Most Overrated aircraft of WWII.....? (9 Viewers)

[michael rauls]

Michael - articles that said that the Mustang was the only fighter to make it to Berlin and back are simply 'under-researched'. It is a known fact that for example, The P-38J escorted the 8th AF to Berlin on March 6, 1944. It is also a fact that 9th AF 354th FG and 4th FG ranged to Berlin, north of Berlin and returned on Mar 4, and March 6. It is also a fact that the P-47D-25 COULD have done so had Republic been able to make the changes REQUIRED to increase internal fuel to match timetable of P-38J and P-51B.

But it did not. The P-82 could have flown nearly to Moscow and back but it was too late. The P-47N could have flown the Berlin missions, the Poland and Czechoslovakia missions, Ploesti and 20th AF missions from Iwo - bit it was too late to make a difference in Argument, Ditto P-47D-25.

You are an intelligent guy - why are you droning on about what each of the fighters you mentioned when they simply didn't have the ability to a.) Perform Deep Target escort, and b.) achieve air superiority over deep targets and c.) achieve by far the most damage to airfield parked aircraft beyond Berlin to compliment the fight in the air. The P-51B achieved all those objectives in the most important Period for USSAFE, when it was URGENT and Required to destroy LW capability of seriously affecting D-Day operations. Neither the P-47D, and to lesser extent, P-38J, were effective in the destruction (contrast annoy) of the LW over the oilfields and aircraft center of gravity in east Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

What if the question was - What was the most important fighter in the air war OVER Germany? Over Japan? Over Ploesti?

Not that this has anything to do with the topic of overrating but I would respectfully disagree with all three of the things you claim the p38/p47 combination could not have achieved. The first is easiest, the p38 could and did perform deep escort that it was there only in limited numbers is not the fault of the aircraft. So did the 47 but yes not as early as the 51 or 38. The second , achieve suppirriority over deep escort objectives is more complex but certainly if the p38 j25/L had been delivered in the same numbers as p51s they could have gained air suppirriority over deep targets evidence the almost 5 to 1 kill loss ratio of the 474th the only unit flying p38s to the end. Not as good as the p51s record but certainly capable of winning air suppirriority over distant targets if they had been there in great numbers but the 8th wisely chose to go with the p51, better performance at half the cost but that doesn't mean that had they gone with the p38 in huge numbers that they could not have done the same. I think the 5 to 1 kill losss record of the 474th proves that.Third point rebuttal same as second. And if I can again refer back to some of my points in earlier posts most historians I have read seam to agree that we had achieved air suppirriority by March 44. So if we had achieved air suppirriority by March then the Luftwaffe was obviously over top of the attrition curve well before that which would be at latest Feb. Well from mid 43 to feb44 or late43( when i think p51 deployment began?) Whenever you want to start the count, from then until the top of the attrition curve in Feb at the latest( probably well before that actually) but just to err on the side of the p51 just for the sake of argument well say feb the p51 had up to that point only a small percentage of kills the point being the Luftwaffe was going down p51 or no p51. So yes the p38/p47 combination was capable of gaining overal air suppirriority because they did.

 

[michael rauls]

To be fair i should point out that had the p51 been available in numbers earlier it almost certainly could have won air suppirriority sooner than the p38/p47 combination did but to say that the 38 and47 were not capable of winning air superiority, in my opinion, is wrong because , well, they did.

 

[drgondog]

Not that this has anything to do with the topic of overrating but I would respectfully disagree with all three of the things you claim the p38/p47 combination could not have achieved. The first is easiest, the p38 could and did perform deep escort that it was there only in limited numbers is not the fault of the aircraft. So did the 47 but yes not as early as the 51 or 38. The second , achieve suppirriority over deep escort objectives is more complex but certainly if the p38 j25/L had been delivered in the same numbers as p51s they could have gained air suppirriority over deep targets evidence the almost 5 to 1 kill loss ratio of the 474th the only unit flying p38s to the end. Not as good as the p51s record but certainly capable of winning air suppirriority over distant targets if they had been there in great numbers but the 8th wisely chose to go with the p51, better performance at half the cost but that doesn't mean that had they gone with the p38 in huge numbers that they could not have done the same. I think the 5 to 1 kill losss record of the 474th proves that.Third point rebuttal same as second. And if I can again refer back to some of my points in earlier posts most historians I have read seam to agree that we had achieved air suppirriority by March 44. So if we had achieved air suppirriority by March then the Luftwaffe was obviously over top of the attrition curve well before that which would be at latest Feb. Well from mid 43 to feb44 or late43( when i think p51 deployment began?) Whenever you want to start the count, from then until the top of the attrition curve in Feb at the latest( probably well before that actually) but just to err on the side of the p51 just for the sake of argument well say feb the p51 had up to that point only a small percentage of kills the point being the Luftwaffe was going down p51 or no p51. So yes the p38/p47 combination was capable of gaining overal air suppirriority because they did.

