Most hated Axis interceptor for American bomber crews

[BiffF15]

Q: What was the most hated Axis interceptor for American bomber crews?

A: The one shooting at you!

In all seriousness I honestly think it would be the above and or specific units. The Abbeville Boys, JG xx, etc., whomever had the current worst reputation. I could imagine that the crews would be familiar with the units / colors of the adversaries on their various legs and would know them by sight and or reputation.

Cheers,
Biff

 

[stona]

what was the ratio of losses ( flak to EA ) on the bomber groups for the schweinfurt raids?

This was vary much a victory for the fighters. On August 17th fighters shot down 46 bombers, plus a further eight already damaged by flak. Flak accounted for only 5, but almost exactly a third of all returning bombers had received some flak damage.

Don't underestimate flak. During the war in Europe flak accounted for 5,400 USAAF combat losses compared with 4,300 shot down by fighters. Between December 1942 and April 1945 flak also damaged an incredible 54,539 aircraft, more than 20% of all sorties dispatched.

Cheers

Steve

 

[fubar57]

What was the number of shells fired per kill? I read it was around 10,000, but that seems quite high. Or would it include every type of flak gun , not just the 88.

Geo

 

[Elmas]

But were the bomber crews actually able to recognise with some reliability the different tipes of LW fighters?
Not that they were not trained about the matter, of course, but to recognise a fighter in an engagement that lasts a few seconds, with the fighter that is trying to kill you and that is trying to show the less of his silhouette, possibly up sun, should not have been an easy task.

 

[Koopernic]

The Fw 190 was almost certainly the most effective.

It had 4 x 20mm canon. An exploding 20mm round being fired at one at a total rate of around 2600 rounds per minute (about 45 rounds per second, inclusive of losses due to synchronisation) is no light matter.

The Pair of 13.2mm guns were also powerful: higher rate of fire than 0.5 Browning albeit somewhat lower velocity it still put holes in objects that were immune to 7mm rounds.

In terms of armament this may be the most powerful standard fighter of WW2.

The 50mm armoured windscreen could survive 0.5 inch rounds. The engine protected the pilot and the fuel tank.

The oil cooler was hidden behind a 6mm, latter 10mm, armoured ring that also protected the BMW801 cylinder heads as well as the oil cooler. The oil cooler was a double reverse flow type device pressure fed from the fan.

Versions with extra armour and a pair of 30mm guns in the outer stations could easily destroy a bomber with only 3 rounds, they would certainly survive approaching a bomber to point blank range and then might, "might" be shot down but the pilot would certainly survive and would make a controlled exit only well after the bomber was destroyed.

The Service ceiling was a respectable 37,000ft though its performance began to drop of after 20,000ft-22,000ft, its one weakness. A more advanced version of the BMW801 engine, the 801F, which offered 2400hp(2600 with MW50) added a 3 speed as opposed to 2 speed supercharger and might have changed this. The 4 speed, two stage, intercooled BMW801R would have only fitted the Ta 152B due to its great length.

Certainly without their turbochargers to take the fight to over 25000ft and escorts USAAF bombers would have simply not survived.

 

[Wayne Little]

Don't think I would want an Fw190A-8 carrying 20 and 30mm cannons getting too close to me....

 

[drgondog]

Q: What was the most hated Axis interceptor for American bomber crews?

A: The one shooting at you!

In all seriousness I honestly think it would be the above and or specific units. The Abbeville Boys, JG xx, etc., whomever had the current worst reputation. I could imagine that the crews would be familiar with the units / colors of the adversaries on their various legs and would know them by sight and or reputation.

