operation Market garden
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Thorlifter
Captain
The idea was fine. The intelligence was bad. "IF" the intelligence was accurate, the offensive would probably had succeeded.
Also remember, the assault was successful initially. Had the British been able to secure and hold Arnhem, the whole operation would have succeeded.
Also remember, the assault was successful initially. Had the British been able to secure and hold Arnhem, the whole operation would have succeeded.
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syscom3
Pacific Historian
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as in the amont of people the allies lost they might as thought to invade japan in early 1942
"Had the British been able to secure and hold Arnhem, the whole operation would have succeeded."
The British 1st Airborne captured and held Arnhem longer than anticipated and all the men there fought with extreme determination and bravery. The plan did not just fail because the British failed to "secure and hold Arnhem".
Operation "Market Garden" failed for countless reasons, and the Americans were at fault too. First and foremost the lack of communication between commands and intelligence staff was a bad start; the intelligence was present from the outset but it wasn't taken onboard - and the true extent of the German presence wasn't realised.
Secondly there weren't enough aircraft for the drops to be made; the British drops at Oosterbeek were made in waves and the initial surprise was lost. The U.S. drops had all the aircraft required. The British drop at Oosterbeek was too far from the objective; and the paratroopers had to struggle on foot to Arnhem bridge. And I believe the U.S drop at Nijmegen was also made too far from that bridge.
Short range radios for the 1st Airborne left them out of contact for days.
The British XXX Corps were held back for confirmation of the drop, and then refused to make a night march on the first night. The Son bridge had been blown by the Germans when the U.S. 101st approached; this led the XXX Corps to slow down and then stop to repair the bridge.
XXX Corps then had to help the 82nd Airborne capture Nijmegen bridge. And then were held on the single road leading to Arnhem. Meanwhile British 1st Airborne clung onto their positions on the north side of Arnhem which they had captured on the 3rd day of the battle.
The American fliers were also partially to blame for not making the entire drop on the first day, despite having all the aircraft available for the U.S drops. One large drop on day one would have secured Nijmegen and, possibly, Son.
And finally, the skill and determination of the German defenders is always forgotten. The German defence was quick to apply pressure to the attacking paratroopers and there was a constant aggressive drive toward the landing zones. Without delay or meetings the average German soldier would head toward the firing and jump in the line against the Allied troops...
The British 1st Airborne captured and held Arnhem longer than anticipated and all the men there fought with extreme determination and bravery. The plan did not just fail because the British failed to "secure and hold Arnhem".
Operation "Market Garden" failed for countless reasons, and the Americans were at fault too. First and foremost the lack of communication between commands and intelligence staff was a bad start; the intelligence was present from the outset but it wasn't taken onboard - and the true extent of the German presence wasn't realised.
Secondly there weren't enough aircraft for the drops to be made; the British drops at Oosterbeek were made in waves and the initial surprise was lost. The U.S. drops had all the aircraft required. The British drop at Oosterbeek was too far from the objective; and the paratroopers had to struggle on foot to Arnhem bridge. And I believe the U.S drop at Nijmegen was also made too far from that bridge.
Short range radios for the 1st Airborne left them out of contact for days.
The British XXX Corps were held back for confirmation of the drop, and then refused to make a night march on the first night. The Son bridge had been blown by the Germans when the U.S. 101st approached; this led the XXX Corps to slow down and then stop to repair the bridge.
XXX Corps then had to help the 82nd Airborne capture Nijmegen bridge. And then were held on the single road leading to Arnhem. Meanwhile British 1st Airborne clung onto their positions on the north side of Arnhem which they had captured on the 3rd day of the battle.
The American fliers were also partially to blame for not making the entire drop on the first day, despite having all the aircraft available for the U.S drops. One large drop on day one would have secured Nijmegen and, possibly, Son.
And finally, the skill and determination of the German defenders is always forgotten. The German defence was quick to apply pressure to the attacking paratroopers and there was a constant aggressive drive toward the landing zones. Without delay or meetings the average German soldier would head toward the firing and jump in the line against the Allied troops...
= Quote from the movie A Bridge to Far
Thorlifter
Captain
Thanks Plan_D. I always learn from you guys!
Brig. General James Gavin: So that's it. We're pulling them out. It was Nijmegen.
Lt. Colonel J.O.E. Vandeleur: It was the single road getting to Nijmegen.
Lt. General Horrocks: No, it was after Nijmegen.
Lt. General Frederick "Boy" Browning: And the fog, in England.
Maj. General Stanislaw Sosabowski: Doesn't matter what it was. When one man says to another, "I know what let's do today, let's play the war game."... everybody dies
Lt. Colonel J.O.E. Vandeleur: It was the single road getting to Nijmegen.
Lt. General Horrocks: No, it was after Nijmegen.
Lt. General Frederick "Boy" Browning: And the fog, in England.
Maj. General Stanislaw Sosabowski: Doesn't matter what it was. When one man says to another, "I know what let's do today, let's play the war game."... everybody dies
ccheese
Member In Perpetuity
Perhaps the best book on the subject is Corneluis Ryan's "A Bridge Too Far".
Excellent reading......
Charles
Excellent reading......
Charles
You are kidding right?
Thorlifter
Captain
You can't compare the two Fly Boy.
I guess your point is Operation Market Garden was such a failure that they should have attacked Japan, which would have been an equal failure. But it's not. You can't compare a failed operation with the estimated 1,000,000+ dead with the invasion of Japan.
Also, the allies knew there would be catastrophic loses attacking Japan. They though Market Garden would succeed.
I guess your point is Operation Market Garden was such a failure that they should have attacked Japan, which would have been an equal failure. But it's not. You can't compare a failed operation with the estimated 1,000,000+ dead with the invasion of Japan.
Also, the allies knew there would be catastrophic loses attacking Japan. They though Market Garden would succeed.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
It would have been interesting to see if Patton could have cracked the Seigreid line in Sept of that year IF he had been given the resources that went to Market-Garden.
1 Million+ dead, where did you get this figure? IMO those Japs were already militarily and industrial wise dead before even the A-bombs hit them.
Regards
Kruska
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
There would of been over a million casualties had Japan been invaded. They would have fallen but the toll would have been immense.
Sys, that's part an partial to my perspective on this thing. I don't think there really was a blitzkrieg solution to the war by the fall of '44. It was a trick that was played and everyone knew how to do it. In 1940, it was new, but by the time of Market Garden, the way to defeat an penetration in depth had been established (hold the shoulders and elastic defense). It was shown at the Battle of the Bulge (and the primary reason why the Bulge was just that).
Ike's Wide Front Strategy took more time and involved far less glamour but it worked simply because the Wermacht could not handle the threat in all those places at the same time. As much as the Allies were stained, to an even greater extent the Germans were as well. Oil, personel, ammunition, you name it, all were in demand and not readily available.
I think Monty's Strategy (and to the same extent, Patton's) were flawed to the extent that neither of them could put men through a breach in the enemies line (at one spot) faster than the Germans could contain it. In half a dozen spots, yes. In one spot or sector, no.
Have to toss in the Japanese dead (home islands) from Starvation, Overwork and Disease. Plus, add in the civilians dying in those territories held by the Japanese that were victims of the same affects due to the cut off Japanese troops taking whatever they needed and leaving them with nothing. As well, need to add in the Allied Prisoners of War that would've been executed when the invasion started and finally, add in the combat deaths from the actual invasion.
You'd go over a million dead in probably the 3rd to 4th month. From there on in, the toll would probably rise and an increasing rate.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Yep......
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