Mighta, Coulda, Shoulda - but Didn't.

The P-38J was in ETO with same strength as P-51B before and during Big Week. Both the 20th and 55th had more combat experience than the 354th and 357th but both the 354th and 357th achieved 6:1 victory credits over the Lightning groups during Big Week when both types were performing target escort (15th AF P-38s couldn't engage over Germany during Big Week and for some time afterwards until the P-38J started arriving in MTO). Both the 9th AF and 8th AF P-38 FGs were flying escort for 8th AF until the end of May.

The high altitude mechanical issues were not 'solved' until the Intercooler/turbo re-design, electrical cockpit heating provided by adding a generator. The instant compressibility was never truly solved when starting dives at 25000 feet, although the dive flaps (finally) introduced into ops after D-Day mitigated controllability. The terrible Roll characteristics until Boosted ailerons (post D-Day), combined with dive issues gave both the 109 and 190 pretty easy 'out moves' but as much as any other characteristic, the P-38 was so big that it was spotted long before the 38 pilot could pick up the 109/190 - giving them an opportunity to a.) attain positive tactical position, or b.) leave.

To try to make your point about P-47D and P-38J/L Potential, you keep wandering away from the Critical period - namely October, 1943 through June 5, 1944 - when the highest priority for SHAEF was the destruction of the LW. The P-47 made major contributions, but did not have the range to force the LW from strategy of waiting (with both S/E and T/E)until the Jugs ran out of range. The P-38 did but didn't get the job done and were dismissed in favor of the P-51B/D for target escort.

Even in MTO where the P-38 did well, the P-51B/D took over target support. It is ironic that an inexperienced FG like the 332nd in 15th AF scored more air victory credits than any of the very experienced 1st, 14th and 82nd FG for the period that 332nd was in combat (June 1944 through VE Day). In comparison, the 332nd was far behind the 31st, 52nd and 325th FG Mustang units

By the time D-Day commenced, the Mustang record of aircraft destruction exceeded the Total (8th and 9th AF) P-47D in air to air credits despite nearly 5X sorties of P-47 over P-51B during ETO combat ops. The P-51B had nearly 3:1 over the combined P-38/P-47 totals for Ground credits.The P-47C/D started in late April 1943 and the P-38 in mid October, 1943 with P-51B beginning in December, 1943

History isn't history when you postulate 'alternate reality'.

You might spend some more time in deep research to understand what Schmid and Galland will tell you from their Informed perspective about the Luftwaffe struggles. What you are also missing is the realization by Schmid and Galland that the Defense of the Reich required great re-enforcement from East and South, bringing day fighters and experienced pilots to try to stem the bleeding after it was clear that P-47s were getting the upper hand on LuftFlotte 3 defending the West in the late Fall/early Winter 1943.

We are talking past each other, so I will retreat from this particular debate with you.

 

[Milosh]

We are talking past each other, so I will retreat from this particular debate with you.

Please don't as you do a very good job at debunking revisionism.

 

[michael rauls]

Mighta, Coulda, Shoulda - but Didn't.

The P-38J was in ETO with same strength as P-51B before and during Big Week. Both the 20th and 55th had more combat experience than the 354th and 357th but both the 354th and 357th achieved 6:1 victory credits over the Lightning groups during Big Week when both types were performing target escort (15th AF P-38s couldn't engage over Germany during Big Week and for some time afterwards until the P-38J started arriving in MTO). Both the 9th AF and 8th AF P-38 FGs were flying escort for 8th AF until the end of May.

The high altitude mechanical issues were not 'solved' until the Intercooler/turbo re-design, electrical cockpit heating provided by adding a generator. The instant compressibility was never truly solved when starting dives at 25000 feet, although the dive flaps (finally) introduced into ops after D-Day mitigated controllability. The terrible Roll characteristics until Boosted ailerons (post D-Day), combined with dive issues gave both the 109 and 190 pretty easy 'out moves' but as much as any other characteristic, the P-38 was so big that it was spotted long before the 38 pilot could pick up the 109/190 - giving them an opportunity to a.) attain positive tactical position, or b.) leave.

