MOST OVERRATED AIRCRAFT OF WWII

[LisaM]

Ok lets get started on the P-38, bit by bit.

First the astonishing inability of Lockheed to upgrade the cooling system (inc intercoolers) to deal wth the greater power developed by Allison.

This meant the performance was officialy fixed across multiple models:
"The maximum speed and climb performance of the various P-38 models is, however, something of a mystery. Although rated takeoff power from the XP-38 through the P-38H increased from 1150 bhp to 1425 bhp the Tactical Planning Charts issued by Wright Field show all variants with a similar speed. Closer examination of the charts will reveal that all P-38 powerplants, through the H model, are limited to 1150-1240 bhp, due to "inadequate cooling." "
The P-38 Lightning

Now can you imagine if Suprmarine, Republic, DH, NA (etc) had said "ok you have upgraded engines but because we cannot be bothered to upgrade the cooling system so you can't use the perfomance"? Heads would have rolled but somehow Lockheed got a pass on that.

Now this, plus the extreme (and unnecessary) complexity of the controls was probably the major factor in the incredible engine unreiability suffered when in service in the 8th. What happened was many undid the stops on the throttle/boost controls and blew their engines up through overheating. That makes much more sense that the claim that the 'low' temps seperated the lead from the fuel, because the P-38 suffered from excessive temps, not too low ones. Amazingly other planes with much hgher intercolooling didn't suffer from this.

Even without this unofficial tweeking they were easy engines to blow because of poor controls and cooling (not Allison's fault):
"As a typical case to demonstrate my point, let us assume that we have a pilot fresh out of flying school with about a total of twenty-five hours in a P-38, starting out on a combat mission. He is on a deep ramrod, penetration and target support to maximum endurance. He is cruising along with his power set at maximum economy. He is pulling 31" Hg and 2100 RPM. He is auto lean and running on external tanks. His gun heater is off to relieve the load on his generator, which frequently gives out (under sustained heavy load). His sight is off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch may or may not be on. Flying along in this condition, he suddenly gets "bounced", what to do flashes through his mind. He must turn, he must increase power and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main. So, he reaches down and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches {valves} to main - turns on his drop tank switches, presses his release button, puts the mixture to auto rich (two separate and clumsy operations), increases his RPM, increases his manifold pressure, turns on his gun heater switch (which he must feel for and cannot possibly see), turns on his combat switch and he is ready to fight.

At this point, he has probably been shot down or he has done one of several things wrong.

Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before increasing RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure. Or, he forgets to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive cylinder head temperature with subsequent engine failure."

"The large number of engine failures deep inside enemy airspace exacerbated the problem, and the aggregate exchange rate, accidents inclusive, dropped to about 1:1.5 in favour of the Lightning by 1944.".
Now that is the claims/loss rate, given the usual 2:1, or 3:1 overclaiming rate P-38s were dying in larger numbers than they were killing

"To aggravate these problems, inadequate cockpit heating resulted in severe pilot frostbite, while the Luftwaffe quickly learned about the compressibility problems in dives, with German pilots evading the P-38s by executing a split-S at high speed. The initial roll rate was not spectacular and the easily recognized planform provided the Luftwaffe with yet another advantage to play."

"Poor serviceability and engine problems meant that initially 50 or less aircraft were available for such missions, including the first escorts over Berlin"
Der Gabelschwanz Teufel - Assessing the Lockheed P-38 Lightning

Then the miserable mach limit, a problem right from the beginning:
"The XP-38 airframe proposal carried 400 USG of fuel internally, employed a near to symmetrical NACA 23016/4412 section and grossed out at 11,400 lb. Designed for 1,150 HP engines, the Model 22 was built to exceed 360 kts at altitude, stunning performance for the time. Johnson had at the time commented in detail on the possibility of compressibility affecting the handling of the aircraft, this was later to prove to be a major issue."

"The 322 (RAF version) had by that time also demonstrated problems due compressibility in dives which caused 'Mach tuck', a severe nose down pitching moment due to the aft of the CoP. This often led to the breakup of the aircraft and usually, loss of the pilot".

Now the P-47 also had a poor mach limit (though better than the P -38) but you had a better chance of survival in it provided the pilot had enough altitude and kept their head until a lower altitude was reached. The problem was the difference between the max level speed, lawn dart speed and 'tear the plane to shreds' speed were much too close in the P-38.

Now the eventually fitted dive recovery flaps saved a lot of iives, not because they improved the mach limit by much (they didn't) but, provided there was enough altitude, they alowed a gentle pull out that didn't overstress the airframe.

So there are two major long known about problems that Lockheed took ages to alleviate, with the third, control complexity, never fixed.

 

[GrauGeist]

...the only US fighter in production before the start of the war and to remain in production till the end.

Don't forget that the last Wildcat was delivered in August of '45.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Ok lets get started on the P-38, bit by bit.

First the astonishing inability of Lockheed to upgrade the cooling system (inc intercoolers) to deal wth the greater power developed by Allison.

This meant the performance was officialy fixed across multiple models:
"The maximum speed and climb performance of the various P-38 models is, however, something of a mystery. Although rated takeoff power from the XP-38 through the P-38H increased from 1150 bhp to 1425 bhp the Tactical Planning Charts issued by Wright Field show all variants with a similar speed. Closer examination of the charts will reveal that all P-38 powerplants, through the H model, are limited to 1150-1240 bhp, due to "inadequate cooling." "
The P-38 Lightning

Now can you imagine if Suprmarine, Republic, DH, NA (etc) had said "ok you have upgraded engines but because we cannot be bothered to upgrade the cooling system so you can't use the perfomance"? Heads would have rolled but somehow Lockheed got a pass on that.

You make this very simplistic - Lockheed couldn't just go out uncontracted and start doing modifications, all modifications were approved by Wright Patterson and during this period all this took time. If you look at the time line between the first contracts, when early issues were discovered and when fixes were implemented and bounce this against when the US entered the war, things moved relatively quickly after that.

Now this, plus the extreme (and unnecessary) complexity of the controls was probably the major factor in the incredible engine unreiability suffered when in service in the 8th. What happened was many undid the stops on the throttle/boost controls and blew their engines up through overheating. That makes much more sense that the claim that the 'low' temps seperated the lead from the fuel, because the P-38 suffered from excessive temps, not too low ones. Amazingly other planes with much higher intercolooling didn't suffer from this.

How about the PTO? ETO?

"As a typical case to demonstrate my point, let us assume that we have a pilot fresh out of flying school with about a total of twenty-five hours in a P-38, starting out on a combat mission. He is on a deep ramrod, penetration and target support to maximum endurance. He is cruising along with his power set at maximum economy. He is pulling 31" Hg and 2100 RPM. He is auto lean and running on external tanks. His gun heater is off to relieve the load on his generator, which frequently gives out (under sustained heavy load). His sight is off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch may or may not be on. Flying along in this condition, he suddenly gets "bounced", what to do flashes through his mind. He must turn, he must increase power and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main. So, he reaches down and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches {valves} to main - turns on his drop tank switches, presses his release button, puts the mixture to auto rich (two separate and clumsy operations), increases his RPM, increases his manifold pressure, turns on his gun heater switch (which he must feel for and cannot possibly see), turns on his combat switch and he is ready to fight.

At this point, he has probably been shot down or he has done one of several things wrong.

Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before increasing RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure. Or, he forgets to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive cylinder head temperature with subsequent engine failure."

"The large number of engine failures deep inside enemy airspace exacerbated the problem, and the aggregate exchange rate, accidents inclusive, dropped to about 1:1.5 in favour of the Lightning by 1944.".

You're now quoting the memo from Col Rau, how novel! That memo been beat to death throughout this forum and mentioned two posts ago. 3/4 of what Rau said "Could have" been addressed with better multi engine training stateside. There were other comments that were either half-true or not true.

Now that is the claims/loss rate, given the usual 2:1, or 3:1 overclaiming rate P-38s were dying in larger numbers than they were killing

Your reference for that? Again PTO???? If you do some research you'll find the ACTUAL kill/ loss rate form the P-38 in the ETO was something closer to 1:1.

"To aggravate these problems, inadequate cockpit heating resulted in severe pilot frostbite,

The initial heating system was ACCEPTED by the air corps during the delivery of the first YP-38 prototypes. There was no plans to fight a war in Europe, in the winter at high altitudes, that simple. Once given the go-ahead by Wright Patterson, Lockheed modified the heating system and the P-38J had no such issues.

Kind of funny though - early P-38s fought over the Aleutians - no issues from Alaska!!!

while the Luftwaffe quickly learned about the compressibility problems in dives, with German pilots evading the P-38s by executing a split-S at high speed. The initial roll rate was not spectacular and the easily recognized planform provided the Luftwaffe with yet another advantage to play."

True, no argument there

"Poor serviceability and engine problems meant that initially 50 or less aircraft were available for such missions, including the first escorts over Berlin"

Der Gabelschwanz Teufel - Assessing the Lockheed P-38 Lightning[/quote]

50 aircraft out of how many being operated by the unit? Do you have info on these issues?The reference your trying gives no specifics for this as well

Then the miserable mach limit, a problem right from the beginning:
"The XP-38 airframe proposal carried 400 USG of fuel internally, employed a near to symmetrical NACA 23016/4412 section and grossed out at 11,400 lb. Designed for 1,150 HP engines, the Model 22 was built to exceed 360 kts at altitude, stunning performance for the time. Johnson had at the time commented in detail on the possibility of compressibility affecting the handling of the aircraft, this was later to prove to be a major issue."

"The 322 (RAF version) had by that time also demonstrated problems due compressibility in dives which caused 'Mach tuck', a severe nose down pitching moment due to the aft of the CoP. This often led to the breakup of the aircraft and usually, loss of the pilot".

Now the P-47 also had a poor mach limit (though better than the P -38) but you had a better chance of survival in it provided the pilot had enough altitude and kept their head until a lower altitude was reached. The problem was the difference between the max level speed, lawn dart speed and 'tear the plane to shreds' speed were much too close in the P-38.

Now the eventually fitted dive recovery flaps saved a lot of iives, not because they improved the mach limit by much (they didn't) but, provided there was enough altitude, they alowed a gentle pull out that didn't overstress the airframe.

So there are two major long known about problems that Lockheed took ages to alleviate, with the third, control complexity, never fixed.

And the P-38 was the FIRST aircraft to encounter compressibility, something that no aircraft company had known to exist prior, and again hind sight is always 20-20 of what should have been done. The P-38 was a ground breaker despite it's problems - yes it had issues but the ETO was not it's only theater of operation, something you seem to be conveniently ignoring.

Kind of funny though - the site you use as a reference has this quote in the middle of the assessment -

"The P-38 was without doubt the strategically most important American fighter of World War II."

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Don't forget that the last Wildcat was delivered in August of '45.

I believe the last FM-2s were built in early August of 1945. The P-38 production line stopped during the last weeks of august 1945 IIRC. That meant the P-38 was in production from July 1939 through Late August 1945 (XP-38 first flew January 1939) although the production line first moved at a snail's pace. The F4F was produced from mid 1940, I think the first deliveries were made in December 1940

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Lisa - since you liked that site sooo much, here's another piece that you neglected to post.

"The quality of multi-engine training during World War II bordered on the ridiculous. I am convinced that with training methods now in use we could take most of civilian private pilots who might be about to fly the Aztec or Cessna 310, and in ten hours, have a more confident pilot than the ones who flew off to war in the P-38. A P-38 pilot usually got his training in two ways. The first way, of course, was twin-engine advanced training in Curtiss AT-9s, which had the unhappy feature of having propellers you couldn't feather. After sixty hours of this, the student received ten hours of AT-6 gunnery, although he might get his gunnery training in the AT-9, since AT-6s were in short supply."

"At this point he had his chance to fly the RP-322 for another twenty hours. The 322, as you know, was the British version of the airplane, and they came with assorted equipment and things on them that nobody could predict. Upon graduation from the RP-322 he was assigned to a P-38 Replacement Training Unit (RTU) or an Operational Training Unit (OTU) for 100 hours or more of fighter training. A second way to get into the P-38 was to transition from single engine fighters. In this event, someone probably took him up in a multi-engine transport or bomber and demonstrated engine shutdown a couple of times after skimming the tech order, a blindfold check, and then Ignoring the check list (not for real fighter pilots!), he blasted off. More than one neophyte has described his first "launch" in a P-38 as being hit in the ass with a snow shovel."

"Either method of training, probably, made little difference as neither guy knew that much about multi-engine operations and procedures. True, he had been warned about the magic number of 120 miles per hour his Vme (editor:Vmca) or single-engine control speed. He had swam in glue during a couple of prop featherings while in formation with his instructor. He was, also, warned never to turn into a dead engine, never put down the gear until he had made the field, and never to go around with one caged. That was about it until shortly thereafter the old Allison time bomb blew up, and he was in business the hard way. Right on takeoff. "Some people lucked out if the runway was long enough. Some overshot or undershot and they bent the whole thing. Some tried a single-engine go-around anyway, usually with horrible results. Such happenings would make a son of a bitch out of any saint."

"Tony Levier's spectacular demonstrations were an attempt to rectify all these problems, but the damage had been done. The Air Corps, as far as I knew, never did change its pilot training."

"For perspective, it must also be remembered that two other significant events had taken place in training (in England). Theater indoctrination at Goxhill in England had received the same overhaul that had occurred in the States. The most important of all may have been the training units set up by the combat organizations themselves. Here it was possible to up-date training to the latest information and for individual commanders to put their special stamp on things and develop new tactics. "But and this is giant towering BUT this was all for the P-51 pilots."

"What would have happened if the P-38 pilots and their units could have been blessed with the same wonderful opportunity?"

And from this site you used...

The P-38 Lightning

The P-38 Lightning turned out to be a real "work horse" for the USAAF. It served around the world as a fighter, fighter-bomber, and photographic/ reconnaissance aircraft and will always be considered one of three great USAAF fighters of World War II.

 

[GrauGeist]

...Then the miserable mach limit, a problem right from the beginning:
"The XP-38 airframe proposal carried 400 USG of fuel internally, employed a near to symmetrical NACA 23016/4412 section and grossed out at 11,400 lb. Designed for 1,150 HP engines, the Model 22 was built to exceed 360 kts at altitude, stunning performance for the time. Johnson had at the time commented in detail on the possibility of compressibility affecting the handling of the aircraft, this was later to prove to be a major issue."

