Merlin powered carrier fighter other than Seafire

[tomo pauk]

The "hooked" P-40 never existed, and for good reason; it's high wing loading and high stall speeds made it unsuitable as a carrier based naval fighter.

That was not the supposed reason (and we don't even know whether the USN really considered the P-40 as CV fighter), and that 'reason' never existed in 1st place. The wing loading was far smaller than of F4U and F6F.

I gave Sea Hurricane IB performance figures earlier in the thread, on post 33. However what isn't shown there is that the combat climb rating would have been close to 4000fpm up to 6000ft or so, while time to 20,000ft would have been in the 6 minute range.

So the Sea Hurricane with ~1400 HP should climb as twice as F4F-4, let alone F4F-3. It should be also better than Spitfire V on same +16 lbs. Perhaps the 3500 fpm is a more reasonable thing to expect?

Sorry, but you're the one claiming that boost override was inoperative at TO, when this is clearly not the case, and you'll have to prove that statement. Boost override is fully under the pilot's control and he could engage it when ever needed.

I never said that boost override was inoperative for TO conditions. I've said that boost override was allowed for an aircraft flying already at fast speed. If the Merlin 45 was indeed allowed for +16 lbs for take off in 1942, then what was the point to insist on two-speed engines for Mosquito, Lancaster, Hurricane and other bombers? Install the Merlin 45 on them and you've saved plenty of time and money. Seems the engineers don't agree with you.
Please note here that there is a distinction made for climb, cruise and combat conditions for Merlin 20 series of engines. And here is the power chart for different Merlin 20s, where again the disitnction was made for take off conditions and all-out conditions.

The speeds given are for the Zero! I provided the SAC data for low altitudes since at high altitudes the Zero is faster, even according to the SAC data. However the SAC data suggests that the F4F-4 should be faster than the Zero at lower altitudes when actual flight tests show that the Zero was faster:
The F4F-4 was test flown against the Zero. USA Flight testing gave the following speeds for the same Zero:
SL/270mph (F4F-4 SAC data = 285
5000ft/287 (F4F-4 SAC data = 290
10000ft/305 (F4F-4 SAC data = 305)
16000ft 326
20000ft 321.5
25000ft 315
30000ft 306
Bolded speeds are for the USA tests of the Zero that was flight tested against a F4F-4.

If you compare the SAC data with Grumman data, you will see that Grumman data is more realistic, for example they list the F4F-4 making 283 mph at 4600 ft.

Sea Hurricane Merlin III engines were modified to allow +16 boost. This gave them performance similar to a regular Hurricane I using +12 boost.

Indeed, they were making 1440 HP at 5500 ft (no ram) as 'combat power'. The take off power remained the same, 880 HP. It took the RR to develop the Merlin XII in order for single speed Merlin to use boost of +12 lbs on take off.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

The USN actually called for Merlin engined fighters for both shore and carrier operations:

I suspect that the USN might have welcomed the Sea Hurricane in 1942.

One Admiral, Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher called for 'P-40F or other suitable aircraft' to be considered for carrier suitability. Considering Fletcher's reputation among senior USN aviation leadership that is a suggestion that is unlikely to be given serious consideration, whatever one thinks of Fletcher, one admiral (and a black shoe admiral at that) is hardly "the USN". In fact, it's quite possible that Fletcher's endorsement of such a proposal if anyone else supported it, killed it outright.

However, I doubt they would have given the notion more than a passing thought and certainly not 'welcomed' any such infusion of such airframes… for a number of reasons some of which have already been noted here.

The FAA didn't resist single seat fighters and used them throughout the war. However, they needed a folding wing fighter that could fit into the narrow lifts on Ark Royal and the Illustrious class carriers and there were no such single seat fighters in service in the RN or USN until late 1941, however by mid 1941 the Sea Hurricane was being used on FAA carriers with larger lifts and in 1942 even on the Illustrious class via a temporary deck park.

The ideal use for the Sea Hurricane would have been as a point defence fighter in lieu of the Wildcats that were kept as CAP (rather than escorts) where it's high climb rate would have allowed it to gain the altitude advantage over incoming raids and provide top cover for the Wildcat, while the Sea Hurricane I would have given USN pilots speed parity with the zero under 10k ft along with better overall manoeuvrability. The Sea Hurricane II could carry twin 45IG drop tanks and could have served as an escort fighter but without folding wings it could not be carried in the same numbers as the F4F-4.

