operation Market garden
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Some people defending the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki use that number but it really isn't credible. Same with the low end people who say it would've been in the range of 38K KIA.
Total casualties for the US generally went in the realm of 4 WIA (wounded in action) for every KIA (Killed in Action). The people who really had a good line on the total casualties for the invasion were the people who made the medals for the Purple Heart. Unfortunately, they had a lot of experience and had gotten good at figuring out the number of medals they would need. They made up 500K of the medal for the invasion of Japan. By the above extrapolation, that means roughly 100,000 KIA and 400,000 WIA for the US (probably includes allies too).
Japanese military casualties were tyically 4 to 1 for Marine operations and 17 to 1 for Army operations. Going for the middle ground, that comes out to about 10 to 1 for the Japanese Military. So we're looking at about a million Japanese Soliders dead but a lesser number wounded (they simply didn't evacuate their wounded very well so a guy who may've survived the wound would become a KIA due to neglect or incapacity of the system to handle his case).
Japanese civilians would've starved. Simply that. By the end of 1945, the food shortages (caused by crop failures and destruction of the transit system in the pre-invasion bombardment) coupled with grueling would load would've starved (or put at starvation level) most of the city dwellers. Those out in the country would've been somewhat better off as long as they were not in the way of the fighting. Probably would've at least survived. But the urban populations would've been decimated (real decimation, not the adjective-we're talking 10% of the population in the urban areas). Starvation leads to disease outbreaks as well as malnutrition. A guess at the number would be something like 1.5 to 5 million dead depending on how long the war went on. If it got into 1946, with the failure of the rice crop in the fall of 1945 taken into account, the higher the number gets.
End result is millions of Japanese dead (both civilian and military), hundreds of thousands of Allied Casualties, several hundred thousand allied civilian dead (in territories occupied by the Japanese- China, Java, Burma, ect) and probably the end of Japan as a coherent nation.
Thanks Kruska, appreciate it. Got the info from a bunch of books on the subject. Richard Franks wrote one (I think it is called "Downfall") as did a bunch of other people. Serious scholars generally come in around that number.
Oddly enough, there are a bunch of crosschecks based on the stats that support the number. On Kyushu, in late August of the '45, there were something like 820K Japanese troops (planners had estimated 325K by the time of the invasion on Nov 1). More troops were coming in so the number of 1 million (in Army Troops) is plausable. That would reinforce the 10/1 KIA rate for the Allied Troops.
There was a second check regarding the number of hospita beds being reserved for the invasion that also supported the number but I forgett it at the momment.
Long and short, the estimates of a million allied dead were way high and the estimates of 50k allied dead were way low. Most of the planners who were going to be responsible for actually moving the dead and wounded or giving them medals had a better idea than revisionist.
Oddly enough, there are a bunch of crosschecks based on the stats that support the number. On Kyushu, in late August of the '45, there were something like 820K Japanese troops (planners had estimated 325K by the time of the invasion on Nov 1). More troops were coming in so the number of 1 million (in Army Troops) is plausable. That would reinforce the 10/1 KIA rate for the Allied Troops.
There was a second check regarding the number of hospita beds being reserved for the invasion that also supported the number but I forgett it at the momment.
Long and short, the estimates of a million allied dead were way high and the estimates of 50k allied dead were way low. Most of the planners who were going to be responsible for actually moving the dead and wounded or giving them medals had a better idea than revisionist.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
The medical staff (at the highest levels of the war dept) were usually correct in their assements of "future" casualties. They derived their figures after seeing what happened on Saipan and Okinawa.
One million Japanese dead civillians was not an underestimate.
They knew that once the transport system in Japan was paralyzed, famine was going to begin immediatly. And the systematic attack on the transport system was to begin in Sept 1945.
Often forgotten, but maybe the main reason why the British failed: They jumped to far from the bridge. Believe me, I walked that part, from the Ginkelse heide to Arnhem, it's long walk. It's even surprising that Frost made it to the bridge. As it was, surprise was not on the side of the British, so they could only take the northern part of the bridge and it was held by a small, isolated group. The Germans had all the time in the world to keep Frost separated from the division. It's called "The battle of Arnhem" but apart from Frost, most fighting took place outside Arnhem, the British were not able to get into the city and thus did not capture and hold the city as Plan suggests here, far from it.
