Patton v Rommel....

Patton v Rommel


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Part III


The Defenses of Walcheren

The German defenses on Walcheren Is were very strong, with heavy coastal batteries posted on the western and southern coasts. The coastline itself had been fortified against amphibious assaults, and a landward-facing defensive perimeter had been built around the town of Vlissingen to defend its port facilities should an Allied landing on Walcheren succeed. The only land approach was the Sloeda, or Walcheren, Causeway—a thin strip of ground a few yards wide joining South Beveland to Walcheren Island over the Sloe Channel. The causeway was little more than a raised two-lane road. To make matters even more difficult for attackers, the flats that surrounded the causeway were too saturated with sea water for movement on foot or in vehicles, but were too shallow for assault boats. The defenses had been attacked by Bomber Command and 2nd Tactical Air Force in September, but poor weather and heavy antiaircraft fire had reduced the effectiveness of the air strikes.

Walcheren Island was garrisoned by 70 inf XX. The unit was a "white bread" or magen (stomach) division made up of men with special dietary needs. Some were recovering from stomach wounds, others had digestive problems such as ulcers and could not tolerate the normal, heavy German flour. The Germans had grouped the sufferers together in August 1944 and assigned the division to safeguard the Dutch coast at Zeeland. Despite their shortcomings, the ailing soldiers performed surprisingly well. Also on Walcheren Island were naval personnel of the 202nd Marine Artillery Bn.

Gaining a Foothold

To weaken the German defenses, Allied bombers mounted five separate attacks involving some 494 sorties against the island's perimeter dike. The bombing breached the dike in four places, and the sea poured into the interior of the low-lying island, flooding four-fifths of the area. Between October 28 and 30, BC mounted a further 745 sorties against German defenses, dropping more than 4,000 tons of bombs and destroying 11 of the enemy's 28 artillery btys.

The island was to be attacked from three directions—from the east, across the Scheldt from the south, and by sea from the west. It was hoped that the German defenders would not be able to respond effectively to these multiple assaults. The 2nd Cdn XX's already bloodied 5th Bde attacked the causeway from South Beveland on October 31. The initial attack by the Black Watch was rebuffed. The Calgary Highlanders then sent a company, which was also stopped halfway down the causeway.

An attack by the Highlanders on the morning of November 1 managed to gain a precarious foothold, but a subsequent German counterattack drove the Cdns back onto the causeway. A day of fighting followed, with the Highlanders relieved by Le Regiment de Maisonneuve, which struggled to maintain the bridgehead. The "Maisies" withdrew onto the causeway on November 2 and were relieved by a bn of the Glasgow Highlanders of the Br 52nd XX.

On November 3, other lowland units crossed the Sloe Channel south of the causeway in boats to outflank the German defenses. Within 24 hours the division had established a sizable bridgehead along the island's unflooded eastern fringes.

Capturing Flushing

The second element of the assault on the island began shortly after midnight on November 1, as landing craft and amphibious vehicles, part of Force T, departed Ostend and headed northeast. Carrying troops from 4th Special Service Brigade under Brig. Gen. G.W. Leicester, Royal Marines, the landing force was to launch an amphibious assault on the westernmost point of Walcheren at Westkapelle.

Meanwhile, the third assault component, with landing craft and amphibious vehicles, under cover from a bombardment of artillery around Breskens, departed Breskens for Flushing—code-named "Uncle Beach." This was Operation Infatuate I and consisted mainly of infantry of the British 155th Infantry Brigade—4th and 5th Battalions, King's Own Scottish Borderers; 7/9 Battalion, Royal Scots; and the No. 4 Commando. At 5:40 am, the commandos assaulted the heart of Flushing's harbor area, with troops of the 4th King's Own Scottish Borderers landing at 7:30. Within the town, Dutch resistance groups also began to attack German positions supported by artillery and Typhoon fighter-bombers. British troops, along with French commandos, gradually fought their way through the town.

The next day, the Allied troops pushed their way to the northern edge of Flushing, again aided by artillery and Typhoons. That night the 7/9 Royal Scots attacked the Hotel Britannia, a center of German resistance southwest of the town. Despite finding themselves wading through water five feet deep in the dark, the Royal Scots pressed home the attack. When the 600 defenders surrendered around noon on November 3, Flushing was finally cleared of enemy forces.

The Assault on Westkapelle

The force destined for Westkapelle—Operation Infatuate II—had moved northeast during the early hours of November 1. At 8 am, the German coastal batteries engaged the landing force, with the battleship HMS Warspite and the monitors HMS Roberts and Erebus returning fire. At 8:45, Allied artillery from Breskens added its weight to the bombardment.

