Merlin powered carrier fighter other than Seafire

[FLYBOYJ]

Hurricanes were available in North America, in some numbers prior to Dec 1941 so one or more of these could have been converted to a Sea Hurricane for deck landing trials.

Could have - but even then you're still looking at a few months of testing and red tape.

The P-40 was already engineered for the Allison, so a hundred or so more Allison engined P-40s and a hundred or so fewer P40Fs. The UK had a relative abundance of Hurricanes in late 1941/early 1942 so much so that Hurricane production actually began to taper off in mid 1942. There was actually lots of aircraft in the UK waiting for "export" to other markets such as the USSR and North Africa.

If the UK had all those Hurricanes, then why were they still taking deliveries of P-40s?

Actually, not that many (a couple hundred maybe) and the F4F-F didn't begin production till Jan 1942, IIRC.

That's still more than what could have been produced in Canada during the same period, even if the order came down after Pearl Harbor. It would have taken at least 6 months to see the first production Sea Hurricane arrive in the US, and that's very wishful thinking.

We're talking maybe a dozen HSHs per CV, and I think the USN was resourceful enough to tackle that problem.

They were - the minute AAF left the hangar deck so did the glycol. Again, US Navy brass did not like "extra" hazmat or flammable materials on ships (same rules as today)

It wouldn't have taken a whole lot of clairvoyance in mid 1941 to see that the FAA was short of fighters, and that the USN would be too in a shooting war, so a joint Cdn/USA project to produce Sea Hurricanes would have made some sense, especially as the conversion kit had already been engineered in the UK and the Hurricane was in production in Canada (albeit in small number prior to large scale Packard production). Not a completely likely scenario, but not completely implausible either.

That's provided someone in the USN liked the Sea Hurricane and saw value added by importing it, apparently that wasnt the case.

The ideal fighter might have been a Sea Hurricane II with 4 x .5in with 350rpg (or 8 x .3in with 500rpg) and a couple of 15g internal wing tanks in lieu of the outer guns on the Mk IIB wing. This would have given the FAA and USN a useful addition to the F4F that was carrier ready and also well suited to base defence.

Again, Interest, how quick, and was it really worth it when you had, as you said it "a couple hundred maybe" F4Fs available, right there, right now - as the old saying goes, "A bird in hand is worth two in the bush."

 

[RCAFson]

Could have - but even then you're still looking at a few months of testing and red tape.

Which means that the USN Sea Hurricane is ready for production just around Dec 7 1941.

If the UK had all those Hurricanes, then why were they still taking deliveries of P-40s?

As I stated Hurricanes were being exported to Russia and elsewhere.

That's still more than what could have been produced in Canada during the same period, even if the order came down after Pearl Harbor. It would have taken at least 6 months to see the first production Sea Hurricane arrive in the US, and that's very wishful thinking.

No, I don't think that's true. The airframe was already for production (conversion to a Sea Hurricane was relatively simple and could be done post production) all they needed was engines and the requisite production priority.

They were - the minute AAF left the hangar deck so did the glycol. Again, US Navy brass did not like "extra" hazmat or flammable materials on ships (same rules as today)

They would have had to have some spare amount onboard, but again I'm sure the USN could overcome this relatively easily.

That's provided someone in the USN liked the Sea Hurricane and saw value added by importing it, apparently that wasnt the case.
Again, Interest, how quick, and was it really worth it when you had, as you said it "a couple hundred maybe" F4Fs available, right there, right now - as the old saying goes, "A bird in hand is worth two in the bush."

Why wouldn't they like a faster, more manoeuvrable fighter that was already combat proven? The USN resisted liquid cooled engines, but as the statement from Nimitz makes clear by mid 1942 they were not happy with the F4F-4:

...Another aspect of
the attack that proved inadequate was fighter escort. To Fletcher the folding wing F4F-4s
represented no improvement over the fixed-wing F4F-3s, except more F4F-4s could be
carried. He echoed the call of Halsey and others of the urgent necessity'' for detachable fuel
tanks to increase their effective attack radius beyond 175 miles. Spruance and Browning
rated the Grumman Wildcat "greatly inferior'' in comparison with the nimble Japanese
Zero. On 20 June Nimitz relayed their fears to King, noting the "extreme and apparently
increased superiority performance of 0 fighters'' was mitigated only by the vulnerability
of Japanese planes and the superior tactics of the U.S. Navy fighter pilots. "Overall results
have been bad and will be serious and potentially decisive with improvement that must
be expected in enemy tactics.'' Remarkably he called for army Curtiss P-4OF Warhawk
fighters to replace navy F4F Wildcats and Brewster F2A Buffaloes in all marine fighting
squadrons defending forward bases and even asked that the P-4OF "or comparable type"
be tested for carrier suitability; In the meantime the F4F-4s must be lightened, and their
ammunition supply increased even should that require reverting to four guns in place ofsix.
The swift introduction ofthe Vought F4U-1 Corsair fighter was an"absolute priority.'' Thus
after Midway the top fleet commanders experienced a serious crisis of confidence over the
effectiveness of the basic U.S. carrier fighter, a worry that would soon influence Fletcher's
most controversial command decision...
Black Shoe carrier Admiral, p.200

By Oct 1942 the USN was scraping the bottom of the barrel to feed F4F-4s into Guadalcanal. The Sea Hurricane II would have given them another fighter to supplement the F4F-4 and it would have been better suited to shore based ops than the F4F-4 with it's narrow LG. Having the Sea Hurricane in production would have reduced the USN's reliance on a single source for carrier fighters.

