Most hated Axis interceptor for American bomber crews

[stona]

Were the Germans aware that the US used a master bomber and if so was that plane identifiable and targeted by either flak or fighters?

Master bomber was a Bomber Command position, an experienced officer who would orbit the target adjusting the marking by the various 'backers up' and in some cases (as at Dresden) ordering the marking of positions outside the original sector to be bombed for second or subsequent Main Force waves, if he considered that the first waves had already achieved the missions primary objective. There is no point in throwing more incendiaries into an inferno, nor blowing up rubble.
A good master bomber could turn a potential disaster into a successful raid (as at Peenemunde).

The Americans employed lead ships, on whose cue all the others in their formation bombed. The Germans were aware of this and flak definitely targeted the leading aircraft in the US formations. I said above, it was point number 3 in a 1943 flak manual.
I doubt the fighters had such a luxury, generally attacking whichever aircraft they could get a good firing position on.

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

A quick scan reveals bombing altitudes against German targets varying between 18,000ft and 25,000ft. I did notice a raid against a target in Norway on which the bombing height was only 11,000ft, but the opposition appeared to be one flak boat moored in a fjord, not exactly Schweinfurt or Berlin! Some were a little higher (27,000ft)

The bombing heights tally well with typical Luftwaffe fighter interception reports, the vast majority reporting the bombers between 6,000m and 8,000m.

Cheers

Steve

I read about a mosquito attack, I think on a target in Norway, where the bombers entered into a shallow dive to throw off the predicted flack, not really an option to a bomber group but they were aware of the predicted flak.

 

[gjs238]

That would be true - except that the B-17 and B-24 bombed at same altitudes - roughly 25000 feet at 8AF operations initiation and the B-17 maintained that general altitude into late 1944. But the B-24s dropped to 22-20000 feet. In the fall of 1944 and into spring 1945 when many of the missions dropped below 20,000 feet for the bombers.

The disparate speeds and handling qualities between the bombers drove the different doctrines as the B-24 was about 20Kts faster and difficult to maintain tight formations above 22000 feet.

If you are drawing a contrast against daylight RAF doctrine with Bomber Command the 8th did fly higher - but didn't change due to flak. What they 'changed' was to order the crews to Not fly evasive maneuvers from the IP to the target.

Why the altitude drops?

 

[gjs238]

Soon the RAF would be bombing, in daylight, from 12,000 ft.

Could you elaborate more on the RAF switch or move to daylight bombing and at such low altitude?

 

[gjs238]

The reason they bombed from those altitudes was flak. The USAAF decided to do so based on over confidence in its bomb sight. It felt it could still bomb accurately from a supposedly safe altitude. This was more of an issue for the USAAF which continued a pretence of 'precision' bombing right up to the point when it started bombing through cloud on radar, than for the RAF which had developed tactics to compensate for a lack of accuracy.

Late in the war the quality of heavy flak in particular started to decrease. By late 1944 only about 40% of the 1.2 million personnel in the flak arm were regular Luftwaffe personnel and the level of training had decreased. Even earlier, when Overlord took place, flak resources were moved to confront allied forces in France. Flak units were moved to protect the oil industry in reaction to the allied campaign against it with more success. This is the experience of one man, just a small cog in the gearbox of an enormous machine, attacking an oil target.

In response to the original question, flying that 13 miles, straight and level with no possibility of any evasive action, must have been one of the most difficult things to do. Crews certainly hated it.

But the extra defences came from somewhere, another target, and it was usually a city, had less protection. In July 1944 the decision was taken to concentrate flak in centres of gravity around the most important targets. If you were not attacking one of these (deemed so by the Germans, not the USAAF or RAF) you would likely encounter much lighter defences. For example 500 heavy flak guns were moved from the protection of industry to the protection of communications and transport routs. Eventually a flak belt extended the length of the Rhine!

Hitler' gamble in the Ardennes alone cost the Luftwaffe 100 heavy flak batteries, 110 light flak batteries and 16 search light batteries.

In September 1944 the 8th Air Force reported an increase in flak losses and damage, probably due to the concentration of flak around its targets. As soon as late October it was reporting a "sharp decrease" in flak losses. This can be attributed to problems with gun laying radar (both less effective and shortages), a shortage of ammunition, less well trained gun crews and of course poor autumn weather. A corner had been turned at the end of 1944. The flak arm, like just about everything else in Nazi Germany, was on the verge of defeat. Soon the RAF would be bombing, in daylight, from 12,000 ft.

Cheers

Steve

Is it possible (or fair to say) that US bombing efforts drew flak away from UK bombing efforts?

 

[gjs238]

The Americans employed lead ships, on whose cue all the others in their formation bombed. The Germans were aware of this and flak definitely targeted the leading aircraft in the US formations. I said above, it was point number 3 in a 1943 flak manual.
I doubt the fighters had such a luxury, generally attacking whichever aircraft they could get a good firing position on.

