B-17engineer
Colonel
True but if you have an enemy, who has just been terribly defeated and are still trying to figure out what just happened, doesn't make sense to go in pursuit?
Patton v Rommel....
- Thread starter Lucky13
- Start date
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No...IMO all press conferences are suspect no matter who gives them or who they reflect upon ... your comments are heated and passionate... Im not saying i disagree with you. Only your source.
Instead of pointing out that the original claim is bunk cause its from a press conference, you counter it with more bunk, another press conference, and cite it as evidence.
I think it's kinda a funny... an attempt to be academic by quoting staged press conferences... the press conferences aren't even worth bringing up unless the topic is about Public Relations and the Military.
.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
But was the British Army capable of going on the attack after the battle? They took some heavy losses too. Sometimes, its better not to bite off more than you can chew.
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The claims Monty dispraged US soldiers at the press confrence is widely believed. However transcripts or a newspaper article confirming this slander has NEVER been sourced or referenced.
I then post the AP reporters version of the press confrence. It is clear that far from criticising US soldiers Monty praised their performance.
Contrast the lack of a single source for the 'slur' claims and the lengthy record of the praise given.
The AP press report directly contradicts the claim that:
Towards the end of battle, Montgomery held a press conference, broadcast throughout Britain by the BBC, in which he announced that he had led the British Army to the victory and had saved the day for the Americans. The British press used banner headlines to report that Monty had rescued the Americans from certain defeat.
It is obvious the claims that Monty criticised the US soldier are bogus.
parsifal
Colonel
Yes
The original claims that Monty disparaged the Americans is based on an alleged press confernce, which no-one has ever produced any evidence of. Evidence does exist, however of press releases by Monty that actually praise the efforts of the Americans in containing and defeating the German offensive.
And the factis that he used US troops to contain the northern arm of the salient because these were the troops on hand at the time. Other tropps (which happened to be British, or Canadian...I forget which) were pulled out of the line and made ready as a reserve force, just in case the Germans did make a breakthrough. This was entirely the correct thing to do. Monty was making provision in case of an adverse contingency....you cannot do better than that. Instead of running around the battlefield by trying to steal the headlines by crossing demarcation lines and trying to fight battles tasked by the supreme commander to be other peoples battles, he did the right thing and prepred for a possible breakthrough. This was the correct thing militarily and politically for him to follow, yet here we are still castigating him, for what, doing the right thing by the look of it.....
The original claims that Monty disparaged the Americans is based on an alleged press confernce, which no-one has ever produced any evidence of. Evidence does exist, however of press releases by Monty that actually praise the efforts of the Americans in containing and defeating the German offensive.
And the factis that he used US troops to contain the northern arm of the salient because these were the troops on hand at the time. Other tropps (which happened to be British, or Canadian...I forget which) were pulled out of the line and made ready as a reserve force, just in case the Germans did make a breakthrough. This was entirely the correct thing to do. Monty was making provision in case of an adverse contingency....you cannot do better than that. Instead of running around the battlefield by trying to steal the headlines by crossing demarcation lines and trying to fight battles tasked by the supreme commander to be other peoples battles, he did the right thing and prepred for a possible breakthrough. This was the correct thing militarily and politically for him to follow, yet here we are still castigating him, for what, doing the right thing by the look of it.....
Glider
Captain
A fair question but when you have defeated the enemy in battle, have total control of the air AND have the exact knowledge of the enemy's tank numbers, oil status from enigma, its almost criminal to follow up. Had Monty let them the British troops would have been able to follow up, they had done it before and could do it again.
Can you imagine Patton letting them go?
That said I would rather have Monty lead the actual battle, it was a set piece situation which he was good at, but let Patton lead the rout of the german forces which is what it would have turned into, as that was his forte.
Generaloberst Guderian was quite critical of Rommel's handling of the preparations to oppose the allied invasion of France, and tried to talk Rommel out of his blunderous utilization of the Panzer units on the Atlantic front. Guderian even tried to get Hitler to intervene but Hitler refused to "intervene with a Fieldmarschal's plans". Guderian wrote that "above all, history must not be twisted for the greater good of Rommel".
vikingBerserker
Lieutenant General
Didn't Rommel suffer some type of nervous breakdown in/after Africa?
Henk
Master Sergeant
Both of them was great at what they did, but I would have to say Rommel, he also saw where the Allied forces would attack France at D-day, but once again he had to make do with what he had. Patton could inspire his troops to do things that other people would have thought was impossible and they had a lot of respect for him.
Hansie Bloeckmann
Senior Airman
Patton-- he knew the value of co-ordination of air support to all the group-based units in his Army group: armor, artillery, infantry, engineers, and the HQ group- Patton relied on intelligence his G-3 Col. Oscar Koch had predicted the German Dec. attack (1944) back in Oct.-- Rommel did not have the G-3 sector in the same depth of information (US could read the Ultra messages)-and Patton knew how to use intel to his advantage. But on a scale of 1 to 10, Patton gets a 9.5, Rommel an 8-IMO anyway.