Cheers,
Biff

Biff, in the early days when JG2 and JG26 were the prime defenders from LuftFlotte 3 (Kanalfront) the distinctive yellow patch under some FW 190 cowls - but the reality is that all aggressive fighters were at one time or another described as Abbevillie Boys (one of the airfields hosting II./JG 26 units through early 1943

 

[Totalize]

When you see gun camera footage of German 20mm or 30mm rounds impacting a B17 its looks absolutely terrifying. Each one causes a minor explosion with parts of the plane often flying off as the rounds impact. There's one where some of the rounds go right into the belly turret/ball gun of a B17. Wouldn't want to view that station afterward if the B-17 made back to its airfield. Messy not to mention the guy's aircrew having to see it.

 

[bobbysocks]

i dont discount flak at all. shooting flak you do not have the chance to lose any of your personnel, you may not shoot an ac down but damage it enough to ground it for awhile meaning one less bomber in the air, there is a psycological effect on aircrews that experience it....however it does cost you a lot in deployment of manpower. researching this a little over the past couple of days i ran across something that said the germans did not have a very good proximity fuse...compared to those of the allies. if they had our losses would have been much greater. i do not know how true that statement is but supposedly it cites a usaaf report ( but no link to the report )

WWII flak (CDB100620)

 

[fubar57]

Nice little article, brings the number of shells fired/kill down quite a lot. Thanks.

Geo

 

[stona]

Steve - I don't have much of a problem with most of your opinion but disagree the 'reduced bombing accuracy' part. The lead bombardiers had control from the IP to the bombs away point. I would bet anything in the world that if a 12 O'clock attack by fighters was boring in, compared to flak, the he would be a lot more 'distracted' by the fighters.

I failed to mention the most obvious way that flak reduced bombing accuracy (quite apart from making the bombers manoeuvre evasively) and that is of course forcing them to fly higher. The higher the bombers flew the less accurately they bombed.

 

[drgondog]

I failed to mention the most obvious way that flak reduced bombing accuracy (quite apart from making the bombers manoeuvre evasively) and that is of course forcing them to fly higher. The higher the bombers flew the less accurately they bombed.

That would be true - except that the B-17 and B-24 bombed at same altitudes - roughly 25000 feet at 8AF operations initiation and the B-17 maintained that general altitude into late 1944. But the B-24s dropped to 22-20000 feet. In the fall of 1944 and into spring 1945 when many of the missions dropped below 20,000 feet for the bombers.

The disparate speeds and handling qualities between the bombers drove the different doctrines as the B-24 was about 20Kts faster and difficult to maintain tight formations above 22000 feet.

If you are drawing a contrast against daylight RAF doctrine with Bomber Command the 8th did fly higher - but didn't change due to flak. What they 'changed' was to order the crews to Not fly evasive maneuvers from the IP to the target.

 

[stona]

The reason they bombed from those altitudes was flak. The USAAF decided to do so based on over confidence in its bomb sight. It felt it could still bomb accurately from a supposedly safe altitude. This was more of an issue for the USAAF which continued a pretence of 'precision' bombing right up to the point when it started bombing through cloud on radar, than for the RAF which had developed tactics to compensate for a lack of accuracy.

Late in the war the quality of heavy flak in particular started to decrease. By late 1944 only about 40% of the 1.2 million personnel in the flak arm were regular Luftwaffe personnel and the level of training had decreased. Even earlier, when Overlord took place, flak resources were moved to confront allied forces in France. Flak units were moved to protect the oil industry in reaction to the allied campaign against it with more success. This is the experience of one man, just a small cog in the gearbox of an enormous machine, attacking an oil target.

In response to the original question, flying that 13 miles, straight and level with no possibility of any evasive action, must have been one of the most difficult things to do. Crews certainly hated it.

But the extra defences came from somewhere, another target, and it was usually a city, had less protection. In July 1944 the decision was taken to concentrate flak in centres of gravity around the most important targets. If you were not attacking one of these (deemed so by the Germans, not the USAAF or RAF) you would likely encounter much lighter defences. For example 500 heavy flak guns were moved from the protection of industry to the protection of communications and transport routs. Eventually a flak belt extended the length of the Rhine!

