In the years I've 'studied' the Bf 109, I have gotten a pretty good view on the aircraft, if I may say so. I'm not the expert like Kurfürst is but there are certain things which I observe without any bias.
Most important is that I usually read on the Bf 109 TOL problems when it's a site or article about the Bf 109. But when I read pilot accounts I hardly ever hear this. I can remember maybe two pilots claiming that they had problems with the landing gear of the Bf 109. All the other stories are writers telling the story. That's just my observation. Feel free to point out axis pilots complaining about the landing gear.
Now ... this still doesn't say that the pilots were right and the writers wrong. But here's another observation: when I was looking up on the Bf 109 TOL problems on the internet - I had to look for that Finnish website, remember? - I noticed how most websites mentioned the TOL problems of the Bf 109. And in 99% of the cases this was brought down to the narrow landing gear. Most of the publications I have in my possession tell the same story.
But as a member correctly pointed out, the problem was not so much the narrow landing gear but the non-vertical position of the 'legs'. That makes me conclude that the pilots know better than the writers.
And as I don't recall many pilots complaining that much about the Bf 109 landing gear, AND because there is no statistical evidence to back these accidents up, I tend to believe that the TOL problem was not as serious as it is usually told.
Another document I mentioned is the "Abschrift des Berichts über die Dienstreise Major Grotes zu J.G. 101, 3./J.G. 105, I. u. 7./J.G. 108
für den Führungsstab Ia/Ausb., Zweck: Feststellung der tieferen Ursachen der hohen Flugzeugunfälle ohne Feindeinwirkung, 14.9.1944, in: BA-MA RL 2II/181"
Basically an investigation into the high non-combat losses of the fighter squadrons in 1944. One of the observations of Major Grotes was that the Flying Schools were deliberatey causing fear amongst the recruits concerning the Bf 109 flying characteristics. Apparently the JG pilots didn't see any reason for this fear.
Btw, in June 1944 48.5% of all losses were not a result of combat. According to Galland 2/3 of these non-combat losses were the result of human failure. That also puts the results of Big Week and other air campaigns into perspective. Training was the biggest weakness of the Luftwaffe in 1943-1945, even more so than the fuel shortage.
Kris