Hansie Bloeckmann
Senior Airman
MacArthur vs. Patton--Well, Patton was never pulled out of a TO by FDR-as was Mac-- Patton was side-lined by Ike-after the slappings in Sicily--and strange, the German OKH Offizers could not understand that action by Ike-- in their command experiences, slapping an enlisted man was not unusual, if needed to restore disciple to the command. In our Armed Forces, that has always been a grey area-- Boot camp discipline, with a DI or other senior Non Com "shaping up a raw recruit"-- usually not done in open sight.
Both Mac and Patton had huge egos- as did Wm. Halsey, Gen. Mark Clark, "Monty" and,on the German side, FM Albert Kessering, RM Herman Goering, etc. But Patton knew how to keep that ego under check when the circumstances dictated, and no General on the Allied side spent more time visiting field hospitals, decorating the wounded, praying with the men who were dying, than did George Patton.
Hansie Bloeckmann
Senior Airman
Hansie Bloeckmann
Senior Airman
Gerd von Rundstedt-- possibly Karl is a second name, along with Gerd. Not 100% sure, and this does NOT detract one bit from the detail in your post about "Monty"! Ego nonwithstanding, he got his assignments completed, and praised the Allies for winning the war in Europe.
Hansie Bloeckmann
Senior Airman
In Carlo D'Este's great book: "Patton, A Genius For War" he details how Patton's troops obtained gasoline for their tank advances to the Siegfried line--Ike had cut off the gasoline supply to Patton's Third Army, in order to support Montgomery's "Market Garden" operation. Great reading, shows how "creative" Patton's troops were in a combat scenario- IMO, way better than the troops commanded by either Mark Clark or Omar Bradley.
mikewint
Captain
Patton, like Rommel is one of my favorite figures in WWII. Like ever human who has ever live he had strengths and weaknesses.
In the strength column, Patton was audacious, understood the power of combined arms better than any army commander in Europe (the 9th Air Force was a tactical air force and he used them extensively) and had a clear view of what it meant to win. Additionally, he was an ardent anti-Communist and was not confused about what the Soviets would do with the territories they captured and said so repeatedly.
He had fought the Germans in WW1 so he had had first hand experience in combat—unlike many other army commanders, he'd been wounded in action. He knew the mind of the German military and had a healthy respect for his foes abilities while despising fascism and Nazism and being very open about the joy of killing them.
His tactics emphasized violent action and speed to exploit any opportunity. His standing orders were to attack and force the enemy to react to his plans rather than the reverse.
In the negative column, Patton didn't know how to keep his mouth shut. He was his own favorite general and said so. Bradley was jealous of Patton's success and notoriety and was a bit of a schemer, so anytime Patton said or did something outrageous (which was frequently) Bradley saw to it that he profited from Georgie's mistakes.
Patton also never really grasped the idea of logistics. He understood it of course but he was much more interested in the point of the spear, not the heavy lifting required to get the fuel and ammo and rations to the front. He left that to others with varying degrees of success.
Finally, Patton had advanced about as far as his skillset would allow. A lot like Robert E. Lee in a way. Patton, like Lee, was an inspiring commander and his troops (contrary to the movie) thought highly of him. They knew as soldiers that speed is life in a combat zone. But Patton, like Lee again, was out of his depth commanding an entire army.
In the strength column, Patton was audacious, understood the power of combined arms better than any army commander in Europe (the 9th Air Force was a tactical air force and he used them extensively) and had a clear view of what it meant to win. Additionally, he was an ardent anti-Communist and was not confused about what the Soviets would do with the territories they captured and said so repeatedly.
He had fought the Germans in WW1 so he had had first hand experience in combat—unlike many other army commanders, he'd been wounded in action. He knew the mind of the German military and had a healthy respect for his foes abilities while despising fascism and Nazism and being very open about the joy of killing them.
His tactics emphasized violent action and speed to exploit any opportunity. His standing orders were to attack and force the enemy to react to his plans rather than the reverse.
In the negative column, Patton didn't know how to keep his mouth shut. He was his own favorite general and said so. Bradley was jealous of Patton's success and notoriety and was a bit of a schemer, so anytime Patton said or did something outrageous (which was frequently) Bradley saw to it that he profited from Georgie's mistakes.
Patton also never really grasped the idea of logistics. He understood it of course but he was much more interested in the point of the spear, not the heavy lifting required to get the fuel and ammo and rations to the front. He left that to others with varying degrees of success.
Finally, Patton had advanced about as far as his skillset would allow. A lot like Robert E. Lee in a way. Patton, like Lee, was an inspiring commander and his troops (contrary to the movie) thought highly of him. They knew as soldiers that speed is life in a combat zone. But Patton, like Lee again, was out of his depth commanding an entire army.
Actually Market Garden was a response to the fuel shortage, not the cause of it.
US units were already running out of fuel due to the 'broad front' advance ordered by Ike, Market Garden was ordered because it was a way to keep the advance going without placing too much further strain on the fuel supplies in France.
Patton was a "Can Do" type General. He was known for leading his army, not directing it.
Hansie Bloeckmann
Senior Airman
Market Garden most likely cost the Allies, with Bernard Montgomery's flawed plan, more in wasted fuel, than had Ike dis-approved "Monty's OP"-- and gave Patton's 3rd. Army the fuel and ammo to punch through the Seigfreid Line and on into Berlin- As "Monty" proved in Africa, Sicily and later after D-Day with his slow paced and possibly over-cautious advancement through the German lines, his delays gave the Germans an opportunity to retreat and re-group and counter-attack.