 

[tomo pauk]

Ceterum censeo, if the USN wants the V-12 powered fighter, the navalized, or just 'hooked' P-40 is a better bet. What kind of performance was the Sea Hurricane displaying, any version?

The Spitfire V with a 90IG drop tank has about the same wing loading as an F4F-4 with fuel internal fuel, but considerably less than a P-40E/F

That's okay with me. Point is that all three were taking off from carriers, with drop tanks.

The Merlin boost override can be engaged at any altitude to be used as the pilot saw fit. In any event, a P40 with 45IG drop tank weighs about 8900lb versus ~7700lb for a Spitfire V with a 90IG drop tank.

Until you back up the statement (1st sentence in the above quoted text) that, by take off, the boost can be greater than +12 lbs, your statement is just a claim, not a fact.

The F4F-4 was test flown against the Zero. USA Flight testing gave the following speeds for the same Zero:
SL/270mph (F4F-4 SAC data = 285
5000ft/287 (F4F-4 SAC data = 290
10000ft/305 (F4F-4 SAC data = 305)
16000ft 326
20000ft 321.5
25000ft 315
30000ft 306

Thanks. Seems like the F4F-4 was actually able to do 326 mph at 16000 ft.

and the results of actual flight testing:
...

Thanks. The excerpt talks on relative merits between Zero and F4F, not about performance figures of the F4F.

Again, these actual flight tests show the F4F-4 to be somewhat slower at lower altitude than the SAC data - again in line with F4F-3/4 pilot comments regarding their experiences with the Zero in actual combat:

The actual flight tests also show that F4F-4 is also faster at medium and high altitudes than it is listed in SAC data - almost 15 mph faster at 16000 ft than SAC data.
Again, nobody was claiming, here or at other places, that Wildcat is a better climber, or that is faster than Zero - I don't get it why you post those excerpts? But, it seems like the F4F (mostly the heavier F4F-4) have had positive ratio vs. Zero in mid 1942:

Bottom line here is that between 7 May 1942 and 4 June 1942, and, thus, just on the basis of exposure, in the first
six months of the Pacific War, there were 12 F4Fs shot down by A6Ms and 14 A6Ms shot down by F4Fs, or an F4F
victory to loss ratio of 1.167 to 1.

From here.

 

[Glider]

I know this is turning the thread but I always wondered why the UK didn't build a naval fighter based on the Hercules. It was a decent engine that entered service in late 1940 so would have been available for 1941. People tend to get hung up on the Merlin and not consider the Hercules in the same way they tend to consider the Halifax to be a distant second to the Lanc

 

[RCAFson]

Thanks. Seems like the F4F-4 was actually able to do 326 mph at 16000 ft.

The actual flight tests also show that F4F-4 is also faster at medium and high altitudes than it is listed in SAC data - almost 15 mph faster at 16000 ft than SAC data.
Again, nobody was claiming, here or at other places, that Wildcat is a better climber, or that is faster than Zero - I don't get it why you post those excerpts? But, it seems like the F4F (mostly the heavier F4F-4) have had positive ratio vs. Zero in mid 1942:

Bottom line here is that between 7 May 1942 and 4 June 1942, and, thus, just on the basis of exposure, in the first
six months of the Pacific War, there were 12 F4Fs shot down by A6Ms and 14 A6Ms shot down by F4Fs, or an F4F
victory to loss ratio of 1.167 to 1.

The speeds given are for the Zero! I provided the SAC data for low altitudes since at high altitudes the Zero is faster, even according to the SAC data. However the SAC data suggests that the F4F-4 should be faster than the Zero at lower altitudes when actual flight tests show that the Zero was faster:
The F4F-4 was test flown against the Zero. USA Flight testing gave the following speeds for the same Zero:
SL/270mph (F4F-4 SAC data = 285
5000ft/287 (F4F-4 SAC data = 290
10000ft/305 (F4F-4 SAC data = 305)
16000ft 326
20000ft 321.5
25000ft 315
30000ft 306
Bolded speeds are for the USA tests of the Zero that was flight tested against a F4F-4.
View attachment 259692

 

[RCAFson]

Ceterum censeo, if the USN wants the V-12 powered fighter, the navalized, or just 'hooked' P-40 is a better bet. What kind of performance was the Sea Hurricane displaying, any version?

