P-51D vs Dora

I think some of this info does beg the question, if the 190D was still (I believe nicknamed) a 'downstairs Dora' what really was the point of it and how much better would it have been to forget it ( the Ta 152/3) and concentrate on better 190A versions and jets?
If these D's Ta's really were just to be used for protecting the jets on take-off landing (as I have seen written) then in what way were they better than the 190A at this sort of mission?
Perhaps that requirement came a bit later in the day?

Gixxerman said:

I think some of this info does beg the question, if the 190D was still (I believe nicknamed) a 'downstairs Dora' what really was the point of it and how much better would it have been to forget it ( the Ta 152/3) and concentrate on better 190A versions and jets?
If these D's Ta's really were just to be used for protecting the jets on take-off landing (as I have seen written) then in what way were they better than the 190A at this sort of mission?
Perhaps that requirement came a bit later in the day?

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I've never heard of a downstairs Dora

Fw 190 D series was intended as a stop gap until the Ta 152 arrived and this is made explicit in Focke-Wulf documents.

Bolting Daimler-Benz engines onto D-9s or A-8/9s was just a late war expedient. You could see it as an emergency measure.

Tank said more than once that he wasn't interested in the projects but they carried on, though largely contracted out to the engine manufacturer. They provided the "triebwerk" which we might call a power egg, complete with radiators etc. This bolted on to the No1 bulkhead of the air frame which remained unchanged.
In the case of the D-15 this work was put out to the Henschel factory at Kassel which was manufacturing Daimler Benz engines under licence and was importantly based in the same city as the Fiesler plant which was manufacturing D-9s.
Daimler Benz were very keen because it gave them an opportunity to sell their engines to Focke-Wulf. A contract is a contract, business is business.

The Ds and Ta 152 were not intended to protect jets taking off though this is a role fulfilled by a handful of D-9s. They were designed to shoot down bombers in day light. They had better performance than the A series in just about every respect.

Cheers

Steve

What good is a German fighter in 1944 that isn't set up to fly at 20,000 to 30,000 feet and shoot down bombers?

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Apparently you're not aware that 10s of thousands of IL2s, Typhoons, P-47s etc. were conducting CAS missions at altitudes below 10,000 feet.

GregP, Stona: can you guys share any info you have on the D-14 and D-15, please?

Hi Silence,

For the Fw 190D-14 I have the following: It had the DB603E powerplant, later to be replaced by the DB603LA. Armament was the same as for the D-12 with only minor changes due to the new engine. The MW booster required minor changes for the same reason together with different engine instruments and a different oil tank. Two D-14's were completed before the end of hostilities but test flying wasn't completed yet before the end of hostilities.

The Fw 190D-15 remained a project only. It was also intended to be produced from an A-8/F-8 airframe with a DB603E engine with the booster to be replaced by an MW system. AN all-weather Fw190D-15/R11 was also projected with a PKS-12 directional control, FuG 125 radio, and heated windows. Completion was prevented by the collapse of armed resistance in 1945.

According to Nowarra, 674 total D-series were built. Other sources say as many as 1,850 but that may well be the werknumbers assigned.

Actual primary source data for the production numbers is partly (or largely, depending on source) missing according to many authors, so any numbers thrown about by me or anybody else are probably estimates based on secondary source information.

Japo devote ten pages of part II of their Fw 190 D book to these developments (pp338-449) which I can't reproduce here. It's the best account I've read, backed up with reference to surprisingly substantial surviving documentation.
I can pull out some salient points for you if you have some specific questions.
Cheers
Steve

D. Hermann's book on the Long Nose has several pages on the D-14, 15.

One often reads that the DB603 was initially rejected because it was much heavier than the Jumo213 engine. When DB received the V76 for conversion to the DB603 engine, they weighed the Jumo213A > 1642kg. This was 2.75kg less than the DB603E. Both weighed with cowling and prop.