There are many reasons why Market Garden was flawed "out of the box": among them are: Lack of common radio frequencies between the American, British and Polish units- airborne, infantry, engineers and armored- complete disregard for the Dutch underground and resistance units that had spotted masses of Panzer units in the area, and had tried to warn the Allies of that threat- Language differences, especially with the Polish airborne units-lack of
co-ordinated air cover, and proper pre-drop scouting of the drop zones-= It was mainly a daylight drop time frame, giving the Germans a "heads-up" as to where Monty's units were coming from-giving them time to prepare, including setting demo charges on the vital bridges the Allies needed to capture--
But in his role as a "peace-maker", I am sure Ike felt he had to do something to contain the resentment that had grown between Patton and Montgomery, from the Sicilian campaign onward. Two different styles of leadership, two different results- Look at the record of the 3rd Army's record advancement in Germany in 1944 up to May 1945- and Patton's sole prediction of the Winter Attack Dec 1944- "The Battle of the Bulge" and how his Army was prepared to move into Bastogne on short notice- whereas Monty was still pulling his thumb out of his arsehole-- Read "War As I Knew It" Patton's Diary from Africa until VE Day, and later-- He details all this and has data and statistics from every battle his Army encountered along the way to victory.
parsifal
Colonel
My adaptation of ;
Allyn Vannoy; Battle of the Scheldt Estuary
(Battle of the Scheldt Estuary)
Part I
Operation Market Garden was not primarily concerned with solving the fuel crisis after the breakout from Normandy. But neither was it primarily the result of monty's vanity. Rather it was his response to the insistent calls by the americans, led by Bradley mostly, for the british to find a way of capturing the port of Antwerp intact and quickly. German defence was far too skillful for that to ever happen, and Market Garden, a distraction in reality to the main task of clearing the port of antwrp and its approach was a rather desperate response to get things moving in response to the rather shrill demands of SHAEF.
As the Allied armies advanced across Western Europe in the summer of 1944, the First Canadian Army undertook the task of clearing the coastal areas and opening the Channel ports. Fighting on the left flank of the Allied forces, the Canadians pushed rapidly eastward through France toward Belgium. The II Canadian Corps reached Ostend, Bruges, and Ghent in the middle of September.
After Allied forces landed in France on D-Day, June 6, the British Second Army pushed forward into the Low Countries and captured Brussels and Antwerp, the latter with its excellent port facilities intact. But the British advance halted with the Germans still controlling the Scheldt Estuary. By September 15, it had become urgent for the Allies to open Antwerp to shipping in order to ease logistical burdens on their supply lines, which now stretched hundreds of miles back into Normandy.
American General Omar Bradley urged Eisenhower to pressure the British. "All plans for future operations always lead back to the fact that in order to supply an operation of any size beyond the Rhine, the port of Antwerp is essential." Eisenhower agreed, telling Montgomery: "I insist upon the importance of Antwerp. As I have told you I am prepared to give you everything for the capture of the approaches to Antwerp, including all the air forces and anything else you can support."
British XXX Corps, after taking Antwerp, could have easily driven the additional 20 miles north and cut off German positions along the inlet to the port. The estuary itself was lined with German forces, including heavy coastal batteries on Walcheren Island that prevented Allied ships from approaching the Scheldt. During the first three weeks of September, however, the German XV Army withdrew, pulling off something of a miracle by extricating nearly 86,000 troops from possible encirclement south of the estuary, using boats and rafts to evacuate them northward across the Scheldt.
The Allies did nothing to open the port of Antwerp during September, instead allocating most of their resources to Operation Market Garden, an ambitious plan to mount a lightning thrust into the heart of the German homeland. This is the evidence of the folly of market garden in the context of solving the supply crisis. XXX Corps failed to reach 1 abn div and the Polish Bde before heavy counterattacks by German armored units threatened annihilation. Market Garden was a glorious failure.
There is evidence that monty was hoping to draw away from the scheldt german reserves. Simultaneous to the XXX corps flying columns to Arnhem, I Cdn XXXX completed the clearing of French and Belgian Channel ports by October 1. The force, under the temporary command of Lt. Gen. Guy Simonds, included the II Cdn XXX, the I Pol Arm XX, and the Br 49th and 52nd Inf XXs. After Market Garden failed, Monty usual stubbornness receded somewhat and he was inclined to listen to American advice. The I Cdn XXXX was dispatched to bring the Scheldt Estuary under its control. But the remaining German defenders were prepared as always to fight an effective delaying action. Complicated by waterlogged terrain, the ensuing Battle of the Scheldt would prove to be an especially grueling (and slow) campaign.
North of the estuary lay the island of South Beveland, which was joined to the mainland by a narrow isthmus. Beyond South Beveland, to the west, was the island of Walcheren, a fortified German stronghold. Much of the area was below sea level, comprising polder land that had been reclaimed from the sea. Large raised embankments kept the waters from flooding the low-lying land. The German defenders skillfully exploited these conditions. In addition, the Germans constructed bunkers in the steep rear slopes of the dikes and located much-feared Nebelwerfer rocket launchers immediately behind them.
