Most heavily Armed ship during ww2.

It would be interesting to know how much of a ship consists of "lucky spots". Imho, there are plenty, on every ship - ventilation, hatches, exhausts, smokestacks, power cables, armour joints, communications, fire control, command, secondary guns and ammo, AAA and ammo, Aircraft, ammo and fuel, rudders, screws, ship oil, boiler water ... there's so much on every ship outside of the armoured parts, so many weak points in the armour, that they add up to a significant source of trouble. Add to that ship roll, which alters the immunity zone, waves, that expose parts below the main belt to gunfire and what not else.

I also tend to think that even inside the immunity zone, there's more target area vulnerable than immune, outside of "lucky" hits. Bottom line, a hit, even inside the immunity zone, leaving no impression at all, will be the exception.

The great golfer Gary Player said "The more I practice the luckier I get"

Let me point out, we are missing the idea that damage can be done without going through the armour. The tramatic impact of a heavy shell will shock systems throughout the vessel. If you break a fuel line, cause power to fail in sections, cut commo lines to different departments. Radios ran on tubes, shock could disable on in a heartbeat, the same with the radar systems. You could inflict more damage then the repair crews could keep up with. The critical hits get all the glory, but if you pummel the ship for a while her fighting effectiveness goes down and the crew starts to get a bit concerned, which may undermine their effectiveness.
Their will always be luck in any battle, it's as important as tactics, Their is a quote from Nepolean which I'm trying to recall, but it's something to the effect of give me a lucky general over a brilliant one. I know that's not right, but maybe one of you folks can find the real one. It's way to early to care and I have to be to work in a few minutes. I know we speak of 25,000 yard ranges, but the hip probablity at that distance is likely low, Training, morale and pride will help fill the gaps when luck turns against you. But it truly is a two sided scale. You need both luck and ability.

The critcal factor of Scharnhorst becoming seperated from its destroyers was not a matter luck though. It was plain mismanagement by the German admiral. Likewise the failure to pass on the Luftwaffe recon intel about Fraser's battle group's location along to the command on Scharnhorst in a timely manner was inexcusable.

I wasn't really referring to "lucky" in regards to training or skill but more in the line of critical hits being obtained early in a hit sequence or critical hits resulting at a higher percentage than random distribution would indicate.

Given the size of a battleship (or large cruiser) for one of the first hits to be on the Bridge, fire control or turret just seems like flipping a coin and coming up heads a number of times in a row.

How many times do we read of a first hit being on the Funnel Cap, quarter deck, boat deck or some place NOT critical to the ships fighting ability, it happened, but some how critical systems seem to be hit affected with the first few hits more often than not.

Given the length of a ship for a torpedo to hit in the prop shaft/rudder area is certainly not impossible or even improbable but three German major warships (or 4?) were crippled by such hits ( which didn't always lead to the loss of the ship), the PoW famously being hit there ( if not first torpedo then among the first) and a few others?

It makes trying to figure out which ship was better a little difficult because the one or another ship suffered a rapid or radical change in ability due to an out of ordinary hit.

Hits to the foretop disabling the vital equipment there and thereby altering the course of battle was actually quite common:

Graf Spee-River Plate
Gneisenau-Encounter with Renown
Bismarck-Final battle
South Dakota-Guadalcanal II
Scharnhorst- 1st Skirmish North Cape
Norfolk- Second Skirmish North Cape
Duke of York- 3rd Skirmish North Cape

There's a pattern here, but foretops and foremasts stick up there just asking to get hit.

Armouring schemes are never 100% fullproof. there is always some chance of a critical hit. The chances just go down so far as to be not worth worrying about.

If a BB was unable to fire back in any way, it might be possible for a DD to sink here using just gunfire, but it would require an extremely lucky hit. Case in point is the Hood. There is fairly good evidence that the fatal shot that caused her to explode may well have been fired by the PE....a ship that in theory should not have been able to hurt her. Its only a theory, but there is some good evidence to support it.

