Patton v Rommel....
- Thread starter Lucky13
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pbfoot
1st Lieutenant
Although Montgomery was no prize I think Patton was a legend in his own mind.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
And just what did he "innovate" that was competely unique and better than what other pre-war generals thought up?
And so what if he was in the fight sooner? Patton gets many more points for controlling an army that had a lot more firepower and logistics capabilities than their German counterparts had. Did Rommel command an army (similar in size as the 3rd Army) that stormed across France? Did Rommel ever fight an offensive battle in winter like the 3rd army in the Battle of the Bulge?
We know what Patton did with the forces at his disposal. Its pure conjecture what Rommel would have done if he had similar forces.
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B-17engineer
Colonel
Patton and Rommel both had equal aggressiveness. This showed when Rommel conducted an offensive against Better equip British soldiers . When you judge take this into perspective, Rommel had to fight with:
A weak Italian Ally
Smaller numbers than the allies
Not nearly the amount of supplies he needed.
Even facing these issues he managed to pull off stunning victories.
A weak Italian Ally
Smaller numbers than the allies
Not nearly the amount of supplies he needed.
Even facing these issues he managed to pull off stunning victories.
B-17engineer
Colonel
He couldn't, he was dead.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
And we will never know if he could do it. With Patton we do know it as factual information.
Score 1 for Patton.
B-17engineer
Colonel
You are right. If Hitler hadn't been someone to overrule his general, who knew more about planning a battle or defending an area of importance than he would have ever known, the world may have seen a different outcome in North Africa.
parsifal
Colonel
Patton had strengths that ought not be scofed at. He pulled an army that had been thoroughly defeated and put it back together. His ideas on armoured brekthrough were very progressive.
However, he was not as well developed in thinking as Rommel in terms of the all arms concepts, plus Rommel got an awful lot out of inferior troops (the italians). Conversely, Rommels logistics capabilities were limited, to put it mildly.
Both Generals were also fairly limited when it came to fighting as part of a coalition....both tended to worry only about their own "fronts". Compared to a Mountbatten or a Macarthur, there was no comparison, both these guys were rank amateurs, and in the case of Rommel, very much the product of the system that trained him....
Its not as clear cut as people think....
However, he was not as well developed in thinking as Rommel in terms of the all arms concepts, plus Rommel got an awful lot out of inferior troops (the italians). Conversely, Rommels logistics capabilities were limited, to put it mildly.
Both Generals were also fairly limited when it came to fighting as part of a coalition....both tended to worry only about their own "fronts". Compared to a Mountbatten or a Macarthur, there was no comparison, both these guys were rank amateurs, and in the case of Rommel, very much the product of the system that trained him....
Its not as clear cut as people think....
The whole thing is conjecture... so? That's the point. Do you presume to know the "only" truth.
other pre-war generals thought up?
You cant compare practical application with theory. If you are using "what pre war generals thought up" as a barometer than how come every General wasn't as good a Patton or Rommel?
Being first .... and demonstrating success is tremendous...
As stated in my first post
All things considered... I believe they are equal... if pressed for an edge, Rommel gets it.
.
ToughOmbre
Senior Master Sergeant
Must have also been a legend in the minds of the German Army.
And what he did to relieve the 101st at Bastogne cannot be overlooked.
BTW, would take Rommel over Monty any day.
TO
parsifal
Colonel
Rommel was a tactical genius, but was limited as an army commander. Monty was limited as a tactical commander (with the exception of his defensive efforts at Alam Halfa), yet he was a superior operational commander to Rommel. He knew exactly what was required to get the best out of the troops under his command. That this required a measured, uninspired approach was a product of his situation....he knew the capabilities of his troops and the dangerous ability of Rommel as a mobile warfare opponent.
Why tempt fate by engaging in a type of warfare that your opponent is renowned for? Isnt it better to avoid that sort of battle, and fight the battle on terms that you (the commanding general) are able to manage. Monty was a master of the set piece battle, Rommel was not. Rommel was the master of the mobile battle, Monty was not.