Two brand new Fw 190 Ds, W.Nrn. 210040 and 210043 were taken from the Focke-Wulf Sorau plant and delivered to Daimler-Benz's testing and development facility at Stuttgart-Echterdingen. They were delivered on the 8th and 10th of October 1944. All the design work for the fitting of the Daimler-Benz engines, initially the 603E, later the 603L, including alterations to the airframes was to be done by Daimler-Benz. Focke-Wulf was deemed not to have the design capacity for the task. Before these aircraft were even delivered the project was in trouble. Focke-Wulf admitted on 3rd October that the design stage was seriously delayed and also that, despite a looming shortage of BMW 801 engines for the following month, neither the 603E or the 603L could be delivered. The DB 603A even featured in a Focke-Wulf document for the D-9, though there is no evidence that it was seriously considered..
Junkers reported that the cooling problems with their Jumo 213E had not been solved.
It is difficult to over emphasise just what a parlous state the German aircraft industry was in around this time, and it would never recover.

Another problem was fuel. At the same meeting Gen. Major. Ullrich Diesing in his capacity as Chef der Technischen Luftrustung (TLR) said that the OKW was not interested in an engine operating only on C3 fuel. He further suggested that as use of B4 fuel was a basic criterion for any engine to be developed, then Daimler-Benz production capacity might be used for production of the Jumo 213E rather than the DB 603L when developed. You can imagine the consternation amongst the Daimler-Benz delegation (Pro.Dr. Nallinger and General Manager Dr.Ing. Wilhelm Haspel).

Cheers

Steve

Ok, I have the Harmann book, but there's little in there. May I ask who/what Japo is, and Nowarra?

Thanks guys.

JaPo is the Czech publisher of a series of books, for the most part authored by Eric Larger (who passed away in 2008 ) Thomas Poruba, Marc Deboeck, Ales Janda et alter. Many eminent Luftwaffe researchers have contributed to their projects.

The two Fw 190 volumes are hard to come by now but are well researched and full of excellent profiles, not all of which I'm totally convinced by, but that's another matter. There was a volume three in the pipeline but that seems to have been put on hold

If you can get hold of them without mortgaging your house do so. Poruba also did a couple of excellent volumes on the Bf 109 K. They have also published a lot of stuff more directly related to Luftwaffe operations in what was Czechoslovakia.

Cheers

Steve

silence said:

Ok, I have the Harmann book, but there's little in there. May I ask who/what Japo is, and Nowarra?

Thanks guys.

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Heinz Nowarra is the prolific German writer, 1st books written in 1960s by him IIRC. Some of them require a grain of salt when reading them, eg. the book on the Bf-109 I have.

I have several books by Nowara. A product of their times, a bit dated now.

Back to the original topic - how much did tactics play a role in the outcome of combat between the P-51 and Fw 190D?

It is my understanding that at some stage in 1944 the order was given to Luftwaffe fighter pilots to ignore the escorting fighters and concentrate on the bombers.

wuzak said:

Back to the original topic - how much did tactics play a role in the outcome of combat between the P-51 and Fw 190D?

It is my understanding that at some stage in 1944 the order was given to Luftwaffe fighter pilots to ignore the escorting fighters and concentrate on the bombers.

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Oh that was always the case. SOP, take out the bombers. But if they have heavy fighter escorts, then you need to 'peel' off the escorts.

That is what Park did in the BoB, some raids came in with 4 or 5 fighters per bomber... So he'd peel off the fighters, usually with Spitfires, then the Hurricanes went for the bombers.
Hence his tactics of (as opposed to Douglas, LM, et) of engaging the enemy before they bombed. Apart form disrupting their bombing, a worthwhile aim in itself, it would start the peeling off process. Even if the RAF couldn't get through the fighter escorts as they came in (which happened sometimes), the escorts would have to break off earlier leaving the bombers more vulnerable on the way out, then other squadrons (or ones that had landed and then came back) could get at the bombers.
Fighter sweeps he would ignore totally.

