operation sea lion

[mkloby]

Have you've read Corum's Luftwaffe book? He makes a very good case for refuting that old myth. Really the LW was positioning it's doctrine between tactical and strategical levels : on the operational level. Tactical would be attacking the enemy directly, ie. on the battlefield, strategical would be

I love it when we get into specific military talk! As viewd by the US:

Strategic - overall national strategy which utilitzes national power to secure objectives. Another component is military strategy, which is application of military force to secure objectives.

Operational - level linking strategic and tactical such that tactical results acheive the desired strategic ambition.

Tactical - art and science of winning engagements through the application of combat power.

 

[Glider]

Kris
Quote Re the use of Barges
And yet the British used them too for the invasion of Normandy.

Reply
Not for the invasion assult. Also as far as I know the barges used to supply the aftermath were carried over and launched on the French coast. Can you tell me which ones were sailed over under their own power?

Quote Re Barges being seaworthy
They were tested and this did not happen. I already mentioned that. Only few received damage at BF 8

Reply
Again we have a fundamental difference. The only tests that I know that took place were a total failure with serious damage to a large number of the improvised vessels. I also know that the Japanese who were asked to comment on the invasion preparations considered them to be totally inadequate and quite ill prepared. This was a report from Specialist Officer Major Sakurai who with other specialist Japanese Naval and Army officers reviewed the preparations at the invitation of Goering.

Quote
Referring to the BC dash. And you want to attack an invasion fleet many times bigger than that, escorted by over a 1000 fighters? I admire your optimism

Reply
Happily. The escort given to those BC's was everything the Germans could muster. An invasion fleet is hundreds of times larger in sea area, with far more targets which would be sitting ducks and the escort would be about the same size would be spread very thin.

Quote
That was not their mission. What would you have expected them to do? Turn the ships around and start attacking those unimportant British vessels?
I think the following quote says it all:
To the men on board Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the engagement had been no more than a small inconvenience.

Reply
Of course it was. They were in 30,000 tons BC's going as fast as they could going the other way. Put the same guy in a large 3 knot barge wallowing at sea armed with a couple of light AA guns with torpedoes coming in his direction, 4.7in guns firing at him and multiple 2pds joining in, then ask him then if it's a small inconvenience. The answer may differ a touch.

Quote
Referring to the role of the GAF.
No, their job was simple: first defend the fleet. After the invasion fleet is returned, escort the bombers. Only a minority would be used for CAPs over the invasion beaches. Instead, it would be the RAF that would have to fly constant CAPs to protect the Royal Navy.
Reply
I dont think you get it. Landing an invasion fleet isn't a one off task. It needs supplies, reinforcements, back up. You don't just land it, then go home and leave it unsupported. You have to land on the beaches, fight your way inland to give the follow up forces space to land and organise themselves. This takes time.
CAPs isn't a minority role. To keep 1 unit constantly on CAP needs at least three units to be involved.
Without CAPs you are leaving your forces wide open to attack. I would use every Hurri bomber, I could lay my hands on. If you catch them they will suffer, without CAPs you wouldn't catch them very often. Flying low they would be in, attack and out, in 10 minutes tops. Without CAPs you would have to identify them, take off, cross the sea, find them by eyeball and then intercept. By which time they would be gone before your half way across the sea.
In May 42 without the threat of invasion the RAF had 12 squadrons of Hurricanes, 2 of Typhoons, 2 of Whirlwinds and 5 of P51's available for GA work. (Source Squadrons of the RAF). With an invasion threat this would have been increased.

Quote
Go ahead and give up North Africa. Give up the Battle of the Atlantic. Get non-operational American troops killed

Reply
You misread my point. Germany would have had to leave aircraft in North Africa as would the RAF. However my figures (including the ones above) exclude RCAF, RAAF and SAAF aircraft who would bolster the numbers in the UK or N Africa. The GAF would have to rely on the Italians. My money isn't on the Italians.

Quote
My figures show much more minesweepers than that. They had 90 ready for Sealion in 1940. Don't think this dropped to 50 a year later as production was still going on. Besides that they had dozens of other auxiliary ships which could be used for minesweeping.

Reply
I was using the German production figures for all minesweepers launched until the end of 1941 to allow time for completion, including pre war ships. Auxiliary ships can be used in local waters but in the front line of an invasion I don't think so. My guess is that the Germans would have included trawlers converted to minesweepers to bolster the numbers. I do have the list of similar British conversions but the list is huge.

Quote
Re Accuracy of bombing
That has nothing to do with it. That's not why British bombs were inaccurate. Do you think they couldn't see the ships in Brest? They had lousy bombsights. It is a tactical mission even if you use carpet bombing. Problem is that carpet bombing is a lousy way to achieve a tactical objective

Reply
No their bombsights were as good as most. They could see the ships in Brest (and hit them a couple of times) and they plastered the area around it. That is good enough for what I am after. Using a carpet bombing approach, to achieve a tactical aim, the disruption of the forces that have landed. The place would look like the moon and any stores would be at severe danger and transporting them around close to impossible.

Quote
Re Opposing forces at Anzio
22 Jan 1944: 36,000 soldiers and 2,300 vehicles versus 20,000 German soldiers.
End May:150,000 soldiers and 1,500 guns versus 135,000 German soldiers

Reply
When the USA landed they had a huge advantage in numbers and were slow to extend the bridgehead. The Germans held them and recovered because of the size of the bridgehead and the area wasn't safe from bombardment. What saved the Allies was the shore bombardment from the BB's breaking up the German attacks.
By landing and leaving the Germans in your scenario, your making the same mistake plus the Germans don't have any old BB's to use for shore bombardment and will be open to heavy air attack at night far beyond anything the Allies suffered from Germany at Anzio.

Quote
Ground control is unnecessary, David. Ground control only guides you to an area where the enemy is. It's not accurate enough to pinpoint the enemy. That came later.
Same thing for the Geman NFs: they knew where the British bombers would be.
Both parties would have to look for the enemy by visual contact. In fact, up to 1945 visual contact was still necessary for both sides.
Yet, you have to understand that it's more difficult to intercept a fighter than it is to find a big and slow Sterling. Because the Bf 110 had a speed advantage, the Bf 110 could have avoided the Beaufighter and attacked the British bombers.

Reply
Ground control directs the fighter to a range behind the enemy aircraft where the fighters radar can take over. The aircrafts radar then takes the fighter to visual range where the attack takes place.
Without the first phase the Germans are stumbling around hoping their short range radar will find something. With the first phase the British nightfighters will be directed onto the german nightfighters and have a significant advantage. The hunters become the hunted.
Top speed is almost irrelevant. Both planes fly at cruising speed and the first moment you normally know that you have been spotted, is when the guns start firing, which is to late in most cases. It isn't a case of avoiding the fighters and concentrating on the bombers, you have no idea what the blip is on the screen until you get to visual.

