me 262 attacks

[gjs238]

The tell tale sign is that German oil consumption closely mirrored their production. They didn't manage to maintain meaningful reserves post Barbarossa.
They used what they had, which meant that it had to be divided between the various services.
Here's the USSBS's chart for what the Americans call 'aviation gasoline', which follows the same pattern.

From Barbarossa onwards the Luftwaffe NEVER had enough aviation fuel. The Luftwaffe command that suffered the most severe rationing was Training Command which had catastrophic consequences in 1943/44.

Cheers

Steve

With US daylight bombing losses extremely high on oil targets, could more night bombing have been performed on oil targets?

 

[stona]

With US daylight bombing losses extremely high on oil targets, could more night bombing have been performed on oil targets?

You'd have to speak to Harris about that. He'd characterise you as a 'panacea merchant', distracting him from his real job, as he saw it, of flattening German cities.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Milosh]

RAF BC dropped more tonnage than either the 8th and 15th AFs but not the combined.

8th - 66,497
15th - 48,378
BC - 93,691

 

[GrauGeist]

RAF BC dropped more tonnage than either the 8th and 15th AFs but not the combined.

8th - 66,497
15th - 48,378
BC - 93,691

Interesting figures...

Tonnage totals for the ETO:
RAF Bomber Command - 1,066,141
USAAF 1st TAF - 25,166
USAAF 8th AF - 692,918
USAAF 9th AF - 225,799
USAAF 12th AF - 207,367
USAAF 15th AF - 312,173

The reason that BC dropped more than any of the other groups, is because BC was in action 3 years ahead of the USAAF.

 

[gjs238]

Interesting figures...

Tonnage totals for the ETO:
RAF Bomber Command - 1,066,141
USAAF 1st TAF - 25,166
USAAF 8th AF - 692,918
USAAF 9th AF - 225,799
USAAF 12th AF - 207,367
USAAF 15th AF - 312,173

The reason that BC dropped more than any of the other groups, is because BC was in action 3 years ahead of the USAAF.

Wasn't the Lancaster a more efficient bomb truck?

 

[Milosh]

Interesting figures...

Tonnage totals for the ETO:
RAF Bomber Command - 1,066,141
USAAF 1st TAF - 25,166
USAAF 8th AF - 692,918
USAAF 9th AF - 225,799
USAAF 12th AF - 207,367
USAAF 15th AF - 312,173

The reason that BC dropped more than any of the other groups, is because BC was in action 3 years ahead of the USAAF.

When did the oil campaign begin, in earnest?

12th and 15th were MTO Forces.

Another link has 97,914t dropped on oil targets (1944 - 48,043t, 1945 - 47,510t, only 2361t before 1944)
World War II RAF Bomber Command Statistics

 

[gjs238]

When did the oil campaign begin, in earnest?

12th and 15th were MTO Forces.

Another link has 97,914t dropped on oil targets (1944 - 48,043t, 1945 - 47,510t, only 2361t before 1944)
World War II RAF Bomber Command Statistics

FWIW: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_Campaign_of_World_War_II

 

[GrauGeist]

12th and 15th were MTO Forces.

They may have been stationed in "MTO" regions, but they targeted Ploesti and other eastern European Oil production facilities.

The figures I quoted were a 1947 War Department summary of tonnage delivered to European targets by Allied bomber forces.

Knocking out Axis oil production was one thing, but knocking out storage, transport and supply routes was just as vital and crippling to the Axis' ability to keep the Luftwaffe in operation. This would also include Me262 manufacturing and assembly sites, Junkers engine plants and the airfields where Me262s operated from.

 

[gjs238]

Knocking out Axis oil production was one thing, but knocking out storage, transport and supply routes was just as vital and crippling to the Axis' ability to keep the Luftwaffe in operation. This would also include Me262 manufacturing and assembly sites, Junkers engine plants and the airfields where Me262s operated from.

From United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (European War)
The German oil supply was tight throughout the war, and was a controlling factor in military operations. The chief source of supply, and the only source for aviation gasoline, was 13 synthetic plants together with a small production from three additional ones that started operations in 1944. The major sources of products refined from crude oil were the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania and the Hungarian fields which together accounted for about a quarter of the total supply of liquid fuels in 1943. In addition, there was a small but significant Austrian and domestic production. The refineries at Ploesti were attacked, beginning with a daring and costly low-level attack in August 1943. These had only limited effects; deliveries increased until April 1944 when the attacks were resumed. The 1944 attacks, together with mining of the Danube, materially reduced Rumanian deliveries. In August 1944, Russian occupation eliminated this source of supply and dependence on the synthetic plants became even greater than before.

 

[Milosh]

The reason that BC dropped more than any of the other groups, is because BC was in action 3 years ahead of the USAAF.

Well I wouldn't call 2361t on oil targets dropped before 1944 a lot. Some 12t (1942) and 54t (1943) is a massive amount, right?

Army Air Forces Statistical Digest,
World War II
Table 141 -- Tons of Bombs Dropped in Theaters vs Germany, By Type of Airplane and By Country: 1942 to 1945
Army Air Forces in World War II

Why did you include the 12th and 15th in the stats you posted for the ETO? Eastern Europe is not the ETO.
Where are the stats for the RAF 2TAF?