"The 322 (RAF version) had by that time also demonstrated problems due compressibility in dives which caused 'Mach tuck', a severe nose down pitching moment due to the aft of the CoP. This often led to the breakup of the aircraft and usually, loss of the pilot".

Now the P-47 also had a poor mach limit (though better than the P -38) but you had a better chance of survival in it provided the pilot had enough altitude and kept their head until a lower altitude was reached. The problem was the difference between the max level speed, lawn dart speed and 'tear the plane to shreds' speed were much too close in the P-38.

Now the eventually fitted dive recovery flaps saved a lot of iives, not because they improved the mach limit by much (they didn't) but, provided there was enough altitude, they alowed a gentle pull out that didn't overstress the airframe.

The P-38 cannot be condemned for it's "miserable mach limit" as all airframes by all nations during the war, possesed a "miserable mach limit".

As Joe mentioned, the P-38 was advanced enough that it was one of the first to realize that there was, in fact, a mach limit.

So going by this allegation, ALL aircraft of WWII had these same limitations.

And as rugged as the P-47 was, if there wasn't enough altitude for the pilot to effect a pull out, it would become a massive lawn dart, and there's plenty of accounts where this happened.

The same goes for the Soviet aircraft and what's worse, was that in a terminal dive, control surfaces would tear away on types like the YaK-1, sealing the pilot's fate.

The Me262 suffered compressibility and would enter a "mach tuck" (nose down tendency) and if the pilot had enough strength and altitude, could push the stick foreward in an attempt to save the aircraft. Several pilots weren't able to.

So in a nutshell, any aircraft has it's safe-to-operate limits and none are exempt from overspeed.

 

[stona]

The P-38 cannot be condemned for it's "miserable mach limit" as all airframes by all nations during the war, possesed a "miserable mach limit".

That's all relative. Several others had lower critical Mach numbers of 0.8 + (I'm not entering a debate about the +). That's a lot better than the P-38.
I read or heard somewhere that the P-38 suffered fewer losses due to compressibility issues than either the P-47 or P-51. Does anyone one have comparative figures to confirm or deny this?
Cheers
Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

The P-38 have had bad Mach limit, worse than P-47, much worse than P-51 or Spitfire.
More on that topic: link

On the other hand, main shortcoming was that there was not enough of them (no second source, or that Lockheed at Burbank wasn't made P-38-only factory once they received both European and US orders).

 

[LisaM]

Well Calos Kopp has a reputation for being brilliant at colecting data...then drawing totally the wrong conclusions...he liked the F-22 for example. To claim the P-38 was "strategically most important American fighter" is nonsense. the P-47, the P-51, Wildcat, Dakota, B-24, etc, etc, yes you can make good arguments for all of them. but not the P-38 (I pick the VLR B-24 as the single greatest strategic contribution by the way)..

If the P-38 had not been available then maybe efforts to increase the P-47's range and P-51's availability would have been greater? Maybe the Merlin XX Mustang would have got up? Quicker drop tanks for the P-47? On that basis it was a strategic liability because it slowed down taking the correct actions until the 8th realised it was a dud..

To survive in the ETO you needed a tactical mach limit of 0.75-0.8. You also needed a gentle transition to warn the pilot. The P-51 showed mach efffects at about 0.75, as did the 109 and 190, but there was enough margin to the limit of 0.8 to warn the pilot and they could push it when needed.. The P-38 was abrupt and its absolute limit of 0.68 was far too low to be compettitive, or even just safe..

Back to the cooling, how come NO other aircraft manufacturer had issues with it when they increased their power? Hurrcane 1,000 bhp to about 1,400 no issues. Spit 1,000 to over 2,000 no issues, Mustang, P-47, P-40, etc, etc, etc.

Lockheed...years to fix it pumping out a sub-standrd crippled plane.

"Here's the Spit IX, but we didn't increase the cooling so it still has the same performance as a Spit V". Yeh how well would that have gone down?

And there was a lot Lockheed could have done to improve it if they had actually listened to real world experience. The primary thing was to make it far simpler to fly with far better controls, interconnected throttle/boost for example so a pilot could just firewall it without blowing up an engine. How hard woud that have to be?. That and others would have meant a lot more pilots gettng more out of it and not blowing it up...and surviving.

So there was something wrong at Lockheed in their attitude and somehow they got a pass from the various authorities that no other manufacturer would have been allowed. It never would have been a great plane, but it could have been a lot better with a bit of thought and effort..Though I'd still argue that it should never have been used at all anywhere, because it delayed the introduction of far better alternatives. The British tests on the 322 should have been a real wake up call.

 

[tomo pauk]

To be fair, engine cooling was without problems at P-38, it was intercooling that was problematic. The users of BMW 801, DB 605, Ha 40, Sabre, Homare, R-3350 would've given their 1st born for having engine reliability of P-38s V-1710.

P-38 have had it's share of problems, but it was not a cripled airplane.

Before we talk about how great P-47 was (it was), let's recall that P-47B was so bad that never left the continental US - USAF have had it's 'Typhoon' (a potential worldbeater, but initially a dangerous fighter for it's pilots, with desintegrating airframe), fortunately for the USAF pilots that was the case. The P-47C and early -D were with problems (radio, engine) that meant usefulnes was not achieved before April 1943, the workable drop tank were installed by June 1943, and the radius is still much worse than what P-38 was making. Let's also recal that P-47 was slated for production in 3 factories, once of them erected in record time in area were nobody produced aircraft before. P-38 have had no such luxury - having a second surce means easier introduction of modifications. Anybody recalls the slogan 'you can have more Spitfires, or better Spitfires, but not both more and better', despite multiple sources?
A work on P-38 does not take anything away from P-47, it is actually too bad that Republic didn't licensed the wing drop tank facility (and that USAF didn't insisted) from P-38 for P-47s as early as 1942.

The P-51 can't put the blame on the P-38 either, it was USAF that didn't jumped into opportunity for earlier, more and better Mustangs.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Once again Lisa you pick and choose what you want to make an issue out of...

Well Calos Kopp has a reputation for being brilliant at colecting data...then drawing totally the wrong conclusions...he liked the F-22 for example.

I like the F-22 AND The F-35, The F-22 is probably the most capable air-to-air combat aircraft in service today - how is this even relevant?

To claim the P-38 was "strategically most important American fighter" is nonsense. the P-47, the P-51, Wildcat, Dakota, B-24, etc, etc, yes you can make good arguments for all of them. but not the P-38 (I pick the VLR B-24 as the single greatest strategic contribution by the way)..

All a matter of opinion, I would have chosen the C-47 for all round aircraft and the P-51 for fighters, but his points far negate the P-38 from being considered the most over-rated fighter of WW2 or any where sub standard as you are trying so hard to show here.

If the P-38 had not been available then maybe efforts to increase the P-47's range and P-51's availability would have been greater? Maybe the Merlin XX Mustang would have got up? Quicker drop tanks for the P-47? On that basis it was a strategic liability because it slowed down taking the correct actions until the 8th realised it was a dud..

"Would have, could have should have." You have excellent 20-20 perspective. If you follow the gestation period of both the P-47 and P-51 you will find that there was no way possible to push them ahead in development and production and in the end there was no reason to. Once again you keep making comments about the 8th, but no mention of the 5th Air Force in the Pacific (You seem to have a lack of grasp that there was a shooting war going on on the other side of the world). The 5th AF couldn't get enough P-38s.

