operation sea lion

[renrich]

Kris, the US Marines had been planning and practising amphibious doctrine for quite some time prior to WW2. To my knowledge, the Germans had not. To compare an amphibious attack in mass on a well defended shore to tank warfare is I believe not relevant. I remember having read on numerous occasions that a mass amphibious landing is the most difficult military evolution of all. The Repulse and Prince of Wales were not sunk by bombing principally. They were hit by 1 bomb and 5 torpedoes and 1 bomb and 6 torpedoes respectfully. No, I don't believe that the LW ever attained the level of lethality that the Japanese had with their torpedo a/c in the early days of the Pacific war. Another opinion about Sealion. From the West Point Atlas of American Wars, Vol. 2, " A plan was developed-and changed several times-amidst constant bickering between the Army and Navy; but it was never destined to be implemented, because the vital requirement for air superiority could not be met." To think that a Sealion would have a better chance of success in the summer of 1942 than it would have in 1940 seems ludicrous to me. To argue about the relative merits of fighter a/c seems beside the point. The LW could not meet the requirement for air superiority in 1942 anymore than they could have in 1940. If memory serves the RAF began a series of offensive fighter sweeps after the BOB called Ramrods. They had higher pilot losses then than in the BOB but it shows how aggresive they were and never overlook that the British were never reluctant to sacrifise blood and bone in either World War. Another point, to dismiss the possible influence of the forces in Torch does not seem realistic to me. Torch began on Nov. 8, 1942 with landings from the Atlantic and the Med. Torch did not spring full grown suddenly into action. It took months of planning and accumulation of weapons and supplies as well as training to bring it off just as a Sealion II would have. The Allies would have known that the Wehrmacht was massing for an invasion against England. Can there be any doubt that Torch would have been canceled and some of the naval and army assets intended for Torch diverted to England. One last point and I don't mean to disparage German military prowess by this observation. The Wehrmacht infantry and armor in WW2 were some of the finest in all of history. There infantry historically probably only equalled in ability and fortitude by the infantry of the Southern Confederacy. The LW as a tactical air force at their peak were superb. But Germany was not a maritime nation. Great Britain and Japan were. I doubt that had positions been reversed Germany would have ever been able to pull off an evacuation of 338,000 men from the beaches as Britain did at Dunkirk. They simply had not the experience, background and heritage. That certainly played a role in the cancellation of Sealion I. If they had been able to invade England at that time then the war is over and they could deal with thr Soviets at their leisure. They could not do it then and to accomplish a Sealion against a much stronger and better organised and equipped Britain with the US alongside and with the stakes that invasion would have represented doesn't seem like a remote possibility to me.

 

[syscom3]

Because Scapa Flow was the main RN base to direct and protect convoys to Murmansk, and to react to a Tirpitz outbreak. Your TF 99 (or TF 39 as you called it) was also there.

But it doesnt mean it has to, does it?

Well, those two carriers weren't. One was on the American eastcoast and the other was in the South Pacific (Argentina, Africa).

That reflects the actual reality of 1942, not what would happen in this hypothetical scenario.

I participated in the last discussion about Brown, so I'm quite aware of his limitations. Fact remains that the Stuka was the better dive bomber.

Open to debate.

Like I said, the SBD was in a shooting alley. It had more opportunity to attack ships than the Stuka.

Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, Rabaul a shooting gallery?

I know the Germans never had an operational carrier but that doesn't say anything about the Stuka.

The US carriers could hit the invasion fleet by the southern flanks.

There were three encounters IIRC, mainly by British FAA pilots. In any case, not a statistically solid record. With just a couple of encounters, chance is too big a factor. One which only gets filtered out after dozens of encounters.

Fact remains that they held their own.

 

[daishi12]

"As it seems you're interested, let me also add that in 1940, they had 2,318 modified (with bow ramps) barges - I don't know how many unmodified barges - and 155 freighters (carrying capacity of totally 700,000 ton) and about 2000 auxiliary vessels, motor boats, motor sailers, etc."

I will assume that as you have stated that Russia is not a problem that the ship building yards in the Baltic states bgecome available to Germany and that they are able to go into full production. I will be generous and add 40% to that total to give a rough estimate of approx 9240 vessels .... this brings me neatly to an additional comment ..."Second, the SDB destroyed more ships because it was used in a shooting alley." I will assume that this is a 'Target Rich Environment'

"You're making some calculations on how many divisions would have been combat ready, which are - let's face it - based on your own views. With all due respect, but the idea that Germany would only have 15 fully operational combat divisions ready is ... well ..."

With respect Kris, the calculations that I have made take into account, IMO, that Russia either surrenders or is forced into a situation where it cannot mount effective resistance to the German invasion. It would be logical to assume that the fighting in Russia would have been more bloody and that therefore losses on both sides would have been much greater. You also need to assign troops to retain territory once the country is captured. As I said, I would estimate that appox 15 divisions would be combat ready, by that I meant that the divisions would have between 90% and 98% of theoretical maximums.

Does anyone know roughly how many divisions were assigned garrison duty in France, the Low Countries and Poland from early 1942 to late summer 1942?

"I would like a source for the pioniere consisting of penal batallions. Sounds very unlikely"

The idea about the Penal battalions being made into pioneer units was actualy first brought to my attention by Sven Hassel, who was a Dane who served in an SS penal unit. I will admit to the fact that I do not fully trust his accounts, but I will say that I do understand the idea that prisoners could be considered expendable when it came to mine/booby trap disposal.


"One more time, this time a bit less complicated:
1.Send out the entire fleet. First wave supported by warships.
OK.. approx 9000 barges, tugs, freighters and assorted small craft embarking troops and equipment and then crossing the channel at approx 4 knots (a convoy can only safely travel at the speed of the slowest vessel) This will take approx 7 to 9 hours to just get across the channel assuming that EVERY single phase of the loading takes place like clockwork and that EVERY single vessel is in the right place at the right time.

2.Disembark the troops.

OK.. This would need to happen in less than 36 hours.. The reason being that it is approx a 2 day run from SF, and you need the invasion fleet to be back in French waters before the RN arrives.


3.Send the fleet back.

Again, this would need to be like clockwork, assuming that EVERY vessel is in the right place at the right time.

4.Royal Navy arrives from SF.
5.Attack the RN with bombers (and other means)
6.RN retreats or gets annihilated.

I would like to take points 4, 5 and 6 together if I may, RN arrives from SF, starts bomarding the landing zones, there is NO KM involvement because the entire invasion force is back in French waters trying to draw the RN into a stand up fight in home waters. This will NOT happen because the RN will try to slaughter as many invaders as possible on the beaches. The attacks with bombers and other means is equally a non-starter as the RAF will fly fighter missions against the Luftwaffer bombers and bombing missions against the invadihng force.

