Hurricanes were available in North America, in some numbers prior to Dec 1941 so one or more of these could have been converted to a Sea Hurricane for deck landing trials.
If one or more could be procured, no doubt it could be accomplished but I expect the motivation to do so was seriously lacking and I suspect all production was in response to a customer demand so it may have been difficult to get one or a few released… my pure speculation.
Actually, not that many (a couple hundred maybe) and the F4F-F didn't begin production till Jan 1942, IIRC.
XF4F-4 first flight was 14 April, 1941 with USN delivery in May. As noted previously, first production F4F-4's appeared at the end of 1941 with 5 delivered to the USN. Production of folding wing Martlet II's for the RN's FAA began
October 4, 1941!! with 48 delivered by year's end.
We're talking maybe a dozen HSHs per CV, and I think the USN was resourceful enough to tackle that problem.
That would appear to be a reasonable number assuming that, with all the uncertainties discussed and to be discussed, that it's concluded to be an effort worth making…Although, it is a bit light for typical assigned CAP numbers in late '42 which seemed to have ranged from between 35 to 50+ F4F aircraft from multiple carriers. If a dozen HSH were embarked after the introduction of the F4F-4, what would be the impact on the air wing for a Yorktown class carrier?
There are real examples of this drawn from the literature often cited here. For example, on April 1, 1942, VF-6 operated with mixed type squadron equipped with 23 F4F-4 and 4 F4F-3s. On April 7, this was changed to 22 F4F-4 and 5 F4F-3 (the -3s were hung from the overhead). Most relevant was the air wing composition on April 28 when the Enterprise and Hornet then presumably operating air groups nominally composed of ~27 F4F-4, ~36 SBD and ~15 TBD also carried respectively 10 and 11 VMF-212 F4F-3s 1 SNJ (on Enterprise) bound for Efate. Based on subsequent events, that appears to be perhaps over a dozen more aircraft than the maximum operating air wing size would prove to be… In late 42, operational composition apparently changed again to be something like 36 F4F-4, ~24 SBD and ~12 TBF. In other words, the CV type could typically comfortably operate about 72 to a maximum of about 78 aircraft although it might carry as cargo another dozen or so hung from the hangar overhead.. The options for embarking a dozen HSH appear to be either to reduce the strike component by a similar number or reducing the number of op-ready F4F-4 by about 5 F4F-4 for every 2 HSH. That suggests a choice that a Yorktown class carrier can either embark 30 F4F-4 or a dozen HSH. That can't be correct! if we take just area and look at the nominal fixed-wing carrier airwing at the start of the war it was 72: 18 VF, 36 VSB 18 VT. One F4F-3 has an area of 1,092.5 sq. ft. vs the HSH's 1,290 sq. ft. The F4F-3 has 85% of the footprint of the HSH so 18 F4F-3s corresponds to 15 HSHs. In the final analysis it looks like a dozen HSH's would displace all but about 10 to 15 F4F-4s.
Since escort missions absorbed about 10 F4F, it looks like a dozen HSH would constitute the standard CAP. Mixing types for CAP would create air-ops cyclic problems for the aircraft with dissimilar endurance. Hanging Drop tanks on the HSH at the late stage in the war would not even out the problem since the CAP F4F-4 would also typically be carrying a drop tank. It just seems like if increased performance is what you are looking to achieve, you are going to pay penalties that may be unacceptable on a regular basis. I think there is more on this to be discussed.
It wouldn't have taken a whole lot of clairvoyance in mid 1941 to see that the FAA was short of fighters, and that the USN would be too in a shooting war, so a joint Cdn/USA project to produce Sea Hurricanes would have made some sense, especially as the conversion kit had already been engineered in the UK and the Hurricane was in production in Canada (albeit in small number prior to large scale Packard production). Not a completely likely scenario, but not completely implausible either.
Sorry RCAFson, but I think this is the most unrealistic of statements. Considering the opinion of the west regarding the IJN's capability as a potential adversary and the resultant procurement of large numbers of obsolescent aircraft for future use in the Pacific theater as war clouds gathered, by virtually all the western allies, I can't imagine anyone saying or thinking, "We (the USN) are going to be faced with (what appears to be) a crisis in carrier fighter performance in late 1942 facing the IJN." That would suggest the A6M's performance wasn't the shock that is well recorded in the histories of that period. Even hollywood accepts that!
The ideal fighter might have been a Sea Hurricane II with 4 x .5in with 350rpg (or 8 x .3in with 500rpg) and a couple of 15g internal wing tanks in lieu of the outer guns on the Mk IIB wing. This would have given the FAA and USN a useful addition to the F4F that was carrier ready and also well suited to base defence.
I'd expect the USN to opt for the 4x .50" armament since that was a familiar suite, but am wondering about that comparison to the HSH established performance with its standard quip and ammo load.