But armouring schemes do reduce the risk. The USN had a system of immune zones to estimate the level of protection that a ship possessed against a particular caliber and type of weapon....ranges at which the armouring scheme (taking into account plunging fire and the like) should not suffer any serious damage or shell penetrations into vital areas. Generally the American system was accurate, but everyone could have a bad day. And firing as many rounds as possible increased the chances for that bad day to become a reality.

In an Alaska vs Scharhorst match up, the Immune zone for the Scharnhorst will be considerable, whereas the immune zone for the Alaska will be virtually never. If the scharnhorst has radar, the advantage swings firmly in her favour. if, as happened historically she doesnt have radar, or loses it as a result of battle damage, she is probably in trouble. in planning an enagagement, you try not to count on those "lucky hits" however. The Germans also had a rather strange operational policy for their radars, according to Cajus Bekker. They feared passive detection, so tended to go into battle with the radar switched off. They would switch it on only after they went into battle. This had some advantages, but it left the ship virtually blind in the battle preliminaries, and has to be figured as a significant factor in her loss

The Germans also had a rather strange operational policy for their radars, according to Cajus Bekker.They feared passive detection, so tended to go into battle with the radar switched off. They would switch it on only after they went into battle. This had some advantages, but it left the ship virtually blind in the battle preliminaries, and has to be figured as a significant factor in her loss

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parsifal

too much agreeing. we need to stop this right now!!!!!

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I'm "so sorry" but to your quote of the rather strange KM operational policy for their radars, I can't agree more!
It is next to the discharge of the destroyers my absolute biggest criticism on Adm Bey and also on the whole leadership of the KM.
They were not realy aware of the advantages of Radar or not able to realy sort it out and to work out a proper service regulation.

Mostly it was the personal estimation of the commanding Admiral which count, you can also see this from Lütjens at BS, as BS had shaked off the detection of Suffolk, but Lütjens and his specialist of his crew were the opinion through the passive reception of emissions they are still detected and they broke the radio silence.

I think the KM overslept proper service regulation and excact tests of radar handling till 1944 and the price was very high.

Bekker is stating this as the probable reason Bey was surprised at the 1st skirmish, but he can't know if that was really the case or not. (Actually there are indications that Bey was not practicing radar silence after all, but it is a complex explanation and far from certain as well)


The KM issued no formal guide lines on radar silence at the time of North Cape. Indeed they issued no formal guidelines on radar use at all until 1944. It was on a case by case basis. For example, many German kapitans and admirals would operate the radar for two or three minutes every ten minutes if it was a situation were radar usage might give away their positions. This was done by Stange quite successfully prior to the Battle of Barents Sea, for example. This wasn't possible with most allied radars, which required extended warm up times. Seetakt could be switched on and off at will.

The possibility of giving away ones own position through active radar use was expressed by Brinkmann captain of the Prinz Eugen during the Bismarck chase in 1941.

Of course, the reluctance of U-boat commanders to use radar after May 1943 is well known. U-boat command actually issued orders ordering U-boat commanders to operate Hohentwiel radar. Hohentwiel could detect the approach of anti-submarine patrol bombers several minutes before the airborne ASV radars could in turn locate a surfaced U-boat. This was far better than relying on a passive radar detector device alone because a passive device can not determine range.

By late1943, everybody had learned that you can't just use radar willy nilly. Indiscriminate use of radar was costing the Japanese, for example. IJN submarines were equipped with Type 22 10cm radar which they operated when on the surface. However, American subs, and ASW ships, and aircraft, had radar detectors. A radar detector can always detect radar emissions to a greater range than the radar it is detecting can register a return echo. The American subs would then locate the emitting IJN sub using its SJ active radar which had a slightly greater detection range than the Japanese Type 22 submarine to submarine. All submarine mounted radars have relatively short range to surface targets because of the needed small antennas and the relatively low mounting height of the antenna. The American subs would then ambush the Japanese subs.