Over to you Kris

Have Fun

 

[Glider]

Just looked up some books on the Barges used by the British. There were two main groupings Dumb and Powered and numerous versions within those groups.
The key phrase is
The conversions were kept simple and with two exceptions were armed with 2 x LMG. They proved an excellent substitute for landing craft but were to large to be handled by anything other than a heavy derrick. The powered versions were able to be make their own way up and down the beaches, but were not seaworthy in open waters.

As an aside the versions were huge, from floating bakeries to carrying army light AA guns, workshop lorries and anything else you could dream of.

 

[Civettone]

If they learned anything, it would be the requirement for large numbers of capital ships providing direct fire support.

You're confusing two things: what is required and what is available. Likewise, Germany also knew it needed carriers. Yet it didn't have them but continued anyway.
Fire support is ideal but not essential: think of Crete. Many losses but the objective was achieved.
But like I said, I do envision fire support on the first day when it is most needed.
You make the same mistake over and over again: everything which is not like D-Day or the Pacific invasions is wrong and doomed to fail!

Now what is your KM going to do..... sortie into the N Atlantic to draw away the RN

If you would have read my posts, you would have known. In any case, the answer is given above.

And obviously they didn't learn any lessons because none of the purpose built amphib vessels were even on the drawing boards (like LST's, DUKW's", Higgins Boats, LCI's....blah, blah blah)

I think this shows how narrow-minded you are in this discussion. Allies used DUKWs, LSTs, ... and for that reason the Germans should also!
You keep repeating this yet you fail to deliver any evidence on why the Germans would have failed to transport and deliver the forces needed by using barges. Are you forgetting that the British also used barges in Overlord?

A little bit of wind and all your unpowered barges and slow moving barges will be scattered.

Again, you're just talking away without realizing that the barges were very capable of crossing the Channel up to Beaufort 6 without significant problems.

Night time will belong to the bombers and strafing fighters.

Once again. The bombers were not capable of hitting anything, plus they would be under attack by an even number of German night fighters.
And strafing fighters at night? What are you smoking?

If an invasion of Britain was a certienty in in summer of 1942, the US would have committed those two carriers, simply because it was written down the the war in Europe was going to come first before the Pacific.

You're contradicting yourself. First you say how air support lacked for Guadalcanal, and now you're suggesting removing Wasp?

Because their aircrew's were expert ship killers.

What's your source for this?

they will be more than useful in sinking your subs.

What? Out of all the things you've said this is really the ... Have you ever heard of the "Second happy time". Read up on it. Basic books on WW2 mention it...

You are making the classic case of attempting to defend everything and end up protecting nothing.

This is absolutely nonsense. What did the carrier fighters do near Guadalcanal? They protected the carriers, the invasion fleet and the marines on the ground.
What you also fail to understand is that the best way to escort or protect is to fly ahead of your force to catch up any interceptors before they reach your friends. That's the doctrine perfectioned by Galland as explained in his book. He is also the one behind the Channel Dash air cover which humiliated the RAF. If he doesn't know how to prevent the British from engaging German targets, then I don't know who does.
Now you may continue to rejoyce in your predestined thinking but I propose you use some actual facts and serious sources instead.

Kris

 

[Glider]

Re bombing accuracy the following may be of interest. Its a summary of the bombing accuracy on plants as reported by the US Strategic Bombing Survey. Showing that on average British night bombing was more accurate than US day bombing.

Under the conditions created in Germany by heavy flak, fighter opposition, bad weather, and effective smoke screening, it was necessary in a high percentage of the attacks to use instrument bombing, which proved to be far less accurate than visual bombing. As a result, tremendous tonnages had to be flown from England in order to hit vital parts of plants with a relatively small tonnage. Detailed plant records for three plants (Leuna, Ludwigshafen-Oppau, Zeitz) show that, of 30,000 tons of bombs dropped, only 3,781 tons hit within the plant fences. Different aiming techniques gave the following results:

Air Force and Technique Percentage of Hits Within the Plants
8th AF visual aiming 26.8
8th AF, part visual aiming and part instrument 12.4
8th AF, full instrument 5.4
RAF, night Pathfinder technique 15.8
Weighted average 12.6

 

[renrich]

The object of having control of the air for the Germans in 1940 over the channel was to help the German navy keep the RN from sinking all of the invasion boats and ships and drowning all the soldiers while they were trying to get ashore during Sealion. Even then the KM could assure the army that they could control the sea only on a narrow beach head. The army wanted a landing on a broader front which was part of the squabbling that went on between the different German commands. In the Pacific the US always made sure that they could maintain local air superiority as well as superiority on the sea during an opposed amphibious landing. The landing at Guadalcanal was unopposed but the allies controlled the air and sea until the troops were landed and many of the supplies were ashore. Of course that was a very small scale compared to a Sealion. The only time in the Pacific that the allies did not have total air superiority during an amphib operation was at Okinawa because of the kamikazes and there was no enemy surface fleet to threaten the landing. The only time the IJN really threatened a landing with surface ships was at Leyte and if Kurita had kept his nerve he could have really done some damage. I am not claiming by any means that the US is going to pull Britain's chestnuts out of the fire in case of a Sealion II in 1942 but I am saying that with the knowledge of an impending invasion of England by enemy forces abundantly clear the US would have attempted to reinforce the Brits in every way possible probably with combat ships some troops and a few a/c and it is unrealistic to assume otherwise. I am aware that the Kaiser built an impressive navy prior to WW1. After all he was Queen Victoria's grandson and there were some impressive ships although built for a different mission than British and American vessels. Good ships don't necessarily make for a good navy and the High Seas Fleet never was able to defeat even a portion of the Grand Fleet and after Jutland was largely a non-factor in the war and in fact was untrustworthy at the end of the war. I think we have an impasse here in this spirited and well contested discussion somewhat like another discussion about the best recip. engined fighter of all time. It all boils down to opposing opinions that can't be proven. My opinion is that the LW could not achieve air superiority over the channel long enough to deny the channel to allied naval forces that would brush aside the KM(while sinking most of it) and then proceed to sink enough of the supply ships and landing craft that a landing force if any got ashore would be stranded and would be either captured or killed by British forces.

 

[HealzDevo]

Also you are talking about a narrow bridge head. Wouldn't that make it easier for aircraft to fly overhead and drop bombs? Especially the big aircraft such as the Manchester and Lancaster to destroy the troops.

