No Strategic Bombing?

[Howard Gibson]

Strategic bombing was a controversial strategy during World War II. Most of the victims were (fairly) innocent civilians. The campaign used up massive allied lives and resources. In addition to tying down Luftwaffe resources and damaging German industry, it provided something that could be presented to the Russians as a second front. Note the number of American and British air commanders who receieved high Russian medals.

In an alternate history, the western allies do not do strategic bombing. They are just as determined to win the war, They need to keep the Russians happy somehow.

What is the new strategy? Resources committed to strategic bombing can be transferred to tactical airpower, and to the forces on the ground. More and better tanks anyone? Is there any chance of moving D-Day ahead? Was Italy really the Axis' soft underbelly? Could they land in southern France in 1943? Is there any chance of directly supporting Russia?

What technology and aircraft do the western allies adopt? To take the extreme case, there were lots of things wrong with the P47 Thunderbolts, none of which mattered at the 30,000ft altitudes from which the Germans needed to attack American bombers. Two-stage supercharging is important if you are running a high-altitude bombing campaign. It does not matter in a tactical war. P38 Lightnings? Spitfire_XIIs? In the absence of high altitude combat, would a Vought Corsair be a good substitude for a P47? Would long range be critical? How about Allison engined Mustangs?

Consider that low altitude P47s and rocket firing Typhoons were effective because the Luftwaffe had been largely destroyed by the strategic bombing campaign. In the face of determined Luftwaffe resistance, how would the allies do tactical bombing?

Is the war shorter or longer?

 

[EwenS]

Strategic bombing was a controversial strategy during World War II. Most of the victims were (fairly) innocent civilians. The campaign used up massive allied lives and resources. In addition to tying down Luftwaffe resources and damaging German industry, it provided something that could be presented to the Russians as a second front. Note the number of American and British air commanders who receieved high Russian medals.

In an alternate history, the western allies do not do strategic bombing. They are just as determined to win the war, They need to keep the Russians happy somehow.

What is the new strategy? Resources committed to strategic bombing can be transferred to tactical airpower, and to the forces on the ground. More and better tanks anyone? Is there any chance of moving D-Day ahead? Was Italy really the Axis' soft underbelly? Could they land in southern France in 1943? Is there any chance of directly supporting Russia?

What technology and aircraft do the western allies adopt? To take the extreme case, there were lots of things wrong with the P47 Thunderbolts, none of which mattered at the 30,000ft altitudes from which the Germans needed to attack American bombers. Two-stage supercharging is important if you are running a high-altitude bombing campaign. It does not matter in a tactical war. P38 Lightnings? Spitfire_XIIs? In the absence of high altitude combat, would a Vought Corsair be a good substitude for a P47? Would long range be critical? How about Allison engined Mustangs?

Consider that low altitude P47s and rocket firing Typhoons were effective because the Luftwaffe had been largely destroyed by the strategic bombing campaign. In the face of determined Luftwaffe resistance, how would the allies do tactical bombing?

Is the war shorter or longer?

If you want a discussion about the possibility of a 1943 invasion of France with the resources then available, have a look at this "what if" and its 300+ posts.

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=291457

 

[Dimlee]

No strategic bombing = no strategic targets are attacked.
German production is less affected. Germany allocates fewer resources to large calibre AAA, to shelters and new housing, to relocation and dispersal of the factories. Those resources can be used for... more U-boats? Armour and artillery for the Eastern Front? Luftwaffe have more personnel closer to the front lines? No Oil Plan, most probably, so fewer fuel shortages in Germany? The Transport Plan is limited to the tactical depth only.

 

[ThomasP]

If I understand the scenario correctly, actual point targeting of actual military installations and directly supporting infrastructure would still be allowed - by tactical FB and/or light/medium/heavy bomber - but area bombing of cities in order to destroy industrial & infrastructure targets would not be allowed. In other words, no 'terror bombing' campaign(s).

So the operations like the 'Dambusters' and the attacks on the U-boat pens by heavy bombers would still be viable options, just no Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo, etc, etc, etc, etc . . .

