On German bombers

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Let's not forget the Germans bombed England in WW I using Gotha bombers ( among others, including zepplins) so the idea of strategic bombing wasn't British alone.
An He 111 should have had a radius of about 750km (450miles?) With a 4400lb bomb load and one hour reserve.
Not quite as good as the Wellington but not too shabby for a "tactical" bomber.
 
An He 111 should have had a radius of about 750km (450miles?) With a 4400lb bomb load and one hour reserve.
Not quite as good as the Wellington but not too shabby for a "tactical" bomber.

About the same as a Hampden, which soldiered on with Bomber Command into 1942. Important to note that Air Ministry Specification B.9/32 to which it was initially built was for a medium bomber and that is how I'd describe the He 111 too.
Cheers
Steve
 
For the Hampden i've range (155 mph at 15,000*) (60 gals of allowance) with 5,000 lbs (1,000 on wings) 775 (miles), with 2,000 lbs 1820 (miles)



*the speed and altitude to most economical cruise is give to mean weight for all the bombers
 
Please note that this chart is with external bombs and additional fuel/oil in the bomb bay. Standard fuel is 3450l
 
Indeed, any bomb bigger than a 250 kg one would not fit in the fuselage.

View of the bomb racks is attached. 'Windgitter' is the spoiler that was deployed prior the release of bomb(s) from the ESAC (as mentioned eleswhere, max load a 250 kg bomb per one ESAC); 'Notzughebel' should be the handle for emergency bomb release. 'Bombenklappen' are the ESAC dors. Between two rows of the ESAC there was a walkway for the crew.

 
Since I plan to add some data sheets about the Ju 88, here is a translation of one such a sheet, so you people can quickly understand the others (open the pic separately):

 
One thing overlooked in this thread is the rationale behind the development of the strategic bomber arm. The luftwaffe was not developed with the foresight that encompassed long range massed bombing formations. Blitzkreig was the order of the day, achieved with Ju 87's for close support, good light/medium bombers like the the JU 88, and short range escort fighters like the Bf 109, which was the equal of anything else out there in 1940. The war was planned to be over in a short time, and there was simply no long term need envisaged. I know this sounds overly simplistic, but it does basically cover it.
 
The He 111 was fielded in vastly greater numbers than the Ju 88 prior 1941, especially against the France and Low countries in mid 1941. Ditto for the Do 17. From Wikipedia (I know..):

Some 133 Ju 88s were pressed into the Blitzkrieg [against France], but very high combat losses and accidents forced a quick withdrawal from action to re-train crews to fly this very high-performance aircraft

There was only 12 Ju 88 deployed against Poland.

The luftwaffe was not developed with the foresight that encompassed long range massed bombing formations. Blitzkreig was the order of the day, achieved with Ju 87's for close support,

In 1939 and 1940 combined, there was less that 740 of the Ju 87 produced. Against 475 Do 17 and 1200+ He 111. Had not the 2-engined bombers attacked air other military bases, supply dumps, railroad junctions and other operational and strategic targets, the Ju 87 would've had far more trouble and less success. The 2-engined bombers were an integral part pf the Blitzkrieg every bit as Ju 87, and then some more.
Again from Wikipedia:

Battle of France

The Luftwaffe's order of battle for the French campaign reveals all but one of the Luftwaffe's Fliegerkorps (I. Fliegerkorps) contained Ju 88s in the combat role. The mixed bomber units, including the Ju 88, of Kampfgeschwader 51 (under the command of Luftflotte 3) helped claim between 233 and 248 Allied aircraft on the ground between 10–13 May 1940.[26] The Ju 88 was particularly effective at dive-bombing. Between 13–24 May, I. and II./KG 54 flew 174 attack against rail systems, paralysing French logistics and mobility.
 
Thanks for all the data, but my point was that 4 engined bombers were not considered to be a necessary addition to the existing types in service. The Ju 88 was picked out at random as being a good medium twin engined bomber, although the He 111 was produced in greater numbers etc. The battle of Britain showed up some obvious flaws in the strategic level, as well as proving the vulnerability of the JU 87 without adequate escort. Like so many of the major mistakes made ( like invading Poland in the first place),the Luftwaffe could never had delivered what was required of it.
 
The He 177 was able to de-couple a desired 'half' of one of it's coupled engines, the performance chart posted recently on the forum shows the climb conditions on 3 engines, as well as two 'halves' running on each side. So it was technically a 4-engined job, and it was featured in Luftwaffe's plans. However, someone in the RLM or/and LW brass thought there is a good thing to couple the engines, while the dive bombing for such a heavy bomber is a must - a self inflicted wound.

The battle of Britain showed up some obvious flaws in the strategic level, as well as proving the vulnerability of the JU 87 without adequate escort.

Not only the Ju 87 was vulnerable, all of the LW bombers were fair game for the RAF if unescorted.

Like so many of the major mistakes made ( like invading Poland in the first place),the Luftwaffe could never had delivered what was required of it.

Invading Poland was not LW's mistake. The LW delivered what was required prior the BoB, and then against the Balkans and Soviet Union prior 1943.
 
In my book "luftwaffe secret projects;Bombers", there is a relatively good section on the He177, which showed that that the aircraft was basically flawed from the outset. Using two coupled engines to drive one prop was a mechanical absurdity, leading to extensive maintainence and cooling issues. Even Goering is quoted as stating that asking a 4 engine bomber to dive was " complete lunacy". The He 277 was a far better proposition but nothing ever came of it. I didn't say that the Luftwaffe decided to invade Poland, but need to clarify that mistakes were made during the war from start to finish, by the people at the top, and the Luftwaffe would never have had the capability to affect the outcome.
 
Using two coupled engines to drive one prop was a mechanical absurdity, leading to extensive maintainence and cooling issues.

Not just that. The exhaust pipes were on the lower portion of the nacelle, just waiting for to ignite the leaked oil. Mostly solved when DB 610 was installed, though, but they never should've went for coupled engines on the 1st place.
The requirement to dive bomb was not helping either.

Even Goering is quoted as stating that asking a 4 engine bomber to dive was " complete lunacy".

Goering was the costumer. It was his mistake for allowing the coupled engines on a bomber at the 1st place - suddenly it is someone else's fault??
But then, expecting from Goering to make sound decisions is probably asking too much.
 

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