 

[plan_D]

"Different times. The Kriegsmarine could handle the British Channel forces as shown during the Channel Dash."

It's not a matter of different times. My mention of Overlord was simply to point out that any invasion would require a naval screen of the English Channel.

You cannot use the Channel Dash as a point for the Kriegsmarine being able to hold the Royal Navy. Your reasoning behind this, I cannot quite work out. The Channel Dash saw the Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen and Scharnhorst with six escort DDs charging through the Channel at full speed, under the cover of fog and cloud with a ceiling of 700 feet.

The convoy had no aim to engage the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy never actually engaged the convoy head-on. Admiral Ramsey didn't realise the convoy had sailed until thirteen hours after it had, even then the only Royal Navy vessels sent against the convoy were MTBs and DDs.

I'm sorry but your reasoning that the Channel Dash proves the Kriegsmarine could stand up to the Royal Navy just doesn't cut it.

The invasion would not have been able to sail under the terrible weather encountered on Feburary 12/13th so it would have been wide open to Bomber Command and Coastal Command. And the Royal Navy would have sent a lot more than a few DDs against any invasion attempt in 1942.
The Home Fleet and anything from Gibralter would be sent to the invasion area. The Kriegsmarine didn't have the power to project in a naval screen capable of stopping the Royal Navy. In a fleet engagement, the Kriegsmarine would have lost. And the Kriegsmarine would have been drawn into a fleet engagement had an invasion attempt been made.

The German naval command knew they could not attempt a large fleet action against the Royal Navy, hence the concentration on U-boats and fast raiding BCs.

"When did they ever try?
The relatively few German bombers used near Dunkirk were mainly directed against the transports and beaches."

The Luftwaffe tried to halt the Royal Navy at Crete, when the Royal Navy managed to destroy the first wave of assault ships with the escort Luzo. Meanwhile the Luftwaffe attempted to destroy the same Royal Navy ships while they evacuated the British Commonwealth troops off Crete.

The Luftwaffe tried to halt the Royal Navy in Norway, while they captured German supply ships, bombarded the shore and then evacuated British and French troops.

The Luftwaffe tried to stop the evacuation at Dunkirk attacking the "transports" which were DDs, mostly. Again, they failed. There was too much of the Royal Navy for the Kriegsmarine or Luftwaffe to deal with.

"Different again. The Channel was in complete hands of the allies. BBs were not at risk from German aircraft, subs or Schnellboote. During Sealion they would have been. That's why Churchill himself forbade their use in the Channel."

Different again? I was simply making the point that during Overlord Battleships were used in the English Channel, it was a counter to a point made earlier that they could not.
If any invasion attempt was made on Great Britain, Churchill would have gladly lifted any kind of ban to throw everything he had at the invasion. The Germans would have any and every ship from Aircraft Carrier to Motor Torpedo Boat thrown at them.

"If you would go back a couple of pages I already explained that Sealion '42 would not have to be a copy of D-Day. The Germans could do with less. Interdiction is fine but not necessary. Would D-Day have failed without the interdiction. Clearly not as the major reinforcements were not ordered to be brought in anyhow. And those divisions that were brought in had no real problems getting there. PlanD, name one unit that didn't manage to get to Normandy.
As long as motorized units had ample fuel and were not hampered by conflicting orders they could move quite rapidly over France, despite allied air power. Furthermore, they did that without undue losses."

I have been back all the pages and I find the idea that the Germans would not need as much for their invasion as we did for ours, quite foolish. Your aerial strategy for any support of this 1942 invasion is flawed, and if you were in charge of this operation it'd be the biggest foul up in military history.

"D-Day" may not have failed without interdiction, but Operation Overlord would have been a tragic loss for the Allies without interdiction.

With quotes such as;

"Railway transportation is impossible because the trains are observed and attacked in short order." - 11 June 1944.

"Troop movements and all supply traffic by rail to the army and within the army sector must be considered as completely cut off." - 11 June 1944

And the 9th US Air Force claiming 24 bridges, 12 trains, 79 locomotives, 427 R/R Cars, 22 tanks, 1288 Motor Transport, 14 Guns, 12 Dumps and 1 Power House in the month of June alone. I can hardly believe that without interdiction the operation would have been a success.

I didn't say any German unit failed to reach the battlefield, I said they struggled. While you believe their losses were low, the time wasted was much more important.

7th Germany Armee, 6 July:

"...the transportation situation makes it impossible to forecast when the 275th Infantry Division, one combat team of which is already committed, can be brought up."

19 July:

"The army supply situation must still be regarded as strained. It is true that there has been a slight decrease in the rate of gasoline consumption at the present time among the troops fighting in Normandy. However, since we cannot count on any supply worth mentioning for the next few days, and since gasoline trains have not yet arrived, we must figure on a decreased supply. In consequence of the failures of rail transportation because of the long periods of heavy fighting, a decrease in ammunition supply below the base quota is inevitable...If the ammunition trains do not appear, a serious ammunition crisis must be expected within three or four days."

The Economic Warfare Division recorded for 6 June to 26 July:

"Destruction of bridges over the Seine forced elements of five enemy divisions to make the crossing by ferry. Some divisions coming from Holland, Rumania or the USSR detrained in the Paris area and moved on foot to the battle area. Six to seven days were required by the 16th GAF Division to make a march of 150 miles in late June, while the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions detrained at Versailles and other points just west of Paris and proceeded by night marches on secondary roads. One unit arrived after two days, while others consumed two weeks in their movement."

To believe Overlord would have been a success without the Allied air forces is naive, at best.

For any invasion of Great Britain, the Luftwaffe needed to do a lot more than cover the invasion fleet on its approach.

It needed to secure the battlefield, by cutting all lines of transport around what would be the beach-head. All airfields within 100 miles would have needed to be put out of action, and put under constant pressure.
On the day and the weeks following, the Luftwaffe would need to provide fleet cover while continuing harassment of moving British forces, trains and transportation. Attacks on supply dumps would be essential and continual assaults on the artillery positions and, in this case, naval assets of Great Britain would be paramount.

I do apologise but I do not believe that the Luftwaffe single handedly would be up to the task of achieving all that. We must be reminded that the Allied air forces over France were considerably larger than anything the Luftwaffe could dream of, the US 9th Air Force alone was the largest tactical air force ever fielded. And the targets for the Allied air forces didn't include, at the time, the largest navy in the world. Nor did the Allied Air Forces encounter an air force actually capable of stopping them.

