Making the Uralbomber work

[bf109xxl]

I am aware, but it was the only fighter that the Soviets had in 1941 with a supercharger that would allow them to operate at the height heavy bombers would operate at.

Armed only with machine guns? With pilots untrained to fly at high altitudes? With a turn time of 45 seconds at an altitude of 9,000 meters? In reality, the MiG-3 performed poorly in air defense. Above 8,000 meters, only very experienced pilots, or rather, only test pilots, could fly it with confidence.

Later on they had access to higher altitude British and American fighters, but that was later than the 1942-1943 period.

Special versions of the Yak were produced for air defense in the USSR starting in 1942. They also suffered from many shortcomings, but overall they were at least as good as the MiG, and much easier for pilots to master.

About 1/3rd of Soviet industry was in the Urals as of 1940, the Germans helped until 1932 in building it up during the cooperation period between the Reichswehr/German industry and the USSR. Clearly the Luftwaffe planners decided in 1933 that needing to be able to bomb the Urals was going to be a factor down the road.

What specific factories were built in the Urals as part of the cooperation between the USSR and Weimar Germany? It is well known that the Soviets purchased equipment in the late 1920s and early 1930s. But the Germans probably didn't have a good idea of the scale of construction already in the mid-1930s.
By the way, I would appreciate a source for the "1/3" figure for the share of Soviet industry in the Urals. What year is that figure from?

I disagree about the A-A line, logistically it was impossible.

This would be possible if the Germans had not underestimated their enemy and had not made fatal mistakes in planning their operations during the offensive. Logistical problems could be solved by switching industry to wartime production as early as 1941.

Now Moscow falling was and I agree that it's loss in 1941 is basically fatal for the USSR even if they hold the Donbas.

After the fall of Moscow, Leningrad would surely fall too - the forces that were freed up would be enough for Donbass and everything else.

 

[Howard Gibson]

Heinkel He 177 Greif - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The majority in 18 months from January 1942-June 1943 historically. That was only because the newer design took longer to get to the production stage, there is zero reason they couldn't have done that earlier, especially given how much they ended up wasting on the Ju288 project. Maybe in this scenario Junkers does the heavy bomber project and Heinkel creates a next generation twin engine bomber not based on the Jumo 222.

He177 construction did not tax German industry, the engine layout was screwed up by the Daimler/Benz and Udet technical departments. The He177 was more complex than the aircraft I'm talking about. After all the Ju290 (the Ju89/90 development) worked fine as did the 6 engine Ju390, as was the BV222 which used 6x Jumo 207s:

Junkers Ju 290 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Junkers Ju 390 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

It is a fact that production of an He177 in 1944 took less time than production of a Ju88 in 1940. They tweaked the design to make it more manufacturable, and they improved their production tooling. Srategic bombing still is a huge undertaking, consuming resources that might be better used elsewhere. After 1941, the Germans were completely committed to the design and production of war technology. Which program should they discontinue?

The above makes it seem like they could have easily done that with the 4 engine Ju89 design and created a 6 engine.

Technically these were less complex as they were not designed to dive bomb nor did they had the welded together engines driving a giant propellor. In fact the Lancaster started similarly as a coupled engine, twin propellor Manchester:

The British brought into service the Short Stirling, the Avro Manchester and Lancaster, and the Handley Page Halifax. The Amricans brought into service in the ETO the Boeing B17 Flying Fortress and the Consolidated B24 Liberator. They built and flew the Douglas B19, and they developed and produced the Boeing B29 Superfortress, which did not reach the ETO. The Lancasters and the Flying Fortresses were successful in the ETO. That is an awful lot of bomber development. In the late thirties, the Manchester was a good idea. It was not obvious that the Rolls Royce Vulture would not work out. The comparable German effort would have been to develop the Dornier Do19, the Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor, and the various Junkers Ju90 based aircraft in the hopes that something would become a good bomber.

I am aware, but it was the only fighter that the Soviets had in 1941 with a supercharger that would allow them to operate at the height heavy bombers would operate at. Later on they had access to higher altitude British and American fighters, but that was later than the 1942-1943 period.

I keep arguing here that the Germans failed to develop the two-stage superchargers needed for effective high-altitude fighters. This was devastating for them when the P47s and P51s showed up. In the absence of escorting fighters, the Bf109s and Fw190s had more than enough performance to engage and destroy an unacceptable number of the high-altitude American bombers. The MiG3 may have been a piece of crap, but was it too crappy to shoot down unescorted bombers? Could you mount a couple of extra cannons in under-wing gondolas to provide bomber destroying firepower? This failed over Germany because of American escorting fighters.