To try to make your point about P-47D and P-38J/L Potential, you keep wandering away from the Critical period - namely October, 1943 through June 5, 1944 - when the highest priority for SHAEF was the destruction of the LW. The P-47 made major contributions, but did not have the range to force the LW from strategy of waiting (with both S/E and T/E)until the Jugs ran out of range. The P-38 did but didn't get the job done and were dismissed in favor of the P-51B/D for target escort.

Even in MTO where the P-38 did well, the P-51B/D took over target support. It is ironic that an inexperienced FG like the 332nd in 15th AF scored more air victory credits than any of the very experienced 1st, 14th and 82nd FG for the period that 332nd was in combat (June 1944 through VE Day). In comparison, the 332nd was far behind the 31st, 52nd and 325th FG Mustang units

By the time D-Day commenced, the Mustang record of aircraft destruction exceeded the Total (8th and 9th AF) P-47D in air to air credits despite nearly 5X sorties of P-47 over P-51B during ETO combat ops. The P-51B had nearly 3:1 over the combined P-38/P-47 totals for Ground credits.The P-47C/D started in late April 1943 and the P-38 in mid October, 1943 with P-51B beginning in December, 1943

History isn't history when you postulate 'alternate reality'.

You might spend some more time in deep research to understand what Schmid and Galland will tell you from their Informed perspective about the Luftwaffe struggles. What you are also missing is the realization by Schmid and Galland that the Defense of the Reich required great re-enforcement from East and South, bringing day fighters and experienced pilots to try to stem the bleeding after it was clear that P-47s were getting the upper hand on LuftFlotte 3 defending the West in the late Fall/early Winter 1943.

We are talking past each other, so I will retreat from this particular debate with you.

A couple thoughts, my original posts and this thread are about p51 overratedness. Not that the 51 wasn't a better plane overall . Both the examples I gave are still valid in spite of superior kill ratios. That wasnt the point. I know you are correct when you say that the p51 dramatically outscored the p38 during big week or so I have read but I have also read that part but I am sure not all of the reason for this is that the p38s were tasked to stick close to the bombers like they had been from the start where as the p51s and 47s were using the new tactic( cocieved and lobbied for by Hub Zemke) of fanning out in front of then bomber formations and intercepting the Luftwaffe fighters on much better terms. This is obviously going to create a huge disparity in kill ratios regardless of the merits of the aircraft involved. Add to the the p51s I better high speed maneuver ability(yes I believe the p51 was the better aircraft for air to air just not be as much as many give it credit for) and tou are going to have what you see in the numbers you posted ie a wipe out in scoring. The fact however remains that certainly by February the Luftwaffe was over the top of bend in the attrition curve and up th that point the p51 had a minority of kills and that was and is my point that the Luftwaffe was going down p51 or no p51.I don't think that's arguable. And that the p38/p47 could in fact win air superiority because in fact they did. My point was not that the p51 was not a better aircraft as one would expect from a latter design. It was. It was that a. The p51 was great but over rated and d. That the p38/p47 won air superiority if we are to believe what most historians, at least the ones I have read and I have seen others quote , that we achieved air superiority in March.

 

[michael rauls]

Please don't as you do a very good job at debunking revisionism.

There is nothing revisionist, at least as far as I know, in any of the facts I have cited unless you want to push the date of achievement of air superiority out to say perhaps June or August but that would fly in the face of what most historians and i believe even Luftwaffe members like Galland say. I have read thet Galland thought that by the end of q1 44, that would be march, the Luftwaffes fate was pretty much sealed. I am certainly open to arguments that air superiority was achieved until a latter data and I have read a few. It's just that they are vastly outnumbered by those that certainly know more than I that itwas achieved in March.

 

[michael rauls]

Mighta, Coulda, Shoulda - but Didn't.

The P-38J was in ETO with same strength as P-51B before and during Big Week. Both the 20th and 55th had more combat experience than the 354th and 357th but both the 354th and 357th achieved 6:1 victory credits over the Lightning groups during Big Week when both types were performing target escort (15th AF P-38s couldn't engage over Germany during Big Week and for some time afterwards until the P-38J started arriving in MTO). Both the 9th AF and 8th AF P-38 FGs were flying escort for 8th AF until the end of May.