Admittedly during 1942 U-Boats had their happy time, but it must be remembered that the U-Boat was going against disorganised convoys in mainly the North Atlantic and Irish Sea. The Channel is shallower which makes U-Boats slightly easier to spot and hence destroy.

I trust that you remember that of the 40,000 submariners that were sent to sea over 30,000 did not return; I salute their memory and bravery, even though my Grandfather was a merchant seaman throughout the war.

7.Send the second wave supported by warships."

Fair enough, the second wave of the invasion fleet puts to sea after leaving the beachhead nearly unsupported for between 2 and 4 days. This agian assumes that EVERYTHING goes like clockwork, the RN is neutralized as an effective force, the RAF is neutralized in less than 6 days and that there is no resitance on the landing grounds. I would contend that the RN was a tougher nut to crack than you anticipate, the RAF/USAF would put up spirited resitance and that the British Army and Home Guard would be fighting tooth and nail to protect Britain.

You assume that the LW and U-Boats would be able to inflict grevious losses on the RN and that aircraft carriers and battle ships could not comfortably operate in the channel.

Please bear in mind that the KM, LW and Werhmacht would also inevitably suffer serious losses.

 

[Civettone]

Kris, the US Marines had been planning and practising amphibious doctrine for quite some time prior to WW2. To my knowledge, the Germans had not. To compare an amphibious attack in mass on a well defended shore to tank warfare is I believe not relevant. I remember having read on numerous occasions that a mass amphibious landing is the most difficult military evolution of all.

Renrich, you're absolutely right, it's damn difficult. But what do you want to conclude from that? That the Germans would fail? I say German ingenuity, improvisation and organisation coupled with existing experience in Norway and Crete would have enabled them to pull it off. I think they would have suffered less losses had they been more experienced but to go as far as to say they would have failed, in my opinion. Your argument is valid but it only goes so far.

The Repulse and Prince of Wales were not sunk by bombing principally. They were hit by 1 bomb and 5 torpedoes and 1 bomb and 6 torpedoes respectfully. No, I don't believe that the LW ever attained the level of lethality that the Japanese had with their torpedo a/c in the early days of the Pacific war.

Yes, you're right again! But again ... what's your point? IIRC PoW and Repulse were brought up to counter the argument that the British ships had strong AA capability, as well as to show that they were not destroyed by level bombing but by torpedoes.
I suppose - and correct me if I'm wrong - that you're implying that the Germans would have been less succesful because they didn't use torpedoes or weren't as succesful as the Japanese when they did use them. If so, I'll tell you that dive bombing is at least as powerful as torpedo bombing. It's level bombing which is problematic (at least in 1942).

but it was never destined to be implemented, because the vital requirement for air superiority could not be met.

The number of theories about Sealion are very high. Having air superiority is great but IMO not essential. Did the Americans and Japanese always have air superiority during their succesful invasions in the Pacific? No. But they did have air control. And that's what I'm crediting the Germans for.

The LW could not meet the requirement for air superiority in 1942 anymore than they could have in 1940.

The RAF had the advantage of fighting over friendly territory. If that wasn't present in 1940, they would have lost.

If memory serves the RAF began a series of offensive fighter sweeps after the BOB called Ramrods. They had higher pilot losses then than in the BOB but it shows how aggresive they were and never overlook that the British were never reluctant to sacrifise blood and bone in either World War.

Again, you're right but again, what's your point? That the Germans would lose because the British had fighting spirit?
But I'm glad you realize that the RAF would have suffered higher losses when fighting over hostile territories.

Torch began on Nov. 8, 1942 with landings from the Atlantic and the Med. Torch did not spring full grown suddenly into action.

I think I know the planning of Torch quite well. Half a year earlier there was nothing there to invade North Africa. The American troops were still in the US, their divisions weren't ready, their air squadrons weren't ready. You would have to get all of this over from the US while they weren't operational.

Can there be any doubt that Torch would have been canceled and some of the naval and army assets intended for Torch diverted to England.

They weren't ready. Plain and simple. I'm sure you're just dying to see American save the day yet again. But I'm sorry, too early. Do you think I chose Summer of 1942 by accident?

But Germany was not a maritime nation.

What do you call the U-boats then? I'm sure the allied sailors would have laughed at the guy saying "don't worry, Germany is not a maritime nation."

Kris

 

[Civettone]

Hi Syscom

But it doesnt mean it has to, does it?(...) That reflects the actual reality of 1942, not what would happen in this hypothetical scenario.

Ok, I get it. In a way you're right but this goes to the essence of "what-if" scenarios. How far do you go in your hindsight?
Let me explain. I've written a 70 page document on how Germany could have avoided losing the war had a dramatic leadership change occured in October 1943 (the latest date possible IMO to change things around before it was too late.) Now, regardless of the possiblity of such a scenario, I have to ask myself the question of how far to go with this what-if scenario. I allow myself to know that the Me 262 and Ar 234 would have been successful while I would cancel the V-2 and the Maus tank. But in October 1943 this would have been far from clear. I only know this because I can looking back from what was the future in 1943. YET I do not allow myself to concentrate all my forces in Normandy, to move Tirpitz just hours before getting bombed, nor do I allow myself to change the Enigma codes.
So I try to look at what could have been likely even without me pushing events in a certain direction.
Wasp was called back to the US for repairs and was going to cross the Panam Canal to fight in the Pacific where it was urgently needed. The other CV was primarily used to transport Spitfires and P-40s to Africa and Malta. Changing both courses could have dramatically changed the outcome in other fields. I don't know that much about the Pacific but I'm sure you know what the result could have been of Wasp stuck in the Atlantic.
But sure, you could use TF 39 for dealing with the planned German invasion. Here's what you wrote about it: Rear Admiral John Wilcox commanding Task Force 39 with the battleship USS Washington (BB-56), the aircraft carrier USS Wasp (CV-7), the heavy cruisers USS Wichita (CA-45) and Tuscaloosa (CA-37) and six destroyers, sails from Portland, Maine, for Scapa Flow, the major British fleet base in the Orkney Islands. These ships will protect British
home waters for the duration of Operation Ironclad -- the British invasion of Vichy French controlled Madagascar. This is a reflection of the heavy Allied losses in capital ships to Japanese action in the Pacific.
So I suppose you would cancel the invasion of Madagascar then?
But comparing TF 39 to the whole Home Defence, what would TF 39 with its 9 ships have contributed? And would Roosevelt be willing to sacrifice a battleship and two heavy cruisers when things were already problematic in the Pacific? I don't know...

