P-38 Lightning VS F6F Hellcat, Pacific Warriors!

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The only thing that seems to go against the P-38 is cost. I dont think any other airforce could have afforded to spend so much on a fighter. I have often wondered if the real reason the RAF rejected it was not because of performance problems (they could be fixed) but because they realised it would be a maintenance hog and require such a big logistics tail.

The P-38 was anything from a "maintenance hog" when you considered the missions it had to perform and the benefits that came with operating a fighter with two engines. In the Pacific, especially during 1943, it was the only fighter that gave the USAAF the ability to take the fight to the Japanese from land bases. I guess the Mosquito was a maintenance hog as well?!?
 
The only thing that seems to go against the P-38 is cost. I dont think any other airforce could have afforded to spend so much on a fighter. I have often wondered if the real reason the RAF rejected it was not because of performance problems (they could be fixed) but because they realised it would be a maintenance hog and require such a big logistics tail.

Unless you have two aircraft of similar performance would cost come into the equation, a situation that doesn't apply here. As for the RAF the version they rejected wouldn'y hae been up to the job and as for it being a maintenence problem, I believe that to be a false trail. Any twin is going to need more maintanence than a single but my view is that if the aircraft can do a decent job then its of secondary interest to the senior ranks.
 
Unless you have two aircraft of similar performance would cost come into the equation, a situation that doesn't apply here. As for the RAF the version they rejected wouldn'y hae been up to the job and as for it being a maintenence problem, I believe that to be a false trail. Any twin is going to need more maintanence than a single but my view is that if the aircraft can do a decent job then its of secondary interest to the senior ranks.

Also consider the P-38s evaluated by the RAF did not have turbochargers, and there were numerous conspiracy theories why this happened.

Yes, it's obvious that a multi engine aircraft will require more maintenance than a single engine aircraft, but to assume that a twin, be it a P-38, Mosquito or Me 110 is a "maintenance hog" because of that extra engine is just nonsense unless one can come up with some real and tangible evidence to support their claim.
 
A twin will require more maintenance than a single. but since every major power at least experimented with twins because the singles didn't have enough power to a particular job ( range, weight of armament, climb or combinations) it is safe to say that maintenance issue alone would have noy stopped adoption if a particular aircraft was the only game in town for certain missions.
This applies to given time frames. The fact that a 1943-44 single can do things close to what a 1939-40 twin can do will be ignored.
 
I am not critiscing the P-38 guys its one of my favourite WWII aircraft. However my thinking on the RAFs thoughts at the time came from my father who was an RAF fitter. He wasnt in the service at the time of the RAF evaluating the P-38 he didnt join up till December 1942 but he told me that the RAF was not keen on Turbo-superchargers. He also said the RAF never ran short of pilots but properly trained fitters were always in short supply particulary in the first half of the war. Perhaps worries about a shortage of ground staff sufficently skilled to deal with what was by the standards of the day a very complicated beast came into it. Even by the wars end on a Coastal Command squadron there would be as few as 6 men available to work on a Liberator getting it ready for a ASW flight.
 
I am not critiscing the P-38 guys its one of my favourite WWII aircraft. However my thinking on the RAFs thoughts at the time came from my father who was an RAF fitter. He wasnt in the service at the time of the RAF evaluating the P-38 he didnt join up till December 1942 but he told me that the RAF was not keen on Turbo-superchargers. He also said the RAF never ran short of pilots but properly trained fitters were always in short supply particulary in the first half of the war. Perhaps worries about a shortage of ground staff sufficently skilled to deal with what was by the standards of the day a very complicated beast came into it. Even by the wars end on a Coastal Command squadron there would be as few as 6 men available to work on a Liberator getting it ready for a ASW flight.

Perhaps then it was his perspective based on where he was and what he was doing at the time (and due respect to him as well) but in actuality the P-38 had a very good mission capable rate despite having the extra engine to deal with.
 
I doubt the P-38 was intended to replace either the Hurricane or the Spitfire.
Bristol Blenheim fighters would be a good candidate. Alternative to the Whirlwind? Supplement Beaufighters? All twins with higher maintenance needs than a single. The plan fact that without the turbos the model 322 had performance well below what the British had been lead to expect sounds at least as likely. Trying to use a common engine with the P-40s to be delivered during the same time frame does show some concern with maintenance issues but the deletion of the counter rotating propellers in pursuit of this goal further degraded the aircraft.
 
Thanks for the info; would you provide some numbers before I snatch the book from Amazon?

121 aircrews lost (which includes non pilots in VB and VT types)
370 aircrews survived.

Bad losses but far from crippling.