If there are too many German strategic bombers, the Russians learn to like Spitifire_IXs. In the absence of escorting fighters, we lose the .303 machine guns, and we install four 20mm cannon in the C-wings. They were configured for this.

About 1/3rd of Soviet industry was in the Urals as of 1940, the Germans helped until 1932 in building it up during the cooperation period between the Reichswehr/German industry and the USSR. Clearly the Luftwaffe planners decided in 1933 that needing to be able to bomb the Urals was going to be a factor down the road.

The Germans knew where pre-war Soviet industry was. How about all the stuff they moved east after the war started?

In 1812, Napoleon captured Moscow, and his campaign ended in disaster. There was a precedent for losing Moscow.

 

[bf109xxl]

In 1812, Napoleon captured Moscow, and his campaign ended in disaster. There was a precedent for losing Moscow.

Do you think that Moscow had the same significance for Russia during Napoleon's time as it did for the USSR in the 1940s?
Do you know where the capital of the Russian Empire was during Napoleon's time?

 

[Howard Gibson]

Do you think that Moscow had the same significance for Russia during Napoleon's time as it did for the USSR in the 1940s?
Do you know where the capital of the Russian Empire was during Napoleon's time?

In 1812, it was in St. Petersburg, or whatever they called it then. This was not a good place for most of WWII.

If we don't like being at war, we need to rely on the chivalry of the Nazis. All of the choices sucked.

 

[bf109xxl]

In 1812, it was in St. Petersburg, or whatever they called it then. This was not a good place for most of WWII.

However, the defense of Leningrad distracted large Wehrmacht forces, which could have been used much more effectively on other sections of the front.

If we don't like being at war, we need to rely on the chivalry of the Nazis. All of the choices sucked.

In 1941, Moscow was the most important railway hub, without which the entire Soviet railway transport system would have collapsed. Needless to say, it was also the largest industrial region and control center. Even if the supreme command had been evacuated, the Soviets would not have been able to establish effective control after losing Moscow. The insane centralization made the USSR very vulnerable.

 

[Howard Gibson]

However, the defense of Leningrad distracted large Wehrmacht forces, which could have been used much more effectively on other sections of the front.

In 1941, Moscow was the most important railway hub, without which the entire Soviet railway transport system would have collapsed. Needless to say, it was also the largest industrial region and control center. Even if the supreme command had been evacuated, the Soviets would not have been able to establish effective control after losing Moscow. The insane centralization made the USSR very vulnerable.

You are assuming that the strategic bombing will be effective enough to make up for the resources removed from the battlefield to provide the bombing resources.

 

[wiking85]

Armed only with machine guns? With pilots untrained to fly at high altitudes? With a turn time of 45 seconds at an altitude of 9,000 meters? In reality, the MiG-3 performed poorly in air defense. Above 8,000 meters, only very experienced pilots, or rather, only test pilots, could fly it with confidence.

I never said it was good, just the only one in mass production capable of reaching the necessary altitude in 1941-42. The lack of capabilities demonstrate how little of a threat they would be other than potential ramming attacks.

Special versions of the Yak were produced for air defense in the USSR starting in 1942. They also suffered from many shortcomings, but overall they were at least as good as the MiG, and much easier for pilots to master.

The Yak-9? Again not a serious threat in 1942 and in 1943 they were needed at the front lines.

What specific factories were built in the Urals as part of the cooperation between the USSR and Weimar Germany? It is well known that the Soviets purchased equipment in the late 1920s and early 1930s. But the Germans probably didn't have a good idea of the scale of construction already in the mid-1930s.
By the way, I would appreciate a source for the "1/3" figure for the share of Soviet industry in the Urals. What year is that figure from?

I didn't say anything about entire factories, just that they helped with the buildup of industry.

Germany–Soviet Union relations, 1918–1941 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

In the late 1920s, Germany helped Soviet industry begin to modernize, and to assist in the establishment of tank production facilities at the Leningrad Bolshevik Factory and the Kharkov Locomotive Factory.

Also:

History of metallurgy in the Urals - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

At the end of the 1920s, Soviet design institutes, with the involvement of foreign companies, began designing the giants of the Ural metallurgy and mechanical engineering — Magnitogorsk, Chelyabinsk and Novotagilsky metallurgical plants, Ural Heavy Machinery Plant, Uralvagonzavod and Pyshminsky Copper-Electrolyte Plant.

What role did Germany play in industrializing the USSR in the 1930s?