The "hooked" P-40 never existed, and for good reason; it's high wing loading and high stall speeds made it unsuitable as a carrier based naval fighter.

I gave Sea Hurricane IB performance figures earlier in the thread, on post 33. However what isn't shown there is that the combat climb rating would have been close to 4000fpm up to 6000ft or so, while time to 20,000ft would have been in the 6 minute range.

Until you back up the statement (1st sentence in the above quoted text) that, by take off, the boost can be greater than +12 lbs, your statement is just a claim, not a fact.

.

Sorry, but you're the one claiming that boost override was inoperative at TO, when this is clearly not the case, and you'll have to prove that statement. Boost override is fully under the pilot's control and he could engage it when ever needed.

 

[RCAFson]

I know this is turning the thread but I always wondered why the UK didn't build a naval fighter based on the Hercules. It was a decent engine that entered service in late 1940 so would have been available for 1941. People tend to get hung up on the Merlin and not consider the Hercules in the same way they tend to consider the Halifax to be a distant second to the Lanc

There were proposals for a Hercules power Hurricane.

 

[Greyman]

Until you back up the statement (1st sentence in the above quoted text) that, by take off, the boost can be greater than +12 lbs, your statement is just a claim, not a fact.

Sea Hurricane Merlin III engines were modified to allow +16 boost. This gave them performance similar to a regular Hurricane I using +12 boost.

Climb might have been slightly better, but to say 4,000 feet per minute and 20,000 feet in six minutes seems exceedingly optimistic - especially considering from what I've read, the Sea Hurricanes used the old deHavilland two-speed props.

 

[RCAFson]

Sea Hurricane Merlin III engines were modified to allow +16 boost. This gave them performance similar to a regular Hurricane I using +12 boost.

Climb might have been slightly better, but to say 4,000 feet per minute and 20,000 feet in six minutes seems exceedingly optimistic - especially considering from what I've read, the Sea Hurricanes used the old deHavilland two-speed props.

Sea Hurricanes used either a Rotal or a Dehavillland constant speed prop, but the Dehavilland unit was preferred because it was lighter. The calculated climb performance of the Hurricane 1 at 6700lb is shown here:

and it works out to about 6.4mins to 20k ft. The Sea Hurricane IB is about 3% (~7000lb) heavier than the Hurricane 1 but has another 10% more peak power (1440 versus 1310) so we can expect the peak climb rate to be higher and time to 20K ft to be about the same.

Your previous info from the Sea Hurricane 1b data card indicated 10mins to 20k ft @ 7015lb which is only marginally worse than the Hurricane 1's data card which indicates 9.7min (~3% worse) to 20k ft @ 6793lb.

 

[wuzak]

Basically you are asking the USN to adopt an unproven type before their own unproven type had met the enemy, of unknown or little known capability, in combat.

I know that the title of the thread is "Merlin powered carrier fighter other than Seafire" but you can't escape the fact that the Admiralty wanted a navalised Spitfire before they ever wanted a Sea Hurricane (from as early as 1938, in fact). The problem was that Seafires would reduce the number of Spitfires available for the RAF, and Fulmar production was a priority (!) for the FAA.

When Seafires did enter service they remained stuck with the single speed Merlin until the Griffon powered XV appeared towards the end of the war. A direct legacy of trying to prop up the performance of the Hurricane with the Merlin XX.

As for the F4F, Grumman had begun development on the F6F not long after the F4F entered service (and before Pearl Harbor). Any move to procure Sea Hurricanes would be a short term solution at best.

 

[RCAFson]

Basically you are asking the USN to adopt an unproven type before their own unproven type had met the enemy, of unknown or little known capability, in combat.

I know that the title of the thread is "Merlin powered carrier fighter other than Seafire" but you can't escape the fact that the Admiralty wanted a navalised Spitfire before they ever wanted a Sea Hurricane (from as early as 1938, in fact). The problem was that Seafires would reduce the number of Spitfires available for the RAF, and Fulmar production was a priority (!) for the FAA.

When Seafires did enter service they remained stuck with the single speed Merlin until the Griffon powered XV appeared towards the end of the war. A direct legacy of trying to prop up the performance of the Hurricane with the Merlin XX.

As for the F4F, Grumman had begun development on the F6F not long after the F4F entered service (and before Pearl Harbor). Any move to procure Sea Hurricanes would be a short term solution at best.

The Sea Hurricane was not "unproven" as it cleared RN carrier trials in early 1941 and saw combat from RN carriers in mid 1941, so, in fact, it was the only "proven" single seat, monoplane, naval fighter in the Allied inventory at that point in the war.

The FAA wanted the highest possible performing fighter and in 1940 that would have been a variant of the Spitfire. OTOH, it is clear that this was a mistake and that the Hurricane was better suited for carrier ops because of it's more robust LG and airframe. The "priority" for the FAA was to secure a folding wing naval fighter that could fit down the narrow lifts of the Ark Royal and Illustrious class carriers and until very late in 1941, the only such fighter in production, on both sides of the Atlantic, was the Fairey Fulmar.