Open to debate. (...) Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, Rabaul a shooting gallery?

SBD did not dive vertically and could not carry as much as the Stuka. Therefor it was less lethal. Both were vulnerable against enemy fighters. SBD was the better carrier aircraft but this was no issue for Sealion. Same goes for the F-4F. None of them mattered in a Sealion environment.
Shooting gallery was not a correct term. It implies that there were no dangers. Daishi used a much more appropriate term: target-rich environment!

Btw, I think the CV would probably have been used to hunt the German battlecruisers. But this is personal opinion, not based on actual sources...
Kris

 

[Civettone]

As I said, I would estimate that appox 15 divisions would be combat ready, by that I meant that the divisions would have between 90% and 98% of theoretical maximums.

No Daishi. Combat ready does not require 90%. In that case there were 0 operational divisions in Germany. It's all irrelevant as forces could have been transferred from one division to another.
Oh btw, there weren't 150 German divisions in 1942. There were 250 of them.

Does anyone know roughly how many divisions were assigned garrison duty in France, the Low Countries and Poland from early 1942 to late summer 1942?

27 in France and the Low Countries. Don't know about Poland.

The idea about the Penal battalions being made into pioneer units was actualy first brought to my attention by Sven Hassel, who was a Dane who served in an SS penal unit. I will admit to the fact that I do not fully trust his accounts, but I will say that I do understand the idea that prisoners could be considered expendable when it came to mine/booby trap disposal.

Aah, now you're getting personal. I absolutely adored Sven Hassel ... until I found out he was never in the German army... My world shattered when I read about it. All made up! Try wikipedia, I'm sure there's an article about him.
In any case I wonder what this has to do with it. Sven Hassel supposed to have served in a Sonderabteilung, not a Pioniere batallion.

at approx 4 knots (a convoy can only safely travel at the speed of the slowest vessel)

4 knots? Where do you get this figure from?
Modified Sieble/Herbert Rafts could cruise across the channel at ~ 6knts and dash to the shore at ~ 10knts. Contrary to perception they apparently were quite seaworthy in coastal waters and 'the channel'.
(P Schenk "Invasion of England 1940" , pp 115-129).
And I disagree that the speed is limited by the slowest element. They could leave first and get caught up by faster vessels.
Germans were great organisers, not amateurs.

OK.. This would need to happen in less than 36 hours.. The reason being that it is approx a 2 day run from SF, and you need the invasion fleet to be back in French waters before the RN arrives.

Correct!

Again, this would need to be like clockwork, assuming that EVERY vessel is in the right place at the right time.

I don't know. I think they would leave as soon as they're unloaded.

I would like to take points 4, 5 and 6 together if I may, RN arrives from SF, starts bomarding the landing zones, there is NO KM involvement because the entire invasion force is back in French waters trying to draw the RN into a stand up fight in home waters. This will NOT happen because the RN will try to slaughter as many invaders as possible on the beaches. The attacks with bombers and other means is equally a non-starter as the RAF will fly fighter missions against the Luftwaffer bombers and bombing missions against the invadihng force.

Dieppe and the Channel Dash showed that the German fighters were superior to the British ones. Overall loss-kill figures by JG1 from 1941-1943 also indicates this.
British fighters would also have to escort British bombers over German held territory which would mean they could not be recuperated. The Royal Navy will try to shell the German invaders which means they would be immobilized targets for German (dive) bombers. Unlike 1940, British fighters would no longer have the time to intercept in time. They would have to fly constant CAPs which they cannot support. Remember that most radar installations were along the coast which is now under German possession or under German assault.
Pedestal was done with few German aircraft against few British aircraft and few British ships. Sealion would be much bigger but with the same comparisons.

The Channel is shallower which makes U-Boats slightly easier to spot and hence destroy.

Why is that?

the RN is neutralized as an effective force, the RAF is neutralized in less than 6 days and that there is no resitance on the landing grounds.

Neutralized perhaps. Better to see it as 'contained'. This does not apply to the British army.

The 10 German divisons on the ground will have had hell to endure for 2 or 3 days while they get attacked by the Royal Navy, the RAF and the British army. They will have run out of supplies and amphetamines
The second and third wave will follow after which 25 divisions will be on the island ready to break out.
Out of 3000 barges 1250 barges were to be used in the first wave which would transport 9 divisions (according to German plans). That means than 1/3 of the barges (=1000) were expendable.

Home Guard would be fighting tooth and nail to protect Britain.

One word for you: Volkssturm.

aircraft carriers and battle ships could not comfortably operate in the channel.

Correct

Please bear in mind that the KM, LW and Werhmacht would also inevitably suffer serious losses.

I have said so in my very first post. Perhaps I give the impression that I think the Germans would have had their own Overlord. I think it would have been the bloodiest battle the Germans had experienced up till that time.

But it would have been the only way to get Britain out of the war. And 1942 was the last year to do so. After that the Americans would grow in strength, invade North Africa, knock Italy out of the war, and drop the A-bomb on Germany.
Once war was declared upon the US, Germany had no other choice than to neutralize Britain.

Kris

 

[Glider]

Kris
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It seems this is more criticizing barges in general than their ability to carry tanks. My impression was that you would think they couldn't be disembarked but now I see you believe the barges would become unstable?? Am I right in this observation?

No. I said the Germans could have tripled U-boat production as they did in 1943. But if they had only doubled it, they could have used that third bit for construction of other ships.
In fact, I don't see a problem with the transport capacity as such. I would simply improve the existing barges and make them self-propelling.

Reply
Barges can carry anything. Getting them to the beach is something else. My sons girlfriend is a sailing instructor off Southend. The currents are fierce, the sands dangerous and tides vicious in the Channel and North Sea. You will need more than a barge with a motor to make it across the Channel. The currents are often more than 5 knots which is faster than barges can go. When the Germans did a test of their plan to tow barges it was a disaster. At best they would be sitting ducks, in all probability they would also be scattered across the sea, at worst a large proportion will run aground and or be sunk due to the weather.

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This only reinforces my opinion about the striking power of the British. The article also states that the British used over 700 aircraft (amongst them 400 fighters) against 250 German fighters. Yet, they only managed to get in a few bombers? They couldn't get them escorted by fighters? Why would things have been different during an invasion? I agree that the targets would have been easier to find but nevertheless, it still says a lot about British capabilities

Reply
Due to the confusion and lack of time as the BC's were going like the clappers to run away, the British were unable to organise a co-ordinated attack. A landing is very different. It's a lot bigger, its in the same area. In all likelihood the first few attacks would have been spontaneous responses but it wouldn't take long to organise heavy co-ordinated attacks.
However the point I was making was that despite the Germans being well prepared they didn't stop any of the small uncoordinated attacks taking place, neither did they sink any of the attacking ships. Even the 5 MTB's attacking on their own, in daylight, made it in and out. Hardly a ringing endorsement of the Germans ability to stop a serious attack by the Home Fleet.

