Most hated Axis interceptor for American bomber crews

[drgondog]

Stona - flak may have been more of a concern during the last days of the war in the ETO/MTO for some bomber crewmen - simply because the ability for German fighters other than 262s to penetrate the US escort was very rare.. but not for 1942 through 1944.

 

[bobbysocks]

Was an issue here the security surrounding the Norden sight. They were kept under lock and key with security as if they were nuclear isotopes. The US didnt want the British to see the Norden sight I am sure they didn't want the Germans to either,.

iirc FDR gave the green light to share the norden with the soviets before he did the RAF. the us was trying to negotiate for bomber bases in the ussr. the soviets kept delaying the project but asked for the everything under the sky to show us good faith. one of the ( many ) things they asked for and got was the norden. in fact they rarely said no to uncle joe for some dumb reason. in the end the deal for bases proved a fiasco and should have been an eye opener for the us in regards to soviet strategy and tactics.

back to the norden and bombing...did the lead of EACH bomber box initate the drop? if they all dropped on the mark of the very first bomber the bomds would drop several miles behind the lead. they would have to either have their own lead bomber or drop their load at a set number of seconds ( minutes ) after the lead so it could be concentrated instead of spread all over the countryside. what was the procedure if you were several flights behind the lead?

 

[stona]

Stona - flak may have been more of a concern during the last days of the war in the ETO/MTO for some bomber crewmen - simply because the ability for German fighters other than 262s to penetrate the US escort was very rare.. but not for 1942 through 1944.

The USAAF was hardly active in 1942, the first mission wasn't until August 17th when 12 B-17s attacked Rouen. It wasn't until 27th January 1943 that a German target was attempted and that was Wilhelmshaven, not exactly a deep penetration raid. Nonetheless, as soon as heavily defended targets were attacked flak became a major factor and a major cause of losses and damage to 8th AF bombers. The statistics back this up.

As the 8th AF prepared to enter the fray in Europe it had only to look at the British figures for the last four months of 1941. Bomber Command was losing about 100 aircraft a month to flak, a substantial majority on soon to be abandoned daylight sorties. The Americans ignored these figures at their peril.

In August 1942, the month the 8th AF began its campaign in Europe, the RAF lost 48 aircraft to fighters and 36 to flak. The following month the figures were 36 and 55. This does not support the contention that flak was not a concern from 1942-44.
The men who, on August 1st 1943, a year into the campaign, flew against the oil targets at Ploesti losing 54 of the 166 attacking aircraft, at least 41 to the flak, would agree.

Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

Had a quick check of the "Dresden flak had been transferred" thing. Frederick Taylor, Goetz Bergander, David Irving all say the city's heavy batteries had been transferred away by the time of the raid. (I know, I know, Irving, but he also cites the OKL order that stripped the batteries from Dresden and from other cities.)

It's not surprising. In the last eight months of the war the Luftwaffe transferred 555 heavy and 175 medium/light flak batteries to the fighting fronts. In the period around the Dresden raids, between the end of January and February 6th 1945, the Luftwaffe transferred 327 heavy and 110 medium/light batteries to the eastern front alone. This represented 21% of the heavy and 16% of the medium/light guns protecting the Reich. At the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945 whole areas of Germany were denuded of their ground based air defences to bolster the fighting fronts. It must be one reason that Harris noted the Luftwaffe's defences crumbling in the last three months of 1944.

Cheers

Steve

 

[gjs238]

iirc FDR gave the green light to share the norden with the soviets before he did the RAF. the us was trying to negotiate for bomber bases in the ussr. the soviets kept delaying the project but asked for the everything under the sky to show us good faith. one of the ( many ) things they asked for and got was the norden. in fact they rarely said no to uncle joe for some dumb reason. in the end the deal for bases proved a fiasco and should have been an eye opener for the us in regards to soviet strategy and tactics.

Ugg.
Amazing how when not in use, the US removed the Norden bombsights from the ships and kept them locked under guard, and the bombardiers were to destroy the bombsight if they landed/crashed in enemy territory.

Did the Soviets go through all that trouble with the Nordens they were entrusted with?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

"Soviet objectives in agreeing to the operation cannot be determined with certainty. Unlike the Americans, the USSR had no doctrine or "theology" of victory through aerial bombardment, and had only a rudimentary long-range air force. Furthermore, when the survival of the USSR was in doubt, Marshal Stalin refused offers of air support, demanding instead maximum lend-lease deliveries. By the time Stalin finally agreed to activate the plan, in a meeting with US ambassador W. Averell Harriman on 2 February 1944, Soviet victory was assured. Indications are that Stalin wished to obtain all possible information about superior American technology, and assigned officers with the stated objectives of learning as much as they could about US equipment and concepts of operation. For example, the USSR demanded and obtained the secret Norden bombsight, and also obtained wide photographic coverage of Europe from American aircraft. However, this objective cut both ways, for the USAAF also learned of the extreme vulnerability of the USSR to air attack, and of the primitive technical and infrastructure conditions prevailing on the Soviet side."