 

[Civettone]

Hi David
I must thank you for doing the effort of looking up stuff and backing up your arguments.

Not for the invasion assult. Also as far as I know the barges used to supply the aftermath were carried over and launched on the French coast. Can you tell me which ones were sailed over under their own power?

Don't really understand why you are enquiring about the "own power" notion. All I'm saying is that river barges were succesfully used by the British.

With so few purpose-built landing craft available for what would be a largely-British operation, one of his first tasks was to requisition 1000 'dumb' (unpowered) Thames barges. They were to be fitted with stern ramps, towed to the French coast by minesweepers and beached using tugs and launches. Many were later engined and armed. "Slegehammer" and "Round-up" were soon cancelled, but by the time of the Normandy landings in June 1944, 400 barges were to take part manned by 3,500 men. Making up only ten percent of total amphibious vessels, their role was nevertheless of major importance. Apart from providing fuel, water, prepared food, repairs and maintenance to the many hundreds of landing craft serving both the American and British beaches, their specialised cargo-carrying and beach-landing characteristics meant they moved immense quantities of supplies from ship-to-shore.

Trials and Early Exercises - The first trials of a Thames barge fitted with a ramp had been held earlier in October 1941, and included landing exercises with three trucks. Following Lord Mountbatten's appointment and starting in April 1942, 1000 barges were towed by trawlers and tugs in around 50 convoys to south coast of England ports for conversion in Operation "Consular". This movement was completed by September 1942 without loss. The first exercises were held at Salcombe, Devon in September 1942 with five converted barges. The first major supply exercise involving barges (36 in 3 flotillas), 36 coasters and other forces, took place at Tenby, South Wales in July/August 1943 in Exercise "Jantzen". As part of the preparation for sailing across the English Channel for the Normandy landings, "Jantzen" meant "dumb" Thames River barges sailing from the south coast of England around Land's End and across the Bristol Channel under their own power. They subsequently made even longer coastal voyages.

Let me also add that they were used in horrible weather while everyone seems to convince me that Sealion had to take place in good weather...

Again we have a fundamental difference. The only tests that I know that took place were a total failure with serious damage to a large number of the improvised vessels.

17th division tested them, as I said before. It is mentioned in the "Halder diaries" as well as the recent work of Schenk.

I also know that the Japanese who were asked to comment on the invasion preparations considered them to be totally inadequate and quite ill prepared. This was a report from Specialist Officer Major Sakurai who with other specialist Japanese Naval and Army officers reviewed the preparations at the invitation of Goering.

Thank you for adding this wonderful piece of information. It's completely new to me that the Japs were given a grand tour.
On the other hand, I don't know what to conclude from it. I can imagine the Americans also being unimpressed when they would have seen it. It however does not mean they would have been unsuccesful. I also wonder what exactly those preparations are. What do they refer to? Do you have an online source for this so I can read up on it??

n invasion fleet is hundreds of times larger in sea area, with far more targets which would be sitting ducks and the escort would be about the same size would be spread very thin.

The Germans had 250 fighters for that job. In my scenario (with increased production and the fighters withdrawn from the Ostfront) they would have had 5 times more fighters, if not more.

Put the same guy in a large 3 knot barge wallowing at sea armed with a couple of light AA guns with torpedoes coming in his direction, 4.7in guns firing at him and multiple 2pds joining in, then ask him then if it's a small inconvenience. The answer may differ a touch.

The Kriegsmarine was quite capable of dealing with the British Channel Fleet.
And I'm just wondering if torpedoes wouldn't go underneath barges??

I dont think you get it. Landing an invasion fleet isn't a one off task. It needs supplies, reinforcements, back up. You don't just land it, then go home and leave it unsupported. You have to land on the beaches, fight your way inland to give the follow up forces space to land and organise themselves. This takes time.

Well, that's exactly what I'm planning on doing. If the Germans can hold on to Stalingrad, they can also hold on to the British beaches for a couple of days.

CAPs isn't a minority role. To keep 1 unit constantly on CAP needs at least three units to be involved.

Even more than three units! So with only 1/5 (or so) of the German fighters destined for CAPs they would form a truly minimal CAP while the bulk of the Luftwaffe would attack the Royal Navy. That's the choice I'm making, that's the gamble. With the bulk of the Luftwaffe attacking the Royal Navy, the RAF would have to choose too. Attack the troops or attack the German dive bombers. My guess is that they would probably try to do both. Do you agree?

Without CAPs you are leaving your forces wide open to attack. I would use every Hurri bomber, I could lay my hands on.

That's also what I would do. Yet I believe the German troops would hold on.

However my figures (including the ones above) exclude RCAF, RAAF and SAAF aircraft who would bolster the numbers in the UK or N Africa. The GAF would have to rely on the Italians. My money isn't on the Italians.

Where are you going to get those Australians from? Australia decided that its troops would fight in the Pacific. SAAF was already in Africa. So if you pull back the RAF I can also pull back the Luftwaffe?
As such I don't think pulling back your units will do you any good.

My guess is that the Germans would have included trawlers converted to minesweepers to bolster the numbers. I do have the list of similar British conversions but the list is huge.

I don't care what the British are capable of. You said the Germans didn't have the minesweepers needed. I showed they did.

No their bombsights were as good as most. They could see the ships in Brest (and hit them a couple of times) and they plastered the area around it. That is good enough for what I am after.

Read Kurfürst post: BC tried for months and couldn't destroy their target!! And you say it's good enough?

When the USA landed they had a huge advantage in numbers and were slow to extend the bridgehead.

Don't change your point. You said the Allies were outnumbered. Do you take this back or not?

By landing and leaving the Germans in your scenario, your making the same mistake plus the Germans don't have any old BB's to use for shore bombardment and will be open to heavy air attack at night far beyond anything the Allies suffered from Germany at Anzio.

Exactly. And I said this already in my very first post!
But if the Allies could hold on for months, I think the Germans could hold on for a couple of days, don't you?

Ground control directs the fighter to a range behind the enemy aircraft where the fighters radar can take over. The aircrafts radar then takes the fighter to visual range where the attack takes place.

You're missing my point: because the Germans knew exactly where the bombers were, they didn't even need ground control (even though they did have the Liechtenstein radar).
British night fighters were not very succesful in engaging German night fighters. Ask Erich if you don't believe me. In those early days the equipment was not advanced enough to have accurate positioning of the enemy, and the Beaufighter was not as good as the Mosquito. You have to remember one very very very important thing about nightfighting, and it's something which Erich taught me: the eyes are the most important weapons of nightfighters. Once within visual range that's all you got. German Bf 110s had 6 eyes.