The high altitude mechanical issues were not 'solved' until the Intercooler/turbo re-design, electrical cockpit heating provided by adding a generator. The instant compressibility was never truly solved when starting dives at 25000 feet, although the dive flaps (finally) introduced into ops after D-Day mitigated controllability. The terrible Roll characteristics until Boosted ailerons (post D-Day), combined with dive issues gave both the 109 and 190 pretty easy 'out moves' but as much as any other characteristic, the P-38 was so big that it was spotted long before the 38 pilot could pick up the 109/190 - giving them an opportunity to a.) attain positive tactical position, or b.) leave.

To try to make your point about P-47D and P-38J/L Potential, you keep wandering away from the Critical period - namely October, 1943 through June 5, 1944 - when the highest priority for SHAEF was the destruction of the LW. The P-47 made major contributions, but did not have the range to force the LW from strategy of waiting (with both S/E and T/E)until the Jugs ran out of range. The P-38 did but didn't get the job done and were dismissed in favor of the P-51B/D for target escort.

Even in MTO where the P-38 did well, the P-51B/D took over target support. It is ironic that an inexperienced FG like the 332nd in 15th AF scored more air victory credits than any of the very experienced 1st, 14th and 82nd FG for the period that 332nd was in combat (June 1944 through VE Day). In comparison, the 332nd was far behind the 31st, 52nd and 325th FG Mustang units

By the time D-Day commenced, the Mustang record of aircraft destruction exceeded the Total (8th and 9th AF) P-47D in air to air credits despite nearly 5X sorties of P-47 over P-51B during ETO combat ops. The P-51B had nearly 3:1 over the combined P-38/P-47 totals for Ground credits.The P-47C/D started in late April 1943 and the P-38 in mid October, 1943 with P-51B beginning in December, 1943

History isn't history when you postulate 'alternate reality'.

You might spend some more time in deep research to understand what Schmid and Galland will tell you from their Informed perspective about the Luftwaffe struggles. What you are also missing is the realization by Schmid and Galland that the Defense of the Reich required great re-enforcement from East and South, bringing day fighters and experienced pilots to try to stem the bleeding after it was clear that P-47s were getting the upper hand on LuftFlotte 3 defending the West in the late Fall/early Winter 1943.

We are talking past each other, so I will retreat from this particular debate with you.

And yes we are talking past each other because you you are studiously and I believe intentionally missing my points and trying to turn this into a which is better debate which of course is niether my point nor the topic of this thread.

 

[michael rauls]

And just one more thought. You posted mighta, coulda, shoulda, but didn't. Ah contraire, if we did in fact achieve air superiority by March as seems to by the consensus then there is no mighta, coulda etc about it. The p38/47 did win air superiority. Like I said I am certainly open to consider alternative views on the timeframe how about you promelgate some instead of responding with coulda woulda shouda and then listing kill ratios to try and turn it into a which is better debate which of course is niether my point nor the topic.

 

[Peter Gunn]

And just one more thought. You posted mighta, coulda, shoulda, but didn't. Ah contraire, if we did in fact achieve air superiority by March as seems to by the consensus then there is no mighta, coulda etc about it. The p38/47 did win air superiority. Like I said I am certainly open to consider alternative views on the timeframe how about you promelgate some instead of responding with coulda woulda shouda and then listing kill ratios to try and turn it into a which is better debate which of course is niether my point nor the topic.

Michael,

drgondog posts kill ratios and dates to point out what the Mustang was achieving and when.

One thing I learned after I got here was how much I didn't know, too many 'historians' are good for nothing more than what can be called "coffee table history books". When I first started here, I admitted I was a Mustang affectionado, but that didn't stop me from appreciating not only other aircraft but also the limitations of the P-51. I'm not an apologist or fanboy, it's my favorite WWII fighter, period.

After a few months, and reading many drgondog posts (among others) I gained a whole new perspective on:

A). Learning a ton of info I thought I already knew but did not.

B). That far from being a nifty fighter that came in after the fracas was over and just batted cleanup, the Mustang wholeheartedly opened up what in the old days we'd call a large can of whoop ass on the Luftwaffe, plain and simple. Guys flying P-38's or P-47's went from 0 or 1 kills to ace, double ace or more in the P-51. That's not coincidence. And they were not facing the second string players of the LW either. At the time period we're talking about, leading up to Overlord, it's doubtful any other fighter in the world was truly capable of doing the Mustangs job in beating the LW to the ground, literally.