During the approach to the beaches, at least one LCT was disabled and a rocket support launch was hit and set off an amazing fireworks display that damaged several other craft. Lt. Col. J.B. Hillsman of the 8th Surgical Unit observed the sinking of one of his unit's craft. "We were getting close in now and the landing craft tank in front of us turned out of line to further back," Hillsman recalled. "As it passed us, it struck a sea mine. There was tremendous explosion and the ship was hurled into the air. It settled rapidly. Men jumped into the sea. Some were picked up by the following craft. Others floated face down in their life belts."

The first assault troops of the 4th Special Service Brigade landed at 9:59 am. Within 30 minutes, the bulk of No. 41 (Royal Marines) Commando was ashore, as were elements from No. 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando, which consisted mainly of Belgian and Norwegian troops, and No. 48 (Royal Marines) Commando, supported by specialized armored vehicles—amphibious transports, mine-clearing tanks, and bulldozers—of the 79th Armored Division. These forces landed at Red and White Beaches, respectively, located to the north and south of the breached dike just to the south of Westkapelle.

To ensure that the landing would be successful, 27 armed landing craft of the Support Squadron Eastern Flank engaged the German batteries in the area, seeking to divert their fire from the assault troops. They achieved hard-won success, but only seven of the craft survived undamaged and another 370 casualties was suffered by the squadron's sailors and marines.

During that morning, the commandos fought their way through Westkapelle in the face of fierce resistance. Subsequently, No. 41 Commando advanced north along the narrow, unflooded coastal strip toward Domburg, which was secured before dusk. Meanwhile, No. 48 Commando had advanced southeast toward Zoutelande, with No. 47 Commando landing later that day. By nightfall, the 4th Brigade had secured a six-mile strip of coast and now had three complete Commandos, plus two French troops of No. 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando ashore.

The Campaign's Last Stages

On the morning of November 2, No. 48 Commando captured Zoutelande, taking 150 prisoners in the process. Two days later No. 47 Commando linked up with No. 4 Commando advancing northwest from Flushing. Three days later, the 11th Royal Tank Regiment, along with the Royal Scots, advanced northeast through the island's flooded interior to Middelburg, using their remaining 11 operational Buffaloes. Simultaneously, the 5th's Calgary Highlanders struck west from the bridgehead secured on the unflooded eastern flank of Walcheren by the 52nd Division. The German defenders were taken by some surprise. General Daser, the German commander, was reported to be considering surrendering, but only to an armored force.

As it was impossible to reach the water-logged town with tanks, a calculated gamble was made to drive amphibious Buffaloes into Middelburg. Faced with the heavy Allied armament, Daser relented, and in the hours that followed the small British force found itself guarding a much larger number of disarmed Germans. Later that day, Veere, in the northeastern corner of the island, surrendered to the 158th Brigade, but enemy forces continued to hold out along the northern coast. By November 7, however, No. 41 Commando and French Commandos overwhelmed the last pocket of enemy resistance.

In the final stage of operations to open Antwerp, a large-scale minesweeping operation of the estuary—Operation Calendar—was undertaken from November 3 to 25, collecting 267 mines. Thus cleared, the first Allied ship, the Canadian-built freighter Fort Cataraqui, arrived in Antwerp on November 28. The Battle of the Scheldt Estuary was over.

2.4 Million Tons of Matériel

In the course of five weeks of often savage fighting, the First Canadian Army took 41,043 Germans prisoner, while suffering 12,873 casualties, 6,367 of whom were Canadians; the remainder were from British and Polish units. The 2nd Canadian Division alone lost 3,650 men in 33 days of intense battle across the isthmus and west to Walcheren Island. The importance of the port was made apparent when the Germans selected it as a key objective in the coming winter offensive known as the Battle of the Bulge. According to one estimate, the two-month delay in opening Antwerp cost the Allies some 2.4 million tons of additional matériel—supplies that were sorely missed during the autumn fighting across northern France and Germany.

So Why did I reproduce this narrative?

