Most Overrated aircraft of WWII.....?

The most over-rated aircraft of WW2


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If two stages were a setting, two stages plus two speeds would equal four settings. Unless there was some way to flip the second stage off, you have two settings.

First supercharger was used first than the second supercharger was added inline, than high speed for the second supercharger so really only three settings. Only the second superchager was dual Speed. This video explains it well starting at two minutes


For the 2-stage superchaged versions of the R-2800 and R-1830 as used during the ww2:
Engine-stage supercharger was always turning if the crankshaft was turning - IOW, single speed only for that stage. The auxiliary stage was de-clutched in low altitude, thus it used no engine power to turn; all supercharging was done by engine-stage S/C.
Above ~5000 ft, the aux S/C was clutched in, using the 1st set of gears (1st speed). Incoming air was 1st compressed by aux stage, than by engine-stage - ie. 2-stage supercharging. Above ~20000 ft, the aux S/C was shifted into second gear (2ns speed now), again 2 stages of supercharging.

So we have a combination of 1 stage being just with 1 speed gearing, and 2nd stage being with 2 speed gearing + neutral setting. What we can make from the 'apples + oranges' equation?
 
Engine-stage supercharger was always turning if the crankshaft was turning - IOW, single speed only for that stage. The auxiliary stage was de-clutched in low altitude, thus it used no engine power to turn; all supercharging was done by engine-stage S/C.

So we have a combination of 1 stage being just with 1 speed gearing, and 2nd stage being with 2 speed gearing + neutral setting. What we can make from the 'apples + oranges' equation?
Thanks Tomo! I was halfway through this very explanation, but you beat me to it and said it more clearly than I would have.
I never cease to marvel at how much confusion reigns about radial engine supercharging. Imprecise terminology and overly complicated explanations combine with preconceived notions to lead to faulty understanding. I never really understood it myself until we took an 1820 apart, reassembled it and ran it in mech school.
 
I remember a statistic: the casualty rate for strategic bombing by the 8th AF and its British equivalent was not only higher than the ground forces engaged in combat, but greater than the Japanese kamikaze squadrons.

If I remember correctly, the 8th's pilots had to get 25 good missions under their belts....

The Special Attack groups, not so much....
 
Hoo boy, here we go again. The primary P39 model that fought the Zero early days (P39D) COULDN'T outclimb it, and though ultimately faster in an extended chase, couldn't match its instantaneous acceleration, which is a serious disadvantage in combat. Early days combat in New Guinea had P39s defending against bombing raids way above their optimum performance altitudes. Later P39s with more horsepower and less weight would have performed better against Zeke, but by then the P38 had taken over and the Airacobras were going to Russia. It's real shortcoming in the PTO was its limited range.
The P-39D was a 1942 airplane so it should be compared with the A6M2 which was in service at the same time. P-39D would not outclimb the A6M2 but would climb at about the same rate at combat power (3000rpm). P-39D was significantly faster at all altitudes, 368mph at 15000' vs 316mph for the A6M2 from the official IJN tests. The captured Zero would reportedly do 330-335mph in US Navy tests, still slower than the P-39D.

1942 P-39s biggest problem was performance with the ever present drop tank. The tank made climbing above about 18000' difficult as that was it's combat ceiling (1000fpm). Cruising at below 18000' meant the A6M2 would almost always be above. Later 1942 P-39L was lightened by 650lbs in an AAF test in September at Guadalcanal and would operate at 27000'. But then in a couple of months the P-38F/G would be in theater.
 
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Ruffato and Clairingbould, cross referencing Japanese and Allied loss records have determined that the Tainan Kokutai, the main Japanese fighter unit in the SWPA during most of 1942, shot down 38 Airacobras, while losing only 12 Zeros to Airacobras.
 
Of course, "useful" and "overrated" are somewhat related: all overrated aircraft were "useful"; the whether an aircraft is overrated or not depends on how it's treated by people talking and writing about it. Every belligerent had combat aircraft that could be considered overrated.

Agree, Swampyankee. As the saying goes, nothing is totally useless, some things can be used as a bad example.
 
What I meant is that the statement "Plainly and obviously 109's will shoot down more Spitfires than they lose if they are only fighting Spitfires" implies that if you have 20 Spitfires and 20 Bf 109s in a fight, the Bf 109s are going to shoot down more Spitfires than they lose. That may not be what he meant to say but that is how it reads.

Which I don't think is generally true, though it depends on the sub-variants of both.

Even when there is a big mix of planes in the air, the effect that has on how the combat goes depends more on the capabilities of the aircraft in question and the strategy. If the aircraft is too slow or lacks performance to disengage, then tactical options are limited so they are more or less stuck with the odds - and suffer losses accordingly if the odds are against them. Hurricanes, MC 200, Cr 42, Me 110 and so on, suffered from this problem. Spitifires, Bf 109s, MC 202 / 205, and P-40s could all disengage if they needed to so if they had sufficient operational flexibility in terms of their orders / chain of command, they could tackle the fight in different ways.