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Where did you explain this? I said I believed between 150 and 300 British ships would be sunk or at least neutralized a day. And that was already dividing the result of my calculations into half.

Reply
I believe your assumptions to be false. The RAF was a lot bigger than the GAF in 1942. The extra 100 squadrons the RAF had by 1942 excluded RAAF, CAF, SAAF squadrons a number of which were in the UK. True we had a number in the Med and Far East but the Far East were obsolete and no threat to the GAF and the ones in the Med would have been compensated by squadrons of the above air force's in the UK. Germany also had planes in the Med and would have had to leave some in Russia.
The RAF would have at least matched the GAF in numbers and we had the advantage of attacking and retreating at will. The fight would have been very tough and the GAF on the defensive having to defend the convoys or the bombers attacking the RN. In addition GAF would need standing patrols over the invasion area during the daylight hours to stop hit and run attacks. This would eat up the available planes hours. Barges, tugs and transports are sitting ducks. To defend from a wing of 3 squadrons of Spits with 2 covering one in the FB role who could attack the area and be on the way home in 10 minutes would require huge resources every minute of the day.
Your assumption that Germany would increase its production and that the British wouldn't at least concentrate its forces to match the threat is optimistic at best. Also to assume that we wouldn't include all combat aircraft in the country including the US forces is even more optimistic.

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British laying mines after the landings. Hadn't thought about that. That would be a great action!
But otherwise, the Germans would know exactly where to sweep mines: in front of the beaches they want to invade. The British would have a much larger area to cover: the entire entrance lanes to the Channel.

Reply
With what would the Germans sweep the mines? By the end of 1941 the whole GN only had about 50 minesweepers capable of operating in enemy waters. With other requirements you would be lucky to get 2/3rds in the area. Try sweeping at night and the RN coastal forces and Navy will have you, by day you are still at grave danger.

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I think you're making the same mistakes as many AF leaders made in WW2: use level bombers for tactical missions. They tried this several times yet I can only think of one single time where I actually had success. And there (Normandy) the troops weren't even dug in.
Your plan sounds wonderful but I don't think it would have mattered much. Their accuracy would even have made it as dangerous for their own troops as for the Germans. What was it again? One third in a 5 mile area?

Reply
We would be a lot more accurate over the short distance to the Landing sites. Plus the landing sites would be easily identifiable, if nothing else the British could fire star shell into the centre of the target area and aim at that. I am not treating this as a tactical mission; a carpet bombing mission would do the job. A 3-5 mile scatter would be acceptable as the landing zone would have to be that size to be safe. Any less and the Germans would be in danger (Anzio wasn't a case of the Allies beating superior forces. It was the Germans holding off vastly superior forces largely because the landing zone was too small for the Allies to operate from and covered by German artillery.)
PS its better to be on the edge of a target area than in the middle and if the German troops wouldn't be killed in large numbers, why would the British on the edge?

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And the German nightfighters would have had a field day, knowing exactly where to find the British bombers. No need for radar

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British night fighters were at least as good and as numerous as the Germans, plus would be operating under ground control. The Germans would be at a significant disadvantage and the Hunter would become the Hunted.
David

 

[Civettone]

You will need more than a barge with a motor to make it across the Channel. The currents are often more than 5 knots which is faster than barges can go.

And yet the British used them too for the invasion of Normandy.

in all probability they would also be scattered across the sea, at worst a large proportion will run aground and or be sunk due to the weather.

They were tested and this did not happen. I already mentioned that. Only few received damage at BF 8.

Due to the confusion and lack of time as the BC's were going like the clappers to run away, the British were unable to organise a co-ordinated attack.

Yet, they were aware it was going down. It was high priority! They knew so weeks in advance. And yet, when they heard the news their organisation tumbled. Lack of time? Still no reason for the organisational mess. And that was just a couple of ships. And you want an even bigger challenge? You want 2500 planes to fight instead of 250?

From: ::Operation Cerberus::
The British very quickly became aware of increased Germany activity not only in Brest but also along the French northern coastline. The French Resistance reported that former French coastal airbases were being more and more used by the Luftwaffe. The Royal Navy concluded that they knew the ships would be leaving Brest at night – they just did not know when! In response to this, the Royal Navy tried to predict the route the ships might take and laid more mines – a total of 1000+ British mines were already placed in the English Channel.

A study of weather predictions led the Navy to conclude that the ships would sail between February 10th and 15th 1942, as cloud cover would make such a journey much safer. Coastal Command, the Fleet Air Arm, Fighter Command, etc were all put on the alert. A submarine, the 'Sea Lion', had been positioned off of Brest – its task was to watch the harbour as opposed to attacking the ships.

The Germans had put a great deal of thought into Operation Cerberus. British coastal radar had been jammed as a matter of course – but by February 1942, the success of the jamming had become extensive.

And from: Scharnhorst - The History - Operation "Cerberus" - The Channel Dash
In spite of Ciliax's insistence on security and his efforts to mislead, there was no lack of clues. It was noticed that the destroyers that had escorted Tirpitz to Trondheim had not remained there, but had departed for a destination in the south. On 8 February aerial photographs of Brest revealed the three big ships in the harbour, four large destroyers and a number of Schnellboats and minesweepers. Photos taken on the following day brought the score of destroyers up to six.

The forces detailed to oppose the progress of Ciliax's fleet were slender enough in all conscience. Six destroyers equipped with torpedoes had been loaned to Admiral Ramsay by the C-in-C Nore. They were normally stationed at Sheerness and Harwich, but they should have been at four hours' notice in the Thames Estuary. In fact, at the crucial moment, they were out in the North Sea off Orfordness, practising gunnery. In addition to this, there were the Hunt class vessels which had been built for escort work. They had no torpedoes and consequently were virtually useless in this instance. Finally there were thirty-two motor torpedo boats that were no match for the German Schnellboats (Fast boats).