As I see it the German air defence system was far more fragmented than the British one, without the ability for that tight tactical control, as well as the 'experten' would probably not take tactical control from the ground too well (yet another weakness in their organisatonal culture). Reading Galland* about him taking off and swanning around the sky looking for victims makes great reading, but it is not the way to win an air war.

The Germans did very well, winning strategic victories in 43 against both the USAAF and Bomber Command at the same time, but as I said it was a fragile win as it was critically dependent on their slow twins.. But I wonder how much better they could have done with a better system and someone like Park controlling it (some Mosquitos wouldn't have hurt ether).... The Germans had the luxury of time, in detecting and plotting raids, as opposed to in the BoB, but they didn't seem to use it properly.

The best thing the Germans could have done when the Mustang and longer ranged P-47s came in, was to pick them up and attack with small numbers of 109s from high altitude as they approached their rendezvous points (even better as they crossed the border), forcing them to drop their tanks and reducing their range (with instructions not to get mauled). But that sort of thing take a tightly integrated C&C system, excellent discipline and, of course, a tactical master like a Park to run it.

This all got more difficult after D-Day when the German radar network in France and Holland was overrun, reducing their warning time.

So to answer your question, oh yes tactics were very important but you'd have to questions some of the Luftwaffe's. In particulary when they went through their own 'big wing phase' (Galland thought similarly to Bader on this). This helped the USAAF greatly, these formations were slow and clumsy, easy to see, took ages to form up and allowed (particularly) the Mustang boys to do their own bounces and break up the attacking formations. A surprise this as Galland and his boys did that repeatedly to the RAF fighters om their big clumsy wings all through 41 and 42 in France, inflicting 4:1 losses through that time.

So the Mustang had the high altitude performance and already was at height, but countering that the Germans (even later on) had the detection advantage giving them time to get a tactical advantage. A 109G with a height advantage (and ideally surprise) is going to give a Mustang a hard time, remembering that their real role was to disrupt the escorts (if you killed any that was a bonus), to let the bomber killers through.


* Badar wanted this too. He didn't want any ground control, he was going to control (???) all his 'big wing' in the air by himself, and swan around flying across different sectors or even Groups airspace as he wanted. Total nonsense of course, the fact the LM agreed and supported this was an indication of how little he really understood air defence (or as he showed later, offence).

I don't have the will to write a page on Luftwaffe fighter control, specifically in Reich Defence as that is effectively the topic above, but the fighters were under tight control from the ground and to a lesser extent in the air. There were actually two commentaries though fighter leaders would usually base their tactics on that put out by divisional headquarters. When aircraft moved from the area covered by their own division the "host" would either broadcast additionally on the incoming fighters frequency or the fighter leader would switch to the other centralised "Riechsjagerwelle" commentary.
The divisional commentaries were very specific. I'll quote here just one intercept to give an idea.

"In two minutes you will attack on a bearing of 270 degrees..."

How much latitude Geschwader commanders had would vary. They ultimately held tactical control. The idea of senior pilots swanning about a hostile sky alone is nonsense and that it comes from Galland does not surprise me. It would be virtual suicide.

The Luftwaffe had much more time to assemble its formations than the RAF in the BoB. The divisional commentary was broadcast by the "stako (Staffel Kommando Gerat-Tannoy)" to all Gruppe headquarters and hence to dispersals. The commentary usually started as the USAAF formations assembled over the English coast. Comparisons with 12 Group's big wings in the Battle of Britain are not really relevant as they rarely had time to assemble in time to make a meaningful interception. When they did they could be effective.
The Luftwaffe did not consider that attacking formations of hundreds of bombers piece meal would be effective. A Geschwader of 100 or so fighters attacking head on was far more likely to, at the very least, loosen the formation than a Rotte or two diving through the formation.

After take off each Gruppe was detailed to a rendez-vous point where the Geschwader formed up and the Komodore or his appointed subordinate took command. These units rarely numbered more than 100 aircraft. There were different units detailed to attack the escorts (the Leichte or Hohen Gruppe) and the bombers. The formations attacking the bombers were supposed to ignore the escorting fighters, which is practically impossible.

