on board radios were always a mixed bag when it came to be assistance or hindrance in fighter control. Overall they were an advantage, not so much for the airborne commanders, who tended to rely on hand signals and teamwork, rather radios allowed fighter assets to be vectored to where they were needed by the ground based fighter controller.
Trouble was, that many US pilots, before they learnt the need for good radio discipline, tended to clog up the communication with useless chatter, ansd this had a twofold effect, not only could the fighter controller not get his message to the people that needed to hear from him, the in flight C&C also suffered, because people were too busy trying to understand or say things that really did not need to be said or communicated. The result was invariably confusion and an overall disjointed defence that often led to less than optimal results for US fighters. Later, as radio discipine was practised and refined, this problem did disappear, and US fighter control overtook everybody because of theiur better radios and superior ground based detection systems.
The Japanese are often criticised because of their poor early type radios. But I think in some respects this improved their fighter defences. As a receival device from ship to plane, Japanese radios were adequate, but inter plane comms were pretty restricted. this made fighter control actually easier, as it eliminated the incessant and uneccessary chatter that plagued the early US efforts. unfortunately for the Japanese, range was still limited to los near the ship, and the ship had no radar. at least early on, making radio direction almost impossible. So, it was not the poor radios that caused the japanese problems, it was the inability to provide meaningful central fighter direction from the ship that was the problem. By the time this was corrected, after Santa Cruz, the japanese had already suffered some very serious defeats.