If they were ordered to go after the bombers and ignore the fighters, or conversely as an escort, if they were forced to stick close to the bombers, then the fighter casualties go up. If they were given more of a free hand then the fighter casualties go down. In MAW II and III, there were cases where both Allied and German fighter squadrons were able to cause devastating damage against much larger enemy formations even when badly outnumbered (including Spits & P-40s), and cases of the opposite where they got creamed.

Generally in mid 1942 when the Spitfires first arrived in the Med the British tactics were still a little bit messed up, overly rigid and they weren't always using pairs / wingmen. But by the fall they had adopted the 'Finger Four' type formations same as the Germans and given their fighter squadron a freer hand, though this still depended on the squadron commander. I remember reading about one engagement with Spits flying escort where they were being attacked from above, behind and to the left by some Bf 109s. The squadron commander ordered "break right" instead of "break left" and the RAF fighters did as ordered, resulting in 4 of them immediately getting shot down. Clearly a disastrous error by the squadron leader. But there were not too many cases like that. Most of the Spitfire squadrons seemed to do pretty well.

The German fighter squadrons were given plenty of tactical flexibility, almost to a fault, and tended to cherry pick the easiest and safest targets, which often meant low flying fighters, and they would disengage by climbing or diving away any time the fight went against them.

Which is why I say, as for the alleged numbers quoted, I wouldn't get too excited about it - I suspect those numbers are way off. The Devil is in the details of how they are counting the losses on both sides, and for example are they using the same criteria for both Axis and Allied squadrons. I have still yet to see this famous original post (I wish somebody would link it) but I suspect there may be something fishy in how the losses are being added up. This can be a little tricky because the damage and losses are reported differently in Shores MAW.
  • The RAF / Commonwealth losses are reported as "shot down" or "bailed out" or "damaged", but also "force landed" or "crash landed", results for crew (KiA, MiA, WiA, POW, "unknown" or "Failed to Return") and damage as "Cat I, Cat II", or (more rarely) "Cat III". It was quite common for P-40s in particular to return back to base as damaged "Cat II" but still manage to land normally. They will also specify the cause of the lost / damaged aircraft: to accident, enemy fighters, or Flak.
  • The USAAF and Free French losses don't have as much detail, but they will indicate "shot down by 109", "lost to flak", "damaged" or "badly damaged", "crash landed / force landed" and where (i.e. crash landed on the base or in the battle area) and sometimes "Late arrival club" for pilots who made it back to base by whatever means a day or two after an incident.
  • The German results while similar are based on percentage, so they will say "Damaged 10% or Damaged 90%", they will indicate "Force / Crash landed" or not, what happened to the pilot, and sometimes they use ambiguous terms like "blown up" which usually means shot down but can mean damaged on the ground by bombers / strafers, or "aircraft abandoned" which usually means bailed out but can also mean abandoned after a forced landing. They will also usually indicate what they think shot them down, such as Spitfires, P-40s, Hurricanes or enemy bombers - or Flak.
  • Italian results are much more vague and usually are either just "Failed to Return", "Crash landed" or "Damaged" plus the condition of the pilot / crew.
Another issue is that sometimes there are losses with no corresponding claims. Sometimes you can find these claims in the other volume - Vol II and III overlap in some periods but seem to come from different sets of records. So for example on a particular day you might find records of 3 lost Bf 109s with no corresponding DAF claims, but you check the other Volume and find 4 or 5 matching claims on that day. If you cant find them then I would say they don't count.