Tonnage totals for the ETO:
RAF Bomber Command - 1,066,141
USAAF 1st TAF - 25,166
USAAF 8th AF - 692,918
USAAF 9th AF - 225,799
USAAF 12th AF - 207,367
USAAF 15th AF - 312,173

In 1943, the USAAF dropped 154,117t vs Germany. The RAF BC dropped 157,457t.

 

[GrauGeist]

Why did you include the 12th and 15th in the stats you posted for the ETO? Eastern Europe is not the ETO.

Odd...so if Eastern Europe isn't the ETO, then what theater would it be?

As far as the stats I posted, I wasn't indicating oil facilities (obviously), I was indicating total tonnage dropped. as per earlier conversation about crippling Germany's ability to manufacture and support the Me262 program.

And those numbers were concluded (as listed) by the U.S. war department, 1947. They (the War Department) didn't indicate any distinction between separate units within Bomber Command, they simply listed it as "RAF Bomber Command".

Unfortunately, I don't have enough political clout to challenge the validity or the assessment of the U.S. War Department.

 

[GregP]

Thanks Steve for posting that chart of German oil production. It says exactly what I said ... they were in real trouble starting in spring of 1944 and it only got worse from there.

 

[stona]

Thanks Steve for posting that chart of German oil production. It says exactly what I said ... they were in real trouble starting in spring of 1944 and it only got worse from there.

They were in real trouble from 1942 when the demand started to follow production. This led to self imposed rationing as there were not enough fuels to sustain all programmes and commands. Since front line units were prioritised other units suffered accordingly. I have posted the figures for the Luftwaffe's training command and its consequences before.

In 1941 the Luftwaffe used an average of 120,000 tonnes of fuel per month of which 27,000 tonnes went to training command.

In 1942 the Luftwaffe requirement rose to 160,000 tonnes per month as the fronts expanded. The average monthly allotment for training was cut to 15,000 tonnes, a reduction of 45%. As a result only 20% of replacement bomber pilots and 40% of replacement fighter pilots were trained and on shorter courses.

In the five week period beginning in September 1942 the fuel allotment to training command was only 5,000 tonnes. That is a reduction of 85.2% from the 1941 figure and that, which ever way you care to spin it, is a fuel shortage.

You can not take 85% of the fuels out of any programme and expect it to continue to operate in a meaningful way, but that is what happened to Luftwaffe training in late 1942

Cheers

Steve

 

[gjs238]

I get the impression that they were in real trouble from 1940 (if not earlier.)
In 1940 they were manic stockpiling for Barbarossa, knowing full well they could not produce enough real-time.

 

[drgondog]

That's 1% to the Me 262.

How many to flak, own attrition, other fighters, and losses on the way home due to damage inflicted by the various combination of foes along the way?

Not saying you are wrong above, but am curious about the entire losses count, not just to the Me 262.

I'd wish them to have pursued the Bachem Natter. As it is, I believe the Natter killed more German test pilots than Allied casualties inflicted. Had they pursued it, I doubt it would have been much better due to rocket power idiosyncracies, a REALLY bad gunsight, and other weakness inherent to rocket designs in a piston powered world that was seeing 8+ hour, 1,000-plane missions missions from one side that were never developed by the other side.

Sure makes me wonder

8th AF lost 5 B-17s Total on March 17. plus three escorts to mechanical failure- no claims.

 

[drgondog]

Well I wouldn't call 2361t on oil targets dropped before 1944 a lot. Some 12t (1942) and 54t (1943) is a massive amount, right?

Army Air Forces Statistical Digest,
World War II
Table 141 -- Tons of Bombs Dropped in Theaters vs Germany, By Type of Airplane and By Country: 1942 to 1945
Army Air Forces in World War II

Why did you include the 12th and 15th in the stats you posted for the ETO? Eastern Europe is not the ETO.
Where are the stats for the RAF 2TAF?



In 1943, the USAAF dropped 154,117t vs Germany. The RAF BC dropped 157,457t.

Poland and Czechoslovakia were 8th AF targets LONG before 15th AF. The first four months of 15th AF ops were concentrated on Austria, Southern Germany and Rumania, while the 8th was bombing Posnan, Stettin,Brux, etc in April and May 1944.

 

[Koopernic]

The Me262's rate of closure meant that it only had a second or so to effectively fire on it's target as it hurtled in on the bomber formation.

Easing off the throttled did not slow the aircraft enough to allow an extended firing window. It was suggested that if the Me262 had "dive brakes" installed, it would have allowed the Me262 to come into the formation at speed and suddenly deaccelerate, enabling it to have a longer firing window (where the pilot could align the cannon on target), which would also increase accuracy.

The tactical solution was to approach the bombers from below, perhaps with a shallow dive, and then pull up to wash of speed. The R4M attacks were often conducted sideways. This needed a gyro sight but the 'experten' thought their deflection shooting good enough somewhat erroneously. It didn't help that there had been a systematic installation problem with the EZ42 gyro sight.

I suspect Me 410 dive brake or air brakes would have been added. Personally I think the fire control would have gotten so good that slowing down wasn't necessary. It really is undesirable. They were planning on integrating the gyro sight with a range only radar called effe or oberon. I think one was the radar the other the computer.