"I agree with you kinda freebird. However, the flip side of that argument is this...by 1944, the Allies had learnt to be cautious when fighting the Germans. When it came to a war of manouver, the Germans were the masters at it. Eisehowers strategy was to attack across a broad front, applying more or less equal pressure across the entire front, keeping sufficient reserves handy to reinforce any sector of the front under threat. This was a cautious, uninspired kind of generalship, but it was fullproof, if slow. When the Germans tried to apply their armoured breakthrough tactics, notably at the Ardennes, they were fairly easily brought to ground.
Now, whilst the allies had mastered the attritional war they could not beat the germans at a manouver war, and this is precisely what Monty was trying to do at Arnhem. It was a heavy cost for a lesson relearnt"
Parsifal,
I disagree. The Germans were only the supreme masters of mobile warfare because the Western Allies refused to step up to the challenge in north-west Europe. Eisenhowers broad front strategy probably cost more lives than it saved, as it constantly gave the German forces to set-up defensive lines in the face of Allied slow march.
The 8th Army learnt to be mobile in North Africa and they defeated Rommel because they always kept themselves mobile. After El Alamein, Montgomery constantly kept the pressure on Rommel until Benghazi and did not allow one moment for Rommel to set-up effective defences. The lessons of mobility (in the air, and on the ground) that were learnt in North Africa were forgotten in North-West Europe.
Quick movement to attack the German army was required in Europe after the D-Day landings. When the Germans held the British forces before Caen, the Americans should have been quick to exploit the weakness in the German lines across from them. Instead Eisenhower held them back until Caen had fallen to the British. Caen was not important, holding the Germans at Caen was.
The Ardennes Offensive that brought up is a perfect example of the western Allies failing to keep the lessons from Africa in their mind. The bulge was pushed out by the 'broad front' strategy; this kind of action allowed the German troops to regroup and set up defences further back. If the Allies were mobile they could have cut the bulge off at its base and forced hundreds of thousand of German troops to surrender.
A war of attrition is costly and slow; the Allies could have matched the Germans in mobile war and it would have cost them less lives and they would have been much closer to Berlin. Slow cautious warfare will always be beaten by quick, hard strikes in weak points...always.
"Furthermore if the British had landed closer to the Bridge and actually taken it, FM Model IMO would have ordered the destruction of the Nijmegen Bridge and thus the whole plan would have dissolved itself even earlier – not to mention the outcome in regards to the then entrapped Airborne units in Arnheim with totally no way of retreat.
In conclusion, IMO the whole plan was just to optimistic and relied too much on the estimate of only facing 3rd class worn down German resistance."
If the 82nd Airborne had landed closer to Nijmegen bridge then Model would not have been able to order its destruction as it would be captured in a short space of time. If everything else was the same the XXX Corps would not have to help the 82nd capture the bridge and thus be rolling toward 1st Airborne at Arnhem at least 2 days earlier.
And given the fact that the 1st Airborne held the north of the bridge, the Germans would not be able to blow Arnhem bridge either.
"If the Allies had a decent heavy tank that could have spearheaded XXX corps it would have made a huge difference. The Sherman Fireflys were not tough enough to survive against most Geman AT fire, so XXX corps had to advance very carefully to avoid getting slaughtered by German ambush. A "super-heavy" tank like the Tortoise could stand up to almost all of the German AT fire except at very close ranges, perhaps they could have pushed on during the night as well. Even if the tank could only do 8 or 10 mph, I think it was less than 50 miles from start point to Arnhem IIRC."
A heavy tank was not required for "Market Garden" the XXX Corps were held up at the bridges Son and Nijmegen mostly. If Nijmegen had been captured by the 82nd alone then the XXX Corps would have had no problems assaulting Arnhem.
The plan was a little optimistic, but most plans are. Nothing ever goes exactly to plan. Operation "Market Garden" failed because of a lot of little faults and set-backs that ended up joining together to be a failure. Remove one or two of those faults and the plan would have suceeded; and as Freebird said we would have been praising its brilliance.