In the late 1920s and early 1930s the Soviet state carried out a policy of rapid industrialization. One of the main goals was to end the country’s dependence on imports from western capitalist states. Ironically, to achieve these goals Moscow had to seek help from those very same Western...

www.gw2ru.com

In fact the Germans had very good intelligence on Soviet Ural developments:

The Forschungsamt’s biggest success

The Air Ministry’s Research Department ( RLM/Forschungsamt) was an intelligence and codebreaking service created by Hermann Goering in 1933....

chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com

Reports on the Soviet economy issued by German Army’s Leitstelle der Nachrichtenaufklärung

In the period 1936-45 the German signal intelligence agencies were able to intercept radio traffic from the interior of the Soviet Union (b...

chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com

Report on the war industry of the Soviet Union

There is a file at NARA called SOVIET UNION, SURVEY OF THE RECORDS OF THE BAND I (NR 3708 CBTM13 20293A 19420201). It is a German est...

chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com

Also you haven't provided a single source of your claims so far, so it is a bit rich that you're demanding sources now.
My source which is not easily searchable at the moment, were German estimates in the Germany and the Second World War series.
Much depends on what you mean too by industry. In 1937 31% of all Soviet iron was coming out of the Urals: History of metallurgy in the Urals - Wikipedia

Iron ore production by 1937 reached 8.7 million tons (31% of production in the USSR), and copper ore by 1935 had reached 2.96 million tons.

https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Industrial-development-of-the-USSR-in-1926--1940-C-Roskartografia-National-Atlas-of_fig5_359906667

This would be possible if the Germans had not underestimated their enemy and had not made fatal mistakes in planning their operations during the offensive. Logistical problems could be solved by switching industry to wartime production as early as 1941.

Industry was in wartime production. They didn't have the political capital to mobilize to 1943 levels, but even then that was more political theater than reality, as has been pointed out about the Speer myth. The big problem in 1941 was not going for Moscow in September.

After the fall of Moscow, Leningrad would surely fall too - the forces that were freed up would be enough for Donbass and everything else.

Agreed.

 

[bf109xxl]

I never said it was good, just the only one in mass production capable of reaching the necessary altitude in 1941-42. The lack of capabilities demonstrate how little of a threat they would be other than potential ramming attacks.

I will repeat: a regular pilot flying a standard MiG-3 could hardly perform combat maneuvers above 8,000 meters due to defects in the oil system. Test pilots and the most experienced pilots could reach 10,000 meters, but even they had extreme difficulty attacking enemy aircraft at that altitude. In 1942, the Yak-7PD outperformed the MiG-3 in almost all features, including ceiling. Apart from aircraft with the M-105PD (which was never completed before the end of the war), there were also special versions of the Yak-1 with the M-105PF for air defense.

The Yak-9? Again not a serious threat in 1942 and in 1943 they were needed at the front lines.

The Yak-9PD was in any case a much greater threat than the MiG. It was only not mass-produced because the Spitfires arrived. On August 22, 1943, as many as 15 fighters were scrambled to intercept Ju 86Rs in the Moscow area: three Yak-9PDs, two Spitfires, two P-39, six Yak-1s, and two MiG-3s. The only one that fired at the Junkers was a Spitfire, which reached an altitude of 11,500 m, while the Yak-9PD reached 11,100 m, the MiG-3 reached 10,800 m, the Yak-1 reached 9,500 m, and the Airacobra reached 9,000 m. And in 1944, the M-106PV Yak-9 reached an altitude of 13,500 m, with most of the cooling problems solved - the aircraft was ready for mass production. But in 1944, high-altitude Junkers no longer flew over Moscow.

I didn't say anything about entire factories, just that they helped with the buildup of industry.

This collaboration ended in 1933. It was then resumed in 1939, but in a different form.

In fact the Germans had very good intelligence on Soviet Ural developments:

Nevertheless, German estimates were not very accurate, sometimes unjustifiably overestimated, which is surprising—apparently, the Germans had such a low opinion of the Red Army that even its industrial potential did not scare them.

Also you haven't provided a single source of your claims so far, so it is a bit rich that you're demanding sources now.

I asked about only one source for the figure "1/3." It turned out that it referred only to iron production, not to the whole industrial production. And I did not mention a specific figure, although in Russian-language sources I came across the figure "40%" for the share of the military industry in 1942, but this share increased significantly after the evacuation of factories from the European part of the USSR.
The main producers of steel and cast iron in the USSR were the southern regions of Ukraine and Russia accounting for 70-80%. If these facilities were destroyed or not evacuated, there would be no need for the Uralbomber - the factories in the Urals would not be able to compensate for this loss.