Did only the lead ships employ Nordon bombsights or did all bombers use them?
If the latter, didn't bombing on cue from a lead ship negate somewhat negate the Nordon bombsight?

 

[wuzak]

Did only the lead ships employ Nordon bombsights or did all bombers use them?
If the latter, didn't bombing on cue from a lead ship negate somewhat negate the Nordon bombsight?

I think that a few crews had the Norden, but the bulk did not.

There were a few back up lead bombers in case the lead bomber was lost.

The reason for dropping on cue from the leader was that it enabled the bombers to remain in formation and maximise their defensive fire against fighters. It also reduced the time the formation remained over target.

The Norden required a long straight run up to the target. If every bomber had to go through the procedure they woudl be over the target much longer.

 

[GrauGeist]

I think that a few crews had the Norden, but the bulk did not.

There were a few back up lead bombers in case the lead bomber was lost.

The reason for dropping on cue from the leader was that it enabled the bombers to remain in formation and maximise their defensive fire against fighters. It also reduced the time the formation remained over target.

The Norden required a long straight run up to the target. If every bomber had to go through the procedure they woudl be over the target much longer.

The Norden was standard equipment in all the U.S. bombers as it's tachometric design and auto-pilot features were better than the older Vector type sights.

 

[Airframes]

Not quite true Dave - some models of the B-24 were fitted with the Sperry gyro sight, a piece of equipment which many considered superior to the Norden. Also, as mentioned above, when a 'lead bomber' (plus reserves) was employed, the majority of the rest of the formation had the Norden (or Sperry) removed, with the Bombardiers in these aircraft releasing their bombs on cue from the Togglier in the lead ship.

 

[GrauGeist]

Interesting, Terry, as I understood each ship's bombardier used the bombsight targeting data, releasing on the lead ship's que. Not just dumping "en masse".

As far as the Sperry goes, the Army cancelled the Sperry in '43 because they felt that the Norden-M series was far superior.

 

[stona]

The drop in altitude was to improve accuracy. The RAF was bombing targets in daylight in 1945 from low altitude to increase its accuracy and because it could. There was no fighter opposition (the Luftwaffe had virtually ceased to exist, thanks mainly to the efforts of the USAAF) and the targets were not heavily protected by flak.

Is it possible to say that the USAAF drew flak away from RAF targets? It's an interesting proposition. As the flak concentrated on targets that the Germans deemed vital (like oil and transportation) units were moved from city defences around the Reich. It was the USAAF that concentrated on the various specific efforts against such targets, though when Harris was forced to join in Bomber Command did an outstanding job, much to his surprise.
I think, without having looked up specific figures and examples (yet), that a case might be made that Bomber Command faced lighter opposition as it flew by night against some of its area targets than it might otherwise have done had the Allied strategy, combined with the successful invasion, not forced the Luftwaffe to make the decision to deploy its flak to defend the Reich's vital resources rather than its civilian population. Some of the cities devastated in the last months of the war were not high on Bomber Command's list and would not have been expected by the Germans to suffer such a fate.

It shouldn't be forgotten that both air forces flew in the campaigns against these 'vital' targets, though Bomber Command's leadership was much less enthusiastic about doing so. USAAF commanders were generally less enthusiastic about what amounted to city raids, though the criteria for bombing a city (even as a secondary target) included a list of things which might be deemed 'military', even a small town would likely have some of them.

I have somewhere a list of flak protecting Dresden when that city suffered its apocalypse, and I believe from memory that it had been substantially reduced in the months before the raid...but I'd need to check.

Cheers

Steve

 

[mhuxt]

I believe you're correct about Dresden's flak having been shifted, but from memory it had been shifted east, not to the oil refineries. The front wasn't far away in February.

 

[stona]

I believe you're correct about Dresden's flak having been shifted, but from memory it had been shifted east, not to the oil refineries. The front wasn't far away in February.

That sounds right, unfortunately I won't be home for another week to check

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

From the 'dailies' of the 323rd B.S. (what we might call an ORB.)

"7 thru 10 Jan. 1944: Mission to Ludwigshaven, Germany: On the 7th, the mission was not "scrubbed". Eight of our ships made it to Ludwigshaven, Germany and back without any serious difficulty. Major John C. Bishop, Squadron Commander, and Captain John T. Gladstone, Squadron Operations Officer, led the group in ship #639 "The Careful Virgin" which has made an enviable record as a ship. It is equipped with all the accessories that make it a lead ship and seems to be the one that Major Bishop usually flies when he leads."

My bold.

That equipment included the bomb sight not fitted to others in the squadron. They bombed 'on cue' which was one contribution to a less concentrated bomb pattern. At 200mph an aircraft covers about 100 yards in a second.

