Most valuable Carrier Fighter Of WWII

Which Aircraft do you consider to be the most valuable carrier based fighter of WWII

  • Sea Gladiator

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Dewoitine D376

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Grumman F3F

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Fairey Fulmar

    Votes: 2 3.6%
  • Mitsuibishi A5M

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Fairey Fulmar

    Votes: 1 1.8%
  • Bf109T

    Votes: 1 1.8%
  • Re2000

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Re2001

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Grumman F4F

    Votes: 12 21.4%
  • Hawker Sea Hurricane

    Votes: 4 7.1%
  • Mitsubishi A6M

    Votes: 8 14.3%
  • Supermarine Seafire

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Fairey Firefly

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Grumman F6F

    Votes: 32 57.1%
  • Vought F4U corsair

    Votes: 7 12.5%
  • Other

    Votes: 0 0.0%

  • Total voters
    56
  • Poll closed .

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According to documents, carrier "B" was to be named Peter Strasser, so I'm not sure where the alledged speculation comes in at. There is no record of intended named for "C" or "D", as they never left the drawing board.
Both carrier "A" and carrier "B" had three elevators each, measuring 43 feet by 46 feet, easily able to handle the Bf109 (and other types) without benefit of folding wings.

In regards to the Bf109T-1, they were a collection of about seven various 109 types, modified to a naval standard. Only the T-2 was a dedicated production type, and numbered only seven built out of an original request of seventy. It has been noted that the T-2 series had a detachment point mid-wing (just outboard of the MG) to facilitate transport and storage, but this is far from the ability to fold.
 
We have been over the British use of two seat fighters before.
The term "navigator" was, in part, a security measure. The idea that an enlisted man in the back seat was going to tell the pilot, often an officer but at least a higher ranking enlisted man, where to steer the airplane doesn't seem to hold up very well.
What the British had was a homing beacon on the carrier and a radio receiver that the rear seater operated to home in on the carrier. This required a bit more work than simply talking on a microphone, keying switch. If you didn't know what to listen for or how the system worked just random listening on the radio even if on the right frequency, wasn't going to lead you back to the carrier.
There are old threads on this that explain it better.
The British did this, in part, due to the crappier weather around Britain, the North Sea and North Atlantic and the dual use of the "fighters" as search aircraft put single aircraft (instead of a formation with an experienced leader) at greater distances from the carrier.
One might also look at the practice of making long range formation flights of naval fighters either in company with the bombers/strike aircraft they are escorting or having one/two bombers/strike aircraft assigned to provide navigational assistance.
The late 30s and early 40s were period of rapid advancement in radio equipment.
 
The German naming "system" was bit strange to other countries, often a proposed name would be common knowledge several years before the ship was finished but "officially" it was called Cruiser "C" or some such depending on if it was new construction or a replacement. If replacing an existing ship it would be known as
(I forget the German term) "replacement for ship XXXXXXXX" which doesn't mean it actually gets that name when launched/commissioned. This means a ship could be called 3 different things during the planning/financing/initial building stages.

There is plenty of room for confusion for people not familiar with the German system (which also may have changed from the Imperial Navy to the German Navy of the 30s).

As long as we all know what ship we are referring to, I don't think it matters that much.
 

True, but Hitler had one Strasser killed and a second managed to barely escape when he decided that National Socialist Party of the German Workers was too long a name and got rid of the Socialist part, might not want to remind people of that.

Breyer does mention that the name was pure speculation.
 

The T1s were the production carrier planes, not modified types, those were the T0s. T2s was the designation the T1s got once de-navalized, either after completion or while under construction.
 

While I agree with the general thrust of your post, I'm afraid you're off-target with the above comment. It was entirely accepted that a more junior navigator could tell a more senior pilot "where to go" because each member of the crew was entrusting his life to the professionalism of the other members. Thus rank was subordinated to the task of actually getting the job done.

Bomber Command often had interesting mixes of rank within a crew. Put the boot on the other foot and consider an officer navigator and a sergeant pilot. Does the pilot follow exactly what the officer navigator says? A good pilot in a crewed aircraft respected and trusted the other members of his team, and took their advice and recommendations when merited. Bottom line, though, is that the pilot was always the captain of the aircraft, regardless of rank. The only time that has ever been different in the RAF is in more modern times with the Nimrod maritime fleet where it was possible for a Navigator to be the captain...but that's the exception to the rule.
 