So there are some questions you must answer if you are going to evaluate this stuff which are a little complex. When I did some totalling up of several days actions for the Bf 109 vs P-40 thread, for me the following issues came to mind:
  • Do you count aircraft destroyed by Flak / AAA? I decided if I'm trying to match claims to losses such as between Spits and 109s, I don't count "Flak kills", but there are a few cases where one side attributed a loss to Flak when it was clearly an enemy aircraft that got them so there are some exceptions to this.
  • How do you count crash landed aircraft? This is very tricky because as I mentioned previously, a single bullet hole in a radiator can force a plane down, but that same plane can be repaired in a few hours or less and right back into action. So there is definitely a difference, but it's clear at least when an aircraft had to 'force land' or 'crash land'. Rather than try to distinguish crash landed from shot down, I just list them separately, so for example on a certain day the RAF may have lost 3 Spitfires destroyed and 2 crash landed.
  • How do you count losses that seem to be in another battle area or a different time? In the P-40 vs 109 thread, one guy argued a lot about one particular incident on March 24, 1943. USAAF 33rd FG P-40Ls escorting a B-25 raid had clashed with Bf 109G-2, G-4 and G-6s of at least two, possibly three different JG, claiming 10 & 5 damaged, and losing 1 P-40. The Germans claimed 7 P-40s (including two by Experten Hans Bar who the German report said shot down two P-40s that were giving his subordinates a lot of trouble) and lost 6 destroyed and 1 damaged 50%. The accompanying text described a long "running battle" from the site of the German airfield at Tebaga North in Southern Tunisia all the way back to the DAF airbase in North West Tunisia or Algeria (it wasn't clear where exactly). The issue was that 2 of the German losses were to 'unknown reasons' and they and one other loss were reported in North-East Tunisia. The ensuing argument was complicated but my general conclusion is, it's just a little bit too much of a mystery to delve deep into every single lost aircraft. It's possible there is a coincidental navigation error or engine malfunction for 3 of the 6 lost German fighters, but I doubt it. The bottom line though if you are trying to do this day by day, I think the criteria should be if there are losses which can be matched to the claims on the same day and within the operational range of the aircraft involved, then they should be counted. If there are odd circumstances you can put an asterix on it for further investigation later. But as we know, some people are so invested in one side or the other they just can't let things go - that's fine, it's how we figure a lot of things out frankly, but it needs to be separated so it doesn't bog down the count.
  • How do you count damaged aircraft? This one is tricky. On the DAF side, if it says Cat III damage, or "written off", "destroyed" etc., then I counted it as destroyed. If not damaged (and therefore not counted in the victory / lost ratio). For the Germans I counted any aircraft with more than 50% damage as destroyed, though that is a bit arbitrary. German losses were often reported as just damage percentage, 60%, 80% etc. I know there was a certain threshold beyond which many aircraft were out of commission for a long time and ultimately written off, as the repair capabilities in remote fields were limited, especially in late 1942 and 1943 as the Germans were often retreating and leaving a lot of planes behind (both in the Med and in Russia). But I'd have to do more research to find that out*. Bottom line is I think that most lightly or moderately damaged aircraft should be ignored in the kill count and tallied separately, while severely damaged aircraft can be counted as killed so long as the criteria are clear and consistent. I also think you should keep a separate tally of damaged aircraft because that does help paint the picture.
Obviously the most important is that the count of losses are done by as close to the same criteria as possible for all air forces on both Axis and Allied sides, and that these criteria are consistent. I do think that is a bit of a challenge but it's also doable.

S

* one other thing that occurred to me, this would take a fiendish amount of effort but in MAW, Shores does list the serial numbers of damaged planes, and then the serial numbers of planes "destroyed by own troops" presumably due to a base evacuation. So if you entered all this into a database or just painstakingly matched them one by one, you could probably determine with some degree of accuracy which German planes in particular that got damaged were ultimately destroyed before they could be repaired and put into action. So maybe those should be counted as destroyed.

OK, just a point--What the guy is saying is that the Spit pilots have to ry and dedstroy the bombers, '109s & such are just a very nasty nusence. Thr '109s, on the other hand, need only concentrate on the RAF fighters so the only time Spits engage DLW fighters is when defending against a German attack--and historically, the guy who attacks is at a serious advantage. I've seen estimates that, at least through Korea, most fighters that were lost had pilots who didn't even realize that they were in the enemy;s Revi....

PGF
 
Biff, the point I was making is that if your airfields are being attacked by bombers escorted by fighters at 20 to 25,00 ft the first thing to do is stop it, not to make plans to bomb a city on their northern coast or a capital city just captured by your enemy who he couldn't give a damn about.

But destroy all the airfields close enough to the Chanel, now he has to send bombers without escorts--and BoB pretty much proved that the '110 was useless as such--and it's 17 September but way earlier....

Or hit Dresden, now the DLW has to pull back a lot of those fighters from Abbeville....
 
But destroy all the airfields close enough to the Chanel, now he has to send bombers without escorts--and BoB pretty much proved that the '110 was useless as such--and it's 17 September but way earlier....

Or hit Dresden, now the DLW has to pull back a lot of those fighters from Abbeville....
No it doesnt, Me110s were perfectly capable of mauling any unescorted bomber even heavily defended ones like the B-17. The British had given up daylight raids on Germany before the BoB started.
 
We were talking about a (ridiculous) hypothetical scenario of using A6Ms to escort Wellingtons ... and you are giving me grief about an offhand suggestion that they put a 20mm gun on the Wellingtons tail? Seriously bruh? So use G4MS if you can't figure it out. Or borrow some ShVak cannon from the Soviets in reverse lend-lease...



A 20mm (or a HMG) is better because it has much longer effective range, especially for the tail gun. But the turrets on the Wellington did dish out some firepower.

S

Ah....Ma Deuce?
 
No it doesnt, Me110s were perfectly capable of mauling any unescorted bomber even heavily defended ones like the B-17. The British had given up daylight raids on Germany before the BoB started.
But if the RAF still has Hurries, and maybe even a few Spits--for Eleven Group....
 

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