To survive in the ETO you needed a tactical mach limit of 0.75-0.8. You also needed a gentle transition to warn the pilot. The P-51 showed mach efffects at about 0.75, as did the 109 and 190, but there was enough margin to the limit of 0.8 to warn the pilot and they could push it when needed.. The P-38 was abrupt and its absolute limit of 0.68 was far too low to be compettitive, or even just safe.

And you came up with this how? Pilot reports? Flight Simulators? Video Games?

Back to the cooling, how come NO other aircraft manufacturer had issues with it when they increased their power? Hurrcane 1,000 bhp to about 1,400 no issues. Spit 1,000 to over 2,000 no issues, Mustang, P-47, P-40, etc, etc, etc.

Do you know that for certain?

"The first Spitfire to be sent overseas in large numbers was the Mk Vc (trop). The majority of these were used by Allied squadrons in the Mediterranean theatre (including North Africa), Burma and in Australia with No. 1 Fighter Wing RAAF. The Vc initially suffered a high rate of mechanical failure in Australia, due to corrosion in engine cooling pipes that were unfilled and exposed to salt air, while being shipped from the UK"

Alfred Price, Spitfire aces

I could list a laundry list of issues with ever top fighter aircraft built during WW2 when they first entered service

Lockheed...years to fix it pumping out a sub-standrd crippled plane.

Years? you need to learn how to read a calendar! The US Entered the war in December 1941. Issues with the P-38 were identified by mid 1942 and corrections started. the P-38J eliminated most of those early issues (Intercoolers, cockpit heating, etc.) and that entered service in August of 1943. Considering that a production line and other manufacturing commitments had to be supported, I'd say a little more than a year from the US entry into WW2 and about a year from the first P-38 combat operations was an excellent response!

"Here's the Spit IX, but we didn't increase the cooling so it still has the same performance as a Spit V". Yeh how well would that have gone down?

About the same as it did for the P-38

And there was a lot Lockheed could have done to improve it if they had actually listened to real world experience.

Once again you have no proof or basis for this comment, total rubbish - they did listen to "real world experience" and almost from the beginning of the war was improving an aircraft that was never intended to be placed in large scale production. There were tech reps all over the globe providing the factory with input, trouble reports and suggestions for improvements, and don't forget the tours by Tony LeVier and Charles Lindberg!!!

The primary thing was to make it far simpler to fly with far better controls, interconnected throttle/boost for example so a pilot could just firewall it without blowing up an engine. How hard woud that have to be?. That and others would have meant a lot more pilots gettng more out of it and not blowing it up...and surviving.

So there was something wrong at Lockheed in their attitude and somehow they got a pass from the various authorities that no other manufacturer would have been allowed. It never would have been a great plane, but it could have been a lot better with a bit of thought and effort..Though I'd still argue that it should never have been used at all anywhere, because it delayed the introduction of far better alternatives. The British tests on the 322 should have been a real wake up call.

I think you need a history and geography lesson. Your condemnation for this aircraft is based on the European experience(and even there many of your comments are just baseless - 322 experience! Bringing that up is almost laughable) but you continue to ignore how the aircraft performed in the MTO and PTO which tells me you're just naturally biased or just tying to be dumb on purpose. We could discuss the dismal showing to the Hurricane and Spitfire during the early stages of the war over Burma and Australia but yet by late 1942 early 1943, the sub standard and poorly designed P-38 took control of the skies over the south west Pacific and were just about slaughtering the Japanese from New Guinea to the Solomons, and Philippines . Were American Pilots Super human Pilots? Were Japanese fighters just junk? By ignoring this just shows how much tunnel vision you have and again I remind you that there were over 100 P-38 aces in the PTO.

So please Lisa, expand your horizons and do some more research as you're only telling half the story.

Oh and I'm also waiting to hear about your perspective on "Quality Issues" on the P-38 or for that matter any other aircraft...

 

[FLYBOYJ]

An honest ETO assessment from Joe Baugher

The story of the P-38 continues with an account of its service in the European theatre.

Having conducted service testing of the YP-38 in the late spring of 1941, the 1st Pursuit Group at Selfridge Field, Michigan was selected to become the first unit to receive P-38s and P-38Ds. The first Lightnings they received did not have their cannons fitted. The 1st Pursuit Group participated with some success in the Louisiana maneuvers of September 1941. Two days after Pearl Harbor, the Unit moved to NAS San Diego and joined the March Field-based 14th Pursuit Group, then transitioning to P-38D/P-38E. Although these fighters were not yet combat ready, these outfits had the only truly modern fighters then available to the USAAF, and provided West Coast defense at a time that Japanese attacks on the US mainland were believed to be imminent

Even though the defense of the US west coast initially took priority, plans were made in the spring of 1942 to deploy Lightning squadrons to Britain. This deployment caused logistical problems, since the U-boat menace made shipping across the Atlantic quite risky. However, development by Lockheed of reliable drop tanks for the P-38F-1-LO increased the ferry range from 1300 to 2200 miles. Test pilot Milo Burcham actually demonstrated a maximum range of over 3100 miles. This made it possible to ferry the Lightnings from Maine to the UK via Goose Bay, Labrador to Bluie West One (Greenland) to Reykjavik, Iceland and finally to Prestwick, Scotland. Following the victory at Midway, the USAAF felt sufficiently confident that the Japanese fleet was not about to show up off Santa Barbara that they decided to redeploy the 1st and 14th Fighter (renamed from Pursuit in May 1942) Groups to Britain. By August 1942, 81 P-38Fs of four of the six squadrons of the 1st and 14th Fighter Groups had arrived in Great Britain to complete the first transatlantic crossing by single-seat fighters. Two other Lightning squadrons (the 27th and the 50th) were held over in Iceland to assist the Curtiss P-40Cs of the 33rd Fighter Squadron in the flying of defensive patrols over the Atlantic. On August 14, 1942, a P-38F flown by 2nd Lieut Elza Shaham shared with a P-40C in the destruction of a Focke- Wulf FW-200C-3 to obtain the first victory over a Luftwaffe aircraft.

The P-38F-equipped 82nd Fighter Group arrived in Northern Ireland in November 1942.

After flying 347 practice and sweep sorties during which there was no contact with the Luftwaffe, the 1st, 14th and 82nd Fighter Groups were transferred to the 12th Air Force in North Africa. While in transit from Britain to Algeria, pilots of the 82nd Fighter Group were credited with the destruction of two Ju-88 bombers over the Bay of Biscay. The Lightnings were soon in regular combat in the North African theatre. The first of these took place on November 19, 1942 when the P-38Fs of the 1st Fighter Group escorted B-17s on a bombing raid on the El Aouina airfield at Tunis. The three P-38 groups contributed a great deal toward the establishment of local air superiority in the area. On April 5, 1943, 26 P-38Fs of the 82nd Fighter Group claimed the destruction of 31 enemy aircraft as against the loss of six Lightnings. In these air battles, mixed success was obtained Because of the tactics of the enemy, the Lightnings were forced to fight at lower altitudes of 15,000 feet, and in battles against fighters it was not entirely successful. The twin engines restricted maneuverability to some extent and the Lightning had a wheel control instead of the conventional stick, which may also have restricted maneuverability. Nevertheless, the Lightning was effective against bombers and had a sensational zoom climb that could rarely be matched. It wreaked great havoc among Rommel's air transport well out to sea, earning for itself the German nickname "der Gabelschwanz Teufel"--the Fork-Tailed Devil.