Top speed is almost irrelevant. Both planes fly at cruising speed

I'm jus saying that the Germans didn't need to fear the Beaufighters. They didn't fear them when escorting their own bombers, so why would they fear them now? This is not my personal opinion, this is looking at loss figures of German nightfighters prior to the arrival of the Mosquito.

Kris

 

[Civettone]

Re bombing accuracy the following may be of interest. Its a summary of the bombing accuracy on plants as reported by the US Strategic Bombing Survey. Showing that on average British night bombing was more accurate than US day bombing.

Under the conditions created in Germany by heavy flak, fighter opposition, bad weather, and effective smoke screening, it was necessary in a high percentage of the attacks to use instrument bombing, which proved to be far less accurate than visual bombing. As a result, tremendous tonnages had to be flown from England in order to hit vital parts of plants with a relatively small tonnage. Detailed plant records for three plants (Leuna, Ludwigshafen-Oppau, Zeitz) show that, of 30,000 tons of bombs dropped, only 3,781 tons hit within the plant fences. Different aiming techniques gave the following results:

Air Force and Technique Percentage of Hits Within the Plants
8th AF visual aiming 26.8
8th AF, part visual aiming and part instrument 12.4
8th AF, full instrument 5.4
RAF, night Pathfinder technique 15.8
Weighted average 12.6

What period? IIRC USSBS deals with 1943-1945. Before 1943 the British didn't have H2S and improved bomb sights.

Kris

 

[Civettone]

The object of having control of the air for the Germans in 1940 over the channel was to help the German navy keep the RN from sinking all of the invasion boats and ships and drowning all the soldiers while they were trying to get ashore during Sealion. Even then the KM could assure the army that they could control the sea only on a narrow beach head. The army wanted a landing on a broader front which was part of the squabbling that went on between the different German commands. In the Pacific the US always made sure that they could maintain local air superiority as well as superiority on the sea during an opposed amphibious landing. The landing at Guadalcanal was unopposed but the allies controlled the air and sea until the troops were landed and many of the supplies were ashore. Of course that was a very small scale compared to a Sealion. The only time in the Pacific that the allies did not have total air superiority during an amphib operation was at Okinawa because of the kamikazes and there was no enemy surface fleet to threaten the landing. The only time the IJN really threatened a landing with surface ships was at Leyte and if Kurita had kept his nerve he could have really done some damage. I am not claiming by any means that the US is going to pull Britain's chestnuts out of the fire in case of a Sealion II in 1942 but I am saying that with the knowledge of an impending invasion of England by enemy forces abundantly clear the US would have attempted to reinforce the Brits in every way possible probably with combat ships some troops and a few a/c and it is unrealistic to assume otherwise. I am aware that the Kaiser built an impressive navy prior to WW1. After all he was Queen Victoria's grandson and there were some impressive ships although built for a different mission than British and American vessels. Good ships don't necessarily make for a good navy and the High Seas Fleet never was able to defeat even a portion of the Grand Fleet and after Jutland was largely a non-factor in the war and in fact was untrustworthy at the end of the war. I think we have an impasse here in this spirited and well contested discussion somewhat like another discussion about the best recip. engined fighter of all time. It all boils down to opposing opinions that can't be proven. My opinion is that the LW could not achieve air superiority over the channel long enough to deny the channel to allied naval forces that would brush aside the KM(while sinking most of it) and then proceed to sink enough of the supply ships and landing craft that a landing force if any got ashore would be stranded and would be either captured or killed by British forces.

Hi Renrich,
I already replied to most of these points, so I apologize for the short answer.
Yes, the Americans were the best at amphibious landings. No doubt about that. However, the question is: are they the standard? Does everyone have to do it the "American way"? I don't believe so. I think the Germans could do with less. They would suffer many more losses but they would have pulled it off. One third of the river barges were expendable.
Now, you go on about the RN destroying the KM though I already said like 5 times already that the KM was going to be retreated once the Royal Navy would enter the Channel. That would be on the second day (or perhaps even the night before). So your opinion of the KM being brushed aside and the invasion fleet being sunk is invalid.

Your opinion about the High Seas fleet is also invalid. Just because they had a much smaller fleet doesn't mean it wasn't a good navy.
Kris

 

[Civettone]

I'm sorry but your reasoning that the Channel Dash proves the Kriegsmarine could stand up to the Royal Navy just doesn't cut it.

Not the Royal Navy, but the Royal Navy ships of the Channel. Those are the ones which would be used against the first wave. These could be contained by the KM and LW.

The Home Fleet and anything from Gibralter would be sent to the invasion area.

But wouldn't get there until the first wave was unloaded.

The Luftwaffe tried to halt the Royal Navy at Crete

Halt or hold off?

If any invasion attempt was made on Great Britain, Churchill would have gladly lifted any kind of ban to throw everything he had at the invasion.

No, he said it in anticipation of the invasion. He said no BB would be used in the Channel as long as the Germans wouldn't commit theirs. A wise decisions as BBs in the Channel are a prize target.

and if you were in charge of this operation it'd be the biggest foul up in military history.

That's your opinion. I also get that opinion of many others who post here but I keep that opinion to myself.

I can hardly believe that without interdiction the operation would have been a success.

Perhaps you need to start looking at the invasion from a German point of view, instead of from an allied one.

To believe Overlord would have been a success without the Allied air forces is naive, at best.

Can you prove it? All you've shown so far is that the reinforcements and supplies came in slower. Where do you get the evidence that the invasion would have been stopped if these reinforcements came in faster?
And where is your evidence that the invasion would have failed had the Germans have had 1000 aircraft operational?
I agree it would have made the job more difficult for the Allies but there's NO WAY you can prove it would have failed. As such there's no way you can prove to me that it was necessary for the Germans.

Kris

 

[HealzDevo]

The question remains because it would be a question of priorities. At this stage the desert war is still ongoing and bleeding the British. Therefore there is a question over whether Sealion could succeed. Hostile territory, a narrow bridge-head and potentially a lot of bombers dropping loads on the Germans. It doesn't really sound like the Luftwaffe could really get the better of Britain. I know you said that Germany would attempt again to crush the RAF but there are still a lot of Airfields like Ireland and Scotland from which to marshall new pilots and aircraft out of the range of Luftwaffe bases in France. Build that up, lure in Germany and then strike and you have a situation that could totally destroy Germany.

 

[plan_D]

"Not the Royal Navy, but the Royal Navy ships of the Channel. Those are the ones which would be used against the first wave. These could be contained by the KM and LW."