The T1s were the production carrier planes

Ah yes, the infamous "production carrier plane" that never actually launched from a carrier (holding back the laughter)....

The topic of the thread is "Most Valuable Carrier Fighter of WWII". How could anyone label an aircraft like the 109T a serious "carrier fighter" when it never took off or landed on one? Using this logic the P-51 and P-47 should be considered first, seeing that they both at the very minimum took off from a flat top at one time or other during their careers (unlike Onkel Willy's contribution).
 
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But they weren't dedicated fighters.

Naval fighters, that operated from aircraft carriers during the interwar years, up to and through WWII, were single-seat types: French, British, Japanese, American and so on.

Not strictly true there were a few small production two seat fighters. Hawker Osprey, Vought VE7, Curtiss Falcon and if you stretch the definition of fighter the Douglas O2. I would call them Reconnaissance Fighters rather than fighters though.
 

You sound kind of salty friend, here, have a hug...
 

Not unusual at all in Naval ships. A ships Captain or the Watch Officer took directions from the Navigator no matter what the difference in rank. There was a case in the Royal Navy pre WWI iirc when the Captain of a Battleship overrode his Navigator and took a channel that was meant only for Destroyers and Light Cruisers and put his ship aground in full view of Portsmouth Harbour.
 
Ahh, I see where this is going...ok.

In the spirit of a serious discussion, I was referring to largely accepted aircraft, not "one offs" or prototypes, but instead, widely accepted types that were single seat, not with a navigator amd had nothing to do with the Bf109T.

I know it may comes as surprise to some, but there were aircraft carriers before WWII and there were single-seat fighters designed for use aboard those carriers, some carriers being employed in the last part of WWI.
HMS Argus and HMS Furious being two examples.

What was the fighter compliment aboard those two ships in 1917? Single seat fighters: the Sopwith Pup and Beardmore W.B.III - both types were produced in large numbers (moreso for the Pup).

Then there's the Misubishi 1MF, Naval Aircraft Factory TS-1, Sopwith 2F.1 and so on and so on.

So in regards to this:
There was a naval P-39 prototype and several navalised P-51 types, so...
 
you also had 20 years for things to change, A Sopwith Pup could stay in the 3 hours if it was lucky and at at 112mph top speed it wasn't going to get all that that from the carrier. Not to mention trying to get airborne or land with 2 seat airplanes on the "decks" of the time. A few mph in stalling speed could be all the difference. Not to mention size, A Pup had a wingspan of 26 1/2 ft.
Policies changed, aircraft capabilities changed, aircraft roles changed. Until 1940 there was no way to really test Policies and roles and more than a few navies (and there weren't much more than few that even had carriers) took a while to figure out how to use carriers, The British losing 2 of them due to stupidity(poor deployment and poor operating procedure) before the war was more than 9 month old.
If the British couldn't figure out how to properly use aircraft carriers after having them for 20 years (some officers did but obviously it was far from a universal skill) what are the chances of the Germans figuring it out on their first or second cruise?
 

Honest question, what was the problem with deploying Ark Royal and Courageous as ASW groups? I have seen the criticisms but it seems it wasnt that much different from later war hunter/killer groups. Beyond the escort not following them during flight operations that is...


Copy the IJN and take it from there, only chance. The IJN was certainly game, for a price.
 
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I believe the two carriers were not in the same group, could be wrong on that.

Courageous had 4 destroyers as her escort/killer group. WHich might be OK for a cheap converted freighter type carrier. Risking a fast fleet carrier with such a small escort seems to be playing with fire.
Then they detach to 2 of the destroyers to investigate a sinking/rescue survivors. All very noble and in the best traditions of the service but that leaves the Courageous with what kind of escort?
Next big blooper. And perhaps I have the story wrong but according to one account they had launched 15 Swordfish to hunt for subs, When they got low on fuel they landed all of them to service them and there was about a 2 hour "window" with no planes in the air (waiting for another mass launch?) and the Courageous was torpedoed near the end of that 2 hour window. Obviously the German sub commander didn't know what was or wasn't in the air or how many destroyers were within a few miles or 20 miles. But using a major fleet asset in such an exposed situation and not even keeping up a constant close in air patrol (1 or 2 planes constantly circling the carrier at a few miles out?) doesn't seem like much in the way of precautions were being used.