All Axis forces in the area surrendered on May 13, 1943, due in no small part to the contribution of the Lightning in cutting off Rommel's air supply route.

Already prior to the Axis defeat in Tunisia, the Northwest African Air Forces (of which the Twelfth Air Force was a component) had begun preparations for the invasion of Sicily. Attacks on Sicily, on Pantelleria and on Lampedusa were stepped up in preparation for Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily on July 10, 1943. Lightnings were in the midst of the fray until Sicily fell on August 17. The three P-38 Fighter Groups then concentrated their efforts against the Italian mainland. On November 1, 1943, they were transferred to the 15th Air Force. By that time, 37 Twelfth Air Force Lightning pilots had made ace, the top scorer being Lieut W. J. Sloan of the 82nd Fighter Group with 12 kills. Lieut H. T. Hanna of the 14th Fighter Group made ace in one day by destroying five Ju 87 dive bombers on October 9, 1943.

Following their transfer, the 1st, 14th and 82nd Fighter Groups concentrated on escorting the B-17 and B-24 bombers of the Fifteenth Air Force in their raids on targets in Austria, the Balkans, France, Greece, and Italy. However, on occasion, they escorted the medium bombers of the Twelfth Air Force.

The first Lightning-escorted raids on Germany began in February 1944 with raids on aircraft factories in the southern part of that country. In April 1944 the Lightnings escorted bombers in raids on the oil refineries at Ploesti in Rumania. Bomb-carrying Lightnings also visited Ploesti on June 10, 1944 when 46 aircraft of the 82nd Fighter Group each carrying 1000-pound bombs paid a visit to the Romano Americana Oil Refinery under the protective escort of 48 P-38s of the 1st Fighter Group. On that raid, good bombing and strafing results were obtained, but in fighter actions against the Luftwaffe twenty-two P-38s were lost against 23 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed.

Six weeks later, Lightnings flew their first shuttle mission to Russia and returned to their Italian base after spending three days at a Soviet base in the Ukraine. Along with their P-51 escorts, they shot down thirty German planes and destroyed twelve on the ground. The last Lightning shuttle mission was flown on August 4/6 and was marked by the daring rescue of a downed pilot by Lieut R. J. Andrews who landed his Lightning in an open field to pick up Capt R. E. Willsie.

The three Lightning Groups also took part in the August 1944 Allied landings in southern France. After that, they returned to providing fighter escort for bombers operating against strategic targets. By the end of the war, 28 of these Lightning pilots had made ace.

The departure of the 1st and 14th Fighter Groups for North Africa in November 1942 left the Eighth Air Force without Lightnings until September 1943, when the 55th Fighter Group arrived in England with its P-38Hs. It began combat operations on October 15, 1943, making its first kill on November 2. The next month, the outfit converted to P-38Js. On March 3, 1944, the 55th flew to Berlin for the first time, a round trip of 1300 miles. The 20th, 364th and 479th Fighter Groups soon became operational in England with P-38s.

However, in air combat over Germany, the Lightning was generally outclassed by the more maneuverable Fw 190 and the later marks of the Bf 109, especially at medium and low altitudes. However, the Lightning had a much faster top speed, a higher rate of climb and operational ceiling and was much better armed. Once pilots had perfected fighting tactics which suited the Lightning's unique characteristics, they had better success. The usual tactics was for the P-38 to climb to a high altitude and then dive down on the enemy, attacking him with a burst of firepower and then zoom back up out of harm's way.

The later versions of the P-38 were equipped with maneuvering flaps, and when their pilots learned how to use these flaps properly, the P-38 could hold its own when maneuvering against German fighters, often being able to turn inside their Fw 190 and Bf 109 opponents.

So I guess Lockheed DID listen to those in combat!!!!

The large size of the P-38 was both an advantage and a disadvantage in combat. The P-38 was quite large for a fighter, and Luftwaffe pilots could usually spot the Lockheed fighter at much larger distances than they could Allied single-engined fighters which were appreciably smaller. In addition, the twin-boomed configuration of the P-38 made it instantly recognizable to the enemy. However, this ease of recognition was not always a disadvantage--P-38s would often feel free to pursue Luftwaffe fighters right through Allied bomber formations with little fear of receiving friendly fire from the gunners.

The Allison engines of the Lightnings proved to be somewhat temperamental, with engine failures actually causing more problems than enemy action. It is estimated that every Lightning in England changed its engines at least once. Nevertheless, the ability of the Lightning to return home on one engine was exceptional and saved the life of the pilot of many a wounded Lightning. Experienced pilots could handle the Lightning satisfactorily at high altitude, but too many of the Eighth Air Force pilots did not have the training or experience to equip them for flying this temperamentally-powered aircraft in combat.

THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN THE CASE FOR ANY OTHER TWIN FIGHTER AS WELL!!!

The powerplant problems were not entirely the Allison engine's fault. Many of the reliability problems were actually due to the inadequate cooling system, in particular the cumbersome plumbing of the turbosupercharger intercooler ducting which directed air all way from the supercharger out to the wingtips and back. In addition, the lack of cowl flaps were a problem. In the European theatre of operation, temperatures at altitude were often less than 40 degrees below zero and the Lightning's engines would never get warmed up enough for the oil to be able to flow adequately. Octane and lead would separate out of the fuel at these low temperatures, causing the Allisons to eat valves with regularity, to backfire through the intercooler ducts, and to throw rods, sometimes causing the engine to catch fire.

These problems bedeviled the Lightnings until the advent of the J version with its simplified intercooler ducting and the relocation of the oil cooler to a chin position underneath the propeller spinner. When the P-38J reached the field, the Allison engine was finally able to attain its full rated power at altitude, and the engine failure rate began to go down.

Earlier Lightnings had problems with high-speed dives. When the airspeed reached a sufficiently high value, the controls would suddenly lock up and the Lightning would tuck its nose down, making recovery from the dive difficult. In the worst case, the wings of the Lightning could be ripped off if the speed got too high. This problem caused the Lightning often to be unable to follow its Luftwaffe opponents in a dive, causing many of the enemy to be able to escape unscathed. The problem was eventually traced to the formation of a shock wave over the wing as the Lightning reached transonic speeds, this shock wave causing the elevator to lose much of its effectiveness. The problem was not cured until the advent of the P-38J-25-LO, which introduced a set of compressibility flaps under the wing which changed the pattern of the shock wave over the wing when they were extended, restoring the function of the elevator.

The P-38J version of the Lightning cured many of the ills that had been suffered by the earlier versions of the Lockheed fighter, producing a truly world-class fighter which could mix it up with virtually any other fighter in the world.

In April 1944, the Lightnings of the 20th Fighter Group began low level fighter sweeps over the Continent. That same month, the 55th Fighter Group used the "Droop Snoot" P-38J for the first time as a leader for other Lightnings in a bombing raid on the Coulommiers airfield. Both types of operations proved successful, and these techniques were later used extensively by P-38s of the Ninth Air Force.

The P-38s of the Eighth Air Force were rapidly phased out of service in favor of P-51 Mustangs--The 20th, 55th, and 364th Fighter Groups converted to P-51s during July 1944, and in September the 479th Fighter Group traded in its P-38Js for P-51Ds.

