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Was an issue here the security surrounding the Norden sight. They were kept under lock and key with security as if they were nuclear isotopes. The US didnt want the British to see the Norden sight I am sure they didn't want the Germans to either,.
Stona - flak may have been more of a concern during the last days of the war in the ETO/MTO for some bomber crewmen - simply because the ability for German fighters other than 262s to penetrate the US escort was very rare.. but not for 1942 through 1944.
Had a quick check of the "Dresden flak had been transferred" thing. Frederick Taylor, Goetz Bergander, David Irving all say the city's heavy batteries had been transferred away by the time of the raid. (I know, I know, Irving, but he also cites the OKL order that stripped the batteries from Dresden and from other cities.)
iirc FDR gave the green light to share the norden with the soviets before he did the RAF. the us was trying to negotiate for bomber bases in the ussr. the soviets kept delaying the project but asked for the everything under the sky to show us good faith. one of the ( many ) things they asked for and got was the norden. in fact they rarely said no to uncle joe for some dumb reason. in the end the deal for bases proved a fiasco and should have been an eye opener for the us in regards to soviet strategy and tactics.
"Soviet objectives in agreeing to the operation cannot be determined with certainty. Unlike the Americans, the USSR had no doctrine or "theology" of victory through aerial bombardment, and had only a rudimentary long-range air force. Furthermore, when the survival of the USSR was in doubt, Marshal Stalin refused offers of air support, demanding instead maximum lend-lease deliveries. By the time Stalin finally agreed to activate the plan, in a meeting with US ambassador W. Averell Harriman on 2 February 1944, Soviet victory was assured. Indications are that Stalin wished to obtain all possible information about superior American technology, and assigned officers with the stated objectives of learning as much as they could about US equipment and concepts of operation. For example, the USSR demanded and obtained the secret Norden bombsight, and also obtained wide photographic coverage of Europe from American aircraft. However, this objective cut both ways, for the USAAF also learned of the extreme vulnerability of the USSR to air attack, and of the primitive technical and infrastructure conditions prevailing on the Soviet side."
Operation Frantic - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Soviets probebly didn't see a Norden until mid/late 1944.
The USAAF was hardly active in 1942, the first mission wasn't until August 17th when 12 B-17s attacked Rouen. It wasn't until 27th January 1943 that a German target was attempted and that was Wilhelmshaven, not exactly a deep penetration raid. Nonetheless, as soon as heavily defended targets were attacked flak became a major factor and a major cause of losses and damage to 8th AF bombers. The statistics back this up.
Steve - strictly speaking the first 8th AF raid was AAF pilots flying RAF Bostons on an attack and both for them and the May 1943 introduction to B-26 combat ops would agree.
Having said that, the 8th quit doing 'low level' and quit doing raids on sub pens at 9-12000 feet for the same reason. Notwithstanding there were 30 8th BC missions prior to Jan 27 at Wilhelmshaven. The crews would be greatly amused to hear that Lorient, Brest, Lille, St. Nazaire, Abbevile, et "were lightly defended" - particularly with respect to high relative LW fighter opposition to the sorties for each bomber mission. Never argued 'major concerns that flak caused", but the topic is 'most Feared'
As the 8th AF prepared to enter the fray in Europe it had only to look at the British figures for the last four months of 1941. Bomber Command was losing about 100 aircraft a month to flak, a substantial majority on soon to be abandoned daylight sorties. The Americans ignored these figures at their peril.
In August 1942, the month the 8th AF began its campaign in Europe, the RAF lost 48 aircraft to fighters and 36 to flak. The following month the figures were 36 and 55. This does not support the contention that flak was not a concern from 1942-44.
Re-read my comments. Never stated nor implied that 'flak was not a concern'. My comments relate to the LW Daylight Fighter arm and their impact on the 8th BC 'fear factor' vs flak
The men who, on August 1st 1943, a year into the campaign, flew against the oil targets at Ploesti losing 54 of the 166 attacking aircraft, at least 41 to the flak, would agree.