How can you prove that would be so? There's no case in World War II where the Kriegsmarine achieved success in fleet action against any part of the Royal Navy. What possible proof can you bring forth that can give the idea that the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe could contain the Home Fleet?

"But wouldn't get there until the first wave was unloaded."

The Home Fleet would arrive while the first wave was unloading. But that is unimportant, the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe would need to hold the Royal Navy off completely for days. If the Royal Navy were to break into the Channel, which they undoubtedly would, the invasion fleet would be shattered.

"Halt or hold off?"

I do not know what you're trying to imply with this picky question. Nor do I see reasonable argument when you're picking out minor, unimportant points. It makes no difference which words you use, either way the Luftwaffe failed to protect the first invasion flotilla sailing to Crete.

"No, he said it in anticipation of the invasion. He said no BB would be used in the Channel as long as the Germans wouldn't commit theirs. A wise decisions as BBs in the Channel are a prize target."

Even if that were the case, the BBs would be used to breakthrough any naval screening that the Kriegsmarine would try. This would allow any BC, CA or CL squadrons the Home Fleet would want to send in.

"Perhaps you need to start looking at the invasion from a German point of view, instead of from an allied one...Can you prove it? All you've shown so far is that the reinforcements and supplies came in slower. Where do you get the evidence that the invasion would have been stopped if these reinforcements came in faster?
And where is your evidence that the invasion would have failed had the Germans have had 1000 aircraft operational?
I agree it would have made the job more difficult for the Allies but there's NO WAY you can prove it would have failed. As such there's no way you can prove to me that it was necessary for the Germans."

I have looked at the invasion from both German and Allied points of view, thank you.

I do not see what could be considered solid evidence of an Allied failure without interdiction. We could spend all year shouting "Can you prove it?" at each other over this. But I won't.

As I say, I cannot solidly prove that the invasion fail just the same as you cannot prove your invasion would succeed. But I can say this;

Time was one of the most vital things for the Wehrmacht in June/July 1944, every moment wasted provided the Allies with more time to bring in reinforcements and fresh supplies. The Germans were out-numbered and the longer they were delayed, the greater the disadvantage in men and material became. The interdiction campaign made every delay, and shortened the Germans own supply. It didn't only slow reinforcement and supply, but also destroy guns and vehicles of the Wehrmact - along with the men that manned them.

If the Luftwaffe could have fielded 1,000 planes, as unrealistic as that is, it would have made no difference. The Allied air forces would have over-whelmed them, and still continued to destroy all airfields within 150 miles of the invasion beaches. This campaign would have rendered Luftwaffe numbers useless as they would have been farther from the beaches than the Allied fighters, which would be closer to home and in much larger numbers. That said, the toll on Allied forces would have been much larger given the increase in Luftwaffe activity.

Kris, there's "NO WAY" you can prove that invasion of Great Britain by Germany would have been a success. So just don't drag the argument to that level.

 

[HealzDevo]

My point is that the RAF could just withdraw some of its newer pilots to Scotland and Wales, further from the French coast and wait for the Germans and then rush them up once the Germans make a crucial move. Then it would be difficult to see the Luftwaffe as having credibility in this instance when an organization thought to be destroyed bounced back a second time...

 

[Udet]

Just as it did occurr in the skies of Europe, without the support of the US Navy in the Atlantic, Great Britain goes nowhere against the Germans.

It was good news for Great Britain they were not fighting against a naval power. Before the end of 1941, the Kriegsmarine had already destroyed and sent to the bottom 2 battleships (HMS Royal Oak and HMS Barham), 1 battlecruiser (HMS Hood), 2 large carriers (HMS Glorious and HMS Ark Royal), plus several cruisers, and dozens of destroyers and minor escort vessels sent to the bottom, not including other capital ships, such as three battleships badly mauled during the Battle for Crete -Luftwaffe victims-, and HMS Malaya, which took severe battle damage spending many months in repairs, meaning they were not available to fight.

Also let´s not forget some other embarrasing episodes, which in my view, are simply unacceptable in the case of a nation that once made one of the greatest naval powers in history:

(a) Commencing the war losing a battleship inside the very Scapa Flow, and
(b) The incident of HMS Prince of Wales during her engagement against the Bismarck...that "onboard her were civilian workers" for the amazing reason some significant part of her equipment was not entirely operational.(!!)

Knowing their refined and well earned tradition for concealing information, is that i believe Great Britain should have concealed this particular part which -amazingly- is brought forward to "explain" or "justify" the performance of the British force in that particular engagement. Sorry but i call that utmost mediocrity, and in some cases, utter stupidity. I will go deeper, you should not only have concealed this piece of information, it should have been erased forever. It is terribly embarrasing to read that part in the records of one of the greatest naval powers in history.

Whatever the British naval tradition might have been it was well into the decay phase by the time World War Two had commenced. There in fact some episodes when British seamanship showed in battle, but also the German did it, and did it in a manner to surpass the Brits several times.

Just like Kurfurst correctly pointed out: you are confusing naval power with naval tradition; German was no longer a maritime power during WW2, but they had a tradition.

The Brits unshield the sword and yell their horrible losses "are irrelevant" for the ships "are there to put up a fight and get the job done even if lost". Very emotive, but it in the end you have to admit that without the extensive aid of the Us Navy in the Atlantic then you cant know what could have happened.

Also do not forget the hammer delivered by the Japs on December, 1941, when the main -and only- capital ships of the Royal Navy in the area were promptly sunk in the same engagement.

The U.S. Navy in the Pacific did not have anything that might come close to resemble the type of losses endured by the Brits in the Atlantic/Mediterranean, and see the type of naval opponent faced by the Navy in the PTO.

Want to call a Navy call the US Navy; that was a Navy in the broad sense of the term. They more than came back, recovering from the initial losses, completely swallowing the Japanese navy, and made them pay dearly.

Do not forget Dunkirk is a DEFEAT. The Royal Navy was not the main target of the Luftwaffe in those days. Had it been the target, you have to believe it would have been one of the most horrifying blood chilling killing grounds in the history of war. This is so real, Hitler made a peace offering after that.

Norway: another defeat. Yes, high losses were inflicted to the German navy, but again, all that naval might and alleged superb intelligence were not enough to defeat the Germans.

Crete: not only a defeat; it was another slaughter. It is interesting to notice there are guys here implying losing 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers in the same battle, plus 3 battleships, 6 cruisers and 6 destroyers more damaged (some of them heavly damaged) is an acceptable balance.

 

[syscom3]

Also you are talking about a narrow bridge head. Wouldn't that make it easier for aircraft to fly overhead and drop bombs? Especially the big aircraft such as the Manchester and Lancaster to destroy the troops.