Once everybody had reliable radar detectors the game changed. This included the Allies as well as the Axis. As early as mid 1943 the RN was instructing captains to keep all radars except S-band switched off until action was joined. Once it became known that the Germans had centimetric radar detectors this policy was expanded to include all radars. In operations in northern waters late in 1944 and in 1945 the RN was operating with all radars switched off as well.

The late Adm. Woodward, who lead the British task force to the Falklands once wrote that perhaps the most challenging aspects of modern command was the cat and mouse game of when to switch on radars and when to switch them off.

German Naval Radar was roughly on a par with US/UK. Unable to steer "him"self Bismarck was able to drive off Vian's five destroyers without getting hit by a single torp. Vian commented that Bis's shooting was so accurate (remember, this was at night) that he was convinced they were using radar. As well, at the Battle of the Barents Sea Admiral Hipper had at least two first-salvo hits against destroyers in conditions of near-dark, snow, low-lying fog, and optics icing up at ranges up to 18km. In the same battle Luetzow straddled with seven straight salvos at 16km+ in a snow storm.

None of this matters, though, if the RN brings Norfolk: she took out both Bis's and Scharnhorst's main fire control! My vote for RN MVP.

parsifal said:

Armouring schemes are never 100% fullproof. there is always some chance of a critical hit. The chances just go down so far as to be not worth worrying about.

If a BB was unable to fire back in any way, it might be possible for a DD to sink here using just gunfire, but it would require an extremely lucky hit. Case in point is the Hood. There is fairly good evidence that the fatal shot that caused her to explode may well have been fired by the PE....a ship that in theory should not have been able to hurt her. Its only a theory, but there is some good evidence to support it.

But armouring schemes do reduce the risk. The USN had a system of immune zones to estimate the level of protection that a ship possessed against a particular caliber and type of weapon....ranges at which the armouring scheme (taking into account plunging fire and the like) should not suffer any serious damage or shell penetrations into vital areas. Generally the American system was accurate, but everyone could have a bad day. And firing as many rounds as possible increased the chances for that bad day to become a reality.

In an Alaska vs Scharhorst match up, the Immune zone for the Scharnhorst will be considerable, whereas the immune zone for the Alaska will be virtually never. If the scharnhorst has radar, the advantage swings firmly in her favour. if, as happened historically she doesnt have radar, or loses it as a result of battle damage, she is probably in trouble. in planning an enagagement, you try not to count on those "lucky hits" however. The Germans also had a rather strange operational policy for their radars, according to Cajus Bekker. They feared passive detection, so tended to go into battle with the radar switched off. They would switch it on only after they went into battle. This had some advantages, but it left the ship virtually blind in the battle preliminaries, and has to be figured as a significant factor in her loss

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Scharnhorst had the best radar suite in the KM except for possible Tirpitz. However, as you point out, they did not do a good job of using it prior to Norfolk taking it out.

silence said:

German Naval Radar was roughly on a par with US/UK. Unable to steer "him"self Bismarck was able to drive off Vian's five destroyers without getting hit by a single torp. Vian commented that Bis's shooting was so accurate (remember, this was at night) that he was convinced they were using radar. As well, at the Battle of the Barents Sea Admiral Hipper had at least two first-salvo hits against destroyers in conditions of near-dark, snow, low-lying fog, and optics icing up at ranges up to 18km. In the same battle Luetzow straddled with seven straight salvos at 16km+ in a snow storm.

None of this matters, though, if the RN brings Norfolk: she took out both Bis's and Scharnhorst's main fire control! My vote for RN MVP.

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Vian was right. An AVKS report on BS radars reveal they included the lobe switching supllimental modules. This means BS had blind fire capability. I believe BS was first warship in the world to have it.

