March until October of 1940: fighters' ranking

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I think it was discussed on this board, but not positive where I read it. A major issue was Spit pilots tried to fight Zeros like they did '109s, in tight, maneuvering dogfights. Not a good thing to do against a Zero, especially once you bled speed. Fighting the way your enemy performs best doesn't end well. I'm sure they learned quickly and adopted more of a "boom and zoom" tactic like others did.
The Spitfires where ordered to ignore the Zero's and attack the bombers, out of the 26 Spitfires lost, 19 were shot down while they were attacking a bomber, 5 in one day when two squadrons attacked at the same time right under the escorting A6M's and were bounced.
 
The link below is a link to an evaluation of the A6M5 Model 52. It notes the controls are very good up to over 300 mph.
It says the controls are seriously effected at 250mph and is only maneuverable at medium speeds.
 
The carriers were in the process of arming for the next strike on Midway when they became aware of the Yorktown.
The decision to quickly change from a land strike mission to a ship strike mission saw the removed ordnance left strewn about the (hangar) deck.
That decision also stopped the process of bringing up the attack force for spotting and launching - if the Yorktown hadn't been spotted and/or the USN launched their strikes a bit earlier, the attack force intended for Midway would have been assembling topside, which might have mitigated the damage to the IJN's carriers, since the extra ordnance would have remained stowed.

My understanding from reading SS was that the continual attacks not only forced cycling of the CAP, but also that the doctrine of avoiding attacks with maneuver hampered the ability of Japanese decks crews to spot and arm on the flight deck.

And yes, Nagumo's order-counterorder-disorder phase was another factor in them being caught pants-down.

American strikes could likely not have been launched much earlier than they were historically.

But in the end, the point is that IJN doctrine dictated that the flight decks were to remain clear until a force was to be launched or recovered.

That doctrine predated the battle of Midway by years and had nothing to do with "Zeros landing to rearm" as stated earlier.

Right, they definitely preferred rearming in the hangars; but at Midway I think that would have been disregarded had the Japanese not 1) had to recover the Midway strike 2) not rearm the second wave to fight ship 3) not had to deal with continual air attack and 4) not had to cycle CAP. ( 3) and 4) are interrelated).

So I stand by my point that CAP cycling was a factor, but not the only factor.
 
I disagree. It doesn't have to fight it's way across England. But it can reach areas that 109s can't, and then fight.
The RAF are not going to let A6M's fly unmolested anywhere they want to go and only fight them when it suits them, Park called his plan ''peeling away the enemy'' which was to bring escorting fighters into battle the further they flew into England, I think the RAF pilots will look at the A6M like the Luftwaffe looked at the B24, that is it's an easy target to destroy than the tougher B17 and Me109 and will attack them at any opportunity.
 
The operations of an air force are dictated by its equipment. That the Germans did not escort bombers to NE England was because they did not have a fighter capable. On the other hand, an aircraft has to be present in sufficient numbers, with sufficiently trained aircrew, to be effective. Bf 109F-0 and -1 were in production during the time frame, but were not available in sufficient numbers to make an impact on the outcome of the battle. Bf 109Es would continue as the Luftwaffe's main SE fighter type for another year.
 
The operations of an air force are dictated by its equipment. That the Germans did not escort bombers to NE England was because they did not have a fighter capable. On the other hand, an aircraft has to be present in sufficient numbers, with sufficiently trained aircrew, to be effective. Bf 109F-0 and -1 were in production during the time frame, but were not available in sufficient numbers to make an impact on the outcome of the battle. Bf 109Es would continue as the Luftwaffe's main SE fighter type for another year.
I was just discussing distance. It is 392 miles from Stavanger in Norway to Newcastle in North East England. It is 325 miles from Schipol in Netherlands to Newcastle. I live in Teesside which was a major steel making and chemical refinery centre in WW2, approx 50 miles closer to Schipol and further away than Stavanger.
 
Are we using time machine Zeros or 1940s Zeros?

We also have the famous (or infamous) Zeros vs Australian Spitfires comparison.

A Spitfire I or II was 5-600lbs lighter than that the Australian Spitfires (or more) if they had plane with two 20mm guns .


The Australian Spitfires used the Merlin 46 engine which
a. A limited the boost to 9lbs.
b. Used the Hooker intake which did boost power
c. Used a higher supercharger gear and a larger impeller which is going to hurt lower altitude power.

Spitfire I & II could use 12 lbs of boost at lower altitudes.

from the later A6M3 version the Zero got trim tabs on the ailerons which did improve the aileron response over the earlier Zeros without the trim tabs.

The point about radios is a bit of nit picking. Germans can either fit German radios or come up with another way to solve the Japanese radio problem
HOWEVER, most of the radios in the 109s were single channel radios and didn't have great range.
This is one of the reasons for the using the Bf 110, which used the same radios as the He 111 and the other bombers.