Exactly. The Germans had the choice of a broad front with the result that air support and sea support would be non existant at many times.

Or they could have a narrow front, in which they would be grouping their barges and auxiliaries together for group destruction.

The allies at Normandy didn't have that problem because the sea and air was under complete control.

 

[Civettone]

How can you prove that would be so? There's no case in World War II where the Kriegsmarine achieved success in fleet action against any part of the Royal Navy.

Channel Dash is an example where the KM achieved success against the Royal Navy.

What possible proof can you bring forth that can give the idea that the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe could contain the Home Fleet?

Just compare the forces of the Royal Navy in the Channel with the Kriegsmarine.
Sure you could bring in more destroyers or other small vessels but then the British would have lost the Battle of the Atlantic. Germany wouldn't even have had to invade the island.

"But wouldn't get there until the first wave was unloaded."

I think that's where we disagree. The bulk of the Royal Navy would not have arrived until the next day (being held up by mines, subs and aircraft) when my invasion barges and the KM have already made their way back to France.

"Halt or hold off?"
I do not know what you're trying to imply with this picky question. Nor do I see reasonable argument when you're picking out minor, unimportant points. It makes no difference which words you use, either way the Luftwaffe failed to protect the first invasion flotilla sailing to Crete.

Yet, the second one came through unharmed. I think Crete was a good learning lesson for the Germans.
About the halt of hold off, what I meant is that the Luftwaffe didn't try to halt the Royal Navy. I don't see them coming full stop. Most important is to hold them off which means contain them, neutralize their threat. That's what the Luftwaffe in the end managed to do. Or why else was the RN pulled back?

Even if that were the case, the BBs would be used to breakthrough any naval screening that the Kriegsmarine would try. This would allow any BC, CA or CL squadrons the Home Fleet would want to send in.

It's folly to send BBs to the Channel. They are way too vulnerable! Why else did the British never use them in the Channel until they had complete control of the waters and sky of the Channel in 1944?
I thought this was common knowledge. At least Churchill knew...

As I say, I cannot solidly prove that the invasion fail just the same as you cannot prove your invasion would succeed.

I reluctantly admit

Time was one of the most vital things for the Wehrmacht in June/July 1944, every moment wasted provided the Allies with more time to bring in reinforcements and fresh supplies.

This is off-topic but out of curiosity - do you believe that the Germans could or would have defeated the allies if the German transport system was not shot to pieces and they could bring in reinforcements much faster? (I just want to know, I'm not going to use it in this discussion.)

If the Luftwaffe could have fielded 1,000 planes, as unrealistic as that is, it would have made no difference.

Don't get me wrong. I didn't say that to show that the Germans could have stopped the Allied AFs. I just wanted to know your opinion about what would have happened if the allies didn't have air superiority. That's why I gave the example of a 1000 planes.

Kris

 

[Hop]

There were very few attacks on land targets in July.
That's completely untrue. Either your source is wrong, or you're making a deliberate attempt to hold back information. Which is it? I hope it's not the latter, that would really disappoint me!
To say that the German Luftwaffe only flew a couple of bombing missions over England is BS! If you want, I'll back it up (as I always try to do).

Go on then. I have posted the summaries from Wood and Dempster. Certainly there were some attacks on land targets in July, but shipping strikes predominated.

And as I pointed out earlier, if the Germans did actually invade, they are going to have a lot of targets on land, unless they abandon the army to it's fate.

Following your previous statement, I also doubt if this is true. I can hardly remember any missions where the Germans used three times as many fighters as bombers.

ER Hooton gives the German sortie numbers. For 1st July - 8th August they are 1150 daylight bomber sorties, 3350 fighter sorties.

Searching the vast spaces of the Channel with just 1000 bombers? What was I thinking...

Not searching. Coordinating 1000 bombers in attacks on small numbers of warships.

Coordinating 1000 bombers attacking a big fixed target like London is difficult enough. Trying to do the same against small numbers of warships, especially when you have freindly warships in the area, is a nightmare.

That's why it never happened during the war.

Good point. But did they all have increased AA armament and an air gunnery radar?

Pretty much. AA defences on destroyers and small craft increased hugely as the war progressed.

Camouflaged? Says who?

The page you linked to. They have photographs showing the camouflaging work being carried out.

What's the point in camouflaging the ships if you can't conceal the docks?

Docks tend to cluster together. A ship takes up a very small part of most docks.

Do you have Google earth? Brest is in fairly high res. I count about 9 dry docks, miles apart, and a lot of wet berthing areas.

And like I said, I don't plan on leaving the invasion fleet on the British beaches. They have to be pulled back. As such, there won't be a German fleet along the British coast when the Royal Navy appears.

This is getting silly.

Unloading heavy equipment and vehicles from barges and freighters, over beaches, takes a long time. Barges, many of which couldn't even reach 10 mph, take a long time to cross 100 miles of water. And just as long to return.

Then there are the problems of landing things in the correct order on the beaches, taking them inland to free up room for the next cargo etc.

The larger freighters will take literally days to unload.

I remember one night, there were 40 sunk. Don't remember the details. Will look it up!

From the War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command, 19th September, translated by Klee for the USAF:

"strong British air raids against the Channel coast, 80 barges sunk, an
ammunition train with 500 tons of explosive blown up.
<snip raids on Germany>
The Torpedo Boat T 11 received two hits the T 3 sunk last night owing to a bomb hit".

One more time, this time a bit less complicated: 1.Send out the entire fleet. First wave supported by warships.
2.Disembark the troops.

Disembarking troops will take a few hours from powered barges, quite a few hours from unpowered craft.

Unloading tanks, trucks, artillery, ammunition etc will take days.

3.Send the fleet back.

Whilst a few of the boats might make it back the same day, the vast majority are still going to be in place the next day, and the next. And the follow on supplies will be arriving by then, as well.

4.Royal Navy arrives from SF.

What about the RN in Portsmouth, and Plymouth, and the host of other bases?

The RN operated cruisers and destroyers in the channel throughout the BoB.

You might not get the battleships and heavy cruisers attacking the invasion fleet the first night, although I wouldn't count on it. But cruisers and destroyers are going to make short work of barges and tugs.

And if the few German heavy ships are actually down south, and not skulking in Norway like in the real world, then expect the RN heavy units to be further south too.

Now you're holding on to threads.
Barges don't look like destroyers. Stukas don't look like Spitfires.

You'd be surprised. When you are in a boat and you think there are hostile aircraft, you shoot at anything that flies. When you are in an aircraft looking for enemy warships, anything that floats is your target.