So, given that Monty fought nearly al his battles as set piece battles (the exception being Arnhem) and that these battles resulted in far less casualties than those fought by Rommel, why do you think Rommel is better than Monty?
I agree with Parsifal. After 1st Alamein battle, what very spectacular Rommel did other than roughing totally green US army at Kesserine. The retreat from El Alamein to Tunisia was successful but the attack at Alam Halfa was typical Rommel, Attack against southern flank of Commonwealth line and then try to drive north to the coast. At Mededine March 43 again his attack against battle hardened Commonwealth troops only produced massive panzer losses without any meaningful gains.
Rommel was very energic, as seen before D-Day in France and well versed to German combined arm tactics but as British had noticed already in Norway in spring 1940, Germans were very good in combat. Rommel was very aggressive and at the beginning that worked well but when the Commonwealth troops learned more on tactics the results became more mixed and still later Rommel time to time only lost valuable assets without reasonable gains.
And he seems to have ignore the fact that Germany's forces were overstretched and Germany needed to husband them carefully. So he seems to not fully understand under which constrictions his superiors worked and overstretched also his own forces. After all NA was a side show and the amount of supplies Italian navy could deliver to NA was limited.
Juha
Rommel was very energic, as seen before D-Day in France and well versed to German combined arm tactics but as British had noticed already in Norway in spring 1940, Germans were very good in combat. Rommel was very aggressive and at the beginning that worked well but when the Commonwealth troops learned more on tactics the results became more mixed and still later Rommel time to time only lost valuable assets without reasonable gains.
And he seems to have ignore the fact that Germany's forces were overstretched and Germany needed to husband them carefully. So he seems to not fully understand under which constrictions his superiors worked and overstretched also his own forces. After all NA was a side show and the amount of supplies Italian navy could deliver to NA was limited.
Juha
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I would like to they could. Rommel's tactics with Patton's aggressiveness. I think it would have been amazing to watch.
Obviously it is not real, but check out the books Fox on the Rhine (there is a 2nd one but I can not remember what it is called).
- Thread starter
- #34
Lucky13
Forum Mascot
Had to check to make sure that I remembered right.... 
"Ghost Division" / "Phantom Division" under Erwin Rommel
The 7th Panzer Division moved with great speed through France and covered vast distance. During the Battle of France, the 7th Panzer Division earned the name of the Gespensterdivision (German:"Ghost/Phantom Division") because of this speed and because nobody seemed to know where it was, not even the German High Command. Rommel had a "lead from the front" attitude and would sometimes cut communications with High Command if wished not to be disturbed. His behavior showed confidence in the blitzkrieg concept; his success and favor with Hitler would prevent repercussions from his insubordination to the High Command. Nevertheless, Rommel was criticized by staff for being difficult to contact and locate. Rommel described the French Campaign in his letters to his wife as "a lightning Tour de France".
Timeline - 7th Panzer Division in Belgium and France
12 May 1940 - 7th Panzer Division reaches Dinant.
13 May 1940 - Crosses River Meuse after heavy fighting.
15 May 1940 - Reaches Philippeville and continues Westward passing Avesnes and Le Cateau.
21 May 1940 - Reaches Arras where counter attacked by 2 British Tank Regiments. British tank advance stopped by feared Flak 88 "Tank Killers".
5 June 1940 - Positioned near Abbeville.
8 June 1940 - Reaches outskirts of Rouen.
10 June 1940 - Reaches English Channel West of Dieppe.
17 June 1940 - Reaches Southern outskirts of Cherbourg.
19 June 1940 - Garrison of Cherbourg surrenders to Rommel.
25 June 1940 - Fighting ends for 7th Panzer Division in France.
"Ghost Division" / "Phantom Division" under Erwin Rommel
The 7th Panzer Division moved with great speed through France and covered vast distance. During the Battle of France, the 7th Panzer Division earned the name of the Gespensterdivision (German:"Ghost/Phantom Division") because of this speed and because nobody seemed to know where it was, not even the German High Command. Rommel had a "lead from the front" attitude and would sometimes cut communications with High Command if wished not to be disturbed. His behavior showed confidence in the blitzkrieg concept; his success and favor with Hitler would prevent repercussions from his insubordination to the High Command. Nevertheless, Rommel was criticized by staff for being difficult to contact and locate. Rommel described the French Campaign in his letters to his wife as "a lightning Tour de France".