Assuming the above is correct:

The North Atlantic campaign would be similar in nature, with support of the UK and future invasion of the mainland in mind from either/both the UK or North Africa.

The South Atlantic campaign would become more prominent than historically, due to the increased US/UK support in the MTO/North Africa campaigns.

The Norway and MTO/North Africa campaigns would be different as the UK/US concentrate on chewing up the periphery of the German/Italian overseas areas and truly deny access to foreign materials from anywhere outside of the European mainland (hopefully much more quickly than in the historical timeline) instead of focusing so much manpower, time, and materiel on the historical strategic bombing campaign. Use of US naval assets in the MTO on an earlier time-table (if possible) could have significant effects.

Convince the Russians to allow UK/US air forces to be involved on the Eastern Front, with the USAAF 8th AF operating as grand tactical assets against German forces and rear areas. The Soviet air and ground assets would operate more-or-less as they did historically, with the USAAF 8th AF concentrating on destroying the logistics chain and mobility of the German ground forces. Assuming the opening stages of the war happened more or less historically - at least through middle-1942(?) after the Battle for Moscow - this could really mess up the German plans for a mobile campaign and anybody surviving the retreat from Russia..

Hopefully, the effects of the above would create a 3-front war, with German & Italy having to worry about UK—>Northern France, North Africa—>Southern France and/or Italy, along with the historical threat on the Eastern Front.

The German assets (aircraft and AAA/radar nets) tied up in defense of the Reich against the strategic bombing campaign would be available for other purposes, but how much that would affect the other fronts is open to question.

As far as the Pacific campaign:

It would progress more or less as it did historically, except no strategic/terror bombing campaign or A-bomb attacks, just cut mainland Japan off from any overseas assets as was done historically, focus on a tight blockade and maintain the blockade after pulling surface assets back outside of range of the Kamikaze threat, and wait until Nov-Dec'45 for serious starvation to set in. No Operation Olympic as such necessary.

 

[Howard Gibson]

If I understand the scenario correctly, actual point targeting of actual military installations and directly supporting infrastructure would still be allowed - by tactical FB and/or light/medium/heavy bomber - but area bombing of cities in order to destroy industrial & infrastructure targets would not be allowed. In other words, no 'terror bombing' campaign(s).

So the operations like the 'Dambusters' and the attacks on the U-boat pens by heavy bombers would still be viable options, just no Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo, etc, etc, etc, etc . . .

Assuming the above is correct:

The Dambusters is a tough mission. If you are not going nuts developing heavy bombers, you don't have a vehicle suitable for the bouncing bomb.

Did they destroy U-boat pens by bombing? This sounds like a job for Tallboys and Grand Slams, in daylight, from Lancasters, in the face of intense air opposition. A better strategy might be to use Beaufighters and Mosquitos to intensively patrol the areas just outside the submarine ports, close enough for single engined fighters to escort. In the absence of strategic bombing, huge resources are available. Liberators did an excellent job of anti-submarine patrol in the mid-Atlantic. More of them would have been better.

The North Atlantic campaign would be similar in nature, with support of the UK and future invasion of the mainland in mind from either/both the UK or North Africa.

The South Atlantic campaign would become more prominent than historically, due to the increased US/UK support in the MTO/North Africa campaigns.

The Norway and MTO/North Africa campaigns would be different as the UK/US concentrate on chewing up the periphery of the German/Italian overseas areas and truly deny access to foreign materials from anywhere outside of the European mainland (hopefully much more quickly than in the historical timeline) instead of focusing so much manpower, time, and materiel on the historical strategic bombing campaign. Use of US naval assets in the MTO on an earlier time-table (if possible) could have significant effects.

Convince the Russians to allow UK/US air forces to be involved on the Eastern Front, with the USAAF 8th AF operating as grand tactical assets against German forces and rear areas. The Soviet air and ground assets would operate more-or-less as they did historically, with the USAAF 8th AF concentrating on destroying the logistics chain and mobility of the German ground forces. Assuming the opening stages of the war happened more or less historically - at least through middle-1942(?) after the Battle for Moscow - this could really mess up the German plans for a mobile campaign and anybody surviving the retreat from Russia..

