MOST OVERRATED AIRCRAFT OF WWII

[Shortround6]

Near as I can figure there were about 875 Lockheed Ventura Is and IIs built Using R-2800s between start of production in 1941 and end if of production in Dec of 1942 when the Navy Ventura PV-1 took over. 1600 of theses were built between Dec of 1942 and May of 1944 when the lines switched to the PV-2.
The Ventura production IF allocated the near standard 50% spare engines would account for about 2600 engines by the end of 1942.
The Warwick needed somewhere between 300 and 450 engines depending on spares allocation.

Still looking for those thousands of engines scrapped before 1943???
Over produced for number of airframes built during the same time period does not mean excess was scrapped.
Still looking for associated airframes scrapped before going into combat.
Granted some B-47Bs used as trainers may have been scrapped after accidents, likewise some early B-26s and some of the Venturas the US took over from the British after Pearl Harbor but that is a whole different thing than scrapped because of engine problems isn't it??

 

[tyrodtom]

Surely everyone tried to produce more engines than there were aircraft to receive them, if at all possible.
You had to have spares. It's a lot quicker to replace a engine than overhaul it.

 

[Shortround6]

Surely everyone tried to produce more engines than there were aircraft to receive them, if at all possible.
You had to have spares. It's a lot quicker to replace a engine than overhaul it.

50% extra engines (or the equivalent in spare parts) was a pretty standard allowance. The US tried for 20-25% spare Merlins for the P-40Fs and Ls used in North Africa and got caught badly. The lower air intake on the Merlin ingested more dust/sand than the Allison and neither engine on the P-40 had a good sand/dirt filter. The British gave the US about 600 used Merlins to be broken down for parts to assist the overhaul program in North Africa.

 

[fastmongrel]

Now add two more: as the U.S. PT boats were powered by three of those...

Imagine the racket below decks when full speed ahead

 

[stona]

At one point in the middle of WW II England had almost 3000 Merlins in store. Did they scrap them or put them aside for later models?
Or did airframe construction catch up with engine production.
Source for the 3000 Merlins is "Planning in Wartime" by Sir Alec Cairncross.

I'll have to dig out my battered copy of Cairncross, but I'm surprised by that figure. Is it actually engines in hand or orders in hand? Rolls Royce operated with a six or eight month carry over period at various times. If, say, the Air Ministry/MAP wanted 500 engines a month, then on an eight month carry over the firm would require orders in hand for 4,000 engines. In the early war period Rolls Royce sought clarification and confirmation that such figures would be required before it was prepared to invest, for example, in the second section of the Crewe factory and an extension at Derby.
Cheers
Steve

 

[gjs238]

Imagine the racket below decks when full speed ahead

Music

 

[drgondog]

The delivery schedule by Packard on the 1650-3 was behind the airframe construction of NAA. The XP-51B first flight was delayed almost 45 days, and subsequently approximately 40-50 P-51B-1-NA's were completed in April, 1944 but not ready to fly because Packard deliveries had not ramped to meet NAA production as yet.

The combined delayed delivery of the first several 1650-3 also had an impact on a.) detecting a cooling system issue clogging the radiator, and b.) subsequent schedules for AAF acceptance and delivery to ETO by perhaps 45 days.

 

[Shortround6]

I'll have to dig out my battered copy of Cairncross, but I'm surprised by that figure. Is it actually engines in hand or orders in hand?

The passage is on Page 83 and is subject to a bit of interpretation I am afraid.

" In the meantime a large stock of Merlin 28s had accumulated in the United Kingdom in 1941-42, 3000 were delivered before the 1st Lancaster III flew at the end of 1942. These engines had been arriving since September 1941 but it was not until nine months later, in June 1942, that MAP suddenly discovered that they could not be fitted to power plants for lack of certain engine accessories known as DIS(B) items (mainly pumps and drives) which had not been put on order along with the engines. The discovery came at a time when the programme provided for the installation of 1600 Merlin 28s by the end of 1942"

It goes on say Rolls Royce made a great effort to supply 1000 sets using British components and 800 of these sets were finished by the end of the year.

How many Merlin 28s were actually on hand at any given time I don't know, my apologies.

 

[stona]

The passage is on Page 83 and is subject to a bit of interpretation I am afraid.

It does, but I agree that it implies a significant number of engines were waiting to be fitted to the relevant air frames.

To put whatever the number was in context, the British aero engine industry (not just RR) produced 36,578 engines of all types in 1941.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

I've dug out my copy and I think when reading the entire text under the heading 'Delay in Fitting Packard Merlins' the situation is explained.
It is important to know that the Lancaster was the only British built aircraft to which Packard built engines were fitted in any numbers during this period.