So far as aircraft were concerned, Coastal Command had agreed to provide three squadrons of Beaufort torpedo bombers. The Fleet Air Arm was able to contribute one squadron of Swordfish torpedo-carriers. Bomber Command had 300 bombers on stand-by, and there was the promise of considerable fighter support. Ideally the torpedo-carrying aircraft would have made a concerted attack with fighter cover. But this was impossible. For one thing, the Swordfish had a cruising speed of 153 kilometers per hour (95 mph) whilst the Beauforts were very much faster. For another, there was the question of bringing them all together. One Beaufort squadron was stationed at Leuchers in Scotland, another at St Eval in Cornwall, and the third at Thorney Island near Portsmouth.

And you want to attack an invasion fleet many times bigger than that, escorted by over a 1000 fighters? I admire your optimism.

However the point I was making was that despite the Germans being well prepared they didn't stop any of the small uncoordinated attacks taking place, neither did they sink any of the attacking ships. Even the 5 MTB's attacking on their own, in daylight, made it in and out. Hardly a ringing endorsement of the Germans ability to stop a serious attack by the Home Fleet.

That was not their mission. What would you have expected them to do? Turn the ships around and start attacking those unimportant British vessels?
I think the following quote says it all:
To the men on board Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the engagement had been no more than a small inconvenience. It had not even consumed very much antiaircraft ammunition as the action had largely been in the hands of Galland's fighter pilots. The sailors had watched with fascination and awe as the fragile biplanes flew towards them.

I believe your assumptions to be false. The RAF was a lot bigger than the GAF in 1942.

There are not many differences in my scenario. But one of them is an increase in ship and aircraft production. What's more the bulk of the Luftwaffe would return from Russia and put pressure on the British again. As such, the RAF would have suffered more losses up to Sealion '42.

In addition GAF would need standing patrols over the invasion area during the daylight hours to stop hit and run attacks.

No, their job was simple: first defend the fleet. After the invasion fleet is returned, escort the bombers. Only a minority would be used for CAPs over the invasion beaches. Instead, it would be the RAF that would have to fly constant CAPs to protect the Royal Navy!

Barges, tugs and transports are sitting ducks. To defend from a wing of 3 squadrons of Spits with 2 covering one in the FB role who could attack the area and be on the way home in 10 minutes would require huge resources every minute of the day.

Don't forget that all the barges had AA armament and were steel and concrete strengthened.
And if you start using the valuable Spitfire for these tasks you cannot use them all for attacking the German bombers or for escorting the British bombers. You too have to make a choice!

Your assumption that Germany would increase its production and that the British wouldn't at least concentrate its forces to match the threat is optimistic at best. Also to assume that we wouldn't include all combat aircraft in the country including the US forces is even more optimistic.

Go ahead and give up North Africa. Give up the Battle of the Atlantic. Get non-operational American troops killed.

With what would the Germans sweep the mines? By the end of 1941 the whole GN only had about 50 minesweepers capable of operating in enemy waters.

My figures show much more minesweepers than that. They had 90 ready for Sealion in 1940. Don't think this dropped to 50 a year later as production was still going on. Besides that they had dozens of other auxiliary ships which could be used for minesweeping.
I do consider the British mines a problem. Perhaps the biggest problem. I see them minesweeping that very night, under the cover of the Kriegsmarine. But just as I don't see the mines stopping them but only holding them up, I see the same thing happening for the British: holding them up.

We would be a lot more accurate over the short distance to the Landing sites. Plus the landing sites would be easily identifiable

That has nothing to do with it. That's not why British bombs were inaccurate. Do you think they couldn't see the ships in Brest? They had lousy bombsights.

I am not treating this as a tactical mission; a carpet bombing mission would do the job. A 3-5 mile scatter would be acceptable as the landing zone would have to be that size to be safe.

It is a tactical mission even if you use carpet bombing. Problem is that carpet bombing is a lousy way to achieve a tactical objective.

It was the Germans holding off vastly superior forces

Is that so?
22 Jan 1944: 36,000 soldiers and 2,300 vehicles versus 20,000 German soldiers.
End May:150,000 soldiers and 1,500 guns versus 135,000 German soldiers.

British night fighters were at least as good and as numerous as the Germans, plus would be operating under ground control. The Germans would be at a significant disadvantage and the Hunter would become the Hunted.

Ground control is unnecessary, David. Ground control only guides you to an area where the enemy is. It's not accurate enough to pinpoint the enemy. That came later.
Same thing for the Geman NFs: they knew where the British bombers would be.
Both parties would have to look for the enemy by visual contact. In fact, up to 1945 visual contact was still necessary for both sides.
Yet, you have to understand that it's more difficult to intercept a fighter than it is to find a big and slow Sterling. Because the Bf 110 had a speed advantage, the Bf 110 could have avoided the Beaufighter and attacked the British bombers.

Kris

 

[daishi12]

Hi Kris,

just checked wikipedia, Sven Hassel apparently served in the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, and also the 11th and 27th Panzer Regiment (6th Panzer division) on all fronts except the African front -- Sven Hassel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia -- however Erik Haaest stated that Sven Hassel was a pseudonyme and never actualy served on the eastern front. My original point still stands that the Werhmahct did use penal battalions as expendable troops.

The point I keep trying to explain in regard to the divisions coming back from the Russian front is this:-

You have made an assumption that the Werhmacht would have been able to invade Russia starting in June 1941 and absolutely pacify/render Russia as unable to carry out combat operations against Germany no later than Feb 1942. This allows you six months to build up naval operations to design, develope and build a significant naval force in France, the Low Countries and the Baltic states. You need to also take into account the following factors:-

If Russia was neutralized, as you contend, there would have been no requirement for the USA and UK to send supplies o the USSR, those supplies would have been stockpiled in the UK to deal with an invasion threat. Please also consider that the UK would have increased production capacity on all fighting equipment from the time it was perceived that the USSR was not able to mount a significant threat to the Werhmacht/Luftwaffe. Even if the RAF recieves aircraft like the Mk1 Hurricane, The Hamdon, The Spit Mk2, and the Wellington, the defficiences are offset by the combat radius and number of aircraft that would be available.

If the USSR was neutralized, Germany would have received heavy operational losses to both the Werhmacht and the Luftewaffe (the reason being that the fighting to subdue the USSR would have been much heavier than was experienced during operation Barbarossa), The Wehrmacht would have needed to garison the USSR as well. This cuts down on the available number of divisions.

Your arguement that Britain used barges during operation Overlord, does not (forgive the pun) hold water. The vast majority of the initial operations used LSVP's which where loaded with troops approx 5 miles from the beach landing zones. The larger vessels such as the LCT's came in after the beachead was secured.