After the mission each Gruppe was to land together in order that it might be prepared for subsequent missions. A Gruppe, typically 20-25 aircraft at this time (early'44) could be refuelled and re-armed in less than half an hour. Drop tanks were never carried on second and subsequent missions.

The Luftwaffe did consider attacking escorting fighters as they crossed the coast of mainland Europe but fairly quickly abandoned the tactic. Its fighters sustained heavy losses and, more importantly, were diverted away from the real target which was the bombers. The USAAF fighters engaged over the coast were doing an excellent job of defending the bombers by proxy and both sides quickly realised this.

As the battle progressed the Luftwaffe became very wary of attacking escorted bombers. The 8th AF radio intercepts are a testament to this. There are several instances of Luftwaffe formations either refusing or deliberately avoiding and attack when a heavy escort has been detected.
I posted some of these intercepts in another thread somewhere.

Cheers

Steve

I am very surprised that the LW made the same mistakes that the RAF did under LM and Bader. Especially when some of the people who had caused heavy losses to the big wing, were in positions to influence the way that they responded.
I am also surprised that the fighter pilots themselves appeared to be under tight control from the ground?
In comparison, the German tank formations were usually given a task, and allowed to operate as they thought best to achieve that objective.

vinnye said:

I am very surprised that the LW made the same mistakes that the RAF did under LM and Bader. Especially when some of the people who had caused heavy losses to the big wing, were in positions to influence the way that they responded.
I am also surprised that the fighter pilots themselves appeared to be under tight control from the ground?
In comparison, the German tank formations were usually given a task, and allowed to operate as they thought best to achieve that objective.

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The Luftwaffe was confronted by hundreds (sometimes well over a thousand) USAAF aircraft. Attacking piece meal in small units was not an option. With their command and control system giving them ample warning of the incoming raids there was adequate time to assemble their "Gefechtsverbande". The first mission of the day was normally flown with a drop tank, increasing the endurance of the Luftwaffe fighters by up to an hour.
The problem for the RAF was a lack of time to react and assemble larger formations. It is for this reason that Dowding, quite correctly, used the squadron as his basic tactical unit. The Luftwaffe raids were coming in from France and had only the English Channel rather than the North Sea to cross. The comparison is not valid.

The occasions when the Luftwaffe was most successful was when a large percentage of the aircraft launched actually made contact with the Americans. It was rare for more than half the intercepting aircraft to even make contact with the enemy, let alone overcome the escort and make attacks on the bombers. Without some kind of ground control the chances of even finding the raid would be close to zero. Interceptors must be vectored to within a few miles of the raid. Most pilots who flew these missions, on both sides, seem to agree that three miles was about the maximum range at which they could actually see the enemy aircraft.

It was important in aerial warfare to maintain formation. There was a standing order in JG 3 (maybe other units too) that anyone running out of ammunition was not to break away but to stay with his formation (at least his wing man, better his "Schwarm") as this gave him the best chance of survival.

Air combat in WW2 was not a solitary affair. If Galland really had swanned about looking for the enemy his chances of finding them were negligible and his chances of survival may well have been even less.

Cheers

Steve

Yes, Vinnye, the Whermacht 'mission command' system (NATO and the US got around to it in the 1980's .....). A task is given clearly, but not how to do it, that is left up to the people entrusted with the task.
Officers, NCOs and troops are supposed to show initiative. Hence their incredible performance,

Martin van Creveld did a great book "Fighting Power', comparing the performance of the US and German Army in WW2, not to the Americans credit. But no one (expect maybe the Australians and New Zealanders) came close to their performance overall. Whether they were on the attack, or on the defence, whether they were outnumbered or were not. Whether they had air cover or didn't, their performance was superb.
That's why it took the combined efforts of the biggest empire (albeit declining) in the World, and the 2 (about to be) superpowers to defeat them.