I am not suggesting that the USN "adopt" the Sea Hurricane as their primary carrier based fighter but I am saying that it would have been prudent and not impossibly improbable that the USN would have decided to support development and production of the Sea Hurricane in mid 1941 with a view towards securing an alternate source of single engine fighters both for itself and for the RN - yes a stop gap, but a very cheap stop gap, that would have paid handsome dividends.

We've already discussed how the RAF installed the Merlin XX in Spitfires, seemingly without difficulty:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/spitfires-merlin-xx-40257.html#post1108788

If you have proof that the FAA was denied the Merlin XX for the Seafire, I'd really like to see it, but the fact remains that the Merlin 45/16lb bbost peaked at 1515hp which actually exceeded the Merlin XX series until they were uprated to 18lb boost in 1943.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Which means that the USN Sea Hurricane is ready for production just around Dec 7 1941.

The USN "would have" had to begun procurement way prior. Ready for production? Tooling? Raw Material? Production floor space? People to build the plane? Oh, and you're talking about this being built in Canada where under 2000 Hurricanes were built during the entire war?

As I stated Hurricanes were being exported to Russia and elsewhere.

Not in early 1941. When was the Soviet Union invaded????

No, I don't think that's true. The airframe was already for production (conversion to a Sea Hurricane was relatively simple and could be done post production) all they needed was engines and the requisite production priority.

Which would of had to happen in the middle of 1941 - tell me how long do you think it would have taken for production to be set up? Have you ever worked in an aircraft factory? Even an aircraft as simple as the Hurricane would have taken at least six months to set up, and we haven't even brought up lead times for raw materials and castings!

They would have had to have some spare amount onboard, but again I'm sure the USN could overcome this relatively easily.

Yes, by dumping excess overboard!

Why wouldn't they like a faster, more manoeuvrable fighter that was already combat proven? The USN resisted liquid cooled engines, but as the statement from Nimitz makes clear by mid 1942 they were not happy with the F4F-4:

Because the aircraft were there - period!!!! Within a year the USN got something a lot more suited for the role. Agree the F4F needed to be replaced but in the end it did serve well and even in the most conservative assessments had a pretty good air to air combat record against a superior enemy.

By Oct 1942 the USN was scraping the bottom of the barrel to feed F4F-4s into Guadalcanal. The Sea Hurricane II would have given them another fighter to supplement the F4F-4 and it would have been better suited to shore based ops than the F4F-4 with it's narrow LG. Having the Sea Hurricane in production would have reduced the USN's reliance on a single source for carrier fighters.

I could agree with that but your scenario would only happen if someone in the Navy Dept. started the ball rolling way before Pearl Harbor.

 

[Greyman]

Sea Hurricanes used either a Rotal or a Dehavillland constant speed prop, but the Dehavilland unit was preferred because it was lighter. The calculated climb performance of the Hurricane 1 at 6700lb is shown here:

and it works out to about 6.4mins to 20k ft. The Sea Hurricane IB is about 3% (~7000lb) heavier than the Hurricane 1 but has another 10% more peak power (1440 versus 1310) so we can expect the peak climb rate to be higher and time to 20K ft to be about the same.

Your previous info from the Sea Hurricane 1b data card indicated 10mins to 20k ft @ 7015lb which is only marginally worse than the Hurricane 1's data card which indicates 9.7min (~3% worse) to 20k ft @ 6793lb.

I see what you're saying but just going by that is a stretch for me. Too much guesswork, especially considering the only reasonable source we have is the data sheet - and I've certainly found errors/discrepancies in those. When I can find no climb test of a DH prop Hurricane or Sea Hurricane and the data sheet uses a nice round number like '10.0 minutes' that raises a bit of a red flag for me.

And while there is little to choose between a +16 Sea Hurricane and a +12 Hurricane under 8,000 feet, the performance gap afterwards makes me think more pessimistically about your climb estimates. But hey, I'm guessing as much as you are at this point.

Also, I was under the impression the two speed prop was desired due to being heavier (metal) than the wooden Rotol - the CG needing to be brought forward due to the hook gear.

 

[RCAFson]

The USN "would have" had to begun procurement way prior. Ready for production? Tooling? Raw Material? Production floor space? People to build the plane? Oh, and you're talking about this being built in Canada where under 2000 Hurricanes were built during the entire war?



Not in early 1941. When was the Soviet Union invaded????

Which would of had to happen in the middle of 1941 - tell me how long do you think it would have taken for production to be set up? Have you ever worked in an aircraft factory? Even an aircraft as simple as the Hurricane would have taken at least six months to set up, and we haven't even brought up lead times for raw materials and castings!