The Ninth Air Force was assigned a tactical role (in contrast to the strategic role of the Eighth Air Force), and retained its P-38J/L fighters a bit longer. Its first Lightning group was the 474th, which flew its first combat mission on April 15, 1944. It was soon joined by the 367th and 370th Fighter Groups. However, in March of 1945 these two latter groups converted to P-47Ds and P-51Ds respectively. By V-E day the 474th was the only Fighter Group still operating P-38s.

More than one in eight Lightnings were either completed by Lockheed as photographic-reconnaissance aircraft or were so modified after delivery. Over 1400 F-5 and F-5 aircraft were delivered to the USAAF. Photographic Lightnings saw widespread service throughout the war. F-4s were first flown in combat beginning in November 1942. They were operated initially by the 5th and 12th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadrons. Later, these units and two other squadrons of the 3rd Photographic Reconnaissance Group operated various versions of the F-5. In the North African theatre, the 154th Reconnaissance Squadron obtained its photographic Lightnings when its maintenance personnel modified a number of P-38Fs in the field. The F-5-equipped 5th Photographic Reconnaissance Group was initially assigned to the Twelfth Air Force and became operational in September 1943. However it was transferred to the Fifteenth Air Force thirteen months later. In the European theatre, where the 3rd PRG had briefly been based before transfer to North Africa, the first operational sorties by photographic Lightnings was flown by F-4As of the 7th PRG on March 28, 1943. This group successively operated F-4As, F-5As, F-5Bs, F-5Cs, and finally, during the last year of the war, F-5Es. Operating initially from bases in England but later moving to the Continent, the Ninth Air Force had for Photographic Reconnaissance squadrons (the 30th, 32st, 33rd, and 34th), which flew various versions of the F-5 from the spring of 1944 until the end of the war.

The F-4/F-5s usually flew alone without fighter escort and in spite of heavy losses, especially when facing radar-controlled Luftwaffe fighters, they proved to be of unequalled value.

The Forces Aeriennes Francaises Libres also received photographic Lightnings. They operated as an attached squadron with the 3rd PRG of the Twelfth Air Force. One of their pilots was the well-known author Antoine de Saint-Exupery, who was lost off southern France on July 31, 1944 while on a combat sortie.

 

[Shortround6]

Ok lets get started on the P-38, bit by bit.

First the astonishing inability of Lockheed to upgrade the cooling system (inc intercoolers) to deal wth the greater power developed by Allison.

Ok there were two things going on here. one was cooling the engine it self. Late models got larger radiators for engine coolant. 2nd is the intercooler problem which had a number of aspects. Please note that Lockheed did not build the new model intercoolers used on the J and L models. It was supplied by an outside vendor and initially production was slow enough that H and J models were intermingled on the production line for several months as production of the new intercoolers got up to speed. I would also note that the Bell P-63 was supposed to have intercoolers but the supplier for model model intercooler failed completely to get into production with a suitable model.

Now this, plus the extreme (and unnecessary) complexity of the controls was probably the major factor in the incredible engine unreiability suffered when in service in the 8th. What happened was many undid the stops on the throttle/boost controls and blew their engines up through overheating. That makes much more sense that the claim that the 'low' temps seperated the lead from the fuel, because the P-38 suffered from excessive temps, not too low ones. Amazingly other planes with much hgher intercolooling didn't suffer from this.

Care to enlighten us on the extreme (and unnecessary) complexity of the engine controls?
I would also note that the P-38 actually saw very little service with the 8th Air Force in regards to the early models. The Became operational on Sept 16th 1942, fly their first escort mission on Oct 15th and on Oct 31 are pulled from operations to take part in the North Africa Campaign. P-38 fighters are not operational in Europe until almost year later, Oct 15th of 1943 at which point there are already 7 fighter groups using P-47s and P-51Bs are rolling out of the Factory at between 200 and 300 a month. Blaming Lockheed for failing to get the P-38 up European standards when the P-38 wasn't being used in Europe at the time seems more than a bit unfair.
You, of course, have proof that many of blown up engines were due to pilots/ground crew adjusting the throttle stops beyond factory recommendations?
In actual fact the P-38 intercoolers could overcool the intake charge at cruising speeds, even the early ones. The was made worse by the Army refusing to use the cruise settings recommended by both Allison and Lockheed. That is use low rpm and high boost (the high boost from the turbo would keep the intake charge warm/hot) and would reduce wear on the engine and increase range. The Army wanted the pilots to use high rpm and low boost, perhaps thinking that it would give them faster response if bounced. It didn't.
There was never a question of the lead separating out of the fuel but instead of certain heavy fuel compounds separating out. There had been a change in the fuel specification in early 1943 that allowed more of these heavy compounds to be used to stretch the fuel supply. This problem of seperation had been anticipated and Allison had been working on a new intake manifold to combat it from the spring of 1943. It went into production in the fall of 1943 but many P-38s built in the Fall didn't get it. Later ALL Allison engines got the new manifold regardless of supercharger type.

There are between 5 to 7 reasons for the "Allison time bomb" in the P-38, I would also note that the engines, turbos, turbo controllers were all government finished equipment and out of control of Lockheed.

More later

 

[FLYBOYJ]

And let's not forget the PTO as some tend to do!!!

The story of the Lightning continues with an account of its service in the Pacific.

The first lightnings to be deployed overseas in the Pacific theatre were the small number of P-38Ds and P-38Es which were rushed to Fairbanks and Anchorage for service with the Alaska Defense Command. However, these aircraft were not considered combat ready. These were soon replaced by P-38Es of the 54th Fighter Squadron which were modified by Lockheed to P-38F-1-LO standards with two drop tanks. Following the Japanese invasion of Kiska in June, 1942, the 54th Fighter Squadron was transferred to an airstrip at Ft Glenn on Umnak Island in the Aleutians. On August 4, two P-38 pilots, Lieutenants K. Ambrose and S. A. Long, shot town two four-engined Japanese H6K4 (code name *Mavis*) flying-boats to claim first blood for the Lightning. Later, during operations against Japanese-held Kiska, the Lightnings encountered opposition from Nakajima A6M2-N (code name *Rufe*) floatplane fighters. However, the Lightnings soon gained control of the air and by July 1943 the Japanese were forced to leave the Aleutians.

In the Aleutians, the initial batch of P-38Es of the 54th Fighter Squadron were supplanted by a specially-winterized version of the Lightning, the P-38G-10-LO. Later they acquired P-38Js. However, the Eleventh Air Force was never able to receive enough Lightnings fully to equip its 343rd Fighter Group. Three of its four squadrons flew a mix of P-38s and P-40s alongside the P-38 equipped 54th Fighter Squadron. The 343rd Fighter Group flew its Lightnings on fighter sweeps and escort sorties to the Kurile Islands up until V-J Day.

So much for the "heater problem" of the ETO!

In India, P-38Hs were first operated by the 459th Fighter Squadrons of the 80th Fighter Group in September 1943. This squadron later was equipped with P-38J/P-38Ls and kept them until the end of the war. The other three squadrons of this group flew P-40s and P-47s. The 449th Fighter Squadron of the 51st Fighter Group flew Lightnings in China while the group's other squadrons flew other types. The 33rd Fighter group in Burma flew a mixture of P-38s and P-47s.