My source which is not easily searchable at the moment, were German estimates in the Germany and the Second World War series.
Much depends on what you mean too by industry. In 1937 31% of all Soviet iron was coming out of the Urals: History of metallurgy in the Urals - Wikipedia

https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Industrial-development-of-the-USSR-in-1926--1940-C-Roskartografia-National-Atlas-of_fig5_359906667

Initially, we were talking about the share of the entire industry. As we can see, my skepticism was justified—it turned out that the figure 1/3 referred only to the share of iron production.

Industry was in wartime production.

After the war in the West, the German military industry worked without much pressure, failing to provide the required quantities of weapons. This is described by the Germans themselves, for example, by Hans Kehrl in "Bilanz des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Erkentnise und Verpflichtungen fur die Zukunft" (The Results of World War II: Insights and Obligations for the Future). In other words, there was an opportunity to increase production significantly much earlier, but the time was lost.

They didn't have the political capital to mobilize to 1943 levels, but even then that was more political theater than reality, as has been pointed out about the Speer myth.

What do you mean by "political capital"? Hans Kehrl wrote that the only reason was inadequate assessment of the opponent and overestimation of own capabilities.

The big problem in 1941 was not going for Moscow in September.

It was just one of several critical mistakes, but perhaps the most serious one.

 

[Shortround6]

The problem I have with the whole Ural bomber concept is the scope of the distances/problems is often glossed over.
Gorki is about 250km past Moscow. Kazan is about 450km past Moscow.

For context It is about 450km from Brussels to Birmingham, which I will grant is not quite the same thing.
What is more relevant is the 600km from Norfolk-Suffolk to Hamburg vs the 1750km from Bryansk to Tankograd.
We are talking about B-29 type distances. Not slightly stretching either B-17 or Lancaster distances.

What the Russians could do or not do in regards to German raids that were 2-4 hours in Russian airspace vs what they could do to raids that needed 8-9 hours (or more).
Assuming that the Germans only needed a few more years to change the laws of physics (bending radio waves around curve of the earth) is also a little optimistic.

Using 6 diesels to try to get enough power to make up for not having larger engines that allow only 4 engines makes depending on the diesel fuel economy a little iffy.

Now if the Germans were trying to build/use a 1000km radius bomber and not a 1750km radius bomber I might have a lot more faith in the outcome.

 

[wiking85]

The problem I have with the whole Ural bomber concept is the scope of the distances/problems is often glossed over.
Gorki is about 250km past Moscow. Kazan is about 450km past Moscow.

~560 miles from Kharkov and it's excellent pre-war airbases. Literally straight up a river line to the city. The Germans bombed it with twin engines repeatedly if you look back at all the info I've already posted in this thread. For reference the max range for the He111 was 1400 miles.

For context It is about 450km from Brussels to Birmingham, which I will grant is not quite the same thing.
What is more relevant is the 600km from Norfolk-Suffolk to Hamburg vs the 1750km from Bryansk to Tankograd.
We are talking about B-29 type distances. Not slightly stretching either B-17 or Lancaster distances.

That is true, getting to the Urals is going to be really hard and require a limited payload.

What the Russians could do or not do in regards to German raids that were 2-4 hours in Russian airspace vs what they could do to raids that needed 8-9 hours (or more).
Assuming that the Germans only needed a few more years to change the laws of physics (bending radio waves around curve of the earth) is also a little optimistic.

Again you're forgetting that Russia is not an integrate air defense system, it is mostly uninhabited and not near airbases and had very limited access to radar, mostly from 1943 on in a few places. There is no intercepting bombers to the Urals with point defense and virtually no AAA or air bases near the Urals factories. They could be built, but then you have the problem of flying to altitude in time with their shitty engines and very limited armament. Also there is geographic navigation, so the beams themselves aren't necessary. You can navigate during day with a compass and instruments, using visual aids to fix navigation errors.

Using 6 diesels to try to get enough power to make up for not having larger engines that allow only 4 engines makes depending on the diesel fuel economy a little iffy.