Marcel, how long is the walk from the drop zones to the bridge? In terms of minutes or hours, how long does it take? Is the ground flat? Is it built up? Are there any streams to cross? What is the distance in kilometers?
I am curious as I've read plenty on the battle but never walked the ground (hugely important if you want to see what exactly happened). I would like to one day but for now would love to know what your impressions are.
I am curious as I've read plenty on the battle but never walked the ground (hugely important if you want to see what exactly happened). I would like to one day but for now would love to know what your impressions are.
Hi Tim, it's about 15-20 km in a straight line (depending on where on the field you land, it's huge) and unlike the rest of the NL, it's not flat. I don't exactly remember how long it took, but I would say about 3 -4hours, normal walking (in peacetime 
). The main stream there is of course the Rhine, and you don't have to cross a stream as far as I recall enroute to the bridge. What you do have to cross is the railroad, which is in a sort of ditch (don't know how to describe it better), it's lower that the surrounding grounds, with steep borders. There are a lot of trees with not much agricultural ground (again unlike the rest of the NL).
). The main stream there is of course the Rhine, and you don't have to cross a stream as far as I recall enroute to the bridge. What you do have to cross is the railroad, which is in a sort of ditch (don't know how to describe it better), it's lower that the surrounding grounds, with steep borders. There are a lot of trees with not much agricultural ground (again unlike the rest of the NL).Marcel, thanks for the fast reply. I appreciate it.
So we're looking at kinda hilly terrain? Just general ups and downs or something like rolling hills you get in say, Southern Germany or Western France.
Do you know if the ground has changed any since the war? Are there more towns, is it more built up (assuming the drop zones were pretty clear and the city itself was, well, a city).
15-20KM!? That's well over ten miles!? Given you are carrying around 60lbs of equipment and have to cover that before the Germans get organized...what nut thought this one up!?
I read on the web that the first patrols of the 1st Para Div reached the outskirts of Arnhem around 1330 hours. Does anyone know the time of the drop?
My reason for asking is I wanted to know how much time the Paras would have (according to the plan) to get set up once they'd gotten into Arnhem before nightfall. Just trying to get my head around it.
So we're looking at kinda hilly terrain? Just general ups and downs or something like rolling hills you get in say, Southern Germany or Western France.
Do you know if the ground has changed any since the war? Are there more towns, is it more built up (assuming the drop zones were pretty clear and the city itself was, well, a city).
15-20KM!? That's well over ten miles!? Given you are carrying around 60lbs of equipment and have to cover that before the Germans get organized...what nut thought this one up!?
I read on the web that the first patrols of the 1st Para Div reached the outskirts of Arnhem around 1330 hours. Does anyone know the time of the drop?
My reason for asking is I wanted to know how much time the Paras would have (according to the plan) to get set up once they'd gotten into Arnhem before nightfall. Just trying to get my head around it.
I believe it was Gen. Urquart. The grounds closer to the city were too wet (general probelm here) and the airforce didn't want to drop near the bridge because of anti a/c on the bridge itself.
HealzDevo
Staff Sergeant
One thing you have to remember with a landing in Japan is that Japanese troops would hold a lot of the cards. That was the reason why Operation Olympus never actually went ahead. The official estimated casualties for an Operation against the Home Japanese Islands in 1945 after Iwo Jima and Tarawa was for approximately 1,000,000 dead. I assume this is in troop numbers. You have to remember that the Japanese coastline is a defenders paradise in terms of rocky coastline, etc.
Hello timshatz and Marcel,
The landing zones around Arnheim were well choosen and the landings were accurate.
I was in the Arnheim region about 10-12 years ago. The terrain is certainly not hilly (compared to South Germany) it is mostly flat with slopes and has several higher ridges – about 5-10m higher than the average surrounding terrain. Trees are more singular or scattered in groups, I can't remember a forest between Wolfheze, Oesterbeek and Arnheim. Most trees didn't look to me being 50 years old, even those 50 years before wouldn't have been much higher than 6-8m. On original Photos one can actually see that around Arnheim trees are very small and scarce = in regards to a forest.