From someone who was there :


"I was a gunner who flew 35 mission with the 8th Air Force back a few years ago...I had the opinion then and still do that the Norden Bomb Sight was not as good as it was touted to be....
I know on several occasion we dropped bombs that came no where near their targets...We even took a shot at the Remagen Bridge and missed completely...I always wondered why on many missions there was a lead ship with a bombardier who targeted the target and when his ship dropped its bombs, the rest of the flight would do likewise... the bombardier hit the toggle switch when he saw the lead ships bombs drop and that is about all..."

He's being unfair to the Norden which was as good as any bomb sight of the period, but he does explain the practice of dropping on the cue of the lead ship(s).

Cheers

Steve

 

[FLYBOYJ]

"Later in the war when long range fighters and 2 years of pounding had all but made the Luftwaffe non-existent, the bombardier was replaced with a toggler. Where the bombardier was a commissioned officer, the togglers were enlisted men. When a toggler was on the aircraft, it did not carry a Norden Bombsight. When the toggler saw the lead plane drop his bombs, he would toggle the bombs to drop out of his aircraft"

B-17 Flying Fortress--Queen of the Skies

"What is a Bombardier? What is a Togglier?
A crew bombardier was trained in all the technical phases of the "dropping the bombs" task. It was his job to operate the bomb sight in his plane to drop the bombs on a target.

However, when it was decreed by 8th AF headquarters that all 36 planes in a Squadron formation would drop their bombs simultaneously, only the bombardier in the lead plane ran a bomb sight and functioned as a true bombardier. All the other 35 planes dropped when he did. The job of the bombardier in all the other 35 planes then was just to trip the bomb release switch in his own plane when the lead dropped his bombs. This method/technique was intended to concentrate the bomb pattern for maximum destruction. So, when there were personnel shortages, some enlisted crew members were selected to sit in the bombardier's position and timely trip the switch when the lead plane dropped his bombs. That job was called a togglier, sometimes spelled toggleier, a combination of toggle + ier."


FAQs about Army Air Force Terms in WWII

 

[gjs238]

He's being unfair to the Norden which was as good as any bomb sight of the period, but he does explain the practice of dropping on the cue of the lead ship(s).

Perhaps it's not that he's being unfair, maybe he just didn't buy into all the hype about the Norden.

 

[stona]

Perhaps it's not that he's being unfair, maybe he just didn't buy into all the hype about the Norden.

Or didn't understand that it was a primitive electro-mechanical computer to which SISO applied just as surely as it does to the machine I'm typing on now

If you programmed it wrongly or with the wrong information it could not possibly resolve the calculations correctly and the bombs would miss, potentially by a wide margin.

Cheers

Steve

 

[gjs238]

"Later in the war when long range fighters and 2 years of pounding had all but made the Luftwaffe non-existent, the bombardier was replaced with a toggler. Where the bombardier was a commissioned officer, the togglers were enlisted men. When a toggler was on the aircraft, it did not carry a Norden Bombsight. When the toggler saw the lead plane drop his bombs, he would toggle the bombs to drop out of his aircraft"

B-17 Flying Fortress--Queen of the Skies

"What is a Bombardier? What is a Togglier?
A crew bombardier was trained in all the technical phases of the "dropping the bombs" task. It was his job to operate the bomb sight in his plane to drop the bombs on a target.

However, when it was decreed by 8th AF headquarters that all 36 planes in a Squadron formation would drop their bombs simultaneously, only the bombardier in the lead plane ran a bomb sight and functioned as a true bombardier. All the other 35 planes dropped when he did. The job of the bombardier in all the other 35 planes then was just to trip the bomb release switch in his own plane when the lead dropped his bombs. This method/technique was intended to concentrate the bomb pattern for maximum destruction. So, when there were personnel shortages, some enlisted crew members were selected to sit in the bombardier's position and timely trip the switch when the lead plane dropped his bombs. That job was called a togglier, sometimes spelled toggleier, a combination of toggle + ier."


FAQs about Army Air Force Terms in WWII

Wonder if the bombing results/effectiveness actually differed between the two methods.
It would seem that the bombs from the planes rearmost in the group would fall short?

 

[Shortround6]

A good bombardier might take that into account.
How big/long is the formation?
What is the average reaction time of the togglers?
Aim a little over to center the group's pattern.
Width of formation helping with lateral errors.

 

[stona]

At least one British ORS report believed that the reason USAAF bomb patterns were more dispersed and the average radial error was slightly larger than those achieved by Bomber Command on its late war daylight missions was because of the use of one bombardier per flight, everyone else releasing on his cue. This runs exactly contrary to the original reason for the adoption of the system by the Americans. You pay your money and you take your pick.
Cheers
Steve