Hitler' gamble in the Ardennes alone cost the Luftwaffe 100 heavy flak batteries, 110 light flak batteries and 16 search light batteries.

In September 1944 the 8th Air Force reported an increase in flak losses and damage, probably due to the concentration of flak around its targets. As soon as late October it was reporting a "sharp decrease" in flak losses. This can be attributed to problems with gun laying radar (both less effective and shortages), a shortage of ammunition, less well trained gun crews and of course poor autumn weather. A corner had been turned at the end of 1944. The flak arm, like just about everything else in Nazi Germany, was on the verge of defeat. Soon the RAF would be bombing, in daylight, from 12,000 ft.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Milosh]

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a542518.pdf

see Table 159

Total losses were almost the same number, EA 2,452, AA 2,439

The Table also shows monthly losses.

From July 1944 losses due to AA had increased to more than losses due to EA.

 

[stona]

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a542518.pdf

From July 1944 losses due to AA had increased to more than losses due to EA.

As noted by the 8th AF. This was due to the declining operational efficiency of the Luftwaffe (many raids were not opposed by the Jagdwaffe) and the concentration of flak around the targets that the USAAF in particular was targeting. There was less flak to go around, but the Germans were very good at putting it where it was needed. It was only in early 1945 when any movement became almost impossible due to a lack of fuel.

As I said above, it wasn't until the end of that year (1944) that due to a combination of many reasons the flak started to become less effective. It could still inflict some very nasty surprises. For example the 15th AF, flying in support of the Soviets in the Balkans were forced to fly lower to accurately hit their smaller targets (bridges, transport hubs, airfields etc) suffered high losses to flak, particularly B-24s, in the last four months of 1944.

It should also not to be forgotten that until the end German technology moved forward. Operational tests with the 'doppelzunder' fuse (contact and timed) in the defence of Munich achieved a shell to shoot down ration of 370:1 which was a massive improvement on the then average 4,500:1. The trials were very limited, but an improvement was clearly possible. Right at the end of the war preliminary combat trials with the two operational 'Kulmbach' gun laying radars further reduced this to 300:1, the same caveat applies, the trials were very limited.
Luckily it was too little too late...again.

Cheers

Steve

 

[bobbysocks]

now wouldnt they vary the altitude of the bomb runs for each mission? using the same altitude everytime is suicide! the aa batteries wouldnt have to adjust at all. a few thousand feet difference each time would make the flak crews waste a couple salvos to home in.

 

[stona]

now wouldnt they vary the altitude of the bomb runs for each mission? using the same altitude everytime is suicide! the aa batteries wouldnt have to adjust at all. a few thousand feet difference each time would make the flak crews waste a couple salvos to home in.

I'm sure they did. The flak established the bombers altitude by radar and for US formations this could often be confirmed visually too, depending on cloud. It wasn't difficult to accurately calculate the altitude of the incoming bombers, the crews didn't have to estimate it.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Milosh]

now wouldnt they vary the altitude of the bomb runs for each mission? using the same altitude everytime is suicide! the aa batteries wouldnt have to adjust at all. a few thousand feet difference each time would make the flak crews waste a couple salvos to home in.

This web site gives the mission details for all the missions flown by the 303rd BG.
303rd Bomb Group (H) - Molesworth, England

 

[stona]

A quick scan reveals bombing altitudes against German targets varying between 18,000ft and 25,000ft. I did notice a raid against a target in Norway on which the bombing height was only 11,000ft, but the opposition appeared to be one flak boat moored in a fjord, not exactly Schweinfurt or Berlin! Some were a little higher (27,000ft)

The bombing heights tally well with typical Luftwaffe fighter interception reports, the vast majority reporting the bombers between 6,000m and 8,000m.

Cheers

Steve

 

[beitou]

Were the Germans aware that the US used a master bomber and if so was that plane identifiable and targeted by either flak or fighters?