Hipper's action report about Barents Sea is puzzling. It says that radar was ordered to be used for firecontrol. However after hitting Achates with its first salvo the forward radar was knocked out and had to be re-set which took some time. The aft radar was out of order the whole battle due to a fault in the ship's power supply that wasn't traced down in time. When the forward radar was brought back online the report states it was used for surface search and not for firecontrol. But if this was the case how did Hipper get surprized by the British cruisers? Furthermore, how did manage to hit Achates with another first salvo at darn near 18,000 meters at that time? Is it coincidental that when the forward radar came back online Hipper suddenly pummeled the Onslow scoring IIRC 4 hits in 8 salvoes?

silence said:

Scharnhorst had the best radar suite in the KM except for possible Tirpitz. However, as you point out, they did not do a good job of using it prior to Norfolk taking it out.

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This is what KzS Giessler wrote in a secret Bundes Marine document from 1948. He wrote that Scharnhorst's radar were the best available at the time and they had been tested extensively and proven to be of exceptional accuracy. I have seen the photographic evidence that SH's radar were upgraded just weeks before the sorti. There are records of SH conducting blind fire training exercises in the fjords.

Wavelength said:

But if this was the case how did Hipper get surprized by the British cruisers?

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Good question. Here's a discussion on it: German Navy Forum | Admiral Hipper Class | Hipper may not have been surprised

silence said:

Good question. Here's a discussion on it: German Navy Forum | Admiral Hipper Class | Hipper may not have been surprised

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Most of that discussion is conducted without a knowlege of the Action Report which comes in at the end and largely settles the original question.

However, the details from the action report submitted by T-geronimo raise the same questions rasied here. Indeed why were reccomendations made on how to make the radars better for firecontrol use if the radar wasn't used for firecontrol? If there was a mix up in writing up the report and it should read that the radar was not used for surface search and was used for firecontrol; then everything makes sense. The OKM commentary according to T-geronimo don't call this into question though. They accept it. They say it was right to use the radar for surface search (although it did not do any good? and why not?) because they had other proven options for firecontrol.

Mike Whitley's description of the events in his book German Cruisers match and don't match the Action Report in places. Whitley reports that the forward radar was knocked out during the initial shooting at Achates at 0939. However, Whitley reads that the aft radar remained in operation and it was this which made the succussful shooting at Onlsow possible at 1020 hours:

Hipper whose after radar was operative, engaged her (Onlsow) very effecteively with 48 rounds..

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Whitely does ask the important question about how Hipper got caught with its pants down:

Which leads to the next question, why was the British cruisers' arrival such a surprize?... during the action itself the poor visibility necessitated constant use of radar for gunnery ranging and it may be that sweeps were not carried out as frequently as prudence required (Admiral Hippers radar log is not clear on this point).....

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Whitley implies that he has examined the logs but dismisses the idea that the radar wasn't used for firecontrol as nonsense.

The British CinC Adm. Tovey criticized the British radar personal for making essentially the same mistake in his commentary submitted to the Admiralty. When the German destroyer closed to within a few thousand yards undetected it was because the surface search set on Sheffield (on Jamacia the radar had been knocked out by the shock of its own guns firing) was being used to range the Hipper and not being used for surface search.

Going back to Vian's insistence that Bismarck was using radar to target his ships, a description (given by Vian) is included Grenfell's The Bismarck Episode:

"...it was a pitch dark night. There was no moon and the blanket of cloud overhead shut out any faint light from the stars. Normally, this should have been in the destroyers favor, for the blacker the night the closer they should have been able to get to the Bismarck without being observed; they, the much smaller targets, being due to sight her first....It very soon became clear, however, that the darkness was no handicap to the Bismarck. Time after time she opened a very accurate fire on the destroyers whether, they could see her or not, and therefore she them. She was evidently firing by radar and independent of visual sighting. The shooting was too good be trifled with, and the Cossack was forced to shear away....at 11.42PM while (Cossack) was still (8,000 yards) away from the Bismarck, flashes of gunfire were seen from the latter's direction, and salvoes of large and small shells fell close alongside the Cossack, splinters from which shot away some of her wireless aerials....Eight minutes latter, the Zulu received the same treatment. She could just make out the Bismarck to the northward and had seen her shooting at Cossack. Now the enemy's guns flashed out again; and a few seconds later a 15-inch salvo straddled the Zulu herself. Two more similar salvoes straddled her in quick succession, the splinters wounding one officer, and two men. It was providential that she was not hit....it was a weird and rather awe-inspiring experience for the destroyers to undergo. Had the Bismarck been using search lights it would have seemed less unnatural, but there was no such warning. Out of the darkness in the Bismarck's direction would come a ripple of brilliant flashes, momentarily lighting up the sky. A ten or fifteen second's pause, and then the shriek of approaching shells...."