Figure on more B25s and B26s, and fewer B17s and B24s. The B25s would be more suitable for the Russian front. P51As would work on the Russian Front, although I think the Merlins are still better. Maybe there is some love for P39s!

Supply depots provide resources immediately required by front line units. It would be a shame if something were to happen to them.

Two stage supercharging allowed the USAAF to wreak havoc on the Luftwaffe in the real war. In a campaign at low altitude on the Russian front, 130_octane fuel keeps things messy for the Luftwaffe.

 

[muskeg13]

Strategic bombing was a controversial strategy during World War II. Most of the victims were (fairly) innocent civilians. The campaign used up massive allied lives and resources. In addition to tying down Luftwaffe resources and damaging German industry, it provided something that could be presented to the Russians as a second front. Note the number of American and British air commanders who receieved high Russian medals.

In an alternate history, the western allies do not do strategic bombing. They are just as determined to win the war, They need to keep the Russians happy somehow.

What is the new strategy? Resources committed to strategic bombing can be transferred to tactical airpower, and to the forces on the ground. More and better tanks anyone? Is there any chance of moving D-Day ahead? Was Italy really the Axis' soft underbelly? Could they land in southern France in 1943? Is there any chance of directly supporting Russia?

What technology and aircraft do the western allies adopt? To take the extreme case, there were lots of things wrong with the P47 Thunderbolts, none of which mattered at the 30,000ft altitudes from which the Germans needed to attack American bombers. Two-stage supercharging is important if you are running a high-altitude bombing campaign. It does not matter in a tactical war. P38 Lightnings? Spitfire_XIIs? In the absence of high altitude combat, would a Vought Corsair be a good substitude for a P47? Would long range be critical? How about Allison engined Mustangs?

Consider that low altitude P47s and rocket firing Typhoons were effective because the Luftwaffe had been largely destroyed by the strategic bombing campaign. In the face of determined Luftwaffe resistance, how would the allies do tactical bombing?

Is the war shorter or longer?

The only way the war is shorter is if the allies lose their will to resist and simply submit to German and Japanese domination. I don't believe the abolition of strategic bombing is plausible. The war would drag on forever. However, if forced into a bloody, resource consuming, seeming never-ending stalemate, the old standby weapon of mass destruction will reappear, poison gas, and it will be employed in cities this time to end the war quicker. U-Boat pens by the way were located in the middle of port cities.

Alternately, without strategic bombing, you'd probably see a more massive heavy artillery build-up than occurred on the Western Front.

 

[Alan Stevens]

If the Western Allies skip strategic bombing, they don't get a faster war — they get a different one, and probably a bloodier one on the ground. The bomber offensive wasn't just about industry; it tied down most of the Luftwaffe's fighter strength, burned German fuel, and gave Stalin something he could plausibly call a "second front." Without it, the Allies must satisfy Moscow through more aggressive Mediterranean operations and a larger commitment to Italy and southern France, but that still doesn't produce a 1943 cross‑Channel invasion. Landing craft, naval escorts, and trained assault divisions remain the gating factors.

The air order of battle shifts toward medium bombers and low‑altitude fighter‑bombers: Allison Mustangs, P‑47s optimized for the deck, Typhoons/Tempests, and more B‑25/B‑26/Mosquito‑type work. A Corsair‑type land‑based strike fighter would make perfect sense. But tactical air now faces a stronger Luftwaffe, because Germany isn't bleeding pilots and fuel defending the Reich. Air superiority takes longer, and CAS losses rise.

German transport and fuel systems also survive longer, making the Italian campaign and any early southern France landing harder to sustain.