We'll just have to agree to disagree about the FAA or RN's 'resistance' to single seat fighters. In my view, if a navy dedicates its limited resources toward the development of two-seat dive bomber-fighters or fighter-recon aircraft (whatever its justification) and then decides it must procure single seat fighter aircraft from other sources… its demonstrated a certain resistance or reluctance by how it prioritizes its expenditures of money.

Just to clarify, time line for the F4F-3 (whose interceptor climb performance is competitive with that of the HSH): Initial sea trials of the F4F were in Early December. 1940. 22 F4F-3 were produced in late 1940 while an additional 27 were delivered to the USN by February 21, 1941 with 19 more by July 2, 1941. That's 68 F4F-3's sufficient to equip more than three squadrons by midyear.

Squadron transitions to the F4F-3 began in November 1940. By Late 1941, Half the USN carrier air wings (except VF-5, 6 and 2) were equipped with F4F-3s. VF-2 was equipped with F2A-3 (Transition from F2A-2 August, 1941) while the VF-5 6 transitioned to F4F-3As on or about in May 1941 (an investment made in their future receipt of F4F-3s or as it turned out, the F4F-4.)
Otherwise transitions to F4F-3 occurred as follows with Atlantic Fleet Carriers having first dibbs on the new A/C:
VF-41: November, 1940.
VF-72: January 1940
VF-42: March, 1941
VF-71: March, 1941
VF-3: August, 1941.

By the end of 1941 Grumman had completed its initial run of 185 F4F-3s and was already producing the F4F-4 variant. Apparently by December 31, 1941 all USN Carrier groups were equipped with F4F-3s except for VF-2 (F2A-3) and 6 (F4F-3A) although some of these were understrength (Sara's e.g. VF-3), some were also overstrength.
AFAIK, only 5 F4F-4 were produced for the USN in 1941. But production accelerated quickly with squadron transitions beginning soon after the new year.
In contrast, (folding wing) Martlet II deliveries beginning on October 4, 1941 amounted to 48 A/C by December 31, 1941. Prior to that 91 Martlet I and II were delivered between July 27, 1940 and March 14, 1941. This just validates your statement about such folding wing single seat fighter aircraft did not becoming available until late '41.

Ignoring the previously mentioned significant logistical challenges of a fighter squadron with dissimilar type a/c, there are a variety of better options and good reasons why the addition of a fixed-wing Sea Hurricane or for that matter a navalized fixed-wing P-40F to USN carrier air wing in 1941-42 is a poor option.

If a mixed composition fighter squadron was desired, the addition of smaller F4F-3's, whose performance was not too dissimilar to that of the initial HSH (except in its max speed), would be a more logistically suitable option with aircrew already trained in type. In early 42, before there were sufficient numbers of F4F-4s became available, such mixed (F4F-3 F4F-4) air groups were not uncommon.

Also, the F4F made possible operational options that may have made it more attractive than one might expect despite its relatively poor performance.

Aside from its anemic climb rate, the biggest objection to the F4F-4 that many pilots expressed was in the reduced firing time of the -4 from the -3's 30+ seconds to 18 seconds; I believe that's about the same as a HSH with 8 .303 lmg. However, It looks like F4F equipped squadrons also had the option of removing two HMGs and reducing ammo supply which could reduce the weight by about 300 lbs. That would recover some of the lost performance of the original F4F-3 but of course further reduce firing time. Alternatively, the original max-load configuration could be retained accepting the performance degradation and the two outboard guns used to extend firing time albeit at a lower volume of fire. Whether any of these options was ever exercised is unknown. But the HSH or P-40F options were more limited with endurance that was already extended by the use of external tanks to be comparable with the F4F-3 or 4. AFAIK, from about May 1942 on, the range comparison bar was additionally raised by extending the Grumman's own range with disposable tanks.

It is clear that proper tactics allowed the F4F for all its faults to be an effective fighter and that whatever configuration was used in combat, it apparently got the job done.