Source: Operation Market Garden September 17 - 27 1944
The British 1st Airborne Corps headquarters landed near to Groesbeek village at around 13.30 while the 1st Parachute Brigade dropped at 13.53 west of Arnhem to complete the British landings.
The 1st Parachute Brigade (under Brigadier G W Lathbury) started to advance towards Arnhem using three routes, 'Lion' (3/Para with the brigade headquarters) which was the main Oosterbeek Highway, 'Leopard' (1/Para) to the north and 'Tiger' (2/Para) "Frost"to the south.
15 – 20 km in a straight line???
Central landing point was around Wolfheze which is about 8-10 km to Arnheim Bridge
Frost's unit was about 7-8 km from Arnheim Bridge. He started off south of Wolfheze at around 3.45PM towards the railway bridge and he had reached Arnheim Bridge by about 8.30PM.
Please see attached map
Regards
Kruska
The landing zones around Arnheim were well choosen and the landings were accurate.
I was in the Arnheim region about 10-12 years ago. The terrain is certainly not hilly (compared to South Germany) it is mostly flat with slopes and has several higher ridges – about 5-10m higher than the average surrounding terrain. Trees are more singular or scattered in groups, I can't remember a forest between Wolfheze, Oesterbeek and Arnheim. Most trees didn't look to me being 50 years old, even those 50 years before wouldn't have been much higher than 6-8m. On original Photos one can actually see that around Arnheim trees are very small and scarce = in regards to a forest.
Source: Operation Market Garden September 17 - 27 1944
The British 1st Airborne Corps headquarters landed near to Groesbeek village at around 13.30 while the 1st Parachute Brigade dropped at 13.53 west of Arnhem to complete the British landings.
The 1st Parachute Brigade (under Brigadier G W Lathbury) started to advance towards Arnhem using three routes, 'Lion' (3/Para with the brigade headquarters) which was the main Oosterbeek Highway, 'Leopard' (1/Para) to the north and 'Tiger' (2/Para) "Frost"to the south.
15 – 20 km in a straight line???
Central landing point was around Wolfheze which is about 8-10 km to Arnheim Bridge
Frost's unit was about 7-8 km from Arnheim Bridge. He started off south of Wolfheze at around 3.45PM towards the railway bridge and he had reached Arnheim Bridge by about 8.30PM.
Please see attached map
Regards
Kruska
Elements of the British 1st Airborne held the north side of Arnhem road bridge; and that is all that was required of them. It has been considered by some that the landing zones at Arnhem and Nijmegen were too far from the bridges.
Rightly or wrongly but approaches have their merits. The 82nd Airborne approach to Nijmegen was a long one that allowed German units to set up defences on boths banks of the Waal. The argument for the LZ being on Groosbeek Heights was that the single highway was more important to hold than the bridge itself. I, for one, think that the U.S. landings there should have been made like the 6th Airborne landings at Caen de Canal bridge for a quick capture.
The British landings at Oosterbeek could have been considered too far, and landings on and around the bridge would have enabled the British to capture it quickly with surprise. It must be remembered that Jeeps were supposed to be accompanying the 1st Airborne into battle; this would have made the distance a lot less critical. Nevertheless, the British held the north side of the bridge for several days and had XXX Corps managed to arrive on time then the Germans would have been crushed between the two forces.
I've been all through Holland, including Oosterbeek and Arnhem, the terrain around there isn't hazardous in any sense. There are wooded areas which would actually suit the paratroopers; open ground would be their downfall against a Panzer division.
Rightly or wrongly but approaches have their merits. The 82nd Airborne approach to Nijmegen was a long one that allowed German units to set up defences on boths banks of the Waal. The argument for the LZ being on Groosbeek Heights was that the single highway was more important to hold than the bridge itself. I, for one, think that the U.S. landings there should have been made like the 6th Airborne landings at Caen de Canal bridge for a quick capture.