The First CCF Hurricane left the production line on Jan 1940. CCF had a large plant that was fully tooled up by mid 1941. Production was slow prior to the Packard Merlin because RR Merlins had to come over from the UK. After Packard Merlins came on the scene the P-40F took a large number of them. CCF built about 1450 HHs and HSHs, so they could, and did, build both both types with the bulk of production from early 1942 to early 1943. To put this into perspective, Grumman only built a total 1778 ( 1347 F4F and 431 Martlet ) F4F and Martlet aircraft (according to Dean) from Dec 1939 to the end of 1942, prior to turning over production to GM.

The design engineering for the Sea Hurricane had already been done by March 1941.

The USSR was invaded on June 22 1941.

Yes, by dumping excess overboard!

I think we'll have to agree to disagree about the coolant. I don't think that carrying a few hundred gallons of glycol represented an insurmountable problem.

Because the aircraft were there - period!!!! Within a year the USN got something a lot more suited for the role. Agree the F4F needed to be replaced but in the end it did serve well and even in the most conservative assessments had a pretty good air to air combat record against a superior enemy.

They should have been able to do even better with a better performing aircraft.

I could agree with that but your scenario would only happen if someone in the Navy Dept. started the ball rolling way before Pearl Harbor.

That is what I am suggesting, and given the demand for naval fighters it would have been prudent to have another source for them.

 

[RCAFson]

I see what you're saying but just going by that is a stretch for me. Too much guesswork, especially considering the only reasonable source we have is the data sheet - and I've certainly found errors/discrepancies in those. When I can find no climb test of a DH prop Hurricane or Sea Hurricane and the data sheet uses a nice round number like '10.0 minutes' that raises a bit of a red flag for me.

And while there is little to choose between a +16 Sea Hurricane and a +12 Hurricane under 8,000 feet, the performance gap afterwards makes me think more pessimistically about your climb estimates. But hey, I'm guessing as much as you are at this point.

Also, I was under the impression the two speed prop was desired due to being heavier (metal) than the wooden Rotol - the CG needing to be brought forward due to the hook gear.

The 9.7min to 20k ft was drawn directly from a flight test of a Hurricane I at 6750lb. I would not expect there to be much difference in climb rates, aside from the 3% weight difference, as the extra drag of the naval gear has a minimal effect on the climb rate due to the slow speeds. Again, the 16lb Sea Hurricane has a better power to weight ratio than the 12lb Hurricane. However, if there was any errors and/or estimation done in the data card, it was probably in the listed speeds. I don't really believe that there's enough of a difference in drag to account for such a major discrepancy between the Hurricane 1 at 1310hp (~ 315 mph at ~1300hp @7500ft) and the Sea Hurricane (316mph at 1440hp @ 7500ft) so I suspect those numbers to be conservative estimates. The Hurricane I trials at an overload weight of 6750lb (310.5mph at 18000ft) almost exactly matches the Sea Hurricane Ib performance at it's mean weight of 6655lb (308mph at 18000ft).

 

[wuzak]

The Sea Hurricane was not "unproven" as it cleared RN carrier trials in early 1941 and saw combat from RN carriers in mid 1941, so, in fact, it was the only "proven" single seat, monoplane, naval fighter in the Allied inventory at that point in the war.

I would think it would take more than carrier trials to make an aircraft proven.

And by mid 1941, when Sea Hurricanes began operating (were these actual carrier aircraft or the CAM Hurricanes?) a replacement for the F4F was on the drawing board. It wasn't going to take a genius to see that if that replacement was any good it would also be superior to the Sea Hurricane.

The FAA wanted the highest possible performing fighter and in 1940 that would have been a variant of the Spitfire. OTOH, it is clear that this was a mistake and that the Hurricane was better suited for carrier ops because of it's more robust LG and airframe. The "priority" for the FAA was to secure a folding wing naval fighter that could fit down the narrow lifts of the Ark Royal and Illustrious class carriers and until very late in 1941, the only such fighter in production, on both sides of the Atlantic, was the Fairey Fulmar.

The original proposal for a navalised Spitfire called for wings which folded just outboard of the landing gear and parallel to the fuselage axis. This could, quite probably, have fitted inside the lifts of the carriers. This was rejected in favour of Fulmars - in 1938/39. If Fairey had lent its carrier expertise to the program at that stage landing gear could have been improved, etc, for the task.

As for the Hurricane being better for carrier ops, was it really? The narrow landing gear of the Spitfire was a downside, but the same could be said of the F4F. But was the Hurricane's structure really more robust? Or was it just simpler?

I am not suggesting that the USN "adopt" the Sea Hurricane as their primary carrier based fighter but I am saying that it would have been prudent and not impossibly improbable that the USN would have decided to support development and production of the Sea Hurricane in mid 1941 with a view towards securing an alternate source of single engine fighters both for itself and for the RN - yes a stop gap, but a very cheap stop gap, that would have paid handsome dividends.

The problem is that they would have barely got them on operations before the squadrons would be taken off active duty to work up on F6Fs.

A more immediate solution, as suggested earlier in the thread, would be for land based units to use higher performing land planes - like P-40s. The Navy can then get the best versions of the F4F until the F6F arrives.