Operation Frantic - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Soviets probebly didn't see a Norden until mid/late 1944.

 

[gjs238]

"Soviet objectives in agreeing to the operation cannot be determined with certainty. Unlike the Americans, the USSR had no doctrine or "theology" of victory through aerial bombardment, and had only a rudimentary long-range air force. Furthermore, when the survival of the USSR was in doubt, Marshal Stalin refused offers of air support, demanding instead maximum lend-lease deliveries. By the time Stalin finally agreed to activate the plan, in a meeting with US ambassador W. Averell Harriman on 2 February 1944, Soviet victory was assured. Indications are that Stalin wished to obtain all possible information about superior American technology, and assigned officers with the stated objectives of learning as much as they could about US equipment and concepts of operation. For example, the USSR demanded and obtained the secret Norden bombsight, and also obtained wide photographic coverage of Europe from American aircraft. However, this objective cut both ways, for the USAAF also learned of the extreme vulnerability of the USSR to air attack, and of the primitive technical and infrastructure conditions prevailing on the Soviet side."

Operation Frantic - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Soviets probebly didn't see a Norden until mid/late 1944.

Hmm, maybe at that point in the game, perhaps Ambassador Harriman ought to have said:

 

[stona]

Mmmmm! From Hansard, a record of the school boy antics of our venerable House of Commons.


" Mr. Donner asked the Minister of Supply when the decision to sell the Rolls Royce Nene jet engine to the U.S.S.R. was taken; how many such engines have been sold to the U.S.S.R. and, separately, to Czechoslovakia or any other country under Soviet influence; at what price they were sold; and whether it is intended to make any further deliveries to these countries.

§ Mr. Piratin
On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker, I wish to ask your guidance with regard to the expression 'to Czechoslovakia or any other country under Soviet influence,' which is an imputation that that country is under Soviet influence. In view of the fact that we are constantly told by the Clerk at the Table that any statement contained in a Question must be a statement of fact, is the expression used in this Question in Order?

§ Mr. Speaker
I should have thought it was a statement of fact, and is, therefore, in Order.

§ Major Guy Lloyd
Further to that point of Order. Would it not have been much more accurate had the words "dominance and domination" been used instead of "influence"?

§ Mr. Piratin
The next time I wish to put down a Question about Greece, a number of which have been rejected by the Clerk at the Table—will it be in Order if I use the expression: "Greece under the domination of Britain and America"?

§ Mr. Speaker
Certainly not, because that is not a fact.

§ Mr. Piratin
Further to that point of Order——

§ Mr. Speaker
This is not a point of Order but merely a political argument, which I think ought to stop.

§ Mr. Piratin
With great respect, Sir——

§ Mr. Speaker
It is not a point of Order and I will not have it pursued.

§ The Minister of Supply (Mr. G. R. Strauss)
Messrs. Rolls Royce were given permission in September, 1946, to sell 10 Nene engines to Russia and in March, 1947, to sell a further 15. None has been sold to Czechoslovakia or to any other country which could be described as under Soviet influence. No further sales are contemplated. The selling price of the engines was fixed under a commercial contract.

§ Mr. Donner
But does the right hon. Gentleman realise that the sale of this particular engine to Russia saved that country years of research; and how does he justify that sale?

§ Mr. Strauss
As the hon. Member is probably aware, none of these engines was on the secret list.

§ Sir Waldron Smithers
In view of the rising tide of Communism, will the right hon. Gentleman give an undertaking that no more munitions of war of any kind will be sold, but all will be kept for defence purposes? Will he give that undertaking?

§ Mr. Strauss
That is a very broad question. As I said in reply to the Question put down, no further sales of this engine are contemplated.

§ Sir W. Smithers
I asked about all munitions of war.

§ Mr. Edgar Granville
Did I understand the right hon. Gentleman to say that these engines were not on the secret list at the time of the sale?

§ Mr. Strauss
Yes, Sir.

§ Commander Noble asked the Minister of Supply how many British jet engines have been supplied to the U.S.S.R.; and in which years.

§ Mr. G. R. Strauss
Fifty-five jet engines were supplied to the U.S.S.R. during 1947.

§ Commander Noble
Can the Minister say, in view of his statement that no further sales are contemplated the reason for this change of policy?

§ Mr. Strauss
One of the reasons is that we have not completed our inquiries.