Net effect: no clear shortening of the war, and a real possibility of a longer, harsher ground campaign once the Luftwaffe remains intact into 1944

 

[Alan Stevens]

Even without a city‑burning strategic bombing campaign, the Pacific war can't be fought as a pure naval blockade. Japan was already cut off from overseas resources by mid‑1945, yet the Army leadership still intended to fight on despite mass starvation. A blockade was necessary, but not sufficient; the Allies still needed the Marianas, Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa to base long‑range reconnaissance, mining, anti‑shipping strikes, and suppression of kamikaze airfields. Those missions required B‑29s, B‑24s, PB4Ys, and carrier air groups even if you remove incendiary raids.

Without strategic bombing, Japan's fuel stocks, dispersed industry, and air infrastructure degrade more slowly, which means more aircraft, more trained pilots, and a stronger kamikaze threat into late 1945. The siege tightens, but surrender moves later, not earlier, and civilian losses rise sharply. The Pacific still ends in a grinding attritional squeeze — just a longer and harsher one.

Even without a city‑burning strategic bombing campaign, the Pacific war can't be fought as a pure naval blockade. Japan was already cut off from overseas resources by mid‑1945, yet the Army leadership still intended to fight on despite mass starvation. A blockade was necessary, but not sufficient; the Allies still needed the Marianas, Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa to base long‑range reconnaissance, mining, anti‑shipping strikes, and suppression of kamikaze airfields. Those missions required B‑29s, B‑24s, PB4Ys, and carrier air groups even if you remove incendiary raids.

Without strategic bombing, Japan's fuel stocks, dispersed industry, and air infrastructure degrade more slowly, which means more aircraft, more trained pilots, and a stronger kamikaze threat into late 1945. The siege tightens, but surrender moves later, not earlier, and civilian losses rise sharply. The Pacific still ends in a grinding attritional squeeze — just a longer and harsher one.

Once you remove both strategic bombing and the atomic bomb, the Pacific war stretches deep into 1946 and very plausibly into 1947. And the reasons are structural, not speculative.

 

[GrauGeist]

One often overlooked issue the Luftwaffe had, was production facilities and transport of their aircraft.
Without strategic bombing of manufacturing centers, aircraft production would not have been hampered. I see the word "tactical bombing" used, but in the real timeline, the Germans had killing zones laid out with their AA batteries, which did have a considerable effect on the Lancs, B-17s and B-24 bombers. Attempting medium altitude "tactical bombing" on industrial centers would have been an extremely costly adventure.
Additionally, a great many Bf109, Fw190 and Me262 airframes were lost to strategic bombing both at the manufacturing facilities and in transit to the front.
That would mean considerably more fighters available to counter the tactical bombing missions - so is the switch from strategic to tactical going to be worth it?

 

[Dimlee]

A better strategy might be to use Beaufighters and Mosquitos to intensively patrol the areas just outside the submarine ports, close enough for single engined fighters to escort.

I'm not sure it can work long-term. U-boats can dive near the coast.

The B25s would be more suitable for the Russian front.

B-25, A-20, Mosquito - if Allies can spare them. Would love to add the B-26, but it was probably harder to handle for low-trained pilots, as I understand.

Would this "no strategic bombing" scenario allow the USA to send more aluminium and copper to the USSR? It would boost the production of the most modern aircraft, such as the Tu-2.

 

[Shortround6]

Did they destroy U-boat pens by bombing? This sounds like a job for Tallboys and Grand Slams, in daylight, from Lancasters, in the face of intense air opposition. A better strategy might be to use Beaufighters and Mosquitos to intensively patrol the areas just outside the submarine ports, close enough for single engined fighters to escort. In the absence of strategic bombing, huge resources are available.

The British had a pretty good idea of what worked with aircraft and what didn't and they knew that in WW I.
However, using aircraft to act as convoy escorts did not fit into the picture of air power that the RAF had of themselves or the narrative they were trying to sell the politicians.
The RAF was supposed to win the war all by itself with no help from either the army or the navy.
In reverse order of actual importance of air missions against the U-boats were,
1. Who carried if the U-boats were sitting in concrete bunkers in France, if they were in the bunkers they weren't at sea sinking ships.
2. Who really cared if the U-boats were 30 or 60 miles off the French coast. There weren't any British ships 30-60 miles off the French coast.
3. Who really cared if U-boats were cruising around 150-300 miles away from any convoys? If they were that far away they wouldn't be sinking anything today.
4. What was important was spotting U-boats close enough to see/detect a convoy and forcing them to submerge (lose contact) or damaging them or destroying them.