The first P-38Fs to reach Australia during 1942 were assigned to the 39th Fighter Squadron of the 35th Fighter Group. This unit traded in its Bell Airacobras for the Lightnings at Amberley in Queensland before returning to combat operations at Port Moresby in Papua, New Guinea. Its first success took place on December 27, 1942 when its pilots claimed eleven kills for the loss of only one P-38F. Two of these kills were claimed by Richard I. Bong, who was to go on to claim a total of 40 kills, all of them while flying the Lightning.

The limited number of Lightnings available during late 1942 and early 1943 had to be used to make up attrition in the 39th Fighter Squadron and to equip only a single squadron in each of the 8th and 49th Fighter Groups of the Fifth Air Force in New Guinea, and of the 18th and 347th Fighter Groups of the Thirteenth Air Force on Guadalcanal.

During this time, two P-38Fs of the 6th Fighter Squadron of the 18th Fighter Group were equipped with radar as single seat night fighters operating from Henderson Field to curb the activities of "Bedcheck Charlie", a Japanese aircraft flying nuisance sorties over Gualdacanal at night.

Two P-38J-20-LO single-seat night fighters were fitted at Townville with AN/APS-4 radar in a pod under the starboard wing. These were operated during the winter of 1944-45 by the 547th Night Fighter Squadron. One of them, operating from Tacoban, Leyte, scored its first kill on January 9, 1945.

The Lightning was ideally suited for the Pacific theatre. It possessed a performance markedly superior to that of its Japanese opponents. It possessed a range significantly better than that of the P-39s, P-40s and P-47s available in 1942 in the Southwest Pacific, and its twin engines offered an additional safety factory when operating over long stretches of water and jungle. The Lightnings proved to be extremely rugged and could take a lot of battle damage and still keep flying. Missions lasting 9, 10, or even 12 hours became routine, and many wounded Lightnings were able to limp home on only one engine. The maneuverability of the Lightning was inferior to that of its nimble Japanese opponents, but by the use of appropriate tactics--for example the avoidance of dogfighting at low altitudes and the use of fast diving attacks--enabled the P-38 squadrons in New Guinea and the Solomons to achieve impressive results.

When compared with the Zero, the Lightning came off badly in terms of speed and maneuverability at medium and low altitudes, but had a far higher top speed, rate of climb and operational ceiling and was much better armed. When the P-38 tried to outturn a Zero at low altitudes, it usually ended up second best. However, when the unique attributes of the Lightning were used to best effect, the results were devastating. The best tactic was for the Lightnings to loiter at high altitudes and then dive down on Zero formations in a blaze of concentrated firepower, using the Lightning's impressive climbing rate to zoom back up out of harm's way. If this did not work, the wise Lightning Lightning pilot would then use his superior speed to make good his escape.

Spurred by these impressive results, the commanders of the Thirteenth Air Force kept pressing the USAAF for more Lightnings. Unfortunately, because lower priority had been given to the Pacific theatre once the initial Japanese thrust had been checked, the requests for more Lightnings went largely unheeded.

One of the most famous Lightning operations during these early months was the killing of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet of the Japanese Navy. U. S. Navy cryptographers had intercepted and decoded a Japanese communication which said that Admiral Yamamoto would be flying out to visit the Ballabe airfield on Shortland Island on April 18, 1943. The Thirteenth Air Force was ordered to attempt to intercept and destroy Yamamoto's aircraft. A consignment of 165 and 310 US gallon drop tanks were flown out especially for the operation. On the appointed day, sixteen P-38F/P-38Gs from the 18th and 347th Fighter Groups took off from Henderson Field, Guadalcanal and flew 500 miles to Shortland Island. They reached their target on schedule just as Yamamoto's flight was coming in. In the ensuing battle, two bomber-transports and at least five Japanese fighters were destroyed at the cost of the loss of one P-38. Captain Thomas Lanphier, Jr. was credited with downing the aircraft in which Admiral Yamamoto had been flying.

In August 1943, the first all-Lightning Fighter Group of the Fifth Air Force, the 475th, began combat operations. Later in the year, continuing shortage of P-38s forced both the 35th and 49th Fighter Groups to convert their single P-38 squadron to P-47Ds, thus leaving the Fifth Air Force at the end of 1943 with only four P-38 squadrons versus eight squadrons with P-47s and three with P-40s. At that time, the Eighth Air Force in England had six squadrons of P-38s and 27 squadrons of P-47s.

In the summer of 1944, the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces had been reorganized into the Far East Air Force in preparation for the invasion of the Philippines. By that time, the shortage of P-38s had been alleviated somewhat and there were five Fighter Groups fully equipped with P-38s--the 8th, 18th, 49th, 347th and 475th. The 475th was perhaps the best known of these, since it contained among its personnel the top three-scoring aces in the Pacific--Richard I. Bong (40 kills), Thomas B. McGuire, Jr. (38 kills) and C. H. MacDonald (27 kills). By the war's end, no fewer than 38 other pilots from the 475th had achieved ace status while flying exclusively P-38s.

The late-model P-38J with its powered ailerons, its dive brakes, and its combat flaps could if flown properly by an experienced pilot actually hold its own against a nimble Zero in a dogfight at low and medium altitudes. However, it was generally a good idea to follow the advice of experienced combat veterans and avoid such dogfights against the Zero.

For a while, the 475th included among its personnel the famous pilot Charles Lindbergh. He was serving with the Group as a technical representative from the United Aircraft Corporation. Lindbergh flew a number of combat missions with the Group in June/August 1944 as a civilian to instruct pilots on how to use their cruise control to get maximum range and endurance from their P-38Js. On July 28, Lindbergh was credited with shooting down a Japanese Mitsubishi Ki-51 over Elpaputih Bay in the Netherlands East Indies.

By the end of the Pacific War, P-38s were flying from bases on Ie Shima and in the Philippines on sorties ranging as far as Formosa, Korea, and the Ryukyus. They are credited with the destruction of more Japanese aircraft than any other type of US fighter.

This is not true as we know this credit belongs to the F6F, but until the USN began its assault towards Japan, the P-38 held this distinction.

In 1945, three Night Fighter Squadrons (421st, 547th, and 550th) were sent to the Pacific zone with P-38M night-fighter Lightnings.

Reconnaissance Lightnings were used in the war against Japan, with F-4s being initially operated in the summer of 1942 by the 18th Composite Group in Alaska, the 8th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron in New Guinea, and the 9th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron in India. They served with the following groups: the 4th (17th, 18th and 38th Squadrons), the 6th (8th, 25th 26th, and 27th Squadrons) and with the 71st (82nd Squadron) as well as with the 28th, 35th, and 41st Squadrons. They took part in the India-Burma campaign with the 8th Photographic Reconnaissance Group (9th and 40th Squadrons). In the United States, they served with the 2nd Group (7th, 10th, and 29th Squadrons). The F-4/F-5s usually flew alone without fighter escort.

On August 25, 1945, a pair of P-38s piloted by Colonel Clay Tice and his wingman were the first American aircraft to land in Japan after the surrender on August 15. They later claimed that this unauthorized landing was due to "engine difficulties", a somewhat suspect explanation. Nevertheless, this was a fitting recognition for an aircraft which had contributed so much to victory.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I would also note that the engines, turbos, turbo controllers were all government finished equipment and out of control of Lockheed.

Something that few understand!!!