In the final analysis, the fact that the F4F's small flight deck footprint allowed many more fighters to be carried significantly outweighs the lack of performance. It's true that most carrier vs carrier combat starts at no more than 20 or so thousand feet and progresses to lower altitudes. It's also true that the air battle over Guadalcanal, the turning point of the Pacific war, was largely waged at the higher altitudes where the F4F's two stage SC was an important factor.

The marines on Guadalcanal were always short of VF VMF F4F-4s. Their numbers were frequently replenished by the land-basing of USN fighter squadrons from the carriers sunk and damaged during the campaign. Attrition was so high that reducing the numbers of embarked USN VF could have compromised the ability of the marine defenders to protect themselves from aerial attack. The HSH's performance edge was not likely to be good enough to balance such losses.

Lt. General Ross E. Rowell Commander Marine Air Wings Pacific, said, " What saved Guadalcanal was the loss of so many carriers." In other words, it was shear numbers of F4F-4's that made the difference, not performance.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

And this may NOT be a smooth landing;

View attachment 250728

He has caught the wire but looks a little high.

Probably a floater. Bounced once on touchdown and proceeded to 'float' down the flight deck. Not a good thing especially if he floats over the barrier.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

The USAAF had no problem with using Spitfires in 1942/43.

I'm pretty sure that if USN pilots were allowed to offer their opinion they would have gladly flown Cdn built Sea Hurricanes. It was the pilots who were the leading dissenters regarding the F4F - they wanted something better and said so on many occasions.

Of course The pilots expressed concern following their disappointment at the loss of performance in exchanging the -3 for the -4. This was exacerbated by the experience during the carrier battles of 1942. However, the diminished ammo supply or firing time seems to have been the chief complaint. Based on their negative comments, BuAer had the GM produced version, FM-1, revert to the F4F-3 armament configuration and did not change the A/C's performance by reducing its weight in any way. In fact it appears the FM-1 basic weight increased by 130 lbs despite the deletion to the two HMGs. Weight reduction and improved performance was deferred until the advent of the FM-2, long after the arrival of the F6F and the performance crisis had passed. The first GM FM-1 appeared in September 1942.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

My apologies RCAFson, I missed your post no. 62 and it at least deserves comment, if not endorsement.

following text preceded by the extended quote from Black Shoe Admiral with negative commentary of USN aviation leadership:

Why wouldn't they like a faster, more manoeuvrable fighter that was already combat proven? The USN resisted liquid cooled engines, but as the statement from Nimitz makes clear by mid 1942 they were not happy with the F4F-4:

By Oct 1942 the USN was scraping the bottom of the barrel to feed F4F-4s into Guadalcanal. The Sea Hurricane II would have given them another fighter to supplement the F4F-4 and it would have been better suited to shore based ops than the F4F-4 with it's narrow LG. Having the Sea Hurricane in production would have reduced the USN's reliance on a single source for carrier fighters.

If the HSH could have been added to the land-based mix in October 42, it would have certainly helped, but that's also when the first P-38s were showing up in Theater with F4U about 5 months later. The suggestion to replace (marine and navy) land based unit's with P-40F Warhawks was acted upon but not by starting a new training and logistical pipeline for USMC and USN, but rather by simply rebasing of army P-40F units. Midway apparently received such a unit in the summer of 42.

The expressions of the senior USN leaders that derided the F4F-4's performance are worth considering in the context in which they were made. Even at this 'late' stage (Spring of '42) of the war, the skill of IJN pilots and the performance of their aircraft came as a something of a collective shock. Many allied combatants were facing and attempting to come to grips with the new reality for the first time. To this point, and despite the events at Midway (during which the USN F4F-4 acquitted itself fairly well) the disparity in F4F-3 vs F4F-4 performance appeared to be a real war waging handicap that threatened the success of future operations. Also, aircrew having their equipment replaced by a newer model, would naturally expect an improvement which didn't materialize. So, it is perhaps not surprising that Nimitz, Halsey, Murray and every VF squadron commander complained about the F4F-4 to varying degrees.

Presenting the expressed negative perspective of various USN leaders regarding the F4F-4 to make a case for the replacement of some carrier based F4F, it seems fair to also present LCdr James Flately's endorsement of the F4F-4 from the same period in a letter he entitled The Navy Fighter to ComCarPac with cc's to BuAer, CominCh and CincPac: From First Team

"What the F4F-4 lacks in climb and maneuverability is more than compensated for by its excellent armament, protective armor, protected fuel system, and greater strength." Focusing on the importance of VF morale and proper tactics, he continues, "Let us not condemn our equipment…. Let's build the confidence of our fighter pilots by teaching them tactics rather than breaking down their confidence in themselves and their planes by telling them they can't lick the enemy in those planes." he concludes: "Let's … quit gripping about our planes."