The last was not seen as being aggressive enough or glorious enough. They were forgetting that true success was the number of ships that made it to port with cargos. Actually, killing U-boats was secondary. Loosing 3-4 merchant ships and killing one U boat was not really a win.

This is somewhat simplistic and advantages in both detection and weapons went back and forth during the war.
But the whole campaign of bombing the U-boats in the building yards or in the Ports (German or French) was a near total failure.
From 1939-1942 only one boat was sunk by bombing either in port or in a building yard. One boat was sunk in March 1940 in the Jade Bight.
It appears that a U-boat was more likely to be sunk by collision by a friendly ship than to be destroyed by bombing in a building yard or base.
Embarrassing enough it seems that the first 'Kill' in a building yard was the U-237 on the 14th of May 1943 by the 8th Air Force. I have stopped looking at U-boat.net

 

[ThomasP]

Some possibilities:

IIRC Attacks on the U-boat pens were planned using Mosquitoes and/or A-20s with either torpedoes or a similar system to Highball. Basically sending the torpedo, or bouncing the bomb, into the mouths of the pens. No idea of how effective this would have been, but it would have been interesting to see if it was. Plus, in this scenario the power flushing of the U-boat pens by dropping very large bombs in the waterway just outside of the pens would still be acceptable.

A reduction in the strategic bombing efforts could have allowed more 4-engine GR aircraft for convoy escort and the anti-U-boat campaign, earlier in the war, thereby maybe shortening the North Atlantic campaign.


In the PTO re the blockade

US ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence) was continuously intercepting and decoding Japanese transmissions until the end of the war. There were also several spies on the Japanese mainland that managed to get intel to the Allies. While there were some of the Japanese High Command that wanted to fight to the death of every Japanese citizen, they were in the minority, and the average soldier and civilian had no such intentions.

Add in the fact that regardless of what a few fanatics wanted:

ONI ELINT/HUMINT collected in late-July 1945 indicated that starvation would set in soon (half rationing had already begun in the Spring) and would start having serious and debilitating morale effects within 2 months. The position of the majority of the Japanese High Command was that surrender would be "necessary" within a few months - the only real question for the non-fanatic Japanese High Command members was what terms were acceptable (they were not aware that the US intent was to force unconditional surrender, regardless of anything else, since the early-1930s). The USN High Command pushed for largely drawing back and waiting for starvation to cause Japan's surrender, the US Army/Air Force High Command did not. (Note that the USN High Command was aware of the viability of the A-bomb since shortly before its deployment.) The decision to drop the A-bomb was due to the rational that it was likely to shorten the war and thereby save Allied lives, and had virtually nothing to do with saving Japanese lives - as can be attested to by the various plans put forward by the US High Command before and during the war, which included mass gas attacks of every city in Japan in one or more of the pre- and early-war plans, as was fire bombing of every city, and the record of acknowledged willingness to A-bomb as many cities as necessary. There were worries in the political realm that the political backlash would be unacceptable if the US did not use the A-bomb, and even a relatively small number of US troops were killed while waiting for Japan to surrender due to starvation.

IIUC The shortage of raw materials and food was caused (almost in its entirety) by the mining of ports and sinking of the Japanese transport fleet (whether by air or by submarine). While a few areas were affected by the destruction of the rail system, most of the effective destruction was accomplished by what we would define as tactical bombing in the discussion. Japan still had significant stocks of aviation fuel, and a fair number of aircraft - whether to be used for normal warfare or Kamikaze attacks - but their Navy was neutralized. The neutralization and destruction of the Japanese Navy was done by USN aircraft and the mining of the harbors (either by submarine or USN/USAAF aircraft).

In this scenario, in any of the major theaters the presence of long-range (4-engine?) heavy bomber type aircraft would still be needed, whether for attacking point targets or laying mines at longer ranges, but how many is open to question.

