I never said it was good, just the only one in mass production capable of reaching the necessary altitude in 1941-42. The lack of capabilities demonstrate how little of a threat they would be other than potential ramming attacks.
I will repeat: a regular pilot flying a standard MiG-3 could hardly perform combat maneuvers above 8,000 meters due to defects in the oil system. Test pilots and the most experienced pilots could reach 10,000 meters, but even they had extreme difficulty attacking enemy aircraft at that altitude. In 1942, the Yak-7PD outperformed the MiG-3 in almost all features, including ceiling. Apart from aircraft with the M-105PD (which was never completed before the end of the war), there were also special versions of the Yak-1 with the M-105PF for air defense.
The Yak-9? Again not a serious threat in 1942 and in 1943 they were needed at the front lines.
The Yak-9PD was in any case a much greater threat than the MiG. It was only not mass-produced because the Spitfires arrived. On August 22, 1943, as many as 15 fighters were scrambled to intercept Ju 86Rs in the Moscow area: three Yak-9PDs, two Spitfires, two P-39, six Yak-1s, and two MiG-3s. The only one that fired at the Junkers was a Spitfire, which reached an altitude of 11,500 m, while the Yak-9PD reached 11,100 m, the MiG-3 reached 10,800 m, the Yak-1 reached 9,500 m, and the Airacobra reached 9,000 m. And in 1944, the M-106PV Yak-9 reached an altitude of 13,500 m, with most of the cooling problems solved - the aircraft was ready for mass production. But in 1944, high-altitude Junkers no longer flew over Moscow.
I didn't say anything about entire factories, just that they helped with the buildup of industry.
This collaboration ended in 1933. It was then resumed in 1939, but in a different form.
In fact the Germans had very good intelligence on Soviet Ural developments:
Nevertheless, German estimates were not very accurate, sometimes unjustifiably overestimated, which is surprising—apparently, the Germans had such a low opinion of the Red Army that even its industrial potential did not scare them.
Also you haven't provided a single source of your claims so far, so it is a bit rich that you're demanding sources now.
I asked about only one source for the figure "1/3." It turned out that it referred only to iron production, not to the whole industrial production. And I did not mention a specific figure, although in Russian-language sources I came across the figure "40%" for the share of the military industry in 1942, but this share increased significantly after the evacuation of factories from the European part of the USSR.
The main producers of steel and cast iron in the USSR were the southern regions of Ukraine and Russia accounting for 70-80%. If these facilities were destroyed or not evacuated, there would be no need for the Uralbomber - the factories in the Urals would not be able to compensate for this loss.
My source which is not easily searchable at the moment, were German estimates in the Germany and the Second World War series.
Much depends on what you mean too by industry. In 1937 31% of all Soviet iron was coming out of the Urals:
History of metallurgy in the Urals - Wikipedia
Initially, we were talking about the share of the entire industry. As we can see, my skepticism was justified—it turned out that the figure 1/3 referred only to the share of iron production.
Industry was in wartime production.
After the war in the West, the German military industry worked without much pressure, failing to provide the required quantities of weapons. This is described by the Germans themselves, for example, by Hans Kehrl in "Bilanz des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Erkentnise und Verpflichtungen fur die Zukunft" (The Results of World War II: Insights and Obligations for the Future). In other words, there was an opportunity to increase production significantly much earlier, but the time was lost.
They didn't have the political capital to mobilize to 1943 levels, but even then that was more political theater than reality, as has been pointed out about the Speer myth.
What do you mean by "political capital"? Hans Kehrl wrote that the only reason was inadequate assessment of the opponent and overestimation of own capabilities.
The big problem in 1941 was not going for Moscow in September.
It was just one of several critical mistakes, but perhaps the most serious one.