I don't know if it would really have been value for money in the longer term.

We've already discussed how the RAF installed the Merlin XX in Spitfires, seemingly without difficulty

I never said they couldn't be installed - just that they weren't. XXs were allocated elsewhere, and that killed the Spitfire III.

And since the early versions of the Seafire were based on, or modified from, Spitfire Vs they were basically stuck with the single stage engine. Also, the longer and heavier Merlin XX may have caused issues with prop clearence had the Seafires simply added the XX without the other required modifications.

but the fact remains that the Merlin 45/16lb bbost peaked at 1515hp which actually exceeded the Merlin XX series until they were uprated to 18lb boost in 1943.

That is a very narrow reading of the situation.

The single speed Merlins had a more limited operating range than the XX. While peak power of the 45 maybe 20-30hp more at its ideal altitude (for +16psi boost I am assuming it is quite low) the XX has more power over most other altitudes.

 

[RCAFson]

I would think it would take more than carrier trials to make an aircraft proven.

And by mid 1941, when Sea Hurricanes began operating (were these actual carrier aircraft or the CAM Hurricanes?) a replacement for the F4F was on the drawing board. It wasn't going to take a genius to see that if that replacement was any good it would also be superior to the Sea Hurricane.

First HSH 1B kill was 31 July 1941 by HSHs operating from HMS Furious. Who, except for you, is talking about replacing the F4F with the HSH? I'm talking about supplementing USN and RN naval fighter production with the HSH in addition to the F4F.

The original proposal for a navalised Spitfire called for wings which folded just outboard of the landing gear and parallel to the fuselage axis. This could, quite probably, have fitted inside the lifts of the carriers. This was rejected in favour of Fulmars - in 1938/39. If Fairey had lent its carrier expertise to the program at that stage landing gear could have been improved, etc, for the task.

This is OT. In any event Spitfire production was inadequate during this time frame.

As for the Hurricane being better for carrier ops, was it really? The narrow landing gear of the Spitfire was a downside, but the same could be said of the F4F. But was the Hurricane's structure really more robust? Or was it just simpler?

Structurally it was better suited because the LG and airframe was stronger than in the Seafire, and it had better visibility over the nose which allowed the HSH to operate quite successfully from CVEs. Stall speeds were lower and the aircraft was more controllable at low speeds. The narrow LG was not a factor at sea (because the carrier operated into the wind) but was when the aircraft were being operated from shore bases, where the wider HSH LG had a decided advantage

The problem is that they would have barely got them on operations before the squadrons would be taken off active duty to work up on F6Fs.

A more immediate solution, as suggested earlier in the thread, would be for land based units to use higher performing land planes - like P-40s. The Navy can then get the best versions of the F4F until the F6F arrives.

Grumman built a total of 272 F6F-3s by the end of April 1943 so the F4F-4 had to hang in there for quite some time. First combat was not till somewhat later. The first HSH conversion was early 1941.

I don't know if it would really have been value for money in the longer term.

??? We are talking about an aircraft already engineered by Feb 1941 and was actually being built in Canada by mid 1942.

I never said they couldn't be installed - just that they weren't. XXs were allocated elsewhere, and that killed the Spitfire III.

Please prove that statement.

And since the early versions of the Seafire were based on, or modified from, Spitfire Vs they were basically stuck with the single stage engine. Also, the longer and heavier Merlin XX may have caused issues with prop clearence had the Seafires simply added the XX without the other required modifications.

The Spitfire III had a much modified airframe from the Spitfire I/II and it was this factor that probably killed it.

That is a very narrow reading of the situation.

The single speed Merlins had a more limited operating range than the XX. While peak power of the 45 maybe 20-30hp more at its ideal altitude (for +16psi boost I am assuming it is quite low) the XX has more power over most other altitudes.

The 45 was cleared for 16lb boost in Dec 1941 while the XX was limited to 14lb in low gear for most of 1942 leading to very minor differences using combat power. In any event this is all OT to the topic, as the Seafire itself is OT. OTOH, I think that a HSH with a Merlin 45/16lb boost would have been a real killer naval fighter in mid 1942.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The First CCF Hurricane left the production line on Jan 1940. CCF had a large plant that was fully tooled up by mid 1941. Production was slow prior to the Packard Merlin because RR Merlins had to come over from the UK. After Packard Merlins came on the scene the P-40F took a large number of them. CCF built about 1450 HHs and HSHs, so they could, and did, build both both types with the bulk of production from early 1942 to early 1943. To put this into perspective, Grumman only built a total 1778 ( 1347 F4F and 431 Martlet ) F4F and Martlet aircraft (according to Dean) from Dec 1939 to the end of 1942, prior to turning over production to GM.

The design engineering for the Sea Hurricane had already been done by March 1941.

The USSR was invaded on June 22 1941.

You just proved my point by your own timelines and indicated logistic issues of the day!!!

