At the outbreak of the war Japanese pilots held a number of advantages against their opponents. Not only were the range and fighting abilities well above what Allied intelligence had predicted, but most of the pilot had considerable combat experience. Japan had been at war since 1939 against first China and then the USSR, the aerial aspects of which had been all but ignored in the outside world. The doctrine that manoeuvrability was the most important aspect a fighter could posses was vindicated in battles against the Chinese air force. The A5M 'Claude' and Ki-27 'Nate' fighters easily swept aside the mix of old British, American and Soviet fighters that opposed them, whilst bombers roamed freely attacking civilian and military targets. The Chinese turned to an American, Claire Chennault, to train their forces. Under his guidance they achieved a number of successes, at least until the introduction of the A6M Zero.
Undoubtedly the most famous Japanese plane of the war, the Zero's combination of high speed, incredible range and almost supernatural manoeuvrability seemed to allow it to strike anywhere at any time. Allied flyers attempted to engage their enemy in traditional dogfights which fell right into their enemy's plans, as a Zero could easily outturn a Buffalo or Warhawk. It was the Chennault's' AVG P-40s and Navy Wildcats that began to restore the balance. Once it was known a turning fight was fatal, they instead learned to adopted alternate tactics. Pioneered by the AVG, pilots would gain height then make repeated diving attacks, turning away immediately afterwards so the Zeros could not follow (Franks p.119). Over the Pacific and Australia, such tactics began to pay dividends. The Achilles' heel of the Japanese machine had also been exposed – their almost complete lack of armour. The standard 7.7mm (.303in) machine gun of most Allied planes had been found to be ineffective in combating the Luftwaffe. Yet a volley that would have barely damaged a Me109 was enough to destroy a Zero or Oscar. The same was true with Japanese bombers, the G4M acquiring the nickname 'flying lighter'. Parachutes were rarely used as bailing out over enemy territory would be tantamount to surrender (Franks p.114). In addition, the early generations of Japanese aircraft rarely carried radios and communication was done by hand signals. Unsurprisingly this proved impossible in the heat of battle and hence tactics revolved around every fighter diving in to make their own attacks.
Later aircraft such as the Frank or Tojo sought a better balance and consequently proved more formidable opponents. Problem was they appeared in fairly small numbers and until the end of the war the Zero and Oscar were common opponents. Although they had been updated with better armament and more powerful engines, the basic airframe was obsolete. There was also little interest in radar as either a defensive or offensive tool (Total War p.). The JAAF concentrated on attacking enemy planes and airfields, it did not hit the vital supply lines or command centres.
By the end of the war, the main problem facing the Japanese was not so much the disparity in aircraft, but the way they could be utilised. Pilot training had fallen disastrously since 1941, pilots training went from being some of the most rigorous in the world to merely applying basic skills. During the final battles the few experienced pilots had to shepherd pilots to their destinations, which by now was usually a one way trip. The inevitable result was them being torn to pieces by battle hardened allied pilots. Iron, steel and above all fuel were becoming desperately short. The reduced octane rating badly affected the serviceability and performance of remaining aircraft.
Of the RAFs strength as war broke out, little could be described as cutting edge or even modern. The aircraft that was to be the mainstay of British and Dutch strength during the initial attacks was the Brewster Buffalo. A lot has been written about this aircraft and not much of it has been complimentary. However, history has been slightly unkind to the tubby little fighter. Although rejected for use in Europe they were deemed "more than satisfactory for the task" (Cull Buffaloes p.15) of defending Malaya and Singapore. Being a carrier aircraft they were sturdy, easy to fly and possessed reasonable firepower. The addition of armour blunted their already average performance however and they lacked the necessary rate of climb to intercept incoming bombers. Given the disparity in numbers and the sate of constant confusion that prevailed it is highly unlikely any fighter could have delayed the Japanese advance. Although soon vanishing from RAF and USN rosters, the Buffalo would go on to gain a superb war record in the hands of Finnish pilots in the war against the USSR. The arrival of the Hawker Hurricane was likewise ineffective. Unsung hero of the Battle of Britain, such was the tempo of fighter development that it was already obsolete as a dogfighter over Europe. Although not achieving great success as a fighter, later IIc and IId versions were employed to good effect as 'tank busters'. Formations flew in 'vics' of three aircraft, a leader and his two wingmen. Such tactics had been exposed as outdated and costly in the Battle of Britain, yet the RAF would once again learn the hard way it needed to adopt the far more flexible 'finger four' formation. Over Arakan and Imphal, the defending Spitfires were denied radar coverage when the Japanese occupied the surrounding hills. With fuel critical, standing patrols could not be maintained and had to be scrambled at short notice, with JAAF units attempting to slip in low through the mountainous terrain. Oscars would attempt to lure the British fighters into surrounding valleys where they could be pounced upon. Wise to such tactics, the Spitfires made slashing dive attacks, using their superior speed and climb to accelerate out of trouble for another pass.
As the war progressed more modern aircraft would finally become available. Spitfires, Liberators, Thunderbolts and Mosquitoes were equal to anything the Japanese or Germans could field. The mighty Thunderbolt, which traded manoeuvrability for outright speed and hitting power became a very potent weapon for both the RAF and USAAF, with the British never losing one in aerial combat (Donald p.) The Mosquito, the "wooden wonder" was not quite an unqualified success as the tropical climate played havoc with its structure. Its predecessor, the Bristol Beaufighter remained the primary strike fighter until the end of the war. The tactic of flying in low and fast to attack earned it the grim nickname of "whispering death" from Japanese troops. Always present was the problem of terrain. In the open fields of France or Russia a target could be identified with relative ease. In the thick jungle it was very hard to see a platoon, truck or tank, much less to ascertain if it was friendly. Pioneered by the Chindits, extensive work was conducted to improve communications between land and air. By 1944, troops could call down air strikes, supplies and casualty evacuations. Light aircraft were used extensively in the spotting and liaison role.
The American P-40 Warhawk is another aircraft that has received much negative publicity, but still managed a good war record. As with the British, its initial losses had as much to do with bad tactics and intelligence then airframe deficiencies. The P-38 Lightning had been a relative failure over Europe, but excelled at the low levels combats usually took place over the jungle. Thus it ended the war having shot down more aircraft than any other US type (Donald p.173). The famous P-51 Mustang had the ability to not only escort long range bombers to their targets, but to out fight any interceptors sent against them. At sea, the Grumman Hellcat and Vought Corsair were markedly superior to anything the Japanese could field and ended the war with near 20:1 kill ratios.
Over claiming was a common feature in the air war. This should not automatically lead to the assumption unscrupulous airmen were simply looking to falsely add to their totals. Although this was an element, in the confused melee of a dogfight it was very hard to keep tabs on just who was hitting who. Many pilots were lost after they became fixated with the plight of their kill and were in turn shot down. Multiple aircraft, especially bomber gunners would also claim the same victim in the belief they had inflicted the killing blow. In addition, an aircraft that appeared doomed may have recovered and made it back to base in one piece. Therefore, all wartime claims must be treated with a degree of scepticism, although intelligence on both sides could be guilty of accepting all pilots' claims as fact.