Doesn't matter if you have 109s with drop tanks or Zeros (or He 100 or single seat Fw 187) for long range missions. At the longer ranges the radios in the single seat fighters won't reach base. You also have the problem of coordinating the fighters with the bombers if they can't talk to each other or, if using single channel radios they are talking over each other.
 
Hypothetical Zeroes. Teleported to Western Europe to take part in the Battle of Britain. They were clearly a match for the few obsolete aircraft flown by the Chinese, and seemed to handle themselves well against the Soviet aircraft sent to China. No other combatants were active during spring - summer 1940, so the question is whether they were up to taking on the RAF or Luftwaffe. Two things apart from their being on the opposite side of the world against them. Lack of sufficient numbers and lack of protection. Performancewise, I believe that they would be competitive, as they remained so even in the face of more developed aircraft later in the war.
 
From German point of view, the main problem with the Zero (A6M2 from 1940) was that they didn't have them. Low ammo count, not being sturdy as the 1942 era fighters, a meh radio - things that just point out that there was no such thing as a perfect fighter in 1940.
 
From German point of view, the main problem with the Zero (A6M2 from 1940) was that they didn't have them
I suspect that if the Germans, (or British) actually had 1940 era Zeros available in time for the BoB, both sides would have rejected them for service, until they could be fitted with standard equipment. Like pilot protection, bullet proof windscreen, self sealing tanks, emergency dingy, radios...etc
 
This obsession with self-sealing tanks and armor is interesting.
The early Hurrican lacked all that and it wasn't until around May of 1940 that the Hurricane was upgraded with pilot protection and then during the Battle of Britain, the need to protect the fuselage tank was discovered and was corrected with "Linatex".

The fuel tanks on the Bf109E were coated with a light layer of rubber and provided inadequate protection. It wouldn't be corrected until the Bf109F was put into service.

The French Hawk 75-C1 fought the Battle of France without armor or self sealing tanks and proved itself a potent adversary to the Bf109.
 
I suspect that if the Germans, (or British) actually had 1940 era Zeros available in time for the BoB, both sides would have rejected them for service, until they could be fitted with standard equipment. Like pilot protection, bullet proof windscreen, self sealing tanks, emergency dingy, radios...etc

British were buying (with cash) during the BoB aircraft without the pilot protection and self sealing tanks: Mohawks, P-40s, Buffaloes, early Martlets, Model 322s from Lockheed... There was no pilot protection or s-s tanks on Gladiators, either.
Hurricane was noted for it's flammable fuel tanks.
 
British were buying (with cash) during the BoB aircraft without the pilot protection and self sealing tanks
Did these aircraft go into service in Europe without the aforementioned upgrades? Honest question, I am curious.
My understanding was that the first Martlets were fitted with armour once arrived in the UK. Same with the P-40. They were buying whatever aircraft they could get their hands on, but fitting them with standard equipment once arrived. Those aircraft deemed not suitable for combat over Britain, were provided to the overseas territories, where it was assumed they wouldn't face first class equipment
 
Did these aircraft go into service in Europe without the aforementioned upgrades? Honest question, I am curious.
My understanding was that the first Martlets were fitted with armour once arrived in the UK. Same with the P-40. They were buying whatever aircraft they could get their hands on, but fitting them with standard equipment once arrived. Those aircraft deemed not suitable for combat over Britain, were provided to the overseas territories, where it was assumed they wouldn't face first class equipment

They probably received some modifications (British radio, armored headrest?) and went into the combat, but after the BoB, since there was just a token delivered before November of 1940 (none from Lockheed)?
I'm not sure that self-sealing tanks were easy to retrotfit.
 
For the French Hawk 75 there are conflicting accounts as to seat armor.
Thickness of seat armor may also be an issue.
8mm seat armor was being fitted before/during the Battle for France.
One or more squadrons were trying to fit tank protection but this was at the local level and the effectiveness may have been questionable?

For the P-40/Tomahawk the production/lines changed over in Sept/Oct.
Late Sept was when the American-British standards were made joint, aside from radios/oxygen etc.
Protection dates from then but they were weeks/months from squadron service.
The air staffs in the west agreed to the need for protection over the summer of 1940. Ramping up production and trying to refit existing planes was a problem.
The fitting of bullet proof glass was also desired but took a while to become standard.
 
Luftwaffe has a concept of a long-range fighter even before 1939 (materialized in the Bf 110). Zero fits in their doctrine far better than in the pre-war RAF's doctrine, that says 'fighters defend the UK, bombers bomb the enemy since they will always get through'.
 
For Tomo the fitting of self sealing tanks depended on the design of the airplane.
The P-40 with it's 3 tanks mounted in large spaces made it relatively easy.
Also the fact that the P-40 held more fuel to begin with helped.
The Brewster was something of a nightmare.
The US resorted to fitting 3 brand new tanks, sealing off one of the old ones etc.
The Groundhog lost 40-50 gallons by the time they figured out decent self sealing tanks that would fit in the same space.

Some planes held a small amount of fuel in a small volume and other planes, with not a whole lot more fuel, spread it out in a variety of spaces giving a much larger target area.
 

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