I'm talking about the developed version by 1941, which would be 1000hp at a minimum per engine, probably more with the need to develop the diesel aero-engines. See the Jumo 208. The extra power and engines actually help a lot to get to altitude where drag isn't a major issue and bigger wings actually help not hinder. I wouldn't worry about the fuel economy since we do have a perfect model for what could be achieved by 6x Jumo 207s:

Blohm & Voss BV 222 Wiking - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

• Empty weight: 30,650 kg (67,572 lb)
• Gross weight: 45,990 kg (101,391 lb)
• Max takeoff weight: 49,000 kg (108,027 lb)
• Ferry range: 6,100 km (3,800 mi, 3,300 nmi)

Junkers Ju 89 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

• Empty weight: 17,164 kg (37,840 lb)
• Gross weight: 22,800 kg (50,266 lb)
• Max takeoff weight: 27,801 kg (61,290 lb)

The max takeoff weight for the historical Ju89 with less than 4000hp combined for its engines was lower by 3 tons than the empty weight of the Bv222, which could travel 3800 miles and had much worse aerodynamics being a seaplane transport. It was not designed for aerodynamics.

So a 6000hp minimum Ju89 at let's say 30 metric tons thanks to the 2 extra engines and extra fuel tanks plus wing area with max long range load is still lighter than the Bv222, has better aerodynamics, and can easily travel as far as a ferry range Bv222. No reason it couldn't take 2 tons of bombs on that journey given the excess weight capacity. That's assuming max take off weight of the OTL model with no refinements or extra allowances for it having extra power from 2 extra engines compared to the OTL design.

Now if the Germans were trying to build/use a 1000km radius bomber and not a 1750km radius bomber I might have a lot more faith in the outcome.

Even if we say that is the case with Gorki and Yaroslavl the main targets, then they could easily carry 5 tons of bombs from Kharkov or Bryansk. Starting in say Spring of 1942 Soviet tank production among other things will be having a very tough time. That's also not counting attacks on Saratov or Kazan, both of which were hit IOTL with twin engine bombers, but in only limited raids. Dedicated strategic bombers have a laundry list of targets to hit and per that book by the Russian historians I've cited already about the German strategic bombing effort in Russia in 1942-43, the Germans were fully satisfied with the results of their efforts, they just started too late IOTL and then were sidetracked by Kursk and the events after. Starting earlier they can keep up the pressure and deny the Soviets important production at THE critical moment in the war.

 

[Shortround6]

Again you're forgetting that Russia is not an integrate air defense system, it is mostly uninhabited and not near airbases and had very limited access to radar, mostly from 1943 on in a few places. There is no intercepting bombers to the Urals with point defense and virtually no AAA or air bases near the Urals factories. They could be built, but then you have the problem of flying to altitude in time with their shitty engines and very limited armament.

China did not have an integrated air defense system in 1936-39 (or after for that matter). Britain did not have an integrated air defense system in 1915-1918. And yet they managed to both provide at least some incepts on attacking planes (or zeppelins). Part of this is response time. What you needed for warning time against 90-150kph aircraft in WW I (or ability to track and plot movements) in WW I was not going to work against 300-400k[h aircraft in WW II. What worked for the Chinese against 200-300kph aircraft Flying over hundreds of km of China is also not going to work over short distances and slightly faster aircraft with Germany raiding England. The problem with long distance raids is that it gives even a poor air defense system 5-8 hours to reposition aircraft closer to the Germans return routes. You don't need radar (although nice to have) to track a large bomber formation taking 4 hours to get back from a deep penetration raid to hit German controlled airspace. Telegraph signals from railway stations near the German routes? Germans planes are not stealth, unseen by ground observers (depends on clouds) and planes heard at location X and then at location Y 45 minutes later should give indications of speed and direction.
Short distance penetrations are much harder to deal with. German planes are circling their own airfields waiting land when the long penetration raiders are still 2 hours inside of Russian air space. Short distance penetration also can use large (relative ) deviations in course to avoid Soviet fighters lurking on the direct return route. Long distance penetration's find this harder to do. Fly the return journey 200km to the side of the impound route? Yes but a what cost in range (more fuel means smaller bomb load).
First few raids are going to hard to stop (or get retribution for) but assuming the Soviets will make no changes to the air defense set up for months is not realistic.

Also there is geographic navigation, so the beams themselves aren't necessary. You can navigate during day with a compass and instruments, using visual aids to fix navigation errors.

All of that is true, also is the fact that many WW II aircraft from different countries managed to get themselves lost using compass/instruments and visual aids all during WW II.
Cloud at different heights, changes in windspeed from forecasts.

 

[wiking85]

China did not have an integrated air defense system in 1936-39 (or after for that matter).

And the Japanese could range over their country with impunity.

Britain did not have an integrated air defense system in 1915-1918.

And the barely dented the offensive bombing force.

And yet they managed to both provide at least some incepts on attacking planes (or zeppelins).

Britain is a much smaller country and in WW1 didn't really stop the German attacks before the end of the war. Nor inflicted the necessary attrition to wear it down. The Zeppelins were a unique target and they ceased to be of value in general for the military by 1915-16.