"In the meantime a large stock of Merlin 28s had accumulated in the United Kingdom in 1941-42; 3000 were delivered before the first Lancaster III flew at the end of 1942. These engines had been arriving since September 1941 but it was not until nine months later, in June 1942, that MAP suddenly discovered that they could not be fitted to power plants for lack of certain engine accessories known as DIS(B) items (mainly pumps and drives) which had not been put on order along with the engines. The discovery came at a time when the programme provided for the installation of 1600 Merlin 28s by the end of 1942. There was no possibility of receiving deliveries in time from the United States but Rolls Royce made a great effort to supply 1000 sets using British components and succeeded in reaching a total of 800 by the end of the year.
The delay in fitting Merlin 28s made it necessary to go on fitting Rolls Royce Merlins until near the end of 1942. That we were able to find engines for the Lancaster in 1942 in spite of these difficulties was attributable to the rapid expansion in production at the new factories making Merlin engines at Ford in Manchester and at Hillingdon in Glasgow. Between the first quarter and the last in 1942 output rose from 1500 a month to nearly 2000. But with the continuing rise in Lancaster production in 1943 it was vital to draw on the supply of American engines from the beginning of the year, and this we were able to do.
For the moment we had a stock of Merlin 28s that could be drawn upon for Lancaster production in 1943. But the bomber programme was still expanding and there were doubts whether engine capacity was sufficient. The demand for Merlins came from four different countries - the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia - and five, possibly six, different aircraft - the British Lancaster, the American Mustang, the Canadian Mosquito and Lancaster, the Australian Mosquito and possibly also the British Mustang. The demand was for one-stage and two-stage engines with no certainty as to the date of introduction of the aircraft using the two-stage engine or as to the timetable for the changeover from one engine to another."

So, the British planned to fit 1600 Merlin 28s by the end of 1942, but the failure to order American parts to go with the engines and Rolls Royce's ability to provide only 800 such kits left a shortfall of 800 engines which was made up by British production. This still left a handy reserve of American Merlin 28s which would help to alleviate the fears for engine supply for the Lancaster III in 1943.
To put the number of 3000 Merlins into further perspective, it represents about 6 weeks late 1942 production from the British engine plants. In the grand scheme it is not a very large number of engines, and at least 800 were in any case used by the end of 1942.
The lead in time for fitting the American engines is surprisingly long. It was nine months between the first engines arriving in the UK and someone realising that they could not be fitted in the Lancaster, but this implies that the engine and air frame programmes for the type had somehow managed to get out of step and (from personal experience of different types of projects) some unjustified assumptions may have been made.
Professor John Jewkes, the Oxford economist who served in the Aircraft Scheduling Unit during the war commented that the United States was too often treated as "a shop to be entered at any time" rather than "as a farm to be harvested."

It is certainly not the case that at any time the British were 'sitting' on 3000 Packard built Merlins. Eventually all these engines found their way into Lancaster production.

Cairncross wrote that what stood out in his memory from his time at MAP was "first and foremost the incessant uncertainty and confusion." It was the men like him that managed that uncertainty and confusion that provided the aircraft with which the war was prosecuted. Mistakes were of course made, but over all they did a pretty good job.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you.

The US may have had similar problems in long range planning. How many aircraft programs ran late or were canceled (or individual contracts canceled while other contracts for the same planes were completed) while engine makers kept fulfilling their contracts.
Engines were government furnished equipment and not ordered (or paid for) by the airplane companies. In only a few cases were airplane makers held up by a shortage of engines and then it was only for a few weeks at a time. It was not chronic like in some other countries.
In regards to the R-2800 and the P-47, while the total of 592 planes is correct for 1942 that includes the first 10 planes from the Evansville plant and 6 P-47Gs from Curtiss. Both orders were placed in Jan of 1941 with 1050 ordered from Evansville and 354 from Curtiss. Construction on the Evansville plant didn't start until March and the first P-47 was being test flown Sept 19, 4 days before the plant is declared completed (how many parts came form parent factory?) Curtiss rolls out it's first P-47G in Oct. Curtiss goes on to make a hash out of P-47 production.
They couldn't wait to see how fast (or slow) factory construction would be or even exactly which aircraft programs would be chosen when building and equipping the engine factories. Buick, Chevrolet and Studebaker had all been brought into aircraft engine production in the fall of 1940 after FDRs speech announcing a goal of 50,000 aircraft per year, in addition to Ford and Packard, Nash wasn't far behind. Dodge joined later making engines for B-29s. The US made roughly 10 times the engines in 1943 that it made in 1940. With such a rapid increase in production it is no doubt that mistakes in scheduling were made but it is highly unlikely that hundreds let alone thousands of defective engines were built that were scrapped before being used.

 

[stona]

The British adopted a central planning policy early on, but nonetheless there were many parties with vested interests. As Jewkes remarked after his first year at MAP, aircraft production since the war began was run by,
"quack efficiency experts, broken down businessmen and temperamental Air Marshals."
At least everyone agreed that any efficient planning of aircraft production had to be coordinated with the aero engine production programme(s)
Cheers
Steve

 

[airminded88]

The delivery schedule by Packard on the 1650-3 was behind the airframe construction of NAA. The XP-51B first flight was delayed almost 45 days, and subsequently approximately 40-50 P-51B-1-NA's were completed in April, 1944 but not ready to fly because Packard deliveries had not ramped to meet NAA production as yet.