I'm kind of a grouchy old guy and it took a lot for me to realize but if you want the real dope on aviation history, especially WWII, you won't find more knowledgeable guys on the 'net than here (me excluded). You seem a well read and intelligent guy Michael, I hope you'll stick around, you just have to make sure you have documented data to back up any claims made here as this crowd is pretty savvy at ferreting out misleading or incorrect data.

Cheers,
Pete

 

[BiffF15]

And just one more thought. You posted mighta, coulda, shoulda, but didn't. Ah contraire, if we did in fact achieve air superiority by March as seems to by the consensus then there is no mighta, coulda etc about it. The p38/47 did win air superiority. Like I said I am certainly open to consider alternative views on the timeframe how about you promelgate some instead of responding with coulda woulda shouda and then listing kill ratios to try and turn it into a which is better debate which of course is niether my point nor the topic.

Michael,

You make your points without any backup or validation. Drgondog puts quotes, statistics and sound, informative reasoning behind his rationale. If you would post other than, "most historians agree", and instead post book & page where your information comes from you might find a more engaged group here. You might also gain a different point of view. I know I have.

Cheers,
Biff

 

[BiffF15]

And just one more thought. You posted mighta, coulda, shoulda, but didn't. Ah contraire, if we did in fact achieve air superiority by March as seems to by the consensus then there is no mighta, coulda etc about it. The p38/47 did win air superiority. Like I said I am certainly open to consider alternative views on the timeframe how about you promelgate some instead of responding with coulda woulda shouda and then listing kill ratios to try and turn it into a which is better debate which of course is niether my point nor the topic.

Michael,

You make your points without any backup or validation. Drgondog puts quotes, statistics and sound, informative reasoning behind his rationale. If you would post other than, "most historians agree", and instead post book & page where your information comes from you might find a more engaged group here. You might also gain a different point of view. I know I have.

Cheers,
Biff

 

[drgondog]

And yes we are talking past each other because you you are studiously and I believe intentionally missing my points and trying to turn this into a which is better debate which of course is niether my point nor the topic of this thread.

I couldn't quite let this one slide by....

I carefully took your points and claims, parsed the content and sources (usually zero) to try to address your points with fact based rebuttals citing sources and inviting you to do the same. Your points in summary were:

1.) P-47D was performing LR escort to Berlin.
2.) The P-38 and P-47 combined had wrested air superiority from the LW before the Mustang made a contribution.
3.) The P-38 and P-47 could have achieved the critical objective of 'destruction of LW' prior to D-Day as mandated (not your words, correct in context) by SHAEF and operation ARGUMENT as a subset of Combined Bomber Offensive (again, not your words, but historically correct)

I pointed out the facts surrounding your three points, said facts rebutting your unsourced claims, and sourced my facts.

To repeat; The VERY FIRST long range mission to Berlin by P-47D was February 3, 1945 - approximately 12 MONTHS after Big Week.

To repeat; The 8th AF began the serious task of TRYING to regain air superiority with deep penetration targets in January, 1944 when ONE P-51B Mustang Group and TWO P-38H/J Groups were operational. The January strikes into Germany included Oschersleben/Halberstadt, Brunswick, Hannover - the rest were within range of the P-47D groups. There was no token or actual air superiority by 8th FC beyond Frankfurt/Hannover line.

JANUARY 1944
The long range strike bomber losses were 42 for for 1-11 to Oschersleben/Halberstadt. The fighter claims were 14 for all the P-47D FG's (that turned back 100 miles short), 15 for the Only P-51B FG, and Zero for the P-38 FG's that actually performed target escort.

In January the single Mustang FG (354FG) destroyed 46 in the air. The two P-38 FG's combined scored 32. The Combined Twelve 8th and 9th AF P47D total was 142. What this should tell you is that a.) the only target escort FG's (3) got more than 50% of 12 P-47D FG's, and b.) that P-47D was effective out to Hannover/Frankfurt, but the primary action was out of their range. Only the P-51B and P-38H offered any protection past P-47D range (90% of critical targets).

I will leave you to work out on your own how defeated the LW was on 4-11, -13, -15, -24, -29, 5-8, -12, -28, -29.