The plan for opening the Scheldt Estuary involved a succession of operations. The first task was to clear the eastern approaches to the Scheldt River north of Antwerp as far as the village of Woensdrecht. This would isolate the German forces on South Beveland from the Dutch mainland. Next step was to eliminate German positions north of the Leopold Canal and south of the estuary—the so-called Breskens Pocket. The capture of 19-mile-long South Beveland was to follow. The final phase of ground combat would be the capture of Walcheren Island, after which Royal Navy minesweepers could undertake operations to clear German mines from the waterway and enable Allied supply ships to pass safely through the estuary to Antwerp.
As a prelude to the coming battle, the Pol 1st Arm XX advanced northeast from Ghent in late September. Against stiffening resistance the division reached the coast on September 20, occupying the town of Terneuzen and clearing the south bank of the Scheldt east to Antwerp. On September 21, the 4th Cdn Arm XX moved nth roughly along the line of the Ghent-Terneuzen Canal, with orders to clear the south shore of the Scheldt around the town of Breskens. The division advanced from a hard-won bridgehead over the Ghent Canal at Moerbrugge, becoming the first Allied troops to confront the formidable obstacle of the Leopold and Dérivation de la Lys Canals.
The Algonquin Regt of the 10th Inf Bde, mounted a night attack across the Leopold Canal on the Belgian-Dutch border in the vicinity of Moekerke, but the assault force was nearly wiped out in a German counterattack. Those who survived swam back to the Belgian side of the canal and were placed in reserve.
"Black Friday"
The Germans placed a priority on holding Woensdrecht, thus controlling access to South Beveland and Walcheren Island. Ge 346 Inf XX, under General Erich Diestel (replaced on October 16 by General Walter Steinmuller), was in line nth of Antwerp. The division had taken a beating during Operation Goodwood on July 18, coming under intense aerial bombardment. It then had avoided encirclement in the Falaise pocket, retreating across France and Belgium into Holland with only a few howitzers and 2,500 men. The division had since received some replacements I believe. Elements of Sturmgeschütz Bde 280, equipped with heavy assault guns, provided support for the division.
OKW ordered the Army reserve, 85 Inf XX, to bar access to Walcheren by holding Woensdrecht. The division consisted of remnants of two grenadier regts, elements of Para Regts 2 and 6, and Training and Replacement Regiment Hermann Göring. It was reinforced by remnants of Army Assault Gun Brigades 244 and 667. The Germans had established positions on the little available high ground, Woensdrecht ridge and the railway dike passing through Beveland to Walcheren Island. German guns and paratroopers had dug in along the top of the dike road.
On October 2, the 2nd Cdn XX began its advance north from Antwerp to clear the choke point of the South Beveland peninsula. For the first four days the div made good progress, advancing nine miles to capture Putte, with the base of the peninsula just five miles distant. The 4th Cdn Arm XX moved up to cover 2nd Cdn XX's eastern flank, freeing forces for a renewed drive toward the base of the peninsula. During the next 10 days, the Cdns managed to secure a tenuous foothold on the peninsula west of Woensdrecht.
For the Cdns, attacking the German positions with understrength infantry Bdes, a squadron of tanks, and artillery regiments that had to ration ammunition was not an inviting prospect. The operation, code-named Angus, called for 5th Bde to employ one Bn to seize the railway embankment, with two others passing through to seal off the route to Walcheren Island. The first phase of the assault was to be undertaken by the understrength Black Watch in a daylight assault.
Heavy casualties resulted as the Canadians attacked over open, flooded ground. Driving rain, booby traps, and enemy land mines made the advance even more difficult. For the Black Watch, October 13, became known as "Black Friday," the second-worst single-day disaster in the history of the regt. In an unsuccessful assault on a topographical feature known ominously as "the Coffin," 56 Black Watch soldiers were killed and another 27 were taken prisoner. All four company commanders were killed, and one company of 90 men was reduced to just four survivors.
Allyn Vannoy; Battle of the Scheldt Estuary
(Battle of the Scheldt Estuary)
Part I
Operation Market Garden was not primarily concerned with solving the fuel crisis after the breakout from Normandy. But neither was it primarily the result of monty's vanity. Rather it was his response to the insistent calls by the americans, led by Bradley mostly, for the british to find a way of capturing the port of Antwerp intact and quickly. German defence was far too skillful for that to ever happen, and Market Garden, a distraction in reality to the main task of clearing the port of antwrp and its approach was a rather desperate response to get things moving in response to the rather shrill demands of SHAEF.
As the Allied armies advanced across Western Europe in the summer of 1944, the First Canadian Army undertook the task of clearing the coastal areas and opening the Channel ports. Fighting on the left flank of the Allied forces, the Canadians pushed rapidly eastward through France toward Belgium. The II Canadian Corps reached Ostend, Bruges, and Ghent in the middle of September.
After Allied forces landed in France on D-Day, June 6, the British Second Army pushed forward into the Low Countries and captured Brussels and Antwerp, the latter with its excellent port facilities intact. But the British advance halted with the Germans still controlling the Scheldt Estuary. By September 15, it had become urgent for the Allies to open Antwerp to shipping in order to ease logistical burdens on their supply lines, which now stretched hundreds of miles back into Normandy.