The British landings at Oosterbeek could have been considered too far, and landings on and around the bridge would have enabled the British to capture it quickly with surprise. It must be remembered that Jeeps were supposed to be accompanying the 1st Airborne into battle; this would have made the distance a lot less critical. Nevertheless, the British held the north side of the bridge for several days and had XXX Corps managed to arrive on time then the Germans would have been crushed between the two forces.
I've been all through Holland, including Oosterbeek and Arnhem, the terrain around there isn't hazardous in any sense. There are wooded areas which would actually suit the paratroopers; open ground would be their downfall against a Panzer division.
Freebird
Master Sergeant
Market Garden was {like many military operations} a gamble. If it had worked we would have been praising it's brilliance. Consider the {rather foolhardy!} idea of a night attack by Swordfish into Taranto, Italy. By any reasonable measure, the Italians should have been prepared with torpedo nets and able to shoot down most of the attackers. Just as at Pearl Harbour a properly prepared defence would have decimated the Japanese.
If that had happened we would now be musing how stupid it was to try surprise attacks...
If that had happened we would now be musing how stupid it was to try surprise attacks...
Thorlifter
Captain
Well said Freebird.
parsifal
Colonel
I agree with you kinda freebird. However, the flip side of that argument is this...by 1944, the Allies had learnt to be cautious when fighting the Germans. When it came to a war of manouver, the Germans were the masters at it. Eisehowers strategy was to attack across a broad front, applying more or less equal pressure across the entire front, keeping sufficient reserves handy to reinforce any sector of the front under threat. This was a cautious, uninspired kind of generalship, but it was fullproof, if slow. When the Germans tried to apply their armoured breakthrough tactics, notably at the Ardennes, they were fairly easily brought to ground.
Now, whilst the allies had mastered the attritional war they could not beat the germans at a manouver war, and this is precisely what Monty was trying to do at Arnhem. It was a heavy cost for a lesson relearnt
Now, whilst the allies had mastered the attritional war they could not beat the germans at a manouver war, and this is precisely what Monty was trying to do at Arnhem. It was a heavy cost for a lesson relearnt
Thanks for the map Kruska and the info. Good stuff from all.
Couple of quick questions, does the deployments on the map show the the positions of the German Troops at the time of the jump or during the battle (after a couple of days of fighting)? What is the scale of the map in terms of distance?
The drops were around 1pm in the afternoon. Doesn't seem like much time to get to your objective before nightfall. Just a thought.
Freebird, I agree with you that suprise attacks are an excellent strategy. Matter of fact, there is a school of thought that says all strategy boils eventually boils down to suprise. My point is even suprise can not compensate for a poor plan.
Time is critical in a battle. Granted. Distance equates into time. Drop zones further from the objective mean more time to get to the objective causing a loss of suprise.
I guess we are all familar with the movie "A Bridge Too Far" and probably a number of us have even read the book and several like it. Also, it is obvious that many members of this board have walked the ground. Given the knowledge of the battle as it was fought, it seems there had to be a better way to handle this part of the battle. Most of the First Para didn't get to the objective, being held up at Oosterbeek.
I think Plan D got close to it when he notes a glider drop close to the bridges back at Nijmegen. Something of a coupe de main or an assault on both ends of the bridge at the same time.
Why didn't the initial drop zone include the same space where the Poles dropped in a couple days later. If the AAA was so heavy on the 17th, would it be less on the 19th or 20th?
I dunno, it just seems like a squirrely plan that had so many elements in it that worked against it that success was a long shot. You can only screw so many things up before it just all falls apart.
Couple of quick questions, does the deployments on the map show the the positions of the German Troops at the time of the jump or during the battle (after a couple of days of fighting)? What is the scale of the map in terms of distance?
The drops were around 1pm in the afternoon. Doesn't seem like much time to get to your objective before nightfall. Just a thought.
Freebird, I agree with you that suprise attacks are an excellent strategy. Matter of fact, there is a school of thought that says all strategy boils eventually boils down to suprise. My point is even suprise can not compensate for a poor plan.
Time is critical in a battle. Granted. Distance equates into time. Drop zones further from the objective mean more time to get to the objective causing a loss of suprise.