The idea of supplementing F4F-4 with HSH is in my opinion not horrible strictly from the standpoint of improved performance, but I don't believe the performance difference between it and the -3 and that of the A6M was so great that they outweighed the logistical/training/familiarity advantages of a mixed carrier wing comprised of -3 and -4 F4F models.
It looks like that was also in the mind of BuAer if one can believe Lundstrom in First team. He seems to say that BurAer's Cdr. Pearson told Flately that 100 additional F4F-3s were being procured for perhaps just that purpose or at the least to augment Land Based marine units.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The only way I could see a number of Sea Hurricanes available to any VF unit is if a number of the aircraft "just happened" to be located in San Diego or Norfolk as a carrier group was returning to port. Considering that the first arrestor hook Sea Hurricane came to be during the late summer of 1941, I don't see this happening UNLESS someone in the USN saw the Sea Hurricane as a great advantage over the F4F and began the production ball rolling prior to WW2. The "supplementation" would have been welcomed IMO, to view this as a "should have done" after Pearl Harbor, was not practical or worth the effort when the F6F was on the way and the F4F (in retrospect) was holding it's own.

 

[RCAFson]

That was not the supposed reason (and we don't even know whether the USN really considered the P-40 as CV fighter), and that 'reason' never existed in 1st place. The wing loading was far smaller than of F4U and F6F.

The wing loading was about the same as the F4U/F6F but the airframe and LG were not designed for arrested landings and if the airframe is modded to take the extra stress the wing loading will get higher yet. The Hurricane's low wing loading and stall speed meant that the airframe/LG could withstand arrested landings without difficulty.

So the Sea Hurricane with ~1400 HP should climb as twice as F4F-4, let alone F4F-3. It should be also better than Spitfire V on same +16 lbs. Perhaps the 3500 fpm is a more reasonable thing to expect?

Peak climb rate will be about twice as high as the F4F-4 and about the same as the Spitfire V (similar weight and lower wing loading than the Spitfire VC).

I never said that boost override was inoperative for TO conditions. I've said that boost override was allowed for an aircraft flying already at fast speed. If the Merlin 45 was indeed allowed for +16 lbs for take off in 1942, then what was the point to insist on two-speed engines for Mosquito, Lancaster, Hurricane and other bombers? Install the Merlin 45 on them and you've saved plenty of time and money. Seems the engineers don't agree with you.
Please note here that there is a distinction made for climb, cruise and combat conditions for Merlin 20 series of engines. And here is the power chart for different Merlin 20s, where again the disitnction was made for take off conditions and all-out conditions.

We got into this phase of our discussion while talking about whether an overloaded Spitfire V pilot could use the boost cut out on take off, for a one time event and I never suggested that this would be standard practice for high intensity ops in land based aircraft! The Merlin 20 clearly gives more TO/high altitude power, at the same boost, as the Merlin 45 which were critical factors for heavily loaded bombers but much less so for a medium altitude fighter.

If you compare the SAC data with Grumman data, you will see that Grumman data is more realistic, for example they list the F4F-4 making 283 mph at 4600 ft.

Grumman revised their data downwards from their initial estimates.

Indeed, they were making 1440 HP at 5500 ft (no ram) as 'combat power'. The take off power remained the same, 880 HP. It took the RR to develop the Merlin XII in order for single speed Merlin to use boost of +12 lbs on take off.

The Spitfire/Hurricane with the Merlin II/III was being used operationally with 100 octane fuel to increase TO performance in 1938:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/24sept38-spitfire-100oct-approval.jpg

This implies an increase in boost since at 6.25lb boost TO power remains the same even with 100 octane fuel.

