And after Normandy, the whole British Army was bled dry. The contributions of the BA became less and less relevant as the US Army expanded week by week. Care to debate that fact?
Certainly in the last months of 1944 the US was able to replace manpower build up in the ETO, while the UK, Commonwealth other Allies were mostly tapped out.
However the US Army had just about "zero" chance of ever landing in France if the UK Commonwealth hadn't laid down the basis of of the whole war effort in 1940, 1941 1942 by keeping the Axis from gaining the oil supplies of the Middle East and preventing the Axis from knocking Russia out of the war. For the period of time up to Nov 1942 the US didn't have the capability to have any ground operations in the ETO, nor to send any meaningful help to Russia without British ships
Care to debate that?
They went to HK and did absolutely nothing of value. Far to few in number,
That pretty much describes the situation everywhere in the PTO {mainly as regards to modern aircraft heavy weapons}
Also "Far to few in number" also describes the number of trained, combat ready US troops a in Dec 1941....
Huh??
What possible basis do you have for this charge? ???
The Winnipeg Grenadiers the Royal Rifles {Canadian} were as well trained as most Allied combat troops serving in their first tour. The fact that a single Canadian company caused over 800 Japanese casualties is what pissed of the Japanese caused its commander to lose face. They had been planning for a walk-over in HK, yet the fact that the Canadians, Royal Scots the other defenders put up a stubborn defence for 3 weeks was unexpected for the Japanese
. The Brits knew they were the proverbial speed bumps of no use, and the Canadian Govt knew it to. A smart govt and an intelligent military would have sent them to Malaya where the would have value.
Are you talking about BRITISH or CANADIAN military command? The War Office in London was mainly responsible for deciding where to deploy
ALL Commonwealth troops overseas, it was their call to send troops to HK or Malaya, not Ottawa's call.
They went to HK and did absolutely nothing of value.
Not the Pacific, so dont even try to offer proof of a token and ill advised defense of HK in 1941.... these two battalions hardly any meaningfull contribution.
Absolutely Wrong!!
Syscom, you can't use 20/20 hindsight to make assumptions about the plans made prior to Dec 6 1941!
Could I say that the USA was silly to waste resources building the BB Arizona training the crew, because it had zero useful role in WWII?
Of course not, it's ludicrous.
The same way that you criticize the plans for the defence of SE Asia, based on 20/20 hindsight.
Basic thumbnail of history:
Prior to WWII, the British Admiralty planned for Singapore to be able to hold out fro 6 months, as in the event of war, the French fleet would keep the Italians bottled up, while a British fleet would be sent east to link up with the Americans and deal with the Japanese.
Obviously the collapse of France in 1940 threw a wrench in the plans.
The British American later made plans for two possible actions from the Japanese.
1.) Japan attacks Malaya Indonesia, at this point the US fleet engages the Japanese, and uses it's bombers to devastate Japan es military bases assets {this is why all the B-17's were in Philippines} Meanwhile a British fleet would arrive to provide relief of Malaya/Singapore
or
2.) Japan attacks the Philippines as well, in addition to the above.
The US never contemplated Japanese attacks on Hawaii, other than sabotage.
In either case, the Philippines Malaya were to hold out until strong Allied Naval Air forces could arrive in theater.
The original plans were tossed on the trash heap of history by the devastating attack on "Pearl".
Now, the Philippines was attacked by 130,000 Japanese troops {vs. ~150,000 US allied troops.}
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Philippines_(1942)
Malaya was attacked by 70,000 Japanese troops vs. ~ 100,000 Commonwealth {Later arrivals would boost this to ~140,000 Allied}
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Malaya
In Hong Kong the ~2,000 Canadians made up around 35% - 40% of the ~5,500 "solid" army ground forces.
{In addition RAF, RN, Indian, fortress Chinese aux. troops pushed the total to ~14,000 military personnel
Instead of the Japanese occupying an undefended HongKong with a brigade or 2, they committed over
52,000 troops to capture the city. - Almost 4x the number of allied military
British, Canadian and Indian forces, commanded by Major-General Christopher Michael Maltby supported by the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Forces resisted the Japanese invasion by the 38th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Sakai Takashi, but were [badly] outnumbered (Japanese, 52,000; Allied, 14,000) and lacked their opponents' recent combat experience.
Battle of Hong Kong - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Had things gone according to pre-war plans the sacrifice of these troops in HK would deny the Japanese ~40,000 - 45,000 troops which could not be used to attack Malaya. Even with the disasters of early Dec 1941, Malaya/Singapore SHOULD have been able to hold out, with competent organization. {Percival Whitehall dropped the ball - badly}
However, add another ~45,000 troops to the 70,000 already committed to Malaya, and the task becomes almost impossible.
So the point is this: far from doing "absolutely nothing of value", the Canadians troops were there to buy crucial time to save Malaya.