Shortround6 ..... I doubt the P-38 was intended to replace either the Hurricane or the Spitfire.

The P-38 was designed from the start as a high altitude bomber interceptor. It was put into the traditional fighter category due to necessity, not by design.

As for the P-47's performance in the Pacific; it was not effective at all. Its short range kept it out of many a battle that the P-38 could fly to. And the P40 had far better performance at the lower and middle altitudes.

We can also say that like the F4U, the moment the P38 came on the scene, it had such a performance advantage over the Japanese types, it dominated the sky. And with its long legs, it could go to where the bombers went. A land based Hellcat did not have the range. That's why the P38 has an edge up on the Hellcat.

Not once in the war did a Japanese type ever have a performance edge over The P38 as to make it vulnerable. But the Hellcat was dated in 1945 as better Japanese designs took to the air. It was by fate that the Hellcat had many of its kills against poorly trained pilots flying inferior aircraft. But during the rare times later in the war when a good Japanese pilot was flying a modern type, the Hellcat was shown not to be an invincible machine and suffered accordingly.
 
Ive always been a big fan of the P-38, such a powerful looking plane. The hellcats main advantage was being carrier based which was very important so I have to give it the edge there.
 
From "Corsair" by Barrett Tillman, page 55.

"At this time AirSols had nearly 270 fighters on hand. But 69 were P39s, ill suited to aerial combat with their short range and mediocre performance at altitude. Of the remaining 200, the majority were F4Us and F6Fs. The 71 Corsairs represented one-quarter of all AirSols fighter followed by 58 Hellcats. There were also 39 American and New Zealand P-40s and 31 US Army P38s."

" In other words, the Corsair squadrons maintained an average two-thirds in commission rate compared to over 90% for F6Fs and P40s. The complex, sophisticated Lockheed Lightings were lowest with 38% operational."

This was in December 1943 and age of the airplanes may have had something to do with the in-service rate. The Hellcats were relatively new to the battle.
 
From "Corsair" by Barrett Tillman, page 55.

"At this time AirSols had nearly 270 fighters on hand. But 69 were P39s, ill suited to aerial combat with their short range and mediocre performance at altitude. Of the remaining 200, the majority were F4Us and F6Fs. The 71 Corsairs represented one-quarter of all AirSols fighter followed by 58 Hellcats. There were also 39 American and New Zealand P-40s and 31 US Army P38s."

" In other words, the Corsair squadrons maintained an average two-thirds in commission rate compared to over 90% for F6Fs and P40s. The complex, sophisticated Lockheed Lightings were lowest with 38% operational."

This was in December 1943 and age of the airplanes may have had something to do with the in-service rate. The Hellcats were relatively new to the battle.

Good info, but it's actually known as "Mission Capable Rate" or MC rate. There's also a "Fully Mission Capable" rate that indicates that everything of the aircraft is functional. Aircraft from that era and even today sometimes go out without everything functioning and there's a predetermined lists that specify what must be functional on the aircraft so it can either fly combat or just fly. Again, I'd like to know his source of information on this because there are many variables that go into these numbers and when you take them. For example, you can have parts shortages or damage to aircraft that can't be repaired at the squadron level, so they must go depot, so that's not the fault of the aircraft. You can also have two or three aircraft go into a maintenance phase check for a day or two and that also affects your MC rate. Its obvious that the P-38 will always have a lower over all MC rate because of its engines.

At 31 P-38s running a 38% MC rate you can be looking at 22/ 23 aircraft that were at least MC. One of the big grounding problems with the P-38 was boost problems in the inter-cooler system in models prior to the "J." Again, I'd like to see more specifics on this because I do know that by 1944 the P-38J was running an overall MC rate into the 80%.
 
FB, you would know more about this than I but it seems to me that whether an airplane is ready to fly or not depends a lot on the quality and quantity of ground personnel available to work on the plane and the availability of spare parts. In the Solomons in 1943, from what I have read, the situation was pretty primitive, which must have effected the readiness of AC. Of course in the fall of 1942 and early 43, it was so primitive that spare Navy pilots, whose planes were shot up by IJN shore bombardment or by local artillery were issued 03s and sent to the front lines.

There is a bibliography in the book which is fairly limited. Barrett Tillman has written a lot of books about WW2 AC but I don't know where his info comes from.

In the "Great Book of WW2 Aircraft" on page 19 it says of the P38 in late 1942 in North Africa that the 1st and 14th FGs were to fly Lightnings as units but it was rare to get more than 10 planes on a mission because aircraft and spare parts were scarce. Sounds like the same issue in the Solomons.
 