I produced this account to show that the need to clear the Antwerp approaches, whilst vital to Allied logistics, and something that both the british and the US commands strongly advocated was a difficult and long drawn out process. The failed Market Garden operation was an attempt to avoid the campaign, by forcing a withdrawal from the position. It further far too ambitiously carried with it expectations of knocking Germany out of the war with far less demands on the supply network than the current broad front advance was causing at that time
 
Monty was so slow his forces could only manage an advance of 250 miles in four days after the breakout from Normandy, and 750 miles in ten days after El Alamein. ;)
 
the German OKW considered him to be the best field commander the Allies had in the entire ETO--

A magnificent accomplishment, unfortunately it's a fabrication made up by his biographer and a couple of other post-war boosters, but the truth is that the Germans didn't pay that much attention to him during WWII.
Patton was certainly hard driving and was proficient at armoured warfare tactics, but the idea that they were obsessed with Patton or in awe of him during WWII isn't backed up by any evidence.

http://www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view.htm

"The Germans did not track Patton's movements as the key to allied intentions. They never raised his name in the context of worthy strategists." Hence their intelligence efforts were much more focused on people like Montgomery and Eisenhower, because this was the level on which strategic decisions were made.

A myth that began in the minds of American generals during the war carried over into the mainstream understanding of the European war. But believing it to be true does not make it so.

Harry Yeide
Hoover Institute -The German View of Patton


ARCHIVES: THE MYTH OF GERMANY'S OBSESSION WITH PATTON
 
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A magnificent accomplishment, unfortunately it's a fabrication made up by his biographer and a couple of other post-war boosters, but the truth is that the Germans didn't pay that much attention to him during WWII.
Patton was certainly hard driving and was proficient at armoured warfare tactics, but the idea that they were obsessed with Patton or in awe of him during WWII isn't backed up by any evidence.

http://www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view.htm


Hoover Institute -The German View of Patton
The only two German General FeldMarschalls that could verify Carlo D'Este's written words about "Old Blood and Guts" are dead, Rommel, by suicide in October 1944- at Hitler's request, as old Adolph mistakenly believed that Rommel was part of the failed July 1944 attempt on his life in Rastenburg-- and later, Rommel's nemesis in the OKW- Gerd Von Runstead-- they disagreed in many ways on the best way to defend Normandy from the Allied invasion, but they both took Patton very seriously- as well they should have in their plans.
Patton predicted the Dec 16th 1944 German Winter Offensive, while Ike, Monty and Omar Bradly were caught by surprise--Not Patton-- another view, was from Der Fuhrer himself- He called Patton "That Crazy Cowboy General" Cowboy no doubt from Patton's fondness for his Colt 1873 Army pistols-- Crazy-Like a fox--as history has shown us.

ARCHIVES: THE MYTH OF GERMANY'S OBSESSION WITH PATTON
T
 
Monty was so slow his forces could only manage an advance of 250 miles in four days after the breakout from Normandy, and 750 miles in ten days after El Alamein. ;)
And how long did Monty's troops attempt to take Caen? About a month.. Monty's approach to advancing was from a superior weight in numbers of troops, tanks, artillery and logistical support in depth- He like to have a 14 to 1 advantage in those factors before he would advance-not always possible in a fluid attack--
 
A magnificent accomplishment, unfortunately it's a fabrication made up by his biographer and a couple of other post-war boosters, but the truth is that the Germans didn't pay that much attention to him during WWII.
Patton was certainly hard driving and was proficient at armoured warfare tactics, but the idea that they were obsessed with Patton or in awe of him during WWII isn't backed up by any evidence.

http://www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view.htm


Hoover Institute -The German View of Patton


ARCHIVES: THE MYTH OF GERMANY'S OBSESSION WITH PATTON
Ladislas Farago was about as accurate a biographer of George S. Patton Jr. as Carlos Baker was of Ernest Hemingway- When you are trying to describe the man, with all his flaws and his virtues as well, and you become emotionally enraptured with the myth that often exists with a "larger than life" personage, and impartial biography becomes a nebulous thing.
 
Obviously its only a personal view but as a defender or in a situation where the enemy had similar resources and air cover I believe that Patton would have failed and failed significantly. His approach would have put his troops at serious risk when facing a well dug in organised defence as practised by the Russians or a more flexible organised defence as practised by he Germans.
 
And how long did Monty's troops attempt to take Caen? About a month.. Monty's approach to advancing was from a superior weight in numbers of troops, tanks, artillery and logistical support in depth- He like to have a 14 to 1 advantage in those factors before he would advance-not always possible in a fluid attack--

Though originally a D-Day objective, it took Allied forces around seven weeks to finally liberate the city. Due to the ferocity of the fighting, much of Caen was destroyed and had to be rebuilt after the war. Though Operation Goodwood failed to achieve a breakout, it did hold German forces in place for Operation Cobra, it should also be acknowledged that this was not the primary objective at that time 9there is admittedly debate about that). A static line battle was the intent, with the primary idea being the attrition of the Wehrmachts mobile forces in Normandy. This was the primary directive for Monty's command, fully endorsed by SHAEF and the Americans. Monty described it as a need to draw the German mobile forces, and "write them down", which he achieved in spades. And he had to do this without taking significant casualties himself. This was due to the acute manpower shortages that were by then afflicting the british forces.

