I think all you p51 defenders( god bless you souls) are missing the piont here. The thread is not which is the better aircraft. The thread, and my comment are, is which is the most overrated aircraft of which I gave two solid examples( which are both just facts. 1: by 44 the p47 could and did fly mission as far as berlin and back and so sid the p38 so the often quoted" the only fighter that could go all the way to Berlin and back" is an example of overrating. 2: " the p51 turned things around" most historians, at least the ones i have read agree we had won air ssuperiority by March( although i am certainly open to reading other historians with different views. I know there are a few). The p51 only accounted for a small minority off kills up to that point so it is factually accurate to say that that is an example of overrated by the verry definition of the words. This is not to say the p51 was not the best choice to make from that point on, especially when cost is factored in but what it does mean is that it is indeed overrated.
Not to belabor the point you are trying to make, namely "51 overrated", but the P-47D was not tasked for Berlin in 1944, nor was any P-47 Fighter Group so tasked for 500 mile radius strikes in ETO until the P-47D-25 began arriving in numbers after D-Day.
That burden/opportunity fell to P-38J with LE tanks and P-51B/C with 85 gallon internal fuselage tank. The P-38J took a back seat to the P-51 by the time May Oil Offensive was in full bloom and 8th AF had already began transition of 20th, 55th and 364th FG to Mustangs by mid July 1944. I would argue that 'air superiority' as a state, occurred in Q2/1944 which is in agreement with Galland. His perspective was that LW air superiority could not be Regained during Q1, but all hope for parity was lost in Q2.
Air Superiority in March, 1944 is an interesting question and begs for definition, but one fact is clear. In March 1944 there were no safe bases for Me 110/410 Day Fighters and no 'safe places' for them to form up for an attack on 8th AF. It took a little longer for 15th because the P-38H in-theatre were not replaced in quantity until May/June 1944 with P-38J-15 with LE tanks and the P-51Bs did the heavy lifting in S. and E. Germany and Austria.
Second fact, is that the operational issues of the P-38H and early J-5 had reached tipping point. Even though the P-38J-10 with LE kits were operational for Berlin range, the dive flaps and final intercooler mods were too late for the P-38 to remain as high priority compared to P-51B/C for LR escort. By the time the 479th arrived for ops in late May, six P-47 groups had transitioned and the 339th entered ops to support the 357th. There were enough to commit releasing P-38s to 9th and make final commitment to convert 78, 353 and 356FG to Mustang in fall, 1944.
Third fact - The P-47D, pre D-25 could well perform medium Penetration/Withdrawal escort and that coverage was still required to blunt LW ops from LF 3 and LuftReich forces still based in west/central Germany. By May/June the last P-38 FG in 8th were still flying some target escort but the P-51B had taken over for Berlin, Munich, Posnan, Brux, Ruhland range targets.
Fourth Fact - The P-38J, as they existed in Feb through late May, 1944 were a.) insufficient in strength to perform escort for three 8th AF Bomb Divisions in the execution of Argument, or b.) the destruction of the LW in air and ground prior to D-Day. They were not only incapable of achieving air superiority over the LW FW 190 and Bf 109G at bomber altitudes, but also incapable of preventing Berlin/Schwienfurt type bomber/crew losses - which were a major political lightning (pardon the pun) rod that almost cost the USSAFE the initiative to continue strategic daylight operations.
So, if your argument that the P-51B Didn't Save the Day for 8th AF, I'm fine with that but remain unclear what your objective criteria might be? I'm also fine with a statement that the P-51 was over rated. It all "depends'.