The RAF statistics are somewhat to completely irrelevant when comparing daylight, massed operations at 22-27,000 feet versus RAF night bomber stream missions at medium altitudes during those periods. LW fighters did not easily find RAF BC aircraft - the LW had no problem 'finding' B-17/B-24 formations, nor did they have a significant problem in evading many US escorts through Big Week 1944. Apples an oranges.
Cheers
Steve
"Soviet objectives in agreeing to the operation cannot be determined with certainty. Unlike the Americans, the USSR had no doctrine or "theology" of victory through aerial bombardment, and had only a rudimentary long-range air force. Furthermore, when the survival of the USSR was in doubt, Marshal Stalin refused offers of air support, demanding instead maximum lend-lease deliveries. By the time Stalin finally agreed to activate the plan, in a meeting with US ambassador W. Averell Harriman on 2 February 1944, Soviet victory was assured. Indications are that Stalin wished to obtain all possible information about superior American technology, and assigned officers with the stated objectives of learning as much as they could about US equipment and concepts of operation. For example, the USSR demanded and obtained the secret Norden bombsight, and also obtained wide photographic coverage of Europe from American aircraft. However, this objective cut both ways, for the USAAF also learned of the extreme vulnerability of the USSR to air attack, and of the primitive technical and infrastructure conditions prevailing on the Soviet side."
Operation Frantic - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Soviets probebly didn't see a Norden until mid/late 1944.
Whether they were sold outright to the Soviet Union is probably a moot point, as the Soviets "interred" U.S. bombers like the 3 B-29s (plus one salvageable wreck), quite a few B-17s (73, although many were eventually returned) and others like the B-24 and a B-25 (although the B-25 from the Doolittle raid didn't have the Norden, but a custom made aiming unit nicknamed the "Mark Twain" for the low altitude operation)...i do not know when they got it. i assumed it was prior to the commencement of the frantic operations. it was in the book the poltava affair which my wife has long since hid beside the holy grail and the arc of the covenant in one of her cleaning whirlwinds. i will see if i can dig up more on it....
The Germans obtained the design for the Norden as it was being designed and had a complete working example before it was issued to the USAAF. It was tested against the German designs but the improvement was deemed insufficient to change their home grown designs.The designer of the Lotfe 7 was interrogated and in American Raiders Book by Wolfgang W.E. Samuel he said he only saw the plans after the Lotfe 7 was in service in 1942. The Germans did obtain Norden plans by espionage in an amateurish, wasteful and foolish operation that compromised an asset.
Whether they were sold outright to the Soviet Union is probably a moot point, as the Soviets "interred" U.S. bombers like the 3 B-29s (plus one salvageable wreck), quite a few B-17s (73, although many were eventually returned) and others like the B-24 and a B-25 (although the B-25 from the Doolittle raid didn't have the Norden, but a custom made aiming unit nicknamed the "Mark Twain" for the low altitude operation)...
Whether they were sold outright to the Soviet Union is probably a moot point, as the Soviets "interred" U.S. bombers like the 3 B-29s (plus one salvageable wreck), quite a few B-17s (73, although many were eventually returned) and others like the B-24 and a B-25 (although the B-25 from the Doolittle raid didn't have the Norden, but a custom made aiming unit nicknamed the "Mark Twain" for the low altitude operation)...
The Germans obtained the design for the Norden as it was being designed and had a complete working example before it was issued to the USAAF. It was tested against the German designs but the improvement was deemed insufficient to change their home grown designs.
The espionage was undertaken by an amateur but was not wasteful or foolish and didn't compromise an asset as he wasn't trained by the Germans.
Our crews were landing in what they thought was friendly, allied controlled territory. They had no idea that they would be interned and their aircraft confiscated.Yes, but the bombardiers were sworn to ensure that the Norden bombsight was destroyed.
The B-25 had no choice, it was either land there, land in Japanese occupied territory or ditch at sea. Fortunately, the 20 cent bombsight wasn't a high security item.are you sure that wasnt briefed well in advance? wasnt that one of the reasons they didnt go to russia on the doolittle raids? they wanted to keep soviet neutrality with japan to keep the lend lease shipping lanes open?