Sources: USAF Study 85, Tables extracted for comparison between P-38/P-47/P51 in ETO in Our Might Always, Kent Millers Fighter Units and Pilots of 8th AF; Caldwell's "Day Fighters Defense of the Reich"; Freeman's "Mighty 8th War Diary", Grabmann "German Air Defense 1933-1945", General Schmid "GAF against Allies in the West 143-1945"; USAFHRA K113.

The above sources are rich in details from Historians and folks that were "There"

 

[michael rauls]

Michael,

You make your points without any backup or validation. Drgondog puts quotes, statistics and sound, informative reasoning behind his rationale. If you would post other than, "most historians agree", and instead post book & page where your information comes from you might find a more engaged group here. You might also gain a different point of view. I know I have.

Cheers,
Biff

Again not clamming to be an expert but the most historians thinking that we won air superiority in march is something that i have gleaned largely from, although not completely from seemingly knowledgeable posters on this site as well as articals i have read through the years. It seams to me to be the cocencus. Yes I do realize that just because something seams that way does not nescesarily make it true. That is why I said im certainly open to reading other historians with different views. To say that I cited no sources for my positions is inaccurate. The two I can rremember citing off the top of my head without going back through all the posts are Americas 100,000( I have been told this is one of the best reasurched books out there) and General Galland himself.

 

[pbehn]

Again not clamming to be an expert but the most historians thinking that we won air superiority in march is something that i have gleaned largely from, although not completely from seemingly knowledgeable posters on this site as well as articals i have read through the years. It seams to me to be the cocencus. Yes I do realize that just because something seams that way does not nescesarily make it true. That is why I said im certainly open to reading other historians with different views. To say that I cited no sources for my positions is inaccurate. The two I can rremember citing off the top of my head without going back through all the posts are Americas 100,000( I have been told this is one of the best reasurched books out there) and General Galland himself.

Just one small point. You repeatedly talk about achieving air superiority. In fact for D-Day to work complete air supremacy over all north Europe was required, the P-47 and P-38 achieved local air superiority, the P-51 with all others achieved the air supremacy that was vital. The only date that was important was D-Day.

 

[michael rauls]

I couldn't quite let this one slide by....

I carefully took your points and claims, parsed the content and sources (usually zero) to try to address your points with fact based rebuttals citing sources and inviting you to do the same. Your points in summary were:

1.) P-47D was performing LR escort to Berlin.
2.) The P-38 and P-47 combined had wrested air superiority from the LW before the Mustang made a contribution.
3.) The P-38 and P-47 could have achieved the critical objective of 'destruction of LW' prior to D-Day as mandated (not your words, correct in context) by SHAEF and operation ARGUMENT as a subset of Combined Bomber Offensive (again, not your words, but historically correct)

I pointed out the facts surrounding your three points, said facts rebutting your unsourced claims, and sourced my facts.

To repeat; The VERY FIRST long range mission to Berlin by P-47D was February 3, 1945 - approximately 12 MONTHS after Big Week.

To repeat; The 8th AF began the serious task of TRYING to regain air superiority with deep penetration targets in January, 1944 when ONE P-51B Mustang Group and TWO P-38H/J Groups were operational. The January strikes into Germany included Oschersleben/Halberstadt, Brunswick, Hannover - the rest were within range of the P-47D groups. There was no token or actual air superiority by 8th FC beyond Frankfurt/Hannover line.

JANUARY 1944
The long range strike bomber losses were 42 for for 1-11 to Oschersleben/Halberstadt. The fighter claims were 14 for all the P-47D FG's (that turned back 100 miles short), 15 for the Only P-51B FG, and Zero for the P-38 FG's that actually performed target escort.

In January the single Mustang FG (354FG) destroyed 46 in the air. The two P-38 FG's combined scored 32. The Combined Twelve 8th and 9th AF P47D total was 142. What this should tell you is that a.) the only target escort FG's (3) got more than 50% of 12 P-47D FG's, and b.) that P-47D was effective out to Hannover/Frankfurt, but the primary action was out of their range. Only the P-51B and P-38H offered any protection past P-47D range (90% of critical targets).

I will leave you to work out on your own how defeated the LW was on 4-11, -13, -15, -24, -29, 5-8, -12, -28, -29.