Again, exactly how much this would change the course of the war is also open to discussion.

 

[EwenS]

Some possibilities:

IIRC Attacks on the U-boat pens were planned using Mosquitoes and/or A-20s with either torpedoes or a similar system to Highball. Basically sending the torpedo, or bouncing the bomb, into the mouths of the pens. No idea of how effective this would have been, but it would have been interesting to see if it was. Plus, in this scenario the power flushing of the U-boat pens by dropping very large bombs in the waterway just outside of the pens would still be acceptable.

Any such missions to attack the face of the pens would have been suicide operations.

Look at the position of the pens themselves. Few faced open waters. Most faced harbour basins or rivers with limited room for aircraft to manoeuvre in front of them to take aim, drop their weapons and clear the AA positions all around as well as on top of the pens. Keroman I & II at Lorient were located on land with the only water access via a ship lift contained in one of the bunkers and under a significant amount of concrete.

Look at the difficulties faced by the Beauforts attacking S & G at Brest in 1941, where one pilot received a posthumous VC for actually putting a torpedo in Gneisenau. No other such attempt was made.

Kenneth Campbell (VC) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

A reduction in the strategic bombing efforts could have allowed more 4-engine GR aircraft for convoy escort and the anti-U-boat campaign, earlier in the war, thereby maybe shortening the North Atlantic campaign.


In the PTO re the blockade

US ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence) was continuously intercepting and decoding Japanese transmissions until the end of the war. There were also several spies on the Japanese mainland that managed to get intel to the Allies. While there were some of the Japanese High Command that wanted to fight to the death of every Japanese citizen, they were in the minority, and the average soldier and civilian had no such intentions.

Add in the fact that regardless of what a few fanatics wanted:

ONI ELINT/HUMINT collected in late-July 1945 indicated that starvation would set in soon (half rationing had already begun in the Spring) and would start having serious and debilitating morale effects within 2 months. The position of the majority of the Japanese High Command was that surrender would be "necessary" within a few months - the only real question for the non-fanatic Japanese High Command members was what terms were acceptable (they were not aware that the US intent was to force unconditional surrender, regardless of anything else, since the early-1930s). The USN High Command pushed for largely drawing back and waiting for starvation to cause Japan's surrender, the US Army/Air Force High Command did not. (Note that the USN High Command was aware of the viability of the A-bomb since shortly before its deployment.) The decision to drop the A-bomb was due to the rational that it was likely to shorten the war and thereby save Allied lives, and had virtually nothing to do with saving Japanese lives - as can be attested to by the various plans put forward by the US High Command before and during the war, which included mass gas attacks of every city in Japan in one or more of the pre- and early-war plans, as was fire bombing of every city, and the record of acknowledged willingness to A-bomb as many cities as necessary. There were worries in the political realm that the political backlash would be unacceptable if the US did not use the A-bomb, and even a relatively small number of US troops were killed while waiting for Japan to surrender due to starvation.

IIUC The shortage of raw materials and food was caused (almost in its entirety) by the mining of ports and sinking of the Japanese transport fleet (whether by air or by submarine). While a few areas were affected by the destruction of the rail system, most of the effective destruction was accomplished by what we would define as tactical bombing in the discussion. Japan still had significant stocks of aviation fuel, and a fair number of aircraft - whether to be used for normal warfare or Kamikaze attacks - but their Navy was neutralized. The neutralization and destruction of the Japanese Navy was done by USN aircraft and the mining of the harbors (either by submarine or USN/USAAF aircraft).

In this scenario, in any of the major theaters the presence of long-range (4-engine?) heavy bomber type aircraft would still be needed, whether for attacking point targets or laying mines at longer ranges, but how many is open to question.

Again, exactly how much this would change the course of the war is also open to discussion.

In relation to the aircraft mining campaign against Japan, it breaks down into two parts.

1. The Inner Area i.e. the waters around the Japanese Home Islands; and
2. The Outer Area i.e. everything else including the DEI, Chinese waters and rivers.