I guess we are all familar with the movie "A Bridge Too Far" and probably a number of us have even read the book and several like it. Also, it is obvious that many members of this board have walked the ground. Given the knowledge of the battle as it was fought, it seems there had to be a better way to handle this part of the battle. Most of the First Para didn't get to the objective, being held up at Oosterbeek.
I think Plan D got close to it when he notes a glider drop close to the bridges back at Nijmegen. Something of a coupe de main or an assault on both ends of the bridge at the same time.
Why didn't the initial drop zone include the same space where the Poles dropped in a couple days later. If the AAA was so heavy on the 17th, would it be less on the 19th or 20th?
I dunno, it just seems like a squirrely plan that had so many elements in it that worked against it that success was a long shot. You can only screw so many things up before it just all falls apart.
Freebird
Master Sergeant
Well it sure did have alot of aspects that could go wrong. There are several posts on the drop zones, and whether they were too far away. I suppose the Allies were being cautious, because of the experience on D-day at st. Mare-Eglise and other places, they didn't want to risk landing too close to a town, because if they were off course they could land on top of it and be machine-gunned out of the sky with no way to defend.
There was also a report I read that due to the stiff defence by Panzers at Arnhem, Gen. Horrocks wanted to divert XXX corps to the next bridge downriver from Oosterbeek {I can't remember the town name} that as it turned out was almost undefended at the time.
If the Allies had a decent heavy tank that could have spearheaded XXX corps it would have made a huge difference. The Sherman Fireflys were not tough enough to survive against most Geman AT fire, so XXX corps had to advance very carefully to avoid getting slaughtered by German ambush. A "super-heavy" tank like the Tortoise could stand up to almost all of the German AT fire except at very close ranges, perhaps they could have pushed on during the night as well. Even if the tank could only do 8 or 10 mph, I think it was less than 50 miles from start point to Arnhem IIRC.
Hello timshatz,
The map shows the position of the British and German troops from 2-3PM onwards on the same day of airdropping.
As for the scale, a straight line from center of Wolfheze to Arnheim Bridge would be 11 km, so I think the British were as close as possible. One can imagine what would have happened to the airdrops if they would have been closer to Arnheim – see the positioning of the German troops.
As for the Polish landing, the AA fire wasn't really the issue – not like in the movies. IIRC more than half of the transport planes actually flew back not because of bad weather, but since strong Luftwaffe units were encountered and reported. The remaining 800-900 polish soldiers that landed didn't really matter in regards to any outcome of the Arnheim objective.
Furthermore if the British had landed closer to the Bridge and actually taken it, FM Model IMO would have ordered the destruction of the Nijmegen Bridge and thus the whole plan would have dissolved itself even earlier – not to mention the outcome in regards to the then entrapped Airborne units in Arnheim with totally no way of retreat.
In conclusion, IMO the whole plan was just to optimistic and relied too much on the estimate of only facing 3rd class worn down German resistance.
Regards
Kruska
Thanks guys, getting a much better picture of what was going on at Arnhem during and immediately after the drop. Good info.
I always believed the SS Panzers were in the neighborhood (10 miles away) when the 1st Para dropped but now realized the Brits dropped right on top of them. In some cases, they were between them and the main objective.
Coming in a 1pm, dropping 10 miles from the target, with an elite enemy armor division in the way and expecting the troops to grab a bridge and defend it is about as bad as it gets. I don't know if it should be put down to poor planning, poor intelligence or overwhelming optimism. There are probably arguements in all directions for this one.
One last question. Does anyone know if the American drops happened earlier than the British drops or were all the drops similtaneous?
I always believed the SS Panzers were in the neighborhood (10 miles away) when the 1st Para dropped but now realized the Brits dropped right on top of them. In some cases, they were between them and the main objective.
Coming in a 1pm, dropping 10 miles from the target, with an elite enemy armor division in the way and expecting the troops to grab a bridge and defend it is about as bad as it gets. I don't know if it should be put down to poor planning, poor intelligence or overwhelming optimism. There are probably arguements in all directions for this one.
One last question. Does anyone know if the American drops happened earlier than the British drops or were all the drops similtaneous?