The barges that the German invasion fleet had to hand would not have been steel and concrete reinforced, the pictures that you posted earlier show that they were effectively river barges which had had the bow cut away to provide a ramp. The AA that would have been available would have been, at best, a quad 20mm mount and maybe a couple of mg42's. The speed of the convoy would have been crucial as well ... probably no more than 4 knots. If the barges are not protected by war ships, they effectively become targets. (please check the opening sceens of Enemy At The Gates to see what happens to improvised water transport under air attack)

Germany did not have a seafaring tradition, and as such the invasion fleet would have fallen prey to getting lost, ramming, and random sinkings that they did not have the training to cope with.

 

[syscom3]

]Renrich, you're absolutely right, it's damn difficult. But what do you want to conclude from that? That the Germans would fail? I say German ingenuity, improvisation and organisation coupled with existing experience in Norway and Crete would have enabled them to pull it off. I think they would have suffered less losses had they been more experienced but to go as far as to say they would have failed, in my opinion. Your argument is valid but it only goes so far.

Norway and Crete were far different than an invasion of Britain. See my point about the difference between the invasion of Guadalacanal and the invasion of Leyte.

Yes, you're right again! But again ... what's your point? IIRC PoW and Repulse were brought up to counter the argument that the British ships had strong AA capability, as well as to show that they were not destroyed by level bombing but by torpedoes.

Youre absolutley right.... the KM had just as poor AA and would have been chopped up by the Britas and USN.

The number of theories about Sealion are very high. Having air superiority is great but IMO not essential. Did the Americans and Japanese always have air superiority during their succesful invasions in the Pacific? No. But they did have air control. And that's what I'm crediting the Germans for.

Famous last words...... great to have but not essential. BTW, the allies in the PTO always had theater or local air superiority in every invasion. Guadalcanal was different as it was at the long end of the IJN range and they didnt have much to counter the invasion fleet the first couple of weeks.

I think I know the planning of Torch quite well. Half a year earlier there was nothing there to invade North Africa. The American troops were still in the US, their divisions weren't ready, their air squadrons weren't ready. You would have to get all of this over from the US while they weren't operational.

That reflected the reality of 1942, not a hypothetical situation we are discussing. Your invasion plans will be known and a couple of US infantry divisions could be sent to the UK prior to the invasion. Again, you plan your invasion on how you want the allies to perform, not for how the allies could do it.

They weren't ready. Plain and simple. I'm sure you're just dying to see American save the day yet again. But I'm sorry, too early. Do you think I chose Summer of 1942 by accident?

Just by being in reserve free's up a few british forces.lus fighting on the defense helps a bit.

 

[Civettone]

Hi Daishi

My original point still stands that the Werhmahct did use penal battalions as expendable troops.

I thought your point was that pioniere batallions were made out of penal troops...

If Russia was neutralized, as you contend, there would have been no requirement for the USA and UK to send supplies o the USSR, those supplies would have been stockpiled in the UK to deal with an invasion threat.

It makes it very interesting, that's for sure. Lend lease was limited until 1942. The stuff that went to Russia was along Russian requests. Giving the British even more copper, grain or aircraft wouldn't have changed much. The British were limited by their manpower as they were already fully mobilized. As such production could not be increased and they flew as many aircraft as they could train. Stating that all the stuff that went into Russia would have gone to Britain is a bit simplistic.

Please also consider that the UK would have increased production capacity on all fighting equipment

See above. In fact, it doesn't make much sense. If Japan had surrendered in 1943, would the Germans have increased war production as a result of this? Clearly not. Britain was getting the max out its industry and armed forces. I agree that they could have changed production, so only increasing one branch by decreasing another.

If the USSR was neutralized, Germany would have received heavy operational losses to both the Werhmacht and the Luftewaffe (the reason being that the fighting to subdue the USSR would have been much heavier than was experienced during operation Barbarossa)[/quotes]This I don't understand.
In any case, I advice you to drop the division shortage argument. It really doesn't hold water. No pun intended but I don't think anyone will agree with you. (If there is someone, I'll shut up.)

Your arguement that Britain used barges during operation Overlord, does not (forgive the pun) hold water.

I think it does. Saying that barges were not suited for crossing the Channel, while the British used hundreds of them in June 1944. I think my argument is spot on!

The barges that the German invasion fleet had to hand would not have been steel and concrete reinforced

They were steel inforced with certain corners filled up with concrete. Why do you say it wasn't?

The AA that would have been available would have been, at best, a quad 20mm mount and maybe a couple of mg42's.

The barges in 1940 would have been equiped with a wide variety of weapons, including single 20mm or 37mm guns, capable of giving fire support as well as AD.

The speed of the convoy would have been crucial as well ... probably no more than 4 knots.

Please read my post. I quoted the performance of a specific barge type with a cruise speed of 6 knots and max speed of 10 knots.

please check the opening sceens of Enemy At The Gates to see what happens to improvised water transport under air attack

I prefer to base my assumptions on facts and primary sources, not on Hollywood fiction.

Germany did not have a seafaring tradition, and as such the invasion fleet would have fallen prey to getting lost, ramming, and random sinkings that they did not have the training to cope with.

These are predestined narrow-minded generalizations.
And who said they wouldn't have trained for them. They trained for Sealion even though they just had weeks ahead of them. So be sure they would have trained in the months prior to Sealion '42.

Kris

 

[Civettone]

Hi Syscom

Norway and Crete were far different than an invasion of Britain.

I acknowledged that these were different. You disagree that the Germans learned valuable lessons from these operations?
Do you think that Guadalacanal didn't help in any way with Leyte?

the KM had just as poor AA and would have been chopped up by the Britas and USN.

I think the KM had even worse AA.
But the Britas didn't have aircraft of the same level as the Germans to destroy ships. And the USN was hardly present at all.

BTW, the allies in the PTO always had theater or local air superiority in every invasion.

If the allies always had air superiority, how do you know their invasions would have failed without it? You say it's a necessity, so that logically implies that their invasions would have failed without air superiority.

Again, you plan your invasion on how you want the allies to perform, not for how the allies could do it.

But they couldn't! The Americans were getting their military geared up as fast as they could. They were barely in time for Torch. And you want to cut off another half year? From 11 months to 6 months??
Look, I know you're proud of American achievements but in this scenario ... the US will have to sit it out.

Kris

 

[mkloby]

No Daishi. Combat ready does not require 90%. In that case there were 0 operational divisions in Germany. It's all irrelevant as forces could have been transferred from one division to another.
Oh btw, there weren't 150 German divisions in 1942. There were 250 of them.

Going into combat with less than 90% of your TOE is not desirable. It's an issue in the military today, just as it was years ago.