 

[RCAFson]

The only way I could see a number of Sea Hurricanes available to any VF unit is if a number of the aircraft "just happened" to be located in San Diego or Norfolk as a carrier group was returning to port. Considering that the first arrestor hook Sea Hurricane came to be during the late summer of 1941, I don't see this happening UNLESS someone in the USN saw the Sea Hurricane as a great advantage over the F4F and began the production ball rolling prior to WW2. The "supplementation" would have been welcomed IMO, to view this as a "should have done" after Pearl Harbor, was not practical or worth the effort when the F6F was on the way.

The FAA and Hawker began engineering the Sea Hurricane in June/july 1940. First arrested landings were in early 1941, first delivery to an operational squadron was probably March 15 of a Sea Hurricane IB converted in the UK, from a CCF Hurricane I. First HSH 1B kill was 31 July 1941 by 880 squadron operating from HMS Furious.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The FAA and Hawker began engineering the Sea Hurricane in June/july 1940. First arrested landings were in early 1941, first delivery to an operational squadron was probably March 15 of a Sea Hurricane IB converted in the UK, from a CCF Hurricane I. First HSH 1B kill was 31 July 1941 by 880 squadron operating from HMS Furious.

I know - you were talking setting up HSH production in North America. There was no way you were going to set up production, build additional tooling, build the aircraft, get it carrier qualified and off to say Guadalcanal if a contract was signed say January 1942, and again, would it be worth it after all that was shown about the F4F?

 

[RCAFson]

From Rich L., a great wealth of knowlege with regards to US Naval Aviation.

Based on Lundstrom's accounts which use IJN and USN data, the Wildcat achieved about a 1-1 kill ratio with the Zero, in 1942.

 

[RCAFson]

I know - you were talking setting up HSH production in North America. There was no way you were going to set up production, build additional tooling, build the aircraft, get it carrier qualified and off to say Guadalcanal if a contract was signed say January 1942, and again, would it be worth it after all that was shown about the F4F?

The Sea Hurricane was already carrier qualified in early 1941. I'm suggesting that after Packard got the Merlin contract, that the USN could have signed a deal with CCF to build the HSH II (say early-mid 1941), with production commencing ASAP ( ~jan-feb 1942) once the Packard Merlin is available. This would have meant fewer P-40Fs (but more P40Es) as the CCF HSH would have had a higher priority for Packard Merlins.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The Sea Hurricane was already carrier qualified in early 1941.

By the RAN, not by the USN. It would have had to go thru carrier quals regardless.

I'm suggesting that after Packard got the Merlin contract, that the USN could have signed a deal with CCF to build the HSH II (say early-mid 1941), with production commencing ASAP ( ~jan-feb 1942) once the Packard Merlin is available. This would have meant fewer P-40Fs (but more P40Es) as the CCF HSH would have had a higher priority for Packard Merlins.

Production ~Jan-Feb 1942, and when do you think the first ones will be delivered? This is all wishful thinking, especially when diverting already allocated engines, again for what value added? This is all assuming a contract was signed in early 1941, again not very likely.

 

[tomo pauk]

The wing loading was about the same as the F4U/F6F but the airframe and LG were not designed for arrested landings and if the airframe is modded to take the extra stress the wing loading will get higher yet. The Hurricane's low wing loading and stall speed meant that the airframe/LG could withstand arrested landings without difficulty.

The landing gear of the early P-40s was designed with some healthy redundancy - it weighted 628 lbs in the P-40 (no letter) vs. 351 lbs for the F4F-4. 740-750 lbs was for the Hellcat, that was 50% heavier for same missions. The weight of landing gear went to 649 kbs with P-40B/C, and then 694 ( a typo in the AHT?) P-40E, then lightened to 552 lbs for the heavier (!) P-40F and stood at about that weight until the magnesium wheels were introduced with P-40N, weighting 488 lbs there. The P-40E (1150 HP for take off) was tested with two 225 US gal tanks ( take off weight close to 11000 lbs), for ferry purposes - looks like landing gear, engine and wing were up to the task.
The P-40 was carrying between 112 and 133 imp gals in protected tanks (150 in non-protected tanks), vs. 94 imp gals for the Hurricane. That leaves option of removing one tank, like it was the case for few P-40 versions, for greater RoC and lower wing loading, or retaining it for a range a bit better than F4F, let alone for Hurricane.

Peak climb rate will be about twice as high as the F4F-4 and about the same as the Spitfire V (similar weight and lower wing loading than the Spitfire VC).