Glorious was short of aircraft but German units were know to be at sea. keeping one or two of the Gladiators recovered from Norway in the air during daylight hours to search even 30-40 miles ahead of the carriers course also doesn't seem like that big a price to pay even if you lost few compared to losing the carrier.

one of the first jobs of Naval aviation was to find the enemy (that dated back to airships/zeppelins) Hopefully it could also keep the enemy from finding the friendly forces. Once the recon/deny recon roles were handled then they could worry about strike forces and counter strike forces.
 
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Copy the IJN and take it from there, only chance. The IJN was certainly game, for a price.

The IJN had two years to study the RN and see what they did right and what they did wrong.

Not saying the Japanese didn't bring a few things of their own to the table but Japanese expertise in 1938/9, early 1940 was in shooting up the Chinese which is hardly the same thing. None of the planes the Japanese used at Pearl Harbor were in service in 1939.
 
I believe the two carriers were not in the same group, could be wrong on that.

No, separate.


Good point, 4 DDs seems like the minimum escort leaving no room for detachment.


Yeah, that was... first week of a war stuff.

The concept wasnt wrong, the implementation was faulty... and proper bombs, two Skuas shot themselves down when trying to attack a Uboat.


There is no justification for the Glorious affair.

Regarding the DKM, this is what was proposed at one time:

"A very different trend, however, was evident in a shift by Fleet Commander Carls. As already noted, Carls had clearly differentiated between ocean-raiding Panzerschiffe and battleships based in the North Sea in his 1934-35 memoranda. But in September 1938 he abruptly changed his mind in submitting a visionary blueprint for the future employment of surface forces against British commerce with four task forces on rotating station in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. For each task force he proposed the inclusion of one battle cruiser (specifying the Gneisenau-class vessels for this function, despite their steam propulsion), one heavy cruiser, four destroyers, an aircraft carrier, five U-boats and accompanying tankers."

Dragging the tankers along is a bad idea, the Uboats would never keep pace, the DDs range would make a joke of the whole thing and the Hippers, well...

GZ+Gneisenau might work, anything beyond that and you need a ridiculous number of tankers.
 

True, but I am talking about the hard yet invisible stuff, deck handling, landing patterns, hangar arrangements, strike preparations, launch sequences, the proper business of aeronaval aviation, the things you learn by doing it for a long time. AFAIK the DKM did get a good look, even had pilots land on IJN carriers, but only briefly. I doubt they really learned everything they could have in such short visits and yet the possibility clearly war there, they chose not to take it.

So I pose this question to you, what could be the worst case scenario for a DKM carrier force in the historical context, nothing crazy, construction can begin in 1935, contacts with Japan including full access to carriers and designs in 1933, how much damage can you do if you are in charge of the DKM and willing to prioritize carriers over the rest bar BBs?
 
Id give it a run, and judge it on its merits and potential. It was tested aboard a number of catapult equipped barges in the Baltic, and some training was undertaken from a small island in the Baltic, which the germans mocked up to resemble their carrier.

My beef stems from the claim that the GZ was potentially more than it could be, and underestimates the issues and problems DKM would have encountered had it continued with its carrier development programs. The carrier had some serious design flaws, and the aircraft slated to form its CAG were not ready design wise and production wise (and to an extent even manning wise) to operate effectively from the carrier. The fact that hardly any of the the carrier capable versions were even built is of course telling of DKMs problems in getting their carrier up and running.

The final nail in the coffin of the german carrier program is that it could only realistically be extrapolated that a second carrier would be added in 1942 or 1943. trying to run a war with just one available carrier, fulfilling both the training and the operational aspirations of DKM would have been exceptionally difficult. I can say that from experience. Having served in a 1 carrier navy, we basically knew that in wartime our time would need to be split in exactly that manner.

The other long term difficulty facing the Germans was the inexperience would have come home to roost even if they managed to bring a second carrier into the mix. All of the big three navies spent a lot of time preparing and training their carriers to operate as task Groups.....working together for mutual benefit. Polmar expresses the opinion in one of his books that whilst it was likely that both the germans and the Italians could probably be expected to field a carrier, with just a moderate increase in effort and resources, neither navy had the expertise to operate those carriers as part of a group in combined operations.
 

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