American General Omar Bradley urged Eisenhower to pressure the British. "All plans for future operations always lead back to the fact that in order to supply an operation of any size beyond the Rhine, the port of Antwerp is essential." Eisenhower agreed, telling Montgomery: "I insist upon the importance of Antwerp. As I have told you I am prepared to give you everything for the capture of the approaches to Antwerp, including all the air forces and anything else you can support."
British XXX Corps, after taking Antwerp, could have easily driven the additional 20 miles north and cut off German positions along the inlet to the port. The estuary itself was lined with German forces, including heavy coastal batteries on Walcheren Island that prevented Allied ships from approaching the Scheldt. During the first three weeks of September, however, the German XV Army withdrew, pulling off something of a miracle by extricating nearly 86,000 troops from possible encirclement south of the estuary, using boats and rafts to evacuate them northward across the Scheldt.
The Allies did nothing to open the port of Antwerp during September, instead allocating most of their resources to Operation Market Garden, an ambitious plan to mount a lightning thrust into the heart of the German homeland. This is the evidence of the folly of market garden in the context of solving the supply crisis. XXX Corps failed to reach 1 abn div and the Polish Bde before heavy counterattacks by German armored units threatened annihilation. Market Garden was a glorious failure.
There is evidence that monty was hoping to draw away from the scheldt german reserves. Simultaneous to the XXX corps flying columns to Arnhem, I Cdn XXXX completed the clearing of French and Belgian Channel ports by October 1. The force, under the temporary command of Lt. Gen. Guy Simonds, included the II Cdn XXX, the I Pol Arm XX, and the Br 49th and 52nd Inf XXs. After Market Garden failed, Monty usual stubbornness receded somewhat and he was inclined to listen to American advice. The I Cdn XXXX was dispatched to bring the Scheldt Estuary under its control. But the remaining German defenders were prepared as always to fight an effective delaying action. Complicated by waterlogged terrain, the ensuing Battle of the Scheldt would prove to be an especially grueling (and slow) campaign.
North of the estuary lay the island of South Beveland, which was joined to the mainland by a narrow isthmus. Beyond South Beveland, to the west, was the island of Walcheren, a fortified German stronghold. Much of the area was below sea level, comprising polder land that had been reclaimed from the sea. Large raised embankments kept the waters from flooding the low-lying land. The German defenders skillfully exploited these conditions. In addition, the Germans constructed bunkers in the steep rear slopes of the dikes and located much-feared Nebelwerfer rocket launchers immediately behind them.
The plan for opening the Scheldt Estuary involved a succession of operations. The first task was to clear the eastern approaches to the Scheldt River north of Antwerp as far as the village of Woensdrecht. This would isolate the German forces on South Beveland from the Dutch mainland. Next step was to eliminate German positions north of the Leopold Canal and south of the estuary—the so-called Breskens Pocket. The capture of 19-mile-long South Beveland was to follow. The final phase of ground combat would be the capture of Walcheren Island, after which Royal Navy minesweepers could undertake operations to clear German mines from the waterway and enable Allied supply ships to pass safely through the estuary to Antwerp.
As a prelude to the coming battle, the Pol 1st Arm XX advanced northeast from Ghent in late September. Against stiffening resistance the division reached the coast on September 20, occupying the town of Terneuzen and clearing the south bank of the Scheldt east to Antwerp. On September 21, the 4th Cdn Arm XX moved nth roughly along the line of the Ghent-Terneuzen Canal, with orders to clear the south shore of the Scheldt around the town of Breskens. The division advanced from a hard-won bridgehead over the Ghent Canal at Moerbrugge, becoming the first Allied troops to confront the formidable obstacle of the Leopold and Dérivation de la Lys Canals.
The Algonquin Regt of the 10th Inf Bde, mounted a night attack across the Leopold Canal on the Belgian-Dutch border in the vicinity of Moekerke, but the assault force was nearly wiped out in a German counterattack. Those who survived swam back to the Belgian side of the canal and were placed in reserve.
"Black Friday"
The Germans placed a priority on holding Woensdrecht, thus controlling access to South Beveland and Walcheren Island. Ge 346 Inf XX, under General Erich Diestel (replaced on October 16 by General Walter Steinmuller), was in line nth of Antwerp. The division had taken a beating during Operation Goodwood on July 18, coming under intense aerial bombardment. It then had avoided encirclement in the Falaise pocket, retreating across France and Belgium into Holland with only a few howitzers and 2,500 men. The division had since received some replacements I believe. Elements of Sturmgeschütz Bde 280, equipped with heavy assault guns, provided support for the division.
OKW ordered the Army reserve, 85 Inf XX, to bar access to Walcheren by holding Woensdrecht. The division consisted of remnants of two grenadier regts, elements of Para Regts 2 and 6, and Training and Replacement Regiment Hermann Göring. It was reinforced by remnants of Army Assault Gun Brigades 244 and 667. The Germans had established positions on the little available high ground, Woensdrecht ridge and the railway dike passing through Beveland to Walcheren Island. German guns and paratroopers had dug in along the top of the dike road.