Part of this is response time. What you needed for warning time against 90-150kph aircraft in WW I (or ability to track and plot movements) in WW I was not going to work against 300-400k[h aircraft in WW II. What worked for the Chinese against 200-300kph aircraft Flying over hundreds of km of China is also not going to work over short distances and slightly faster aircraft with Germany raiding England. The problem with long distance raids is that it gives even a poor air defense system 5-8 hours to reposition aircraft closer to the Germans return routes.

Which routes would those be and what loiter time/radar warning was possible? The Soviets once again had a point defense system and even in June 1943 couldn't even dent bombing attacks near Moscow. What do you think they could do in the Urals when the threats are much greater even closer to the capital?

You don't need radar (although nice to have) to track a large bomber formation taking 4 hours to get back from a deep penetration raid to hit German controlled airspace. Telegraph signals from railway stations near the German routes? Germans planes are not stealth, unseen by ground observers (depends on clouds) and planes heard at location X and then at location Y 45 minutes later should give indications of speed and direction.

You actually do if you don't have people to observe them. Russia is not Britain, the latter is heavily populated and an integrated air defense system with ground observers, the first nation-wise radar grid, and the Y-intercept service telling them that a raid was getting ready to take off. Germany had something similar. The Soviets had nothing even close to that outside of specific point defenses like around Moscow or Leningrad only. Random reports from random stations are not going to reach the necessary places hundreds of miles away because they did not have a national defense grid. It seems like the conceptual problem you're having is you're superimposing the British system on the Soviets. They were completely different and the Soviet one was so full of gaps even the He111, obsolete in the west since 1941 during the day, was able to operate over the Eastern Front in 1944.

Short distance penetrations are much harder to deal with. German planes are circling their own airfields waiting land when the long penetration raiders are still 2 hours inside of Russian air space. Short distance penetration also can use large (relative ) deviations in course to avoid Soviet fighters lurking on the direct return route. Long distance penetration's find this harder to do. Fly the return journey 200km to the side of the impound route? Yes but a what cost in range (more fuel means smaller bomb load).
First few raids are going to hard to stop (or get retribution for) but assuming the Soviets will make no changes to the air defense set up for months is not realistic.

Again the Germans were able to fly 550+ miles to attack Gorky in mid-1943 and not be intercepted. 650+ sorties and a sub-1% loss rate. The RAF would have salivated over loss rates like that in 1943, especially for the distances involved. See how the attacks on Berlin went, which was nearly the same distance.

All of that is true, also is the fact that many WW II aircraft from different countries managed to get themselves lost using compass/instruments and visual aids all during WW II.
Cloud at different heights, changes in windspeed from forecasts.

Sure, it is hardly fool proof, but given the Sonne system of radio navigation that worked over the Atlantic had a 1500 mile range, there is little reason it couldn't work to reach the Urals.

 

[bf109xxl]

The Soviets had nothing even close to that outside of specific point defenses like around Moscow or Leningrad only.

+ Baku. Since late 1941, the Soviets were trying to reinforce the air defense of the inner regions, especially the Volga region, but the measures taken were totally inadequate. There was even a case of a Junkers aircraft flying unpunished under a bridge in Gorky in May 1942.

 

[wiking85]

+ Baku. Since late 1941, the Soviets were trying to reinforce the air defense of the inner regions, especially the Volga region, but the measures taken were totally inadequate. There was even a case of a Junkers aircraft flying unpunished under a bridge in Gorky in May 1942.

Depends with Baku. Per Haywood it had limited defenses until September 1942. Prior the Luftwaffe could have had free reign. After that the Soviets built it up, but it wasn't in the same league as Moscow or Leningrad. They also did build up Gorky during June 1943, but even then the efficacy despite the numbers of defenders was pretty bad. Not useless, but pretty bad.
Russian wikipedia about the raids on Gorky has some interesting sources, though others are blatant propaganda and the sources contradict one another:

«Война и нас покрыла своим крылом»

Немецкие авиационные удары по Горьковскому автозаводу (1941—1943 гг.) Аннотация. В статье на основе документов партийных и советских органов власти, периодической печати, воспоминаний очевидцев рассказывается о бомбардировках германской авиацией Горьковского автозавода в годы Великой...

lib-avt.ru

 

[bf109xxl]

Depends with Baku. Per Haywood it had limited defenses until September 1942. Prior the Luftwaffe could have had free reign. After that the Soviets built it up, but it wasn't in the same league as Moscow or Leningrad.