Delayed until July 25, Cobra saw American forces knock a gap in the German lines and reach open country to the south. This operation benefitted greatly from the battle of attrition that had been fought for Caen. In no small part due to the pounding their frontline formations had taken in the battle for Caen the Americans achieved the breakout that led to the encirclement at Falaise. Panzer Lehr for example went into battle with less than 5000 effectives having suffered over 3000 casualties to the end of June alone, nearly all of them around Caen, after entering the battles against the british with more than 13000 men.

At st Lo, the Americans pivoted east, and moved to encircle German forces in Normandy as Dempsey from monty's 21 AG mounted a new advance with the goal of trapping the enemy around Falaise. Lucky for the allies, monty had used overwhelming numbers in his battles, thereby reducing allied casualties and retaining full offensive capabilities for his forces when the time came to actually contribute to the breakout. Beginning on August 14, Allied forces sought to close the falaise pocket and destroy the German Army in France. Though nearly 100,000 Germans escaped the pocket before it was closed on August 22, around 50,000 were captured and 10,000 killed. Having won the Battle of Normandy, Allied forces advanced freely to the Seine River reaching it on August 25. In no small measure, allied abilities to mount such an effective explpoitation was due to monty's precision and caution in the earlier battles and his stubborn resistance to succumb to the temptation of fighting a battle of manoeuvre for which his temperament, and the psyche of the forces he commanded were ill prepredered to carry out.
 
In BH Liddell-Hart's book of interviews with German generals, Montgomery was described as ponderous but unstoppable, like an elephant.

In regard to Patton, John Eisenhower described him as a "master of pursuit," best in a fluid offensive battle.
 
And how long did Monty's troops attempt to take Caen? About a month.. Monty's approach to advancing was from a superior weight in numbers of troops, tanks, artillery and logistical support in depth- He like to have a 14 to 1 advantage in those factors before he would advance-not always possible in a fluid attack--
Are you aware that Monty was the Allied Ground commander in Normandy in this period, he was in charge of all the ground forces including the Americans. The general tasked with taking Caen was Dempsey and the reason he didn't take it on the first day was because the troops heading towards the city were counter attacked by 21st Panzer Division, the British stopped the counter attack, inflicting heavy losses on the German's but it stopped the advance towards the city and over the next couple of days the German's reinforced the area with several more divisions including a couple of panzer divisions.

ps: Please can you tell me when Monty ever had a 14 to 1 advantage over the German's.
 
Are you aware that Monty was the Allied Ground commander in Normandy in this period, he was in charge of all the ground forces including the Americans. The general tasked with taking Caen was Dempsey and the reason he didn't take it on the first day was because the troops heading towards the city were counter attacked by 21st Panzer Division, the British stopped the counter attack, inflicting heavy losses on the German's but it stopped the advance towards the city and over the next couple of days the German's reinforced the area with several more divisions including a couple of panzer divisions.

ps: Please can you tell me when Monty ever had a 14 to 1 advantage over the German's.
Montgomery never had that numerical advantage over the German forces.. Your version differs from that of Patton somewhat, taken from his diary "War As I Knew It"-- but one point you raised in your informative post goes to the heart of the issue- Patton despised the fact that Ike, as Supreme Commander ETO, favored Monty, both as AGC at Normandy, and later when Ike by-passed Patton's plan to invade Germany, and instead, gave Monty the "green light" for the flawed Market Garden Op..- The rumored 14 to 1 ratio theory was never espoused by Monty- it was attributed to him by Patton, who always favored an attack mode, never a defensive holding to buy time to build up troops and supplies before advancing into the enemy's positions.

To be fair, neither Monty's nor Patton's plan might have succeeded in freeing the vital Scheldt Estuary and opening the port of Antwerp to Allied Supply movement, to support the inevitable Allied push into Germany-- Even Hitler must have realized how vital was Antwerp to the Allied Forces, as his "Oktober Sturm" final push, 16 Dec/1944 involved a Blitzkreig strike towards Belgium through the Ardennes, and then towards Antwerp--

Had that attack been successful for the Germans, the final end of the ETO conflict may have been delayed, at least on the Western front- There was nothing that Hitler and the OKW could do to stem the Russian tidal wave heading towards Berlin from the East--and I think even Der Fuhrer may well have realized that fact..
 
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