 

[stona]

"All Axis forces in the area surrendered on May 13, 1943, due in no small part to the contribution of the Lightning in cutting off Rommel's air supply route."

Rubbish!

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

Between November 1942 and January 1943 the P-38 equipped 14th FG, based in Algeria, lost 32 of 54 pilots and ended up with just 7 operational aircraft. Rommel must have been quaking in his boots.
Cheers
Steve

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Between November 1942 and January 1943 the P-38 equipped 14th FG, based in Algeria, lost 32 of 54 pilots and ended up with just 7 operational aircraft. Rommel must have been quaking in his boots.
Cheers
Steve

Despite this the 14th, 1st and 82ne FGs quickly turned things around.

"On Sept. 3, 1943, as the Allied invasion of Italy got underway, the Italians threw in the towel. Even so, there were to be many months of fighting before German troops were driven out of the peninsula in a bloody campaign that absorbed virtually all Allied military power in the Mediterranean.


While granting that Italy had first priority in the Med, Winston Churchill also had his eye on another prize--the Greek Dodecanese Islands lying off the southwest coast of Turkey in the Aegean Sea. They were garrisoned largely by Italian troops who, Churchill judged, would cooperate if the islands could be seized before the Germans took over. Capturing the islands, he thought, might bring neutral Turkey into the Alliance and open the Dardanelles and Bosporus as a short supply route to beleaguered Russia. But Allied forces in the eastern Med had been stripped to support the Italian campaign and to prepare for the Normandy invasion. About all that was left was a Royal Navy squadron of a dozen ships and a few RAF aircraft.


Churchill's plea for a minor diversion from Italy fell on nearly deaf American ears. Finally, General Eisenhower agreed to send some long-range P-38 fighters and a few cannon-carrying B-25s to help out. The 14th Fighter Group was moved from its base in Tunisia to Gambut 2, an RAF strip of sand near Tobruk, a few miles west of the Egyptian border. From that desert paradise they were to escort Royal Navy ships and to attack German convoys headed for the Greek islands.


The group's 37th Squadron was commanded by Maj. William L. Leverette, who had arrived in North Africa late in August. Leverette was not your average replacement. He had spent two years teaching fighter tactics in the States, had more than 1,000 hours in fighters, and was no stranger to the gunnery range.


On Oct. 9, Leverette led seven P-38s on a mission to protect Royal Navy warships near the island of Rhodes. As they reached the ships, a formation of some 30 Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers was sighted approaching from the west. Leverette dispatched one flight of three P-38s to fly top cover while his flight closed with the Stukas.


The Stuka was not a particularly nimble aircraft, but it wasn't to be approached casually, either, especially when encountered in wholesale lots. In addition to wing-mounted guns, it carried a rear gunner manning a flexible machine gun. And with so few hunters (Leverette's wingman was a new, nervous, slightly trigger-happy lad) attacking so many targets, conserving ammunition was the key: "Get in close and make every round count." What happened in the next few minutes is best described by Leverette himself in this debriefing account:


"We peeled off into the middle of them, and I got two almost before they knew we were there. The gunner in the first started to fire, but stopped as soon as I let go. We came back behind them and I got on the tail of another. His gunner stopped firing as soon as I opened up, and the pilot bailed out. My fourth was a 30-degree deflection shot from 200 yards. Then I gave a lone plane a burst of cannon and machine-gun fire from a 20-degree deflection. That finished him.


"I came in directly behind the sixth. His gunner opened up before I did, but I got him with my first shots. The plane nosed down a little, and I gave him a burst in the belly. I was closing fast and had started to go under him when he nosed almost straight down, his propeller shot off. I tried to dive under him, but didn't quite make it. My left prop cut two feet into his fuselage as he went down. My last hit was the best. I was closing on him from the right when he turned into me. I rolled into a steep bank to the left and got him while firing from an almost-inverted position."


While all this was going on, the leader of Leverette's second element downed five Stukas, and his wingman got three. After disposing of a Ju-88 that was escorting the dive bombers, the top-cover flight came down to drop another Stuka. A few got through to make their bomb runs; the rest either jettisoned, headed for home, or ended up in the sea.

For his combat leadership and individual performance, Leverette was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, this nation's second highest award for valor. But his combat career didn't stop there. The group soon returned to the Italian campaign where again, Leverette downed two Me- 109s and two, Me-110s for a total of 11 victories, ending his war as one of the top 20 aces in the Mediterranean theater."

USAAF MTO Aces of World War Two

 

[stona]

They made a contribution, as did many. To suggest that Rommel's aerial supply line was broken "in no small part" due to the presence of the P-38s is, as I said rubbish.
The P-38 really struggled against the Luftwaffe's single engine fighters of this period. That doesn't make it a bad aircraft, in fact I believe it was a rather good one, as well as an important one, more so in other theatres than than the ETO/MTO.
Cheers
Steve

 

[FLYBOYJ]

They made a contribution, as did many. To suggest that Rommel's aerial supply line was broken "in no small part" due to the presence of the P-38s is, as I said rubbish.
The P-38 really struggled against the Luftwaffe's single engine fighters of this period. That doesn't make it a bad aircraft, in fact I believe it was a rather good one, as well as an important one, more so in other theatres than than the ETO/MTO.
Cheers
Steve

And agree 100% Steve. As shown with Joe Baugher's articles, When the P-38J came along, (and to once again remind some, 1 year 9 months after Pearl Harbor) many of the P-38s limitations were addressed. For one to say that Lockheed didn't listen or took too long to address problems is just plain nonsense. Having worked for Lockheed the P-38 has always been special to me, I will never argue to say it was the "best" but it did many thing well and made the difference in many combat theaters. The P-38 was certainly not "overrated" as LisaM is so feebly trying to prove, evidently she chooses to ignore certain facts about the aircraft and the training of US pilots that flew the aircraft. I have flown turbo boosted reciprocating engine aircraft and you could easily destroy an engine on a turbo Cessna 210 as easily as you could on an early P-38 if you weren't trained and fully understood that happens when you overboost an engine, in fact I'd bet dollars to donuts to say that many of those early "overboost explosions" were due to pilot error, as with many of the other so-called issues with the P-38.

From Shortround's earlier post - he nails it.

"Blaming Lockheed for failing to get the P-38 up European standards when the P-38 wasn't being used in Europe at the time seems more than a bit unfair. You, of course, have proof that many of blown up engines were due to pilots/ground crew adjusting the throttle stops beyond factory recommendations?

In actual fact the P-38 intercoolers could overcool the intake charge at cruising speeds, even the early ones. This was made worse by the Army refusing to use the cruise settings recommended by both Allison and Lockheed. That is use low rpm and high boost (the high boost from the turbo would keep the intake charge warm/hot) and would reduce wear on the engine and increase range. The Army wanted the pilots to use high rpm and low boost, perhaps thinking that it would give them faster response if bounced. It didn't.

There was never a question of the lead separating out of the fuel but instead of certain heavy fuel compounds separating out. There had been a change in the fuel specification in early 1943 that allowed more of these heavy compounds to be used to stretch the fuel supply. This problem of separation had been anticipated and Allison had been working on a new intake manifold to combat it from the spring of 1943. It went into production in the fall of 1943 but many P-38s built in the Fall didn't get it. Later ALL Allison engines got the new manifold regardless of supercharger type."

The P-38 was certainly not the most over rated fighter of WW2, if anything it was probably a bit under rated.