In reality, it was a brilliant plan that went wrong. If the Allies were in a position to perform Market Garden in August, it would have most likely been a resounding success.
Now, whilst the allies had mastered the attritional war they could not beat the germans at a manouver war, and this is precisely what Monty was trying to do at Arnhem. It was a heavy cost for a lesson relearnt"
Parsifal,
I disagree. The Germans were only the supreme masters of mobile warfare because the Western Allies refused to step up to the challenge in north-west Europe. Eisenhowers broad front strategy probably cost more lives than it saved, as it constantly gave the German forces to set-up defensive lines in the face of Allied slow march.
The 8th Army learnt to be mobile in North Africa and they defeated Rommel because they always kept themselves mobile. After El Alamein, Montgomery constantly kept the pressure on Rommel until Benghazi and did not allow one moment for Rommel to set-up effective defences. The lessons of mobility (in the air, and on the ground) that were learnt in North Africa were forgotten in North-West Europe.
Quick movement to attack the German army was required in Europe after the D-Day landings. When the Germans held the British forces before Caen, the Americans should have been quick to exploit the weakness in the German lines across from them. Instead Eisenhower held them back until Caen had fallen to the British. Caen was not important, holding the Germans at Caen was.
The Ardennes Offensive that brought up is a perfect example of the western Allies failing to keep the lessons from Africa in their mind. The bulge was pushed out by the 'broad front' strategy; this kind of action allowed the German troops to regroup and set up defences further back. If the Allies were mobile they could have cut the bulge off at its base and forced hundreds of thousand of German troops to surrender.
A war of attrition is costly and slow; the Allies could have matched the Germans in mobile war and it would have cost them less lives and they would have been much closer to Berlin. Slow cautious warfare will always be beaten by quick, hard strikes in weak points...always.
"Furthermore if the British had landed closer to the Bridge and actually taken it, FM Model IMO would have ordered the destruction of the Nijmegen Bridge and thus the whole plan would have dissolved itself even earlier – not to mention the outcome in regards to the then entrapped Airborne units in Arnheim with totally no way of retreat.
In conclusion, IMO the whole plan was just to optimistic and relied too much on the estimate of only facing 3rd class worn down German resistance."
If the 82nd Airborne had landed closer to Nijmegen bridge then Model would not have been able to order its destruction as it would be captured in a short space of time. If everything else was the same the XXX Corps would not have to help the 82nd capture the bridge and thus be rolling toward 1st Airborne at Arnhem at least 2 days earlier.
And given the fact that the 1st Airborne held the north of the bridge, the Germans would not be able to blow Arnhem bridge either.
"If the Allies had a decent heavy tank that could have spearheaded XXX corps it would have made a huge difference. The Sherman Fireflys were not tough enough to survive against most Geman AT fire, so XXX corps had to advance very carefully to avoid getting slaughtered by German ambush. A "super-heavy" tank like the Tortoise could stand up to almost all of the German AT fire except at very close ranges, perhaps they could have pushed on during the night as well. Even if the tank could only do 8 or 10 mph, I think it was less than 50 miles from start point to Arnhem IIRC."
A heavy tank was not required for "Market Garden" the XXX Corps were held up at the bridges Son and Nijmegen mostly. If Nijmegen had been captured by the 82nd alone then the XXX Corps would have had no problems assaulting Arnhem.
The plan was a little optimistic, but most plans are. Nothing ever goes exactly to plan. Operation "Market Garden" failed because of a lot of little faults and set-backs that ended up joining together to be a failure. Remove one or two of those faults and the plan would have suceeded; and as Freebird said we would have been praising its brilliance.
In reality, it was a brilliant plan that went wrong. If the Allies were in a position to perform Market Garden in August, it would have most likely been a resounding success.