On October 2, the 2nd Cdn XX began its advance north from Antwerp to clear the choke point of the South Beveland peninsula. For the first four days the div made good progress, advancing nine miles to capture Putte, with the base of the peninsula just five miles distant. The 4th Cdn Arm XX moved up to cover 2nd Cdn XX's eastern flank, freeing forces for a renewed drive toward the base of the peninsula. During the next 10 days, the Cdns managed to secure a tenuous foothold on the peninsula west of Woensdrecht.
For the Cdns, attacking the German positions with understrength infantry Bdes, a squadron of tanks, and artillery regiments that had to ration ammunition was not an inviting prospect. The operation, code-named Angus, called for 5th Bde to employ one Bn to seize the railway embankment, with two others passing through to seal off the route to Walcheren Island. The first phase of the assault was to be undertaken by the understrength Black Watch in a daylight assault.
Heavy casualties resulted as the Canadians attacked over open, flooded ground. Driving rain, booby traps, and enemy land mines made the advance even more difficult. For the Black Watch, October 13, became known as "Black Friday," the second-worst single-day disaster in the history of the regt. In an unsuccessful assault on a topographical feature known ominously as "the Coffin," 56 Black Watch soldiers were killed and another 27 were taken prisoner. All four company commanders were killed, and one company of 90 men was reduced to just four survivors.
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parsifal
Colonel
Part II
Preparing For Operation Switchback
After the debacle of Black Friday, Canadian commanders decided that a night attack was needed. The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry was selected to assault Woensdrecht on October 16. The unit was blessed with seasoned company commanders and veteran noncommissioned officers, and the attack had the support of three field and two medium artillery regiments. By noon on October 17, the Royal Hamilton Infantry had captured the village and the high ground beyond, but German defenders launched repeated counterattacks. Bitter fighting raged for five days, costing the Royal Hamiltons 21 killed and 146 wounded. The Canadians held on to their hard-won gains.
While Simonds concentrated his forces at the neck of the South Beveland peninsula, the 4th Cdn Arm XX moved north and took Bergen-op-Zoom on the Dutch shoreline, further protecting the flank of the 2nd XX. To the south of the Scheldt, German Ge 64 Inf XX held a 25-mile sector that ran west along the Leopold Canal from the Braakman Inlet to the historic town of Zeebrugge. The division, formed as an emergency measure after the collapse of German forces in Normandy, consisted mainly of men on leave from the Eastern Front. Thrown into the line in August 1944, it fought in the subsequent battle for the Albert Canal and was isolated when the XV Army was forced to withdraw.
On October 2, the German division commander, General Kurt Eberding, with 2,350 infantry plus 8,500 support and service personnel and six coastal artillery pieces, prepared to meet the Canadian assault. The Germans had deliberately breached the dikes, and the ensuing flooding channeled the Canadian advance onto the area's few raised dike roads and polder land.
The next day, Maj. Gen. D.C. Spry's 3rd Cdn Inf XX initiated the second phase of the Scheldt campaign, code-named Operation Switchback, to reduce the Breskens Pocket. The Div encountered tenacious German resistance as it fought to cross the Leopold Canal. It was decided that the best place for an assault would be immediately east of where the Leopold and Dérivation de la Lys Canals split—a narrow strip of dry ground only a few hundred yards wide at its base beyond the Leopold Canal. The plan was for the Canadians to cross the canal, drive straight north to the coast, eliminate the key German gun battery at Cadzand, capture the port of Breskens, and move east, eliminating German gun batteries there.
On the night of October 5, the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regt of the 8th Bde brought forward canvas assault boats, carrying them over the fields and placing them along the slope of the dike to their front. When the signal came, they could grab the assault boats, carry them over the top of the dike, and throw them into the water.
Operation Switchback Begins
The next morning the assault commenced, with the 3rd Div's 7th Bde, along with the North Shore Regt, making the initial assault across the canal near the town of Eede. German positions in the area included concrete bunkers reinforced with logs, with good fields of fire across the canal. Roads leading north from the rear of the German positions were covered by machine-gun fire.
The assault of the 7th Bde was supported by artillery and Wasp troop carriers, which were equipped with flamethrowers to deliver a barrage of flame across the Leopold Canal. With screaming Germans lit up like torches running into the trees on the opposite shore, the attackers scrambled up the steep banks and launched their assault boats.
Only half of the troops made it to the far side and established two precarious footholds. The Germans, dug in on the rear slope, managed to recover from the shock of the flamethrowers and counterattacked repeatedly for the next 48 hours, but they were unable to drive the Canadians from their vulnerable bridgeheads. The Canadian infantry soon discovered that they could not dig foxholes more than a foot deep before the holes filled with water. Adding to their problems, close air support was hampered by poor weather. By October 9, however the gap between the bridgeheads had been closed.
The flooded polder land beyond the dike made maneuvering extremely difficult. Any movement along the roads leading north came under intense enemy fire. After six days of fighting, the Canadian commanders, having suffered nearly 600 casualties, realized that they needed to find another way to get to the coast. Orders were given to withdraw. Meanwhile, the 9th Inf Bde mounted an amphibious attack on the coastal side of the pocket, sweeping west of the mile-wide Braakman Inlet. The bde used Terrapin and Buffalo amphibious vehicles, crewed by the British 5th and 6th Assault Regts of the Royal Engineers, to carry them across the mouth of the inlet to land in the vicinity of Hoofdplaat and exert pressure from two directions on the German defenders along the inlet. Mortars laid down a heavy smoke screen as the Canadians made their way across marshland and over dikes.