As for the USAAF, the first challenge is to get them on board earlier.

Aircraft mining of the Inner Area doesn't really become possible until bases were established on the Mariana Islands in the autumn of 1944. The task was then allocated to the 4 B-29 bomb groups in 313th Bomb Wing (about 180 aircraft at full strength), which after training in the USA, flew its first mining operation at the end of March 1945 and continued until Aug. IIRC, at one point the campaign had to be suspended due to a lack of mine stocks in the Marianas at that particular point in time.

Wayback Machine

AFAICT, Kenney's 5th & 13th AF don't seem to have had much interest in mining, being happy to leave it to the USN and RAAF. 14th AF in China took to mining Chinese rivers like the Yangtze.

It was June / July 1945 before tactical bombers arrived on Okinawa to begin striking across the southern part of Japan and up to Korea.

USN submarine commanders did not particularly like laying mines. Article on their contribution is here.

https://archive.navalsubleague.org/2007/u-s-submarine-mining-successes-during-world-war-ii

RN contribution can be found here.

British Naval Minelaying in World War 2, including submarines and coastal craft

 

[ThomasP]

re

Keroman I & II at Lorient were located on land with the only water access via a ship lift contained in one of the bunkers and under a significant amount of concrete.

Interesting. I did not know that.

How much run-up to target did the Mosquito/A-26 size Highball need? (I do not know.)


re the USAAF getting on board with a different strategic mission in the PTO.

We have to assume in this scenario that things like the USAAF accepting taking on different mission profiles is possible, if for no other reason than their CIC demands it. Otherwise it is not a what-if.

 

[EwenS]

re

Interesting. I did not know that.

How much run-up to target did the Mosquito/A-26 size Highball need? (I do not know.)

The dropping parameters for Highball were established during trials against the old French battleship Courbet in summer 1943 when she was moored in Loch Striven and then in 1944 against the RN battleship Malaya. These were:-

Dropping speed - 360mph
Dropping height - 50-60ft
As for the dropping distance from the target, trials in 1943 saw drops starting at 1,600 yards down to 200 yards. With modified Highballs in 1944 against the battleship Malaya, a drop from 600 yards produced 3 bounces with 1,700 yards producing 17, but a realistic limit was 1,500 yards. The sweet spot seems to have been established at 1,200 yards. Successful drops were made at up to 60° from target centre line.

This was from a modified Mosquito IV carrying two Highballs with no defensive armament. Highball itself, in its final form in 1944, weighed 1,280lb but only contained 600lb of Torpex explosive and used a modified Mk.XIV depth charge pistol to explode it under water.

In terms of potential targets, only the U-boat pens at Brest were considered a realistic target with hits required on multiple pens implying a large force. Other potential targets were the protected locks to the basins at St Nazaire and La Pallice. But those presented a much narrower target that would have been harder to hit.

It was autumn 1944 before all the problems with Highball and it's sighting systems were ironed out. There was then a rush programme to modify a batch of Highball Mossies to operational spec for carrier operations before they left for Australia at the end of Oct 1944.

As for the US involvement

"In January 1945, a USAAF Douglas A-26 Invader was adapted by Vickers technicians to carry two Highballs. They were almost completely enclosed in the aircraft's bomb bay, using parts from a Mosquito conversion. After brief flight testing in the UK, the kit was sent across the Atlantic to Wright Field, Ohio, and installed in an A-26C Invader. Over two dozen inert Highballs – apparently known to the Americans as Speedee bombs – were dispatched to the US for use in the USAAF trials. Release tests were carried out over Choctawhatchee Bay near Eglin Field, Florida. Tragically, on April 28, 1945, during a drop test, the inert Speedee bounced dangerously and struck the Invader, breaking its fuselage apart and causing it to crash fatally. The project was subsequently abandoned."
This is the footage of the unfortunate incident with the A-26 in April 1945. Looks like the pilot got a bit too low before release.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F-0czoTQOTc

 

[ThomasP]

Thank you for the info.

