debt now has been this high or high in 220 of the last 250 years...yet we cut back...and when the consumer cuts back and then the government cuts back its disaster. The bond markets were quick to jump on the boost in spending for the U.S. economy in World War II , and carried on after...and they would do the same today.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back