The Canadians took the German defenders by surprise and quickly established a bridgehead. Once again, the Germans recovered quickly and counterattacked with ferocity, but they were slowly forced back. General Spry moved his remaining force, the 8th Bde, into the bridgehead. Attacking west, the Canadians took Biervliet and Hoofdplaat on the coast. Seeing the eastern flank of their defenses unhinged, the Germans withdrew to a second line of defense that ran from Breskens along the Sluis Canal to Zeebrugge. Meanwhile, RAF Bomber Command mounted heavy strikes against German gun batteries at Breskens and Flushing
Cornering the Germans on Walcheren
The second phase of Operation Switchback started on October 21 with a successful assault on Breskens. The 9th Bde cleared German troops from the towns of Schoondijke, Oostburg and Zuidzande. The coastal bastion of Fort Frederik Hendrik held out for three more days before its garrison surrendered. Cadzand, where the Germans had their largest gun emplacement along the southern side of the Scheldt, fell on October 27. The 3rd XX completed Operation Switchback two days later, overwhelming the last German resistance in the Belgian coastal towns of Knocke and Zeebrugge, swt of the pocket. Some 29 days of fighting had cost the Canadian division 2,077 casualties. During the fighting, some remnants of Ge 64 Inf XXmanaged to escape north across the estuary to South Beveland.
With the Breskens Pocket cleared, the Allies could now use it as a staging area for the attack on Walcheren. Amphibious vehicles landed at the port of Breskens, and the Allies positioned supporting artillery in the low-lying area to the south. The 2nd Div began its westward advance down the Sth Beveland peninsula from its hard-earned gains at Woensdrecht. After a heavy artillery bombardment, 4th Cdn Inf Bde began to fight its way west. By dawn the following day, it had advanced 3 miles to capture Rilland. Throughout the remainder of the day, the brigade closed on the town of Krabbendijke. The Canadians hoped to advance rapidly, bypassing opposition and seizing bridgeheads over the Beveland ship canal, which bisected the peninsula, but they were slowed by mines, mud, and strong enemy defenses.
In support, other Allied forces launched Operation Vitality II to outflank German defenses at the eastern end of the peninsula. A Royal Navy landing craft, supplemented by Buffalo and Terrapin amphibious vehicles, carried elements of the Br 52nd Inf XX across the Scheldt. Sailing from Terneuzen, the amphibians of the 1st Assault Bde, Royal Engineers, advanced 8 miles across the estuary to Sth Beveland, west of the ship canal. Spearheaded by amphibious DD Shermans from the Staffordshire Yeomanry, the force established a beachhead near Hoedekenskerke.
On October 26, the 6th Cdn Inf Bde began a frontal attack on the canal head in assault boats. Engineers were able to bridge the canal along the main east-west road. By October 29, the Canadians had captured the town of Goes and linked up with the 52nd Div. With the canal line cleared, German resistance crumbled on South Beveland. Remnants of some German units managed to withdraw to Walcheren Island. The final phase of the Battle of the Scheldt was about to begin.
Preparing For Operation Switchback
After the debacle of Black Friday, Canadian commanders decided that a night attack was needed. The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry was selected to assault Woensdrecht on October 16. The unit was blessed with seasoned company commanders and veteran noncommissioned officers, and the attack had the support of three field and two medium artillery regiments. By noon on October 17, the Royal Hamilton Infantry had captured the village and the high ground beyond, but German defenders launched repeated counterattacks. Bitter fighting raged for five days, costing the Royal Hamiltons 21 killed and 146 wounded. The Canadians held on to their hard-won gains.
While Simonds concentrated his forces at the neck of the South Beveland peninsula, the 4th Cdn Arm XX moved north and took Bergen-op-Zoom on the Dutch shoreline, further protecting the flank of the 2nd XX. To the south of the Scheldt, German Ge 64 Inf XX held a 25-mile sector that ran west along the Leopold Canal from the Braakman Inlet to the historic town of Zeebrugge. The division, formed as an emergency measure after the collapse of German forces in Normandy, consisted mainly of men on leave from the Eastern Front. Thrown into the line in August 1944, it fought in the subsequent battle for the Albert Canal and was isolated when the XV Army was forced to withdraw.
On October 2, the German division commander, General Kurt Eberding, with 2,350 infantry plus 8,500 support and service personnel and six coastal artillery pieces, prepared to meet the Canadian assault. The Germans had deliberately breached the dikes, and the ensuing flooding channeled the Canadian advance onto the area's few raised dike roads and polder land.
The next day, Maj. Gen. D.C. Spry's 3rd Cdn Inf XX initiated the second phase of the Scheldt campaign, code-named Operation Switchback, to reduce the Breskens Pocket. The Div encountered tenacious German resistance as it fought to cross the Leopold Canal. It was decided that the best place for an assault would be immediately east of where the Leopold and Dérivation de la Lys Canals split—a narrow strip of dry ground only a few hundred yards wide at its base beyond the Leopold Canal. The plan was for the Canadians to cross the canal, drive straight north to the coast, eliminate the key German gun battery at Cadzand, capture the port of Breskens, and move east, eliminating German gun batteries there.