From Wiki - "By 1939, with war on the horizon, Canadian Car Foundry and its Chief Engineer, Elsie MacGill, were contracted by the Royal Air Force to produce the Hawker Hurricane"

Your comment "The First CCF Hurricane left the production line on Jan 1940." No comment on actual user acceptance and actual deployment. How many more were built that year? How many F4F were built and already in service in 1940? I believe the first arrester hook Hurricanes didn't reach the fleet until the Summer of 1941. How many F4F were built and readily available during the same period? Oh and BTW, wasn't the FAA operating Marlets in late summer of 1940? Hmmmm, it almost seems the MARTLET was supplementing the Sea Hurricane!

1778 F4Fs and Marlets by the end of 1942. Do you really think CCF could have come close to those numbers, tooled and built the required aircraft, the USN gotten the aircraft carrier qualified and deployed with in a year? Again aside from that where's the "value added"? Although Nimitz wanted the Wildcat replaced it still more than held it's own and was continued to be built till the end of the war. If the USN was really dissatisfied with the aircraft production would have ceased the minute the F6F was rolling out the factory.

I think we'll have to agree to disagree about the coolant. I don't think that carrying a few hundred gallons of glycol represented an insurmountable problem.

It didn't - they (USN) just didn't want it on their carriers.

They should have been able to do even better with a better performing aircraft.

That's an opinion - the Spitfire "should have" easily handled the Zero and it didn't, especially in initial engagements. How about the Hurricane over Burma? Shall we discuss the Hurricane's combat record against the Zero vs the Wildcat?

That is what I am suggesting, and given the demand for naval fighters it would have been prudent to have another source for them.

Not denying that but your time lines on this happening only "would have" happened if someone recognized the potential in early 1941. A very good crystal ball would have been needed for that, but I repeat, in the end would have it beenworth the effort? In the mean time -

"I would still assess the Wildcat as the outstanding naval fighter of the early years of World War II ... I can vouch as a matter of personal experience, this Grumman fighter was one of the finest shipboard aeroplanes ever created."

—Eric M. "Winkle" Brown, British test pilot

 

[fastmongrel]

Wildcats just needed a bit more power to equal the Hurricanes. Is there a prospect of more horses in the timeframe I know the late models got a 1350hp engine can this be brought forward?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

From Rich L., a great wealth of knowlege with regards to US Naval Aviation.

"Claims to losses is a sticky subject. If you're looking for an analysis of actual, verifiable victories to actual verifiable losses, that's real hard to do. That being said, when talking about F4F's vs A6M2's in the first year of the war in the Pacific, the best place to go is two books written by John Lundstrom, "The First Team – Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway" and "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign". Both are pretty thick books with real small print. John was probably the last researcher to get to most of the USN and USMC pilots while they were still with us. As an example, from VF-42 he was able to speak to ten of the squadron's pilots who flew at the Battle of the Coral Sea. There's only two left today. John went to the Japanese records to reconcile claims to actual victories. I have not personally gone through the books page by page and made a stick count, but I can think of a few of guys who have and all agree that the ratio of F4Fs to A6Ms is damn close to about 1 F4F lost for every 1 A6M in the first year.

Personally, I like to work with the official reports. If you look at the roll up reported by the USN in 1946, you quickly find that it divides aerial victories into enemy bombers and enemy fighters, which, of course leaves out quite a few other players (float planes and the like) and leaves us wondering which fighters are they talking about. The only way to determine who is who is to look at the actual reports from the squadrons. I can do that with the Navy squadrons, I don't have the information from the reports of the Marine squadrons.

Overall it looks like this (and just for F4F's; FM-2's are another story all together, with one of the highest kill claim to loss ratios of the war):

Carrier based F4Fs flew 1,104 combat sorties. Within these combat sorties, 17 F4Fs were lost to AA fire and 47 to enemy aircraft. There were 32 combat related operational losses (that is losses that occurred during a combat sortie but were not caused by combat damage; these are usually due to fuel exhaustion or flight deck accidents), 49 losses on non-combat related flights, and 22 were lost in the sinkings of Lexington, Yorktown, Wasp, or Hornet. On the claims side, there were a total of 302 enemy planes reported destroyed in combat, 190 bombers and 112 fighters.

USMC land based F4Fs flew 1,074 combat sorties. Within these combat sorties, 4 F4Fs were lost to AA fire and 75 to enemy aircraft. There were 11 combat related operational losses (these are usually due to fuel exhaustion or airfield accidents), 34 losses on non-combat related flights, and 26 were lost on the ground, at Wake or Guadalcanal. On the claims side, there were a total of 356 enemy planes reported destroyed in combat, 175 bombers and 281 fighters.

USN land based F4Fs flew 450 combat sorties. Within these combat sorties, 3 F4Fs were lost to AA fire and 56 to enemy aircraft. There were 7 combat related operational losses, 29 losses on non-combat related flights, and 20 were lost on the ground, at Wake or Guadalcanal. On the claims side, there were a total of 147 enemy planes reported destroyed in combat, 53 bombers and 94 fighters.