Timeline - 7th Panzer Division in Belgium and France
12 May 1940 - 7th Panzer Division reaches Dinant.
13 May 1940 - Crosses River Meuse after heavy fighting.
15 May 1940 - Reaches Philippeville and continues Westward passing Avesnes and Le Cateau.
21 May 1940 - Reaches Arras where counter attacked by 2 British Tank Regiments. British tank advance stopped by feared Flak 88 "Tank Killers".
5 June 1940 - Positioned near Abbeville.
8 June 1940 - Reaches outskirts of Rouen.
10 June 1940 - Reaches English Channel West of Dieppe.
17 June 1940 - Reaches Southern outskirts of Cherbourg.
19 June 1940 - Garrison of Cherbourg surrenders to Rommel.
25 June 1940 - Fighting ends for 7th Panzer Division in France.
One of the biggest faults Rommel had was his tendency to attack further than he could reach, without regarding the supply lines. Quite often he stretched his supply lines to the limit and beyond, which is one of the reasons that he eventually lost. Someone mentioning that Montgomery being far worse than Rommel should remember that Montgomery commanded the forces that beat Rommel.
That is absolutely true. That is why I wonder how he would have fared if he had seemingly unlimited supplies as some of his contemporaries had.
The same time, I wonder how Patton would have fared if he had the supply problems that Rommel had.
vikingBerserker
Lieutenant General
I had to go with Patton, he has always been my favorite.
It's interesting that both Patton's Rommel's biggest failures were on the political front.
It's interesting that both Patton's Rommel's biggest failures were on the political front.
ToughOmbre
Senior Master Sergeant
Not to get too off topic but I don't think that casualties suffered by Rommel was a function of Monty's superior leadership. Overwelming resources, men and materiel. I must admit that I am pre-disposed to not be a fan of over-caustious, non-aggressive commanders like Monty.
No one is saying that Monty did not enjoy success, certainly he did. But Caen, Arnhem and his reluctance to engage in the Ardennes colors my judgement of the man.
Patton would probably be the first to admit that he was a prima donna, not sure that Monty would.
TO
parsifal
Colonel
Monty was an insufferable Prima Donna, I'll agree with that.
But I still think you are being too hard on him in your appraisal of him as a commander. The battles you mention, Caen, Arnhem and the Ardennes is not taking into account the restrictions he was fighting under.
In the case of the Ardennes and Caen, I dont think there were two more different battles fought by the same person in the whole war. Caen was a battle of attrition, but a battle in which the the british could not afford to lose many men. Quite simply by 1944, ther were no more replacements for the british army, every man lost was not coming back. The British were breaking up formations to keep their frontline units in fighting shape, so they traded firepower for manouvre, in order to save lives. They literally pounded Caen to rubble with the heavy bombers, and the artillery bombardment. The armour was relatively cheap in terms of lives, and only as a last resort was the Infantry thrown into the battle. And none of this was designed to actually achieve a direct breakthrough....it was all designed to draw the German armoured reserves away from the American sector, wher the breakthrough was being planned. The strategy worked brilliantly to be honest, as the success of "Cobra" attests to. It was the classic Monty style set piece battle, with 34000 casualties of which 18000 were unrecoverable. German losses were approximately twice that number. Considering the quality of the german opposition, I would say that was a credible result.