Lots of reasons why they went down that road, started prior to WW1 and became perfected as the operational concepts in the 1930s. But 'mission command' was at the heart of it.

But the Luftwaffe, was not from that DNA, except in that quite a few originally came from an army background. It was largely created by the Nazis and the head of it was the number 2 man himself.
Hence the contradictions of the Luftwaffe, superb in the beginning at close support .. but then got outperformed later.
Full of the 'warrior' mythology, with too much attention on 'stars' (experten) to the price of focus on missions.

For example, Bungey is very critical of Marseille, who he characterised, quote correctly, as someone who wanted to lark about in fast planes. Despite their technical superiority at the time (that wonderful 109F again), their performance in stopping bombers blowing the C@%p out of the troops on the ground was close to non-existent.

Very professional in some ways, but incredibly amateur in others. Stillpepper in his book (Spitfire on my Tail) talks about Galland who was (at that time, though he re-wrote history in his own book) being dead set against radios in their fighters, this was the force that created the, standard to this day, (as we call it) 'finger four' tactical formation.

Instead of someone like a Park to put them in their place, they were feted and promoted.... that 'throat ache' again.

As for their daylight air defences (and even their night ones) their were so many holes in it that it was not funny. Galland did (in his owjn words in his own book) swan around at times.
He did want to get bigger groups together, their 'big wing' stuff.

His ultimate (stupidity) was his 'big blow' idea . He husbanded planes for months until, in his own words, to face the Americans with a massive blow. Nonsense, just would have made a lot more Mustang pilots aces...

Hitler overruled him and used them for an attack on the ground to try and get the planes on the ground .. it was a limited success (not the disaster some people claim) but a poor use of pilots. Especially since the idea was to destroy plane's which the Allies had heaps of, not kill (or capture) pilots. So they expended a lot of irreplaceable pilots for a lot of very replaceable planes. Poor trade.

Hiltler does also come into the act in preventing the one thing that could have totally destroyed the RAFs Bomber Command ... intruder operations, though not much fight from the Luftwaffe's higher command (including Galland who knew nothing about night fighting).
That, if done right, would have ended Bomber Command (or at least, maybe just, possibly, crossing fingers .. made them a bit more rational) .

Even though the British had, by that time, the best night fighter defence force and system in the World (another Dowding thing though he got the boot before he could see it in action) it would have been impossible to defend against given the huge number of bombers in the air and the impossibility (at the time) of the night fighters separating it all out.

But, like his push (at one time, as said by Galland) he wanted to get rid of all German fighters to just use AA, his decision was a political one. Bombers dead on German soil seemed good to him, raised morale amongst the German people (and they he was right in a sense, but might have been better to not let them get there in the first place).
Again the Luftwaffe higher command just rolled over. They never had a Dowding or Park to sort them out ... then again Goering would have put a Dowding or Park into a concentration camp...

And (eg) Galland would never have obeyed a Park ... Bader and him got on well after the war..... I'm sure both dreaming of giant (WW1 like) 'furballs' in the air.. all tactically and strategically meaningless.

Hey I am an an unbiased insulter ... the Germans could show that they were just as crap as the British, American and Soviets in various (and often very important) areas, which is a bit lucky .. they could have won....

At the end of the day tactics employed by tanks moving at a few miles an hour in two dimensions and engaging at ranges of a thousand yards or so have got absolutely nothing to do with aircraft flying at several hundred miles an hour in three dimensions and attempting to engage at even closer ranges.

The command and control systems developed during the war gave intercepting fighters the only realistic chance of engaging their enemy before they were gone. The chances of fighters not vectored or controlled as part of such a system, and that means controlled from the ground, arriving in the correct air space, at the correct time, and at the correct altitude were zero.
They still are.

Cheers

Steve

Engaging the P-51s early on is easily a loosing proposal for the LW in early 1944, since that would locate them within the scope of P-47s when airborne, and within scope of many tactical fighters bombers when at the airbase, taking off and landing.