The combined delayed delivery of the first several 1650-3 also had an impact on a.) detecting a cooling system issue clogging the radiator, and b.) subsequent schedules for AAF acceptance and delivery to ETO by perhaps 45 days.

Did Packard get penalized in any way for the delay given the urgency to bolster the 8th AF with longer ranged fighters?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

"Engines were government furnished equipment and not ordered (or paid for) by the airplane companies."

Please remember this folks.

 

[gjs238]

Did Packard get penalized in any way for the delay given the urgency to bolster the 8th AF with longer ranged fighters?

It's not Packard's fault that the customer neglected to order the necessary DIS(B) items.

 

[Shortround6]

Did Packard get penalized in any way for the delay given the urgency to bolster the 8th AF with longer ranged fighters?

It would depend on the contract wording.

Packard had made 850 engines in both Dec 1942 and Jan 1943 and 864 engines in Feb, these were all single stage engines.
March saw only 615 single stage engines and 3 two stage engines.
April saw 607 single stage and 1 two stage.
May saw 1222 single stage engines and 16 two stage.
June was 1002 and 56
July was 1142 and 184
Aug was 964 and 371.
The Original contract not only called for 9000 engines, it called for 800 a month once production reached full capacity. In 1942 Packard had 5 months in a row of 800 engines a month.
The original contract was completed about the end of Feb 1943.
follow on contracts had been placed before the first was completed and required plant expansion.
Since a lot of the machine tools were also controlled by the government, failure of the Government to supply needed machine tools on time (or even to supply structural steel for the building) could mean that Packard might be held blameless for delays of certain time length.
AS long as a company delivered engines (or air-frames) according to a previously agreed schedule it could not be penalized for a change in the tactical or strategic situation that made faster deliverers desirable.
Failure to meet agreed to schedule might result in penalties. But change overs from one version to another often meant a drop in production. The actual drop was much harder to predict and was allowed for in planning, or at least attempts to allow for it were made.
In 1944 Packard sometimes built over 2000 engines a month. Peak production was Aug of 1944 with 737 single stage engines and 2017 two stage engines.

 

[Hickam Field]

My submission would be the IL-2. Reason being that for a designated ground attack/support aircraft, it's ordinance capacity though historically adequate, was unimpressive compared to other a/c of the same role. The Typhoons, Fw-190F's and G's, Corsairs, and Thunderbolts all carried equal or heavier bomb/rocket loads than the VVS poster child.... Not to mention that those other a/c had solid single engine fighter characteristics as well.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Vis the R-2800, The -5 was the initial production model of the R-2800. About 1450 were produced. The -5 production was slated to equip the B-26 program, but did not produce the promised power output. R-2800-5 engines equipped all 201 B-26 "straights", 30 of the B-26As, and 307 of the initial run of B-26Bs. So nearly 1100 were initial equipment, plus ca 50% spares. As the uprated -41 and -43 became available, these were retrofitted to just over 200 of the initial contract B-26Bs and were standard on the B-26B-2 and beyond. The excess -5s were undoubtedly not scrapped, but used as replacements for the earlier model aircraft. B-26 "straights" were still in combat as late as January of 1944, and B-26As and Bs continued to be used in training until the end of the war.

 

[gjs238]

Vis the R-2800, The -5 was the initial production model of the R-2800. About 1450 were produced. The -5 production was slated to equip the B-26 program, but did not produce the promised power output. R-2800-5 engines equipped all 201 B-26 "straights", 30 of the B-26As, and 307 of the initial run of B-26Bs. So nearly 1100 were initial equipment, plus ca 50% spares. As the uprated -41 and -43 became available, these were retrofitted to just over 200 of the initial contract B-26Bs and were standard on the B-26B-2 and beyond. The excess -5s were undoubtedly not scrapped, but used as replacements for the earlier model aircraft. B-26 "straights" were still in combat as late as January of 1944, and B-26As and Bs continued to be used in training until the end of the war.

Could the subpar performance of the -5 have contributed to the infamous issues of the B-26 "straights"?
Might have the B-26 "straights" had less issues if the engines had performed as intended?

 

[Greg Boeser]

The design originally envisioned a more powerful engine. The -5 was all that was available when production started. The -43 was not a big improvement, so the whole B-26 program was always saddled with underpowered engines. That's a factor in aircraft development. You can't use what's not available. Then once production is in full swing, its hard to make major changes.
The B-26 involved so many untried systems that its not surprising that the early versions had a lot of issues. The Curtiss Electric prop was notorious for failing at high power.
The biggest problem was the flood of inexperienced pilots stuffed into them right out of flight school.
The 22nd BG and 28th BG, manned by crews trained prewar that flew them in action loved them. They were fast enough to outrun Zeroes, something the B-25 could not do.
The 22nd lost only a handful to fighters while flying the B-26, never more than one on a given mission, the 3rd BG flying B-25s at the same time lost five on one mission alone.