At Arnhem, monty, having been stung by the publicity he had received about being over cautious, threw caution to the wind, and adopted what was perhaps the most audacious allied plan of the entire war. He very nearly pulled it off. He was unlucky in that two SS Divisions just happened to be refitting near to the objective, and because the drop zones for the arnhem assault forces were simply too far away from the objective. If these problems had been overcome, the war really would have been over by Christmas. It was always a gamble, Monty admitted that himself, as it turned out it was a failure (but what a glorious failure).
At Ardennes, Monty took no chances. Having witnessed the collapse of the French in 1940, I believe he acted completely justifiably by placing his reserves in a position to immediately stall any German attempt to interfere with Allied logistics networks. If this was done at the cost of American lives in the breakout zone, then so be it. A greater priority existed here, the defence of the logistic system. Monty was 110% correct to act as he did here, even if that does ruffle American feathers to say that.
But I still think you are being too hard on him in your appraisal of him as a commander. The battles you mention, Caen, Arnhem and the Ardennes is not taking into account the restrictions he was fighting under.
In the case of the Ardennes and Caen, I dont think there were two more different battles fought by the same person in the whole war. Caen was a battle of attrition, but a battle in which the the british could not afford to lose many men. Quite simply by 1944, ther were no more replacements for the british army, every man lost was not coming back. The British were breaking up formations to keep their frontline units in fighting shape, so they traded firepower for manouvre, in order to save lives. They literally pounded Caen to rubble with the heavy bombers, and the artillery bombardment. The armour was relatively cheap in terms of lives, and only as a last resort was the Infantry thrown into the battle. And none of this was designed to actually achieve a direct breakthrough....it was all designed to draw the German armoured reserves away from the American sector, wher the breakthrough was being planned. The strategy worked brilliantly to be honest, as the success of "Cobra" attests to. It was the classic Monty style set piece battle, with 34000 casualties of which 18000 were unrecoverable. German losses were approximately twice that number. Considering the quality of the german opposition, I would say that was a credible result.
At Arnhem, monty, having been stung by the publicity he had received about being over cautious, threw caution to the wind, and adopted what was perhaps the most audacious allied plan of the entire war. He very nearly pulled it off. He was unlucky in that two SS Divisions just happened to be refitting near to the objective, and because the drop zones for the arnhem assault forces were simply too far away from the objective. If these problems had been overcome, the war really would have been over by Christmas. It was always a gamble, Monty admitted that himself, as it turned out it was a failure (but what a glorious failure).
At Ardennes, Monty took no chances. Having witnessed the collapse of the French in 1940, I believe he acted completely justifiably by placing his reserves in a position to immediately stall any German attempt to interfere with Allied logistics networks. If this was done at the cost of American lives in the breakout zone, then so be it. A greater priority existed here, the defence of the logistic system. Monty was 110% correct to act as he did here, even if that does ruffle American feathers to say that.
ToughOmbre
Senior Master Sergeant
I admit that I'm hard on Monty. As I stated, he certainly did have successes, but still vastly overrated.
And to say that Monty was a "thorn" in the side of Ike was putting it lightly.
The following is from the Eisenhower Memorial Commission website, American perspective to be sure, but accurate IMO.....
P.S. Last word on Monty. I won't go off topic from Rommel vs Patton again.
Ike and Monty – Command Collisions
The task of creating the tremendous war coalition of allies for the purpose of invading Nazi-occupied Europe was a matter requiring the cooperation of many governments. But the task of managing the combat operations of that coalition was up to a single individual, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Ike went to great lengths to hold the coalition together. He worked hard to maintain cordial relations with his subordinate commanders as he exercised his duties as Supreme Commander. But Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery of Great Britain created a series of contentious incidents that finally developed into a direct command collision with Ike near the end of the war. The situation came very close to ripping the alliance asunder.
Both Ike and Monty came from humble origins and earned their way to the top of their respective hierarchies. But there the similarities ended. With his warm smile and optimistic demeanor, Eisenhower welcomed frank discussion and was often willing to accommodate and even compromise in the interest of allied unity. Monty, on the other hand, was stubborn, rebarbative, and prone to