Baku was defended no worse than Leningrad. By the end of the 1930s, Baku's AA artillery was equal to that of Leningrad in terms of quantity and quality. In the 1930s, there were only three air defense corps districts in the USSR: Moscow, Leningrad, and Baku. During the war, the Moscow district became an air defense front, while the Leningrad and Baku districts became air defense armies. In 1940, Baku's air defense fighter aviation was significantly strengthened—in 1941, it consisted of nine fighter aviation regiments, the same number as in Leningrad's air defense. Source (Volume I as well):

They also did build up Gorky during June 1943, but even then the efficacy despite the numbers of defenders was pretty bad. Not useless, but pretty bad.
Russian wikipedia about the raids on Gorky has some interesting sources, though others are blatant propaganda and the sources contradict one another:

«Война и нас покрыла своим крылом»

Немецкие авиационные удары по Горьковскому автозаводу (1941—1943 гг.) Аннотация. В статье на основе документов партийных и советских органов власти, периодической печати, воспоминаний очевидцев рассказывается о бомбардировках германской авиацией Горьковского автозавода в годы Великой...

lib-avt.ru

I can recommend a good source, but unfortunately it is only available in Russian: the book by Zefirov, Degtev, and Bazhenov, "The Swastika over the Volga: The Luftwaffe Against Stalin's Air Defense," 2007.

 

[Shortround6]

So what if the Junkers company disregarded the restrictions of the RLM and the RLM was more forward thinking and accepted what Junkers offer with a 6x Jumo 205 diesel fueled Ju89? The wing area could be cut down on with more power and given the Ju390 later on a 6x engine long range bomber was not a problem. We could even reference the B36, but a pusher configuration is beyond the scope of this what if. But with 6 such engines and 1/3rd lower fuel consumption per engine, the Ural bomber concept was viable for much greater than the specifications called for. The Urals could actually be reached and hit from East Prussia by 1941 with a developed Ju89 with Jumo 207 engines.

We can reference a lot of things that we probably should not.
The US had established a pretty good reputation in the 1930s for both aerodynamic design and structural design/fabrication. US was not building exceptional warplanes for most of the 1930s but the US transports were widely used. A number of German designers (and others) worked for several years in American companies in the early/mid 30s, perhaps the benefits of both sides? But most of the Germans went back to Germany (which had not been allowed to build much for aircraft until after 1933).
When looking at 1930s aircraft flying boats were not just landplanes that could fly off of water. They were large (heavy) planes with small engines that could use very, very long runways. Longer than most (any?) land runways in certain years.
Boeing XB-15 was a ground breaking aircraft in it's time and was a record setter for heavy loads in land planes. But it never got better engines. It was also slow, max speed of 197mph and cruise of 145mph which made it pretty useless as a warplane. Taught Boeing a lot about how to design/build large airplanes which they used on 314 Clippers which pretty much used a B-15 wing on a flying boat hull and used 1500hp Wright engines instead of the 1000hp P&W engines. The Air Corp did not bite on a version of the XB-15 powered by the Wright engines. It would have been better than the XB-15 but aerodynamics and construction had moved on. The up rated B-15 would have been too slow and not provided the performance with bombload and ranges the USAAC was looking for.
Now please note that the Boeing 314s started with 6000hp from 4 engines and didn't need 6 engines like the BV 222 or several French flying boats that used 6 HS 12Y engines.
Douglas XB-19 was another giant that became obsolete even before it was built. Douglas was loosing money on it and begged to be released from the contract. The USAAC said no, they wanted the engineering data, they knew they would never order a production version.
B-29 used a wing about 60% as large as the wing on a 324 Clipper. It gained a lot of weight, it used larger engines (not quite large enough) and without the US bulldozers (and other construction equipment) would have taken many months longer to get into service.
B-36 was using several generations later construction and aerodynamics from a 1930s design and was using six 3000hp engine (to start) which turned out to be nowhere near enough.

2 jet engine pods, with about 4 1/2 times the power of an ME 262 helped it get off the ground.

Perhaps the Germans should have worked on the DB 603 a little harder or Jumo 213 and gotten them into service in 1942.
Either one and put a pair on a Do 217 with extended wings (extra fuel tanks out board of the engine nacelles?) for higher altitude and a bit better cruise efficiency.
Two medium bombers for every one super bomber?

 

[WARSPITER]

From an assessment made using bombing effect data by comparing the bombing offensive by US and British strategic bombers
the Luftwaffe could not have had a strategic bombing campaign against the USSR without serious consequences.