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Wavelength said:

This is what KzS Giessler wrote in a secret Bundes Marine document from 1948. He wrote that Scharnhorst's radar were the best available at the time and they had been tested extensively and proven to be of exceptional accuracy. I have seen the photographic evidence that SH's radar were upgraded just weeks before the sorti. There are records of SH conducting blind fire training exercises in the fjords.

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Its difficult to say one way or another whether Scharnhorst was a significantly more accurate gunnery platform. its an often stated claim that german radars (and hence ships) were much more accurate gunnery platforms than their allied opponents. The trouble is, there is virtually no operational results to establish, one way or the other the degree of Scharnhorst claimed superior accuracy. The conclusion to draw is that if she did have superior accuracy levels, it did not confer significant real advantages in her operational service.

One thing that can be said is that Allied gunnery during North Cape was not particularly good. During the opening pahases of the battle, with Scharnhorst operating at speeds 26knots or more, and the engagement ranges starting at 11000m (at1647 hours ) and thereafter increasing to 19500m (at 1824 hours), the DoY managed to hit the Scharnhorst 7 or 8 times. To achieve those 7-8 hits. One source I know of says the DoY expended 52 salvoes to achieve those hits, which would equate to 520 rounds. However, for the entire engagement, DoY only expended 443 14inch rounds, so in all probability some of those 52 salvoes were secondary only. Estimated ammunition expenditure 1947 to 1824 is around 240 rounds. If correect, the DoY was hitting the Scharnhorst with 1 hit for every 25 shots, roughly speaking. The overwhelming majority of these hits were registered with fire controled radar only, no visual confirmation. Visual hits were achieved later, so are not really comparable.

Parsifal,

I don't think that most people, who are involved in this theme through their knowledge and the given primary sources, would claim that the german radar was superior to allied radar or had significant advantages at accuracy.
The primary goal is to prove from primary sources and happened events, that the german radar was equal to the allied and not so much inferior, as often claimed in many books and secondary sources.

Radar is part of a system. To prove or show anything, one has to resort to the operational or observed results, under similar conditions. I really cant think of many instances where thi situation developed.

Perhaps one (slightly) similar action was that of the Rawalpindi, though it is marginal at best I concede. The German battle cruisers passed north of the Shetland and Faeröe Islands and patrolled in the Iceland* Faeröe channel throughout the 23rd of November. Towards dusk the Rawalpindi was sighted by the Scharnhorst, which chased and engaged at 8,000 yards range, and destroyed the armed merchant cruiser after a one-sided action

Action here began at 1530 hours, with the Rawalpindi sighting the German Battlecruisers, and attempting to run. Gunnery commenced 1545. There was a hit with the first salvo, and the action only lasted another 15 minutews really. However the ship did not sink until 2000, and she was not fully immobilised until 1645. She had suffered 8 hits by then. sea state unknown, but better than at North Cape. Visibility also unknown, but probably du sky half light. Given the time of the year unlikely that gunnery was all visual. Ive read somewhere that Scharnhorst expended 230 rounds to achieve that hit rate. Thats not better than DoYs effort, in fact its significantly worse when you take into account the target state (immobilised) and range (no more than 8000m) for most of the engagement.

This example proves nothing, but it does underline the fact that German ships were necessarily better shots than their allied counterparts. And the dataset is so limited that I doubt we can arrive at any meaningful comparison.