So, from the USN statistics, there were a total of 178 F4Fs lost in aerial combat versus about 905 claims, of which 487 were fighters. As much as I am an F4F booster, those numbers are a little hard to swallow, although I was interested to read in Herbert Bix's "Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan" on page 461 reports 892 airplanes and 1882 pilots (and, one presumes, crewmen) lost between August 1942 and February 1943 in the struggle for Guadalcanal. General Yamada Otozo who was on Hirohito's staff noted that this was " . . . two and a half times the number of planes and fifteen times the number of pilots lost at Midway." Certainly the F4F pilots did not shoot down all the Japanese planes lost during that period, but they did shoot down a goodly number, if not a majority. Gives one some pause to think, anyway.

Navy statistical records indicate that F4F's were out of combat by October 1943, but the last two squadrons in action were VF-11 and VF-21 operating out of Fighter I on Guadalcanal. They left combat in July 1943. There may have been some F4F-4s mixed into with FM-1 squadrons operating from CVE's between July and October, but they scored no victories of which I am aware.

So much for the gross numbers. If you look at the results culled for reports you can get a better feel for actual types shot down. Since I only have the information on Navy squadrons, you can draw your own conclusions on the Marines. The results I have tabulated for the Navy F4F squadrons looks like:\

Navy F4F-3 pilots were credited with 68.5 victories/10 Probables/7 damaged. Navy F4F-4 pilots were credited with 453/74/34, for a total of 521.5/84/41. Also of interest is that only 494 of these credits were for Japanese planes. Two of them were for German types and 25 for Vichy French (all from the F4F-4 total). If you compare the USN victory credits from the 1946 statistical report you can see that the statistical report has 449 credits for USN F4Fs for just enemy fighters and bombers in the Pacific. That would mean that some 45.5 of the Japanese aircraft shot down were NOT included in the statistical study as they were neither fighters (VF) nor bombers (VB). Counting up the non VF and non VB types listed gives a total of 33 victory credits or 12.5 less than the calculated value. On the other hand, the by squadron count shows 226 Japanese VB types credited and 233 Japanese VF types compared to the 1946 statistical report's 243 and 206, repectively. My list of enemy types shot down by Navy F4Fs, based upon what was actually reported by squadrons, looks like this:

Japanese:
219/33/19 - A6M Mitsubishi A6M series Type 00 Models 21, 22, 52 VF (Zeke)
6/0/0 - A6M2-N Nakajima Type 2 Float VF (Rufe)
1/0/0 - A6M3 Mitsubishi A6M series Type 00 Model 32 22A VF (Hamp)
58/14/6 - B5N Nakajima Type 97 VTB (Kate)
115/22/14 - D3A Aichi Type 99 VB (Val)
4/0/0 - E13A Aichi Type 00 2/Float VSO (Jake)
4/1/0 - E7K Kawanishi Type 94 VSO (Alf)
1/0/1 - E8N Nakajima Type 95 Float VSO (Dave)
7/1/0 - F1M Mitsubishi Type 0 Float VSO (Pete)
60.5/5/1 - G4M Mitsubishi G4M series Type 01 2/E VB/VR (Betty)
14/0/0 - H6K Kawanishi Type 97 4/E VP FB (Mavis)
2/0/0 - H8K Kawanishi Type 2 4/E VP FB (Emily)
1/0/0 - U/I 4/E VP Unidentified Japanese Patrol Aircraft
0/1/0 - U/I aircraft Unidentified Japanese Aircraft
2/2/0 - Me-109 Pacific Action Mis-ID, Probably A6M Mitsubishi Type 00 VF (Zeke, Zero)
494.5/79/41 – Japanese Total
German:
1/0/0 - He-115 Heinkel S/E Twin Float VSO
1/0/0 - Ju-88 Junkers Ju-88 Series 2/E VB
2/0/0 – German Total
Vichy French:
1/0/0 - B.174 or P.63/11 Bloch Type or Potez Type 2/E Lt VB
4/1/0 - D.520 Dewointine Type VF
8/0/0 - D.520 or H.75 Dewointine Type VF or Curtis P-36 type VF
8/4/0 - H.75 Curtis P-36 type VF
1/0/0 - LeO.45 Loire et Olivier Type 2/E Med VB
3/0/0 - Martin 167 or LeO.45 Martin 'Baltimore' or Loire et Olivier 2/E Med VB
25/5/0 – Vichy Total
521.5/84.0/41.0 – Grand Total

For what it's worth.

Rich"

At a minimum you're looking at 3:1 to 4:1 ratio against the Zero. In hindsight, I don't see any value added by the USN supplmenting the Pacific Fleet with Sea Hurricanes, especially when you had the F6F and later the F4U entering service. I also question if it "could have" happend quick enough to really make a difference, the time, money and materials "would have" been better used elsewhere (and they probably were).