Sorry, Greg, I think I made a liar out of you just seconds before you posted!
Cheers,
Wes
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Sorry, Greg, I think I made a liar out of you just seconds before you posted!the attacks of a typical 10-year old have been conspicuous by their absence, even if we DID wander off-topic a bit.
As a shooter and a sailor and a pilot who's self-grounded due to deteriorating distance focus, take it from me, the 2D earth's surface and the 3D sky are not the same animal!! Not even close!I am not an Opthamologist, but I think the experience is pretty similar and I don't buy your argument which is only a subset of the debate over the merits of Sims, and which I think you are overstating. Yes you do need 20-20 (or better) vision to be a military pilot but that certainly isn't rare among young people - I had 20-15 vision when I was in the service and I was just a lowly medic. Learning to spot things at very long distances is also not entirely rare. If you have ever been hunting for certain types of game, or just practiced marksmanship, or if you have experience sailing or many other outdoor activities, you have probably honed this skill somewhat.
I'd say that in WWII, there was very little possibility of anything like rear warning radar, so manual scanning of the sky behind you and especially behind and below and upsun was obviously not done as well as it should have been considering the loss rate to first-pass attacks by surprise.
One point I've wondered about but never really investigated is as follows. After D-Day, when the Allies were on the continent, did we move radar sites forward some dsicrete distance behind the front lines or did they stay on the coast of Britain as they were in 1940? If we advanced them, I'm wondering if there were any initial attempts to warn various fighter and bomber groups of impending attacks by enemy fighters from the radar operators.
It's called task saturation, and it's a deadly disease. The vaccine for it is situational awareness capacity, and the faster you can grow it, the longer your life expectancy.i was shot down some times by someone i honestly didn't see while i had too many things to do at the same time
I think they WERE easy to exploit....once our pilots had the straight scoop on what they were. It was the lack of thorough knowledge of the Zero, as well as inappropriate tactical doctrine that was taught, that cost us so many losses early war.I also don't think the flaws of the Zero was so easy to exploit either. Most pilots couldn't in the first couple of years of the war.
Yes, the no armor and unprotected tanks were pretty easy to figure out, but getting the word out and getting it believed were another story all together. And the wrecks couldn't tell you anything about its insane agility or its difficult high speed maneuvering, or its right turning deficiency at speed. And since most early encounters were cases where the Zero started out with an energy advantage, it took awhile to figure out what its actual level flight top speed was.There were Zero wrecks at Pearl Harbor, I mean there were wrecks recovered of Zeros at Pearl. Couldn't we tell that there was no pilot armor or self sealing fuel tanks from them?
Of course no way to tell they were only 330mph airplanes from the wrecks.
Correct, but we had first hand eyewitness reports for that.Yes, the no armor and unprotected tanks were pretty easy to figure out, but getting the word out and getting it believed were another story all together. And the wrecks couldn't tell you anything about its insane agility or its difficult high speed maneuvering, or its right turning deficiency at speed. And since most early encounters were cases where the Zero started out with an energy advantage, it took awhile to figure out what its actual level flight top speed was.
Cheers,
Wes
Correct, but it takes awhile for that kind of info to be assessed, accepted, disseminated, and incorporated into the sylabus and the fighter pilot culture, then make it back to the theater of operations in the heads of replacement pilots. In the dark days after Pearl Harbor, with our thin, isolated, and scattered forces being pushed back on every front, that process wasn't as instantaneous as it is today. Remember, there were all kinds of contact reports being sent, some accurate, others wildly optimistic and/or pessimistic. Who's going to be believed when it comes to separating the wheat from the chaff?Correct, but we had first hand eyewitness reports for that.
Gents: Yup, that's me Barrett Tillman. (There used to be another BT author but he was a poet who died young.)
As noted, a big reason I compiled the AFAA survey was because in years & years of "debriefs" and "shooting wrist watches" it was noteworthy how seldom aces mentioned ambushing a bandit or getting surprised themselves. (Navy-Marine pilots seemed to have a better lookout doctrine than AAF though I forget the numbers.) Point being: the Conventional Wisdom advanced by Hartmann-Toliver did not match what I was hearing from aces representing every US service in 3 or 4 wars. I took that as a Clue and built the survey around it. IMO we in the history community--however defined--should not be reluctant to challenge the CW. Just because Thus & So may have applied in one situation (E Front/Luftwaffe) does not mean it should be accepted at face value elsewhere. Takes more work, of course, but IMO the time & effort invested in the survey were more than worthwhile, especially now that we have fewer than 50 aces extant.
Resp:Yea, this thread has been extremely hijacked!
If anyone has ever flown in a GA aircraft, you will find that it could be extremely difficult to see other aircraft in the distance, especially if there's any kind of haze or thin stratus. I don't find it unreasonable to say 80% of pilots shot down never saw their demise coming. Now having had an opportunity to fly mock dogfights, I would have to say if I was to fly in WW2 combat, I would avoid a dogfight at all costs, boom and zoom and the minute I lost advantage I'd "bug off." It sounds cowardly but its actually the way to fight and survive. As Von Richthofen said;
"Find the enemy and shoot him down, everything else
is nonsense."