On the night of October 5, the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regt of the 8th Bde brought forward canvas assault boats, carrying them over the fields and placing them along the slope of the dike to their front. When the signal came, they could grab the assault boats, carry them over the top of the dike, and throw them into the water.
Operation Switchback Begins
The next morning the assault commenced, with the 3rd Div's 7th Bde, along with the North Shore Regt, making the initial assault across the canal near the town of Eede. German positions in the area included concrete bunkers reinforced with logs, with good fields of fire across the canal. Roads leading north from the rear of the German positions were covered by machine-gun fire.
The assault of the 7th Bde was supported by artillery and Wasp troop carriers, which were equipped with flamethrowers to deliver a barrage of flame across the Leopold Canal. With screaming Germans lit up like torches running into the trees on the opposite shore, the attackers scrambled up the steep banks and launched their assault boats.
Only half of the troops made it to the far side and established two precarious footholds. The Germans, dug in on the rear slope, managed to recover from the shock of the flamethrowers and counterattacked repeatedly for the next 48 hours, but they were unable to drive the Canadians from their vulnerable bridgeheads. The Canadian infantry soon discovered that they could not dig foxholes more than a foot deep before the holes filled with water. Adding to their problems, close air support was hampered by poor weather. By October 9, however the gap between the bridgeheads had been closed.
The flooded polder land beyond the dike made maneuvering extremely difficult. Any movement along the roads leading north came under intense enemy fire. After six days of fighting, the Canadian commanders, having suffered nearly 600 casualties, realized that they needed to find another way to get to the coast. Orders were given to withdraw. Meanwhile, the 9th Inf Bde mounted an amphibious attack on the coastal side of the pocket, sweeping west of the mile-wide Braakman Inlet. The bde used Terrapin and Buffalo amphibious vehicles, crewed by the British 5th and 6th Assault Regts of the Royal Engineers, to carry them across the mouth of the inlet to land in the vicinity of Hoofdplaat and exert pressure from two directions on the German defenders along the inlet. Mortars laid down a heavy smoke screen as the Canadians made their way across marshland and over dikes.
The Canadians took the German defenders by surprise and quickly established a bridgehead. Once again, the Germans recovered quickly and counterattacked with ferocity, but they were slowly forced back. General Spry moved his remaining force, the 8th Bde, into the bridgehead. Attacking west, the Canadians took Biervliet and Hoofdplaat on the coast. Seeing the eastern flank of their defenses unhinged, the Germans withdrew to a second line of defense that ran from Breskens along the Sluis Canal to Zeebrugge. Meanwhile, RAF Bomber Command mounted heavy strikes against German gun batteries at Breskens and Flushing
Cornering the Germans on Walcheren
The second phase of Operation Switchback started on October 21 with a successful assault on Breskens. The 9th Bde cleared German troops from the towns of Schoondijke, Oostburg and Zuidzande. The coastal bastion of Fort Frederik Hendrik held out for three more days before its garrison surrendered. Cadzand, where the Germans had their largest gun emplacement along the southern side of the Scheldt, fell on October 27. The 3rd XX completed Operation Switchback two days later, overwhelming the last German resistance in the Belgian coastal towns of Knocke and Zeebrugge, swt of the pocket. Some 29 days of fighting had cost the Canadian division 2,077 casualties. During the fighting, some remnants of Ge 64 Inf XXmanaged to escape north across the estuary to South Beveland.
With the Breskens Pocket cleared, the Allies could now use it as a staging area for the attack on Walcheren. Amphibious vehicles landed at the port of Breskens, and the Allies positioned supporting artillery in the low-lying area to the south. The 2nd Div began its westward advance down the Sth Beveland peninsula from its hard-earned gains at Woensdrecht. After a heavy artillery bombardment, 4th Cdn Inf Bde began to fight its way west. By dawn the following day, it had advanced 3 miles to capture Rilland. Throughout the remainder of the day, the brigade closed on the town of Krabbendijke. The Canadians hoped to advance rapidly, bypassing opposition and seizing bridgeheads over the Beveland ship canal, which bisected the peninsula, but they were slowed by mines, mud, and strong enemy defenses.
In support, other Allied forces launched Operation Vitality II to outflank German defenses at the eastern end of the peninsula. A Royal Navy landing craft, supplemented by Buffalo and Terrapin amphibious vehicles, carried elements of the Br 52nd Inf XX across the Scheldt. Sailing from Terneuzen, the amphibians of the 1st Assault Bde, Royal Engineers, advanced 8 miles across the estuary to Sth Beveland, west of the ship canal. Spearheaded by amphibious DD Shermans from the Staffordshire Yeomanry, the force established a beachhead near Hoedekenskerke.
On October 26, the 6th Cdn Inf Bde began a frontal attack on the canal head in assault boats. Engineers were able to bridge the canal along the main east-west road. By October 29, the Canadians had captured the town of Goes and linked up with the 52nd Div. With the canal line cleared, German resistance crumbled on South Beveland. Remnants of some German units managed to withdraw to Walcheren Island. The final phase of the Battle of the Scheldt was about to begin.
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