No doubt that the climb rate would be better than F4F. I, however, doubt it that RoC should be better than of Spitfire Vs. The bigger drag should be also a concern?

We got into this phase of our discussion while talking about whether an overloaded Spitfire V pilot could use the boost cut out on take off, for a one time event and I never suggested that this would be standard practice for high intensity ops in land based aircraft! The Merlin 20 clearly gives more TO/high altitude power, at the same boost, as the Merlin 45 which were critical factors for heavily loaded bombers but much less so for a medium altitude fighter.

Seems like this statement got us side-tracked: "The Merlin boost override can be engaged at any altitude to be used as the pilot saw fit. " (your post #60 here).

Grumman revised their data downwards from their initial estimates.

Would you be so kind to direct me to the Grumman's data other than what can be found at Williams' site?

The Spitfire/Hurricane with the Merlin II/III was being used operationally with 100 octane fuel to increase TO performance in 1938:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/24sept38-spitfire-100oct-approval.jpg

This implies an increase in boost since at 6.25lb boost TO power remains the same even with 100 octane fuel.

Thanks for posting that.
In case the +12 lbs boost was allowed also for take off regime, the power should be greater, 1180-1190 HP judging by the power chart for Merlin III. It is puzzling why the later document, that covers even the mid-war Merlins, notes only +6.25 lbs boost (880 HP for take off)?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Based on Lundstrom's accounts which use IJN and USN data, the Wildcat achieved about a 1-1 kill ratio with the Zero, in 1942.

And the Sea hurricane "would have" done any better? Based on what happened in Burma there's a lot of wishful thinking going on here!

 

[RCAFson]

The landing gear of the early P-40s was designed with some healthy redundancy - it weighted 628 lbs in the P-40 (no letter) vs. 351 lbs for the F4F-4. 740-750 lbs was for the Hellcat, that was 50% heavier for same missions. The weight of landing gear went to 649 kbs with P-40B/C, and then 694 ( a typo in the AHT?) P-40E, then lightened to 552 lbs for the heavier (!) P-40F and stood at about that weight until the magnesium wheels were introduced with P-40N, weighting 488 lbs there. The P-40E (1150 HP for take off) was tested with two 225 US gal tanks ( take off weight close to 11000 lbs), for ferry purposes - looks like landing gear, engine and wing were up to the task.
The P-40 was carrying between 112 and 133 imp gals in protected tanks (150 in non-protected tanks), vs. 94 imp gals for the Hurricane. That leaves option of removing one tank, like it was the case for few P-40 versions, for greater RoC and lower wing loading, or retaining it for a range a bit better than F4F, let alone for Hurricane.

It is not the take off that stressed the LG and airframe, but the arrested landing and the aircraft will be heavier yet with an airframe modded for that. Additionally the view over the nose is terrible and it would have been very difficult to land on a carrier.

No doubt that the climb rate would be better than F4F. I, however, doubt it that RoC should be better than of Spitfire Vs. The bigger drag should be also a concern?

The difference in drag at climbing speeds is minimal and offset by the lower wing loading.

Seems like this statement got us side-tracked: "The Merlin boost override can be engaged at any altitude to be used as the pilot saw fit. " (your post #60 here).

Yes, and I stand by that statement.

Would you be so kind to direct me to the Grumman's data other than what can be found at Williams' site?

See the Grumman specs for the F4F-3:

Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation
Report No. 1469A
August 12, 1941
Detail Specification
For
Model F4F-3 Airplane

and note the performance for the overload fighter at 7432lb.

and then look at the specs for the F4F-4:

Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation
Report No. 1471C
October 21, 1942
Detail Specification
For
Model F4F-4 Airplane

and note the performance at 7426lb and then note the discrepancy between the F4F-4 and F4F-3 at near identical weights! The time to climb to 20K ft has gone from 8.4min in the F4F-3 to 12.7min in the F4F-4 yet the weights are the same! Grumman "sexed up" the performance stats for the F4F-3/4 and then had to back away from them as it was obvious that actual service aircraft, in combat, could not hope to match Grumman's claims, and USN/USMC pilots said so in no uncertain terms.

Thanks for posting that.
In case the +12 lbs boost was allowed also for take off regime, the power should be greater, 1180-1190 HP judging by the power chart for Merlin III. It is puzzling why the later document, that covers even the mid-war Merlins, notes only +6.25 lbs boost (880 HP for take off)?