Sources: USAF Study 85, Tables extracted for comparison between P-38/P-47/P51 in ETO in Our Might Always, Kent Millers Fighter Units and Pilots of 8th AF; Caldwell's "Day Fighters Defense of the Reich"; Freeman's "Mighty 8th War Diary", Grabmann "German Air Defense 1933-1945", General Schmid "GAF against Allies in the West 143-1945"; USAFHRA K113.

The above sources are rich in details from Historians and folks that were "There"

1 I never made the point that p47s were performing long range missions to Berlin in earlier44. I said there were other planes capable and in fact did fly missions of that distance including Berlin, some earlier p38, some later p47 thus making the often printed claim that the p51 was the only fighter able to make it to Berlin and back false and a case of overrating. Thats what this thread and my comments are about. Not that the p51 didn't open a can of whopass as you say on the Luftwaffe. It certainly did but that isnt my point. 2 I never said the p51 had made no contribution by the wresting of air superiority in March(again I am certainly open to reading opposing views and I have they just seem to be vastly outnumbered be the march view)what I did say was that If we did indeed have air superiority by March and unless the numbers for Feb 270 for p47/p38s and 88 for p51s are wrong( certainly open to those numbers being challenged also just nobody has) then the second most frequently quip about the p51 that it turned things around durring rhe month of big week is not true and thereby a case of overrating which is my point and the topic of this thread: overrated aircraft. If the two things thet the average guy reads about a particular aircraft and thus gleans his impressions from are not true then it is by definition at least as it pertains to those most frequently quoted " facts" a case of overrating. Rhis also bleeds over to your point 3 there you do have my position correc( at least as it stands now again I am open to callanges those numbers and air superiority date) but if those are accurate then yes I do stand by my claim that the 38/47 combination was capable of wresting air superiority from the Luftwaffe as is air superiority was achieved in March then over the top of the attrition curve was Feb at the latest and if the p38/p47 combination accounted for whats 270 ÷88? I dunno my brain is starting to hurt lets say about70%? then yes not only were the p47/p38 capable ow winning air superiority they did win air suppirriority. This does not in any way take away from the sterling qualities of the mustang it is just the reasoning behind my pick for a case of overrating.

 

[BiffF15]

Again not clamming to be an expert but the most historians thinking that we won air superiority in march is something that i have gleaned largely from, although not completely from seemingly knowledgeable posters on this site as well as articals i have read through the years. It seams to me to be the cocencus. Yes I do realize that just because something seams that way does not nescesarily make it true. That is why I said im certainly open to reading other historians with different views. To say that I cited no sources for my positions is inaccurate. The two I can rremember citing off the top of my head without going back through all the posts are Americas 100,000( I have been told this is one of the best reasurched books out there) and General Galland himself.

Michael,

Chapter or page from America's 100k, source you use to pass along Gallands perspectives?

Also you mentioned that the Mustang was not the only plane that could go the distance, you are correct and Drgondog concurred. However he gave solid data of why it wasn't optimal (roll authority, limited max Mach) which the Germans could easily use against it in combat.

The "P38/P47 could have done the job" is not a known fact, and therefore not a fact to be used to forward your opinion. It is an opinion. I agree there is potential the Allies could have got the job done without the Mustang. However they didn't, which lends more credence to the quality of one airframe over another.

Do I think the Mustang is overrated, it can be depending on who is saying what. I used to think it was, but then I came in here and got some serious tutoring and have since changed my mind.

Cheers,
Biff

 

[michael rauls]

Michael,

Chapter or page from America's 100k, source you use to pass along Gallands perspectives?

Cheers,
Biff

Americas 100, 000 chapter 4 page 283. Galland posters on this site largely although I have read this quoted in several articles through the years. Is it your contention that this was not his view? If you can point me to a quote or better quotes by him that it was later I am certainly not resistant to reading them.

 

[fubar57]

I don't own the book, what does it say exactly.

 

[michael rauls]

I don't own the book, what does it say exactly.

It's a table of combat range with different amounts of fuel and gives it with as best i can remember 5min warm up and take off, climb to 25000 feet, 15 minutes at military power, 5 minutes at war emergency power, cruise back at 25000 feet and 30 min reserve on minimum cruise. It has ranges for all us fighter types under the same conditions. ( obviously fuel capacity is one condition that will varry) . If you are really interested i will go dig it out again an make sure i quoted it exactly but im pretty sure i have.

 

[michael rauls]

I'm sorry i guess i left out the most critical piece of data. The range it gives for the p47 d23 qith 300 gal external fuel stores is 670 under these conditions.