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FB, you would know more about this than I but it seems to me that whether an airplane is ready to fly or not depends a lot on the quality and quantity of ground personnel available to work on the plane and the availability of spare parts. In the Solomons in 1943, from what I have read, the situation was pretty primitive, which must have effected the readiness of AC. Of course in the fall of 1942 and early 43, it was so primitive that spare Navy pilots, whose planes were shot up by IJN shore bombardment or by local artillery were issued 03s and sent to the front lines.

There is a bibliography in the book which is fairly limited. Barrett Tillman has written a lot of books about WW2 AC but I don't know where his info comes from.

In the "Great Book of WW2 Aircraft" on page 19 it says of the P38 in late 1942 in North Africa that the !st and 14th FGs were fly Lightnings as units but it was rare to get more than 10 planes on a mission because aircraft and spare parts were scarce. Sounds like the same issue in the Solomons.

All correct Ren, so when one looks at MC rates all this has to be considered. I would see aircraft like the P-39 and P-40 with higher MC rates than the P-38(42 - 43 time frame) because of not only the twin engine situation but both aircraft were in production a lot longer at this point the logistic system was probably well established. Additionally I would bet dollars to donuts that there were a lot more mechanics who were well trained on both the P-39 and P-40 in lieu of the P-38. Of course you need maintainers to keep these aircraft in the air as well as parts. I do know the first combat ready P-38s were slow coming to all theaters, it seems that changed by the end of 1943/ 1944.

In the end, when you can establish a level playing field where logistics and adequate personnel are available for all aircraft, then a measure of real time MC rates can be established, although that scenerio rarely happens. Keep in mind however that the bean counters who look at this stuff do consider parts shortages and inadequate manning so that's why you'll see units living with 25 and 30% MC rates.

In the case of the 14th FG only being able to field 10 aircraft, it would be interesting to know how many aircraft the unit actually had.
 
What would be interesting to know would be the average time that a new fighter would stay in service, not counting if it was destroyed by friendly or enemy action, and also know in which theatre of operatons a fighter lasted longest. I recently received online a series of photos made when the P51s began to operate off of Iwo Jima. I forwarded them to Dan because I know not how to get them on this forum. The photos had captions and it was absolutely amazing how many Mustangs were destroyed not by enemy action in that environment. Crippled B29s making emergency landings destroyed a lot. Landing gear collapses got a lot. Apparently there were bad cross winds. It was stated that the environment there( wind, sand, corrosion, etc.) was very hostile and there were a lot of engine failures. It was not easy duty for the pilots with eight hour missions, most over water.

In the article, it seemed to be saying it was two FGs, 1st and 14th that could only get up ten AC.
 
What would be interesting to know would be the average time that a new fighter would stay in service, not counting if it was destroyed by friendly or enemy action, and also know in which theatre of operatons a fighter lasted longest. I recently received online a series of photos made when the P51s began to operate off of Iwo Jima. I forwarded them to Dan because I know not how to get them on this forum. The photos had captions and it was absolutely amazing how many Mustangs were destroyed not by enemy action in that environment. Crippled B29s making emergency landings destroyed a lot. Landing gear collapses got a lot. Apparently there were bad cross winds. It was stated that the environment there( wind, sand, corrosion, etc.) was very hostile and there were a lot of engine failures. It was not easy duty for the pilots with eight hour missions, most over water.

In the article, it seemed to be saying it was two FGs, 1st and 14th that could only get up ten AC.


From what I understand many fighters weren't expected to last more than 500 hours. Multi engine aircraft lasted a little longer. Its pretty obvious that many of these aircraft would have probably lasted longer as many of them were abused while in service and I'm sure that shortened the life span for many of them. I have an accident report from my kids' great grandfather who flew B-24s where he was out on a training mission after the war and the LMG collapsed. If I remember correctly the aircraft had 1,800 hours on it which by today's standards is still considered brand new.
 
There were some F4's and F5's operating in the SW Pacific as early as July 1942. I dont know for sure, but there had to be the same working in N Africa in the fall of 1942.

I wouldn't doubt that they got first call on spare parts which impacted other groups untill the supply situation worked itself out.
 
There were some F4's and F5's operating in the SW Pacific as early as July 1942. I dont know for sure, but there had to be the same working in N Africa in the fall of 1942.

I wouldn't doubt that they got first call on spare parts which impacted other groups untill the supply situation worked itself out.

Agree...
 
There was also the 343rd FG that was active in Alaska as early as June 1942.

They too would have been receiving parts and supplies that the other groups had to contend for.
 
There was also the 343rd FG that was active in Alaska as early as June 1942.

They too would have been receiving parts and supplies that the other groups had to contend for.

Yes, and from what I understand they did pretty good for what they had to work with.
 

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