 

[Kurfürst]

The LW could not meet the requirement for air superiority in 1942 anymore than they could have in 1940. If memory serves the RAF began a series of offensive fighter sweeps after the BOB called Ramrods. They had higher pilot losses then than in the BOB but it shows how aggresive they were and never overlook that the British were never reluctant to sacrifise blood and bone in either World War.

Do you know Tony Wood's site? He list all RAF sorties per day, look it up. You'll find Ramrods and RAF daylight operations in the West in general after BoB is an evidence for anything but not British willingness to sacrifice blood; true that their loss rates were even less favourable than in BoB, when the RAF was on defense with all the known advantages, but overall the Ramrods, Circuses et co. were very small scale operations, which would be best referred to as nuisance raids. They were trying to bait the German fighters, that were left in France (just two JGs, shows the level of the 'threat') into disadvantagoues combats, but the LW didn't quite took the bait and turned the tables, attacking only when there was gain in it. The relative losses were very much in favour for the LW. The RAF sortie rate in those raids compared to what they put up during BoB was marginal, and so were the losses in absolute numbers. In short, it's hard to say the RAF was trying to hard to confront the LW in the air after 1940 for about 2-3 years, at least over Western Europe.

The LW as a tactical air force at their peak were superb.

Have you've read Corum's Luftwaffe book? He makes a very good case for refuting that old myth. Really the LW was positioning it's doctrine between tactical and strategical levels : on the operational level. Tactical would be attacking the enemy directly, ie. on the battlefield, strategical would be

But Germany was not a maritime nation. Great Britain and Japan were. I doubt that had positions been reversed Germany would have ever been able to pull off an evacuation of 338,000 men from the beaches as Britain did at Dunkirk. They simply had not the experience, background and heritage. That certainly played a role in the cancellation of Sealion I.

I think you underestimate German maritime potential. Germany was certainly no newcomer to the sea - the Hansaetic Leage was the first large maritime union of the World, and dominant in trade until the Great Explorations. The North German big ports like Hamburg, Brema, Lubeck etc. certainly had a tradition of sea. The German navy in WW1 was the second largest in the World., not speaking of the submarine arm here, but the surface units. They certainly had the experience, background, and heritage.

What they did not have for Sealion I was the neccesary preparations - the whole idea of Sealion came out of nowhere, it was not planned before the war as a possible scenario at all, nor was there much political will to actually implement it. Simply to put, 'Sealion I' was proposed halfheartadly and never considered very seriously, the hardships were obvious. It's just not possible to pull out an invasion fleet from a hat just a month after the French campaign concluded - just look at Dunkerque in comparison, the British, being an island nation and with far more interest at sea could pull together a decent transport fleet, just a ragtag collection of barges, small steamers and such on which they could - let put it as it was, throw away everything and flee.

If they had been able to invade England at that time then the war is over and they could deal with thr Soviets at their leisure.

I disagree. In 1940 they were unprepeared for such an operations. Such operation would be unneccsarily risky, and simple as that, the Navy could simply not guarantee the conditions that were minimum requirements for such an operation. Pulling off such an operation was simply stupid in a military sense. Politically, the situation was that Britiain was beaten and could not hope to interfere with the Germans on the continent, as a threat, as seen in 1940, they were neutralised for the time being. And, as Hitler put it, there would be little gain for Germany in crushing the British Empire, only that the US and USSR could feed on the corpse. Far more threat was coming from the East, with the USSR's expansionist foreign policy begun to threaten vital German interests in the region, and tension was growing between the two powers. And the USSR, which silently built up the largest army in the World under Stalin, was certainly a greater threat, to be dealt with first than Britain, which was already bankcrupt by 1940-41, fighting merely to survive.

 

[syscom3]

Hi Syscom I acknowledged that these were different. You disagree that the Germans learned valuable lessons from these operations? Do you think that Guadalcanal didn't help in any way with Leyte?

The difference is the US and it's Allies learned from their experiences and implemented the changes in doctrine and material support (read logistics). The Germans didn't seem to learn the lessons or just ignored it. Just look at the KM's plans for direct fire support. Pretty much nothing at all. Thats why the invasion was going to fail.

I think the KM had even worse AA.
But the Britas didn't have aircraft of the same level as the Germans to destroy ships. And the USN was hardly present at all.

Again you put complete faith in the LW having air supremamcy at all times, which they wouldn't have during the night, or under poor weather. The USN contribution is a pair of carriers that could attack at will from the flanks. The Channel is a highly constricted space (as you know) and the opportunities for quick coordinated attacks from over are plentiful. You simply cant have all your forces protecting your naval assets without opening up your bombers for attack and destruction.

If the allies always had air superiority, how do you know their invasions would have failed without it? You say it's a necessity, so that logically implies that their invasions would have failed without air superiority.

Because the Allies learned their lessons well on the need to control the air. Too many ships were lost at the onset of the war because of that simple fact.

But they couldn't! The Americans were getting their military geared up as fast as they could. They were barely in time for Torch. And you want to cut off another half year? From 11 months to 6 months??

The US had a couple of good divisions that would have performed well in a reserve role. And its far easier to introduce fresh troops to a defensive role first, rather than the more complicated attack roles.

Again, you plan your scenario to what you want the allies to do, rather than what we were capable of.

 

[Civettone]

Going into combat with less than 90% of your TOE is not desirable. It's an issue in the military today, just as it was years ago.

Agreed.
But German divisions were rarely at 90+% and from 1942 onwards none of them were.
Standard compositions of military units started to fade away over the years as a result of over-flexibility. Generals started having problems recognizing the weaknesses or strengths of each unit. A problem which the allies didn't have.

Tactical would be attacking the enemy directly, ie. on the battlefield, strategical would be

I have a feeling that sentence wasn't finished quite yet, Kurfürst.
Impressive post as always...

Kris

 

[plan_D]

The Royal Navy would hold the invasion fleet of Germany at bay during any invasion attempt. The Germans could not field an effective naval screen as seen during Overlord, they did not have the numbers to provide it.

This idea of the Luftwaffe being able to render the Royal Navy inoperable is nice, but has no weight. Every attempt by the Luftwaffe to remove the Royal Navy from any zone was a failure. There was too much to the Royal Navy for Ju 87s to destroy. Even with DD losses at Dunkirk the Royal Navy just kept coming back.

BBs can operate in the Channel, they operated there during Operation Neptune. HMS Ramillies and Warspite were used to suppress gun positions on Juno.

All this is not important, however. As the Wehrmacht seemed unable to perform the kind of interdiction needed to secure a successful invasion. For Overlord the 9th and 8th U.S Air Forces along with the 2nd Tactical Air Force and RAF Bomber Command dedicated months to sealing off the Normandy battle ground.
German generals commented constantly on the lack of their ability to move to the battle due to 90% of the rail and road bridges being knocked out over the Loire and Seine rivers.