Too much testosterone there - yea, you had heroes and those who have the need to go the extra mile, but those are far and few. Then you had the fight for survival (BoB). At the end of the day complete your mission (as you said) and live to fight another day.Resp:
I am a new member, so I know this is an old thread. However, if one looks, you can sea how Group Commanders (Zemke in ETO flying P-47s. Chennault"s Flying Tigers in China flying P-40s, etc), each tried to control their 'dogfights' with tactics that benefited their fighter's strengths. But just as important, they stressed 'breaking off' an engagement when tactics didn't benefit them. The old phrase from America's Colonial Days; "Swamp fox, swamp fox, hiding in the den; he ran away to fight again" has merit . . . Survival! However, flying escort required fights to save the bomber/crews so they could bomb again. As USAAF Commander Arnold put it, the loss of a fighter is the loss of one man; the loss of a B-17 or B-24 was one bomber and 10 men! Sometimes, you just have to fight. Take a look at Maj James Howard actions in early 1944 while flying a P-51B escorting B-17s. Someone in the group call 'bogies' at whatever o'clock high . . . causing the other Mustangs to leave the bombers in chase of the Luftwaffe! Howard, for 20+ minutes attacked multiple enemy fighters . . . diving on approaching enemy . . . even after his P-51 was out of ammunition! He didn't do this because he enjoyed it. His fighters were there to protect the bombers. He was performing his mission (job). One thing you learn in the military, is mission . . mission, complete the mission. We are expendable.
During the BoB an experienced pilot (over 200 hrs on type) was worth infinitely more than the plane he flew. Pilots arriving with as little as 50 hrs had a first duty to stay alive and learn until such time as they could contribute, with each 10 hours their chances of survival increased as did their effectiveness. Park and Dowding specifically ordered pilots not to chase the enemy across the channel, their chances of survival being shot down over water were much lower and their chances of being shot down increased massively as they approached Calais.Too much testosterone there - yea, you had heroes and those who have the need to go the extra mile, but those are far and few. Then you had the fight for survival (BoB). At the end of the day complete your mission (as you said) and live to fight another day.
Those "strict and complex" systems, in their attempt to mass firepower and facilitate hand signal communication, were often the very reason they didn't see the enemy coming. The more attention that is absorbed in tight formation flying, the less there is available for maintaining a sharp lookout. More potent armament and more reliable radios reduced the need for tight formations long before doctrine recognized that fact.What even be the point of developing tactics of any kind let alone the strict and often fairly complex systems which were developed, if 80% of the pilots got blindsided and didn't even see their opponents coming?
Those "strict and complex" systems, in their attempt to mass firepower and facilitate hand signal communication, were often the very reason they didn't see the enemy coming. The more attention that is absorbed in tight formation flying, the less there is available for maintaining a sharp lookout. More potent armament and more reliable radios reduced the need for tight formations long before doctrine recognized that fact.
Cheers,
Wes
Resp:yes, I'm actually referring more to the post-(functional) radio environment, when they are forcing them to fly with wingmen, in groups of four / two pairs, but they still had all these strict rules to follow and patterns that they used. The Finns apparently invented it in the 30's. The Germans figured it out in the Spanish Civil War and were doing this from the Battle of Britain era, though perfected arguably in 1941. I think this was one of the things that helped US Navy pilots hold their own against Zeros and Ki 43s with Wildcats in early 1942. It started to be adapted by the DAF in mid 1942 and by the Russians in the fall of 1942.
In the Med DAF probably adhered to these "formation rules" a bit more strictly than the Germans but they all had them. And it seemed to contribute to survival, (even as the earlier, clumsier / more rigid formations used by the DAF tended to get them killed).
As one specific example, en-route to a target area in August of 1942, DAF squadrons would assign lookout directions to different pilots. This guy looks East, that guy looks West, this guy checks the Sun. They all check Six periodically. They maintain formation of at least 10-12 aircraft. When attacked the whole formation turns into the attack (a new and key innovation). The squadron commander will tell them to break right or left - on one occasion the squadron leader apparently told them the wrong direction, they all turned and 4 got shot down. Once engaged flights of four either break right or break left or right.
For example, a whole squadron of Spitfires might turn into an attack by four Bf 109s, then another flight of four Bf 109s attacks from above and to their six - the Squadron Leader would order a flight or two flights to break off and attack the new threat head-on, while the rest of the squadron concentrated fire on the first group, then broke right or left after the merge.
Prior to that stage of the fight, for an individual pilot or pair to leave the formation they had to get explicit permission from the squadron leader. This was mentioned several times in various anecdotes. The only one who could violate this was the squadron leader himself.
After they split into flights it tended to break up into pairs though sometimes they might form a defensive circle if badly outnumbered, or try to form up later into flights or a whole squadron again for the trip home. It just depended how crazy the fight got. Wingmen remained under strict orders to stick with their element leader regardless, as that was key to survival.
S