 

[MikeMeech]

2. Who really cared if the U-boats were 30 or 60 miles off the French coast. There weren't any British ships 30-60 miles off the French coast.

Hi
I presume this is ignoring the English Channel which is off the French coast, 350 miles long, 21 miles wide at its narrowest point and 150 miles wide at its widest. So there would be a 'number' of British ships 30-60 miles off the French coast!

Mike

 

[Shortround6]

Hi
I presume this is ignoring the English Channel which is off the French coast, 350 miles long, 21 miles wide at its narrowest point and 150 miles wide at its widest. So there would be a 'number' of British ships 30-60 miles off the French coast!

Mike

Caught ne
However, going by Google maps. It is about 60 miles from the NE corner of Normandy to Isle of Wight
After that is the area, on the British side, that runs from a little SW of Eastbourne through Dover and up to Ramsgate that is within 60 miles of France. About 90 miles in Length.
30 mile limit runs from about Dungeness-Mont Soleil to Deal-Calais (or 2 miles further east) and is about 30 miles worth of channel.
Granted British coastal convoys cannot hug the British beaches to the last mile.
One the other hand, a lot of the Channel in the area of Dover is only around 20 meters deep. NOT good area for subs although they did transit it.

 

[EwenS]

Convince the Russians to allow UK/US air forces to be involved on the Eastern Front, with the USAAF 8th AF operating as grand tactical assets against German forces and rear areas. The Soviet air and ground assets would operate more-or-less as they did historically, with the USAAF 8th AF concentrating on destroying the logistics chain and mobility of the German ground forces. Assuming the opening stages of the war happened more or less historically - at least through middle-1942(?) after the Battle for Moscow - this could really mess up the German plans for a mobile campaign and anybody surviving the retreat from Russia..

Politically, that might be harder than you think. Look at the background to British & US operations that did take place on Soviet soil. While at first these seem cordial, that very quickly developed into one where the Soviets treated foreigners with deep suspicion.:-

Operation Benedict in 1941 - 81 & 134 Hurricane squadrons forming 151 Wing in Northern Russia

Operation Benedict - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Operation Orator in Sept 1942 - 2 squadrons of Hampdens to Northern Russia in support of convoy PQ18.

Operation Orator - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Operation Frantic July -Sept 1944 - shuttle bombing of German targets by aircraft of 8th & 15th AF usinf three airbases around Poltava in what is now Ukraine. Note the limitations on personnel and types of unit the Soviets were prepared to have on their soil.

Operation Frantic - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Also see how merchant sailors were treated during their stopovers, or sometimes forced longer stays, by the Soviets.

This article sheds light on the difficulties faced by the British Mission in Moscow in WW2.
'They treat us with scant respect': prejudice and pride in British Military Liaison with the Soviet Union in the Second World War

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2021.2003845#abstract

Co-operation was certainly not being seen as a two way street. Soviet "co-operation" seems to have waxed and waned according to how much "help" was seen as coming from the Western Allies in opening other battle fronts.

The biggest problem however lay in Russian / Soviet attitudes to outsiders over centuries. As it was put in the article:-

"These differences aside, Miles put forward a number of explanations for the general Soviet reserve towards collaboration. There was the deep suspicion of foreigners, which had pervaded Russian history for centuries and which had been actively encouraged by the communist regime since 1917, allied to the inherent secretiveness of all Russians. This meant that there were structural and cultural barricades against the free, informal and mutual exchange of ideas and information."

And also:-

"Miles also detected an inferiority complex about Russian facilities and materiel, which was disguised by boastful talk about the superiority of all things Soviet over anything produced under capitalism."

These are deeply ingrained issues that would need overcome before the Soviets would be allowing any troops / air forces onto Soviet soil. At the end of the day changing those would, IMHO, be impossible.

 

[Shortround6]

Not helped by the British, French, Americans and others taking part in the Russian civil war from 1919 to 1922 to a greater or lesser extent. Always on the anti-Soviet side (restore the czar!). Some soviet officers that had survived the purges had fought against western troops 20 years earlier.