If the Germans really thought the invasion through, the Luftwaffe should have been pounding the airfields (as the Allies did in 1944, all those within 130 miles of the invasion area), marshalling yards, rail and road bridges and road junctions. The British rail system seemed to remain largely intact during 1940, while the Allies managed to reduce the French rail system from being able to cope with extra needs to being unable to supply the garrison troops.

If the Luftwaffe was an amazing tactical airforce, the doctrine would have been written down for extensive interdiction of the British road and rail system. The Luftwaffe strikes against Britain seemed to be a strategic assault, which not only would have not aided any invasion but also was a complete waste of resource since the bomber numbers, and size of bombers themselves were not large enough.

 

[Civettone]

The Germans didn't seem to learn the lessons or just ignored it. Just look at the KM's plans for direct fire support. Pretty much nothing at all. Thats why the invasion was going to fail.

Now you're mixing up things. First you say that the Germans didn't learn from their lessons. And then you give the example of KM's plans for direct fire support which I presume are the plans for Sealion '40.

Again you put complete faith in the LW having air supremamcy at all times, which they wouldn't have during the night, or under poor weather.

I never said anything about air supremacy at night, nor did I say the Luftwaffe would attack the Royal Navy at night.
You guys keep repeating that the invasion had to take place under good weather so...

The USN contribution is a pair of carriers that could attack at will from the flanks.

Well, first they have to be in the area which none of them were. The Wasp went for repairs to the US Eastcoast after which it was sent to the Pacific where a CV was more needed than in England which was one big carrier.
Your notion of attacking from the flanks doesn't make sense. The RAF could just as well make flanking attacks by flying in an arch. This isn't the Pacific you know?

You simply cant have all your forces protecting your naval assets without opening up your bombers for attack and destruction.

I assume you're talking about the invasion day. Bombers will indeed support the invasion forces as they advance. As both are fighting the same targets the German fighters will be able to protect both.
This is no longer the case when the battle against the Royal Navy starts. Then most fighters will be escorting the bombers while only a part will fly CAPs over the dug in German troops which will be hard pressed.

The US had a couple of good divisions that would have performed well in a reserve role.

Like I said, the Americans won't come and save the day. Why you keep stressing American involvement is beyond me.

Again, you plan your scenario to what you want the allies to do, rather than what we were capable of.

I'm always talking about what both the allies and the Germans were capable of. That's why we're talking so much about Dieppe, the Channel Dash and Pedestal.

Kris

 

[Civettone]

The Royal Navy would hold the invasion fleet of Germany at bay during any invasion attempt. The Germans could not field an effective naval screen as seen during Overlord, they did not have the numbers to provide it.

Different times. The Kriegsmarine could handle the British Channel forces as shown during the Channel Dash.

Every attempt by the Luftwaffe to remove the Royal Navy from any zone was a failure.

When did they ever try?
The relatively few German bombers used near Dunkirk were mainly directed against the transports and beaches.

BBs can operate in the Channel, they operated there during Operation Neptune.

Different again. The Channel was in complete hands of the allies. BBs were not at risk from German aircraft, subs or Schnellboote. During Sealion they would have been. That's why Churchill himself forbade their use in the Channel.

As the Wehrmacht seemed unable to perform the kind of interdiction needed to secure a successful invasion.

If you would go back a couple of pages I already explained that Sealion '42 would not have to be a copy of D-Day. The Germans could do with less. Interdiction is fine but not necessary. Would D-Day have failed without the interdiction. Clearly not as the major reinforcements were not ordered to be brought in anyhow. And those divisions that were brought in had no real problems getting there. PlanD, name one unit that didn't manage to get to Normandy.
As long as motorized units had ample fuel and were not hampered by conflicting orders they could move quite rapidly over France, despite allied air power. Furthermore, they did that without undue losses.
Kris

 

[syscom3]

Now you're mixing up things. First you say that the Germans didn't learn from their lessons. And then you give the example of KM's plans for direct fire support which I presume are the plans for Sealion '40.

If they learned anything, it would be the requirement for large numbers of capital ships providing direct fire support. Now what is your KM going to do..... sortie into the N Atlantic to draw away the RN (and then by default, not be around for fire support), or go into the channel for a few days and be boxed in by subs, mines and aerial attack and unable to do anything. And obviously they didn't learn any lessons because none of the purpose built amphib vessels were even on the drawing boards (like LST's, DUKW's", Higgins Boats, LCI's....blah, blah blah)

I never said anything about air supremacy at night, nor did I say the Luftwaffe would attack the Royal Navy at night.
You guys keep repeating that the invasion had to take place under good weather so...

And inclimate weather is the last thing the KM needs because of the small size of its fleet. A little bit of wind and all your unpowered barges and slow moving barges will be scattered. Night time will belong to the bombers and strafing fighters. The RAF will have a field "night" attacking your fleet.

Well, first they have to be in the area which none of them were. The Wasp went for repairs to the US East coast after which it was sent to the Pacific where a CV was more needed than in England which was one big carrier.

Why do you dwell on what was the actual situation of 1942 rather than what this hypothetical scenario is? If an invasion of Britain was a certienty in in summer of 1942, the US would have committed those two carriers, simply because it was written down the the war in Europe was going to come first before the Pacific. And why those two carriers? Because their aircrew's were expert ship killers. Your KM was going to come under attack by skilled dive bomber crews (and a few lucky torpedo planes) that will inflict damage on you.

Your notion of attacking from the flanks doesn't make sense. The RAF could just as well make flanking attacks by flying in an arch. This isn't the Pacific you know?

A North Sea or Bay of Biscay attack on the ports. Even if they are kept far from the fray int he channel, they will be more than useful in sinking your subs.

I assume you're talking about the invasion day. Bombers will indeed support the invasion forces as they advance. As both are fighting the same targets the German fighters will be able to protect both.

You are making the classic case of attempting to defend everything and end up protecting nothing.

You have your choice in the daytime.... protect your invasion fleet, or ... protect your capital ships.... or protect your bombers. At night, all of your naval assets are at risk so you might as well plan for heavy loss's, which further complicates your invasion scheme.

Like I said, the Americans won't come and save the day. Why you keep stressing American involvement is beyond me.

Better to have some reserve than no reserve.

I'm always talking about what both the allies and the Germans were capable of. That's why we're talking so much about Dieppe, the Channel Dash and Pedestal.

Dieppe proved the need for logistics and 24/7 fire support. Something the Germans didn't have.