And it's not just barges on the German side and destroyers on the British. Both sides had converted trawlers etc as gunboats in fairly large numbers.

Those from Ostend maybe? But 50 miles is a better average. And that's 5 hours according to your calculations? Or do you want me to attach a map of the Channel?

Look at a map of the proposed landing sites from 1940. They intended landing as far west as Portsmouth. Portsmouth - Le Harve is 103 miles as the crow flies.

And none of those speeds allow for currents, which can reach more than 5 mph in the Channel

And "averages" don't cut it. The lead elements have to set out at least 10 hours before they are due to land. In the actual plan, the Germans had some ships setting out 24 hours before they were due to land, so I'm really giving your plan the benefit of the doubt by saying 10 hours, especially as few of the barges could make 10 mph.

Days? What do you base this on? Why not one day?

Reality. Ever beached a boat? Ever tried unloading over a beach? Ever tried it with people shooting at you, aircraft bombing you, and artillery shelling you?

Unloading will take days even without enemy interference.

So? Did the British have to seal off the Channel? The Germans were quite capable of mining the Channel. Even in 1944 the British were still minesweeping the Channel. You're clearly underestimating the German minelaying capability.
I'm not underestimating the British minesweeping capability. I'm just saying that the British cannot sweep them as fast as the Germans can lay them.

And the Germans cannot sweep them as fast as the British can lay them. So what happens to your tugs and barges and gunboats?

You didn't read what I wrote. I specifically said that the British would no longer have the advantage of flying over friendly territory, and that's why the situation was different from 1940.

And I pointed out to you that in the fighting over the Channel in 1940, the British came out on top.

And there are a few more points to consider.

If the Luftwaffe does not reach the British coast, then the German beachheads have no air cover. The British soldiers do not have to worry about air attack.

The invading forces will be light on artillery (it's heavy, so is the ammo). The British will outgun them by a considerable margin. The British will be able to bomb the Germans ashore with impunity.

The problem for the Germans is that the Luftwaffe has 4 separate tasks, all of which they have to carry out.

Firstly, because the Kreigsmarine is so weak, it's up to the Luftwaffe to protect the invasion fleet from the RN.

Secondly, because the invasion forces will be light on artillery and armour to begin with, the Luftwaffe has to support the army.

Thirdly, because it's easier and quicker to get troops to the front by road and rail than by ship and barge, the Luftwaffe has to interdict the British road and rail network. Otherwise the few German divisions struggling ashore are going to be overwhelmed by the 40+ divisions based in Britain.

Fourthly, because a seaborne invasion is very vulnerable to air attack, and the advancing German troops will be light on AAA, the Luftwaffe has to protect them from the RAF.

Now the Luftwaffe has to do all these tasks at once. That's why in the real world, the absolute prerequisite for the invasion was the defeat of the RAF. Trying to do all 4 tasks at once, with thousands of RAF fighters and bombers opposing them, is not going to work.

 

[Hop]

This only reinforces my opinion about the striking power of the British. The article also states that the British used over 700 aircraft (amongst them 400 fighters) against 250 German fighters. Yet, they only managed to get in a few bombers? They couldn't get them escorted by fighters? Why would things have been different during an invasion?

Because an invasion wouldn't be taking place in stormy weather in February?

The Germans picked the weather for the Channel dash because it was bad.

You might just as well argue that the allied air forces didn't do much during the first day of the Battle of the Bulge, therefore couldn't have performed well at Normandy. It's a silly argument.

And the numbers are wrong, too.

Tony Wood has the Fighter Command records for the period.

Squadron / number type / result
825 - 6 Swordfish - all lost
72 - 11 Spitfire - claimed 3 for no loss
124 - 12 Spitfire - claimed some damaged for no loss
401 - 12 Spitfire - claimed 2 for 1 loss
64 - Spitfire - delayed by poor weather at base
411 - Spitfire - delayed by poor weather at base
303 - Spitfire - uneventful patrol
315 - Spitfire - uneventful patrol
316 - Spitfire - uneventful patrol
1 - 11 Hurricane - 2 lost to flak
125 - 12 Spitfire - claimed 1 damaged for 1 loss
607 - 10 Hurricane - attacked unrelated coastal targets, 1 loss
607 - 8 Hurricane - second sortie. Attacked enemy warships, 3 losses
32 - Hurricane - attacked unrelated coastal targets
32 - Hurricane - second sortie. Attacked enemy warships
41 - 11 Spitfire - escort for 607 32 squadrons. Claimed 3 for 1 loss
3 - Hurricane - made straffing attacks on enemy destroyers. no losses
313 - Spitfire - straffing attacks on enemy flak ships. no losses
485 - 14 Spitfire - straffing attacks on enemy warships. 4 enemy aircraft claimed, no losses
452 - Spitfire - straffing attacks enemy warships. no claims or losses
602 - Spitfire - straffing attacks enemy warships. no claims or losses
65 - 12 Spitfire - 1 claim, no losses
111 - 11 Spitfire - 1 claim, no losses
137 - 7 Whirlwind - anti shipping strike. 4 losses
222 - 12 Spitfire - anti shipping strike. claimed 1 damaged, no losses
403 - 9 Spitfire - anti shipping strike. claimed 1 destroyed, no losses
234 - 12 Spitfire - anti shipping. claimed 2, lost 2
118 - 12 Spitfire - anti shipping. lost 1

That's the entirety of Fighter Command operations. It totals 20 Spitfire squadron sorties (probably about 220 sorties), 6 Hurricane squadron sorties, 1 Whirlwind squadron. The Hurricanes and Whirlwind were attack aircraft by this stage of the war. 5 of the 20 Spitfire sorties didn't encounter the enemy, meaning about 170 Spitfires actually saw combat.

In terms of fighter sorties, Hooton notes the Luftwaffe flew "over 300", the RAF as shown above almost exactly the same number (even counting the ground attack Hurricanes as fighters). The Luftwaffe fighters of course knew where their own ships were, many of the RAF squadrons failed to find the action.

Edit: As regards the claims of German superiority, the Spitfires of Fighter Command made 18 claims (actual German losses were 22). 6 Spitfires were lost.

I agree that the targets would have been easier to find but nevertheless, it still says a lot about British capabilities.

What does it say about the German capabilities? 5 British destroyers and 3 MTBs made attacks on 2 German battleships and a heavy cruiser, escorted by multiple German destroyers/torpedo boats. And not a single one of the British ships was lost. The Luftwaffe joined in with repeated bombing/straffing attacks on the destroyers as well, and failed to sink any.