Because, for a land based aircraft it was probably made little difference to a Merlin III fighter with CS prop, so they left the TO rating at 6.25lbs, especially since pilots knew that they were authorized to use higher TO boost if it became necessary.

 

[RCAFson]

And the Sea hurricane "would have" done any better? Based on what happened in Burma there's a lot of wishful thinking going on here!

The Sea Hurricane II was faster and could out roll, out turn, and out climb the F4F-4. Given the same tactical situations it should do better than the F4F-4.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Based on Lundstrom's accounts which use IJN and USN data, the Wildcat achieved about a 1-1 kill ratio with the Zero, in 1942.

Interesting compilation but what I really wonder was there a trend as time went on?

It looks like (Based on 1st Team-GC) page 528 529 we have summary tabulation including 7 August 42 thru 15 November 42.

He estimates 31 USN F4F lost vs 25 A6M over this period. So 9 F4F were lost in A2AC against 1 A6M at the outset, including 5 a/c from two divisions of VF-5 on the first day of fighting at Guadalcanal, badly positioned due to overcast. Two divisions of VF-6 also lost 4 more F4F to A6M attacks All in all from that point on, the ratio went 22 USN F4F vs 24 IJN A6M… So as time progressed the tally got no worse and mayhaps got marginally (very marginally) better. I believe most of the USN VF were committed to the island during September with the loss of Sara and Wasp, with Enterprise and Hornet contributing some VF to the total at various times. What we don't have is a compilation of the results of Marine VMF Performance in this volume. We do however, have a quote by Lt. Col. Joe Bauer who exhorted his pilots to, "Be an aggressor." His aerial warfare philosophy with the F4F was purported to be:

"When you see Zeros, Dogfight 'em."

The supposition is that he recognized that the IJN was losing its best pilots in the war of attrition and the new replacements didn't fully understand how to get the most out of the A6M.

In any event, I think your case suffers when you make comparisons to the F4F performance. I believe it's strongest when you argue that the HSH was a fine aircraft that could make a worthwhile contribution, if it had been available in numbers in that critical time frame, flying primarily from land bases but with the flexibility for staging from A/C carriers at need.
JMHO.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The Sea Hurricane II was faster and could out roll, out turn, and out climb the F4F-4. Given the same tactical situations it should do better than the F4F-4.

And it "SHOULD" have done better in Burma, don't ya think?

It boils down to tactics, so in the end, I don't see the value added here unless there was a gaggle of HSHs just sitting idle somewhere in a US port shortly after PH.

BTW, although Lundstrom has done some great work, I still take his numbers with a grain of salt. And you say he showed "1942" numbers, what about the rest of the F4F's operational career?

The Sea Hurricane II was faster and could out roll, out turn, and out climb the F4F-4.

So could the Zero

 

[FLYBOYJ]

In any event, I think your case suffers when you make comparisons to the F4F performance. I believe it's strongest when you argue that the HSH was a fine aircraft that could make a worthwhile contribution, if it had been available in numbers in that critical time frame, flying primarily from land bases but with the flexibility for staging from A/C carriers at need.
JMHO.

BINGO!!!

 

[RCAFson]

I

In any event, I think your case suffers when you make comparisons to the F4F performance. I believe it's strongest when you argue that the HSH was a fine aircraft that could make a worthwhile contribution, if it had been available in numbers in that critical time frame, flying primarily from land bases but with the flexibility for staging from A/C carriers at need.
JMHO.

If there had been a fly-off between the F4F-3/4 with the Sea Hurricane II, the Wildcat would have been "tamed" pretty convincingly. It simply couldn't compete with the Sea Hurricane II as a pure fighter. As You and I have pointed it, the folding wing F4F-4, was better suited to the overall duties required of a naval fighter but it was not well suited for use as a point defence fighter. For example a Sea Hurricane II could climb to 30k ft in about 17min versus 25-30 mins for the F4F-4. So, would the USN have gained a tactical advantage from having a 1/2 dozen Sea Hurricane IIs on each CV from early 1942? I think the answer is yes.

So if we add a hundred+ HSHs to the USN, we can then give the surplus F4F-4s to the RN for use on the narrow lift RN CVs - everybody wins.