The main problem was logistics / money. germany only had a certain amount to budget for the entire military. Resources were also
a problem as Germany did not have enough by itself. What was allocated was limited.

Manpower and training time didn't allow for a strategic bomber force without seriously depleting the tactical bomber force.

Calculations using all these factors show that a reduction of the tactical bomber force (single and twin engine)
to allow a force of 200 heavy bombers would drop the likelihood of successful blitzkrieg to just over 75%.

Reducing tactical bombers to allow a strategic force of 400 heavy bombers would drop the chance of successful blitzkrieg
to just under 55%.

A heavy bomber force of 800 aircraft would put blitzkrieg chances down to almost nil.

The calculations also show that a strategic force up to and including 400 bombers would have little to no effect on the Ural
production.

Even a strategic bomber force of 800 would not have a decisive effect.

This is borne out when looking at bombing effects over Germany. US and British strategic bombing increased over time and
German production continued to increase anyway. Part of this was due to weather conditions and the difficulty in bombing
accurately at the time. The Luftwaffe would not have done any better.

In other words, Germany had a choice to make. The split in the Luftwaffe was 40% bombers, 30% fighters, 20% observation, and 10%
transport. A strategic bomber force could not be added but would have taken part of the 40% bomber section, thus reducing tactical
bomber numbers.

If this had happened even the invasion of France in 1940 would have stalled and brought on the dreaded war of attrition earlier. A war
of attrition given resource availability was one Germany simply could not win.

 

[wiking85]

Baku was defended no worse than Leningrad. By the end of the 1930s, Baku's AA artillery was equal to that of Leningrad in terms of quantity and quality. In the 1930s, there were only three air defense corps districts in the USSR: Moscow, Leningrad, and Baku. During the war, the Moscow district became an air defense front, while the Leningrad and Baku districts became air defense armies. In 1940, Baku's air defense fighter aviation was significantly strengthened—in 1941, it consisted of nine fighter aviation regiments, the same number as in Leningrad's air defense. Source (Volume I as well):
View attachment 855540

In 1941 sure, but that number changed over the course of the year into 1942 when it was stripped out for other areas, but then built back up during the invasion of the Caucasus.

I can recommend a good source, but unfortunately it is only available in Russian: the book by Zefirov, Degtev, and Bazhenov, "The Swastika over the Volga: The Luftwaffe Against Stalin's Air Defense," 2007.

I know that book, I've been citing the English version with a different title. Perhaps it is a bit different.

Hitler's Strategic Bombing Offensive on the Eastern Front

<div>Germany was never able to match the power of the Allied air forces with their great four-engine bombers, the Lancasters, Liberators and Flying Fortresses. Indeed, many have ascribed the defeat of

openroadmedia.com

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

They were large (heavy) planes with small engines that could use very, very long runways. Longer than most (any?) land runways in certain years.

... which then prompts the question of "where do you put these long runways which are screaming 'Uralbomber here!' such that they can still reach the Urals but are out of range of VVS medium-bomber raids?"

It's similar to the conundrum of putting Me-262s in France. Sure, now they can reach the Normandy beaches ... but those long runways may as well be neon signboards.

 

[wiking85]

... which then prompts the question of "where do you put these long runways which are screaming 'Uralbomber here!' such that they can still reach the Urals but are out of range of VVS medium-bomber raids?"

It's similar to the conundrum of putting Me-262s in France. Sure, now they can reach the Normandy beaches ... but those long runways may as well be neon signboards.

Kharkov. The Soviets tried raiding German airfields IOTL to stop the June 1943 attacks on Gorky and they were a miserable failure due to radar and flak.
They also tried to do the same before Citadel to disrupt German air power, but that failed badly too:

Battle of Kursk - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

In the early morning of 5 July, the VVS launched a large raid against German airfields, hoping to destroy the Luftwaffe on the ground. This effort failed, and the VVS units suffered considerable losses.[218]​[212]​ The air operation is misunderstood in most accounts. The German Freya radar stations at Belgorod and Kharkov in 1943 had only picked up Soviet air formations approaching Belgorod and were not responsible for the failure of the entire Soviet preemptive air strike on the eve of Operation Citadel.[219]​ The VVS lost 176 aircraft on 5 July, compared to the 26 aircraft lost by the Luftwaffe.[220]​[218]​ The losses of the VVS 16th Air Army operating in the northern face were lighter than those suffered by the 2nd Air Army.[221]​

Again the Soviets were an entirely different kind of foe compared to the Wallies and were nowhere near as capable. Their main ability was to suffer immense losses, but be able to continue to fight and wear down the Axis.