§ Mr. Blackburn
Will my right hon. Friend make it quite plain that, so long as the present cold war continues, we have no intention whatsoever of supplying any kind of warlike materials either to the Soviet Union or to any of her satellites?

§ Mr. Speaker
This Question asks how many engines have been supplied, not about the cold war. "

And we're worried about a bomb sight!

Cheers

Steve

 

[drgondog]

The USAAF was hardly active in 1942, the first mission wasn't until August 17th when 12 B-17s attacked Rouen. It wasn't until 27th January 1943 that a German target was attempted and that was Wilhelmshaven, not exactly a deep penetration raid. Nonetheless, as soon as heavily defended targets were attacked flak became a major factor and a major cause of losses and damage to 8th AF bombers. The statistics back this up.

Steve - strictly speaking the first 8th AF raid was AAF pilots flying RAF Bostons on an attack and both for them and the May 1943 introduction to B-26 combat ops would agree.

Having said that, the 8th quit doing 'low level' and quit doing raids on sub pens at 9-12000 feet for the same reason. Notwithstanding there were 30 8th BC missions prior to Jan 27 at Wilhelmshaven. The crews would be greatly amused to hear that Lorient, Brest, Lille, St. Nazaire, Abbevile, et "were lightly defended" - particularly with respect to high relative LW fighter opposition to the sorties for each bomber mission. Never argued 'major concerns that flak caused", but the topic is 'most Feared'

As the 8th AF prepared to enter the fray in Europe it had only to look at the British figures for the last four months of 1941. Bomber Command was losing about 100 aircraft a month to flak, a substantial majority on soon to be abandoned daylight sorties. The Americans ignored these figures at their peril.

In August 1942, the month the 8th AF began its campaign in Europe, the RAF lost 48 aircraft to fighters and 36 to flak. The following month the figures were 36 and 55. This does not support the contention that flak was not a concern from 1942-44.

Re-read my comments. Never stated nor implied that 'flak was not a concern'. My comments relate to the LW Daylight Fighter arm and their impact on the 8th BC 'fear factor' vs flak

The men who, on August 1st 1943, a year into the campaign, flew against the oil targets at Ploesti losing 54 of the 166 attacking aircraft, at least 41 to the flak, would agree.

The RAF statistics are somewhat to completely irrelevant when comparing daylight, massed operations at 22-27,000 feet versus RAF night bomber stream missions at medium altitudes during those periods. LW fighters did not easily find RAF BC aircraft - the LW had no problem 'finding' B-17/B-24 formations, nor did they have a significant problem in evading many US escorts through Big Week 1944. Apples an oranges.

Cheers
Steve

If you look to August 17, October 10, October 14, 1943 - then Jan 29; Feb 22, 25; March 6, 8; April 13, 15, 24, 29, then May 8, 12, 19, 24, 27, 28, 29; June 20,21; July 7,21; Sept 11, 12, 27; Oct : Nov 26, 30; All High value targets, all heavily defended by both LW and AAA the losses to LW were 30 or more. The number of missions in which the loss totals for 8th BC between 20-29 are slightly more than the 28 named above.

However, missions to the same targets absent LW attacks were in the 0-4 range for losses and you would have to parse mid air collisions, weather related issues, mechanical failures against solely flak related and confirmed by MACR.

Flak was certainly respected, but you could assert that the attitude about flak is that 'it was impersonal', 'when your number is up - its up', 'it was scary' - but Fighters were personal, visibly and frequently deadly, and until US escorts intervened, persistent and relentless.

 

[bobbysocks]

"Soviet objectives in agreeing to the operation cannot be determined with certainty. Unlike the Americans, the USSR had no doctrine or "theology" of victory through aerial bombardment, and had only a rudimentary long-range air force. Furthermore, when the survival of the USSR was in doubt, Marshal Stalin refused offers of air support, demanding instead maximum lend-lease deliveries. By the time Stalin finally agreed to activate the plan, in a meeting with US ambassador W. Averell Harriman on 2 February 1944, Soviet victory was assured. Indications are that Stalin wished to obtain all possible information about superior American technology, and assigned officers with the stated objectives of learning as much as they could about US equipment and concepts of operation. For example, the USSR demanded and obtained the secret Norden bombsight, and also obtained wide photographic coverage of Europe from American aircraft. However, this objective cut both ways, for the USAAF also learned of the extreme vulnerability of the USSR to air attack, and of the primitive technical and infrastructure conditions prevailing on the Soviet side."

Operation Frantic - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Soviets probebly didn't see a Norden until mid/late 1944.

i do not know when they got it. i assumed it was prior to the commencement of the frantic operations. it was in the book the poltava affair which my wife has long since hid beside the holy grail and the arc of the covenant in one of her cleaning whirlwinds. i will see if i can dig up more on it....

 

[GrauGeist]

i do not know when they got it. i assumed it was prior to the commencement of the frantic operations. it was in the book the poltava affair which my wife has long since hid beside the holy grail and the arc of the covenant in one of her cleaning whirlwinds. i will see if i can dig up more on it....

Whether they were sold outright to the Soviet Union is probably a moot point, as the Soviets "interred" U.S. bombers like the 3 B-29s (plus one salvageable wreck), quite a few B-17s (73, although many were eventually returned) and others like the B-24 and a B-25 (although the B-25 from the Doolittle raid didn't have the Norden, but a custom made aiming unit nicknamed the "Mark Twain" for the low altitude operation)...

 

[Glider]

The designer of the Lotfe 7 was interrogated and in American Raiders Book by Wolfgang W.E. Samuel he said he only saw the plans after the Lotfe 7 was in service in 1942. The Germans did obtain Norden plans by espionage in an amateurish, wasteful and foolish operation that compromised an asset.

The Germans obtained the design for the Norden as it was being designed and had a complete working example before it was issued to the USAAF. It was tested against the German designs but the improvement was deemed insufficient to change their home grown designs.

The espionage was undertaken by an amateur but was not wasteful or foolish and didn't compromise an asset as he wasn't trained by the Germans.

 

[bobbysocks]

Whether they were sold outright to the Soviet Union is probably a moot point, as the Soviets "interred" U.S. bombers like the 3 B-29s (plus one salvageable wreck), quite a few B-17s (73, although many were eventually returned) and others like the B-24 and a B-25 (although the B-25 from the Doolittle raid didn't have the Norden, but a custom made aiming unit nicknamed the "Mark Twain" for the low altitude operation)...

i agree it is probably moot. all the same it still P!$$es me off that we would make a deal with stalin....all the while withholding it from churchill and the brits. if i am going to pick which of my allies i am going to be more open with and share technology in the spirit of cooperation and comradery its not going to be the soviets! then again maybe that is why i am not a politician.

 

[gjs238]

Whether they were sold outright to the Soviet Union is probably a moot point, as the Soviets "interred" U.S. bombers like the 3 B-29s (plus one salvageable wreck), quite a few B-17s (73, although many were eventually returned) and others like the B-24 and a B-25 (although the B-25 from the Doolittle raid didn't have the Norden, but a custom made aiming unit nicknamed the "Mark Twain" for the low altitude operation)...

Yes, but the bombardiers were sworn to ensure that the Norden bombsight was destroyed.

 

[gjs238]

The Germans obtained the design for the Norden as it was being designed and had a complete working example before it was issued to the USAAF. It was tested against the German designs but the improvement was deemed insufficient to change their home grown designs.

The espionage was undertaken by an amateur but was not wasteful or foolish and didn't compromise an asset as he wasn't trained by the Germans.

Where did the complete working example come from?
Did the Germans fabricate it from plans or acquire a US built one?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I don't believe the German copy worked...

 

[GrauGeist]

Yes, but the bombardiers were sworn to ensure that the Norden bombsight was destroyed.

Our crews were landing in what they thought was friendly, allied controlled territory. They had no idea that they would be interned and their aircraft confiscated.

 

[bobbysocks]

are you sure that wasnt briefed well in advance? wasnt that one of the reasons they didnt go to russia on the doolittle raids? they wanted to keep soviet neutrality with japan to keep the lend lease shipping lanes open?

 

[Glider]

The person responsible for the leaking of the secret for the Norden bombsight was Hermann Lang a German who moved to the USA in 1927. He worked as an inspector in the design studio and had access to some of the blueprints. He simply took them home and copied them. As he didn't have access to all the design drawings at any one time,, to get a full copy of the design took some time but eventually he did pass all the blueprints to the German authorities.
It was built and test flown by the Germans and the summary was 'Flight testing of the apparatus showed that the principle realized in it worked satisfactorily for bombing'. However they were never able to match the accuracy claimed by the USAAF.

With hindsight I am not surprised about this as claims by many US manufacturers of all types of aviation material tended to be lacking in accuracy and high in anticipation.

 

[GrauGeist]

are you sure that wasnt briefed well in advance? wasnt that one of the reasons they didnt go to russia on the doolittle raids? they wanted to keep soviet neutrality with japan to keep the lend lease shipping lanes open?

The B-25 had no choice, it was either land there, land in Japanese occupied territory or ditch at sea. Fortunately, the 20 cent bombsight wasn't a high security item.

One of the B-29 bombers crashed in Soviet territory after the crew had bailed out, the other three landed for various reasons. However, the B-24s, B-17s not to mention RAF bombers in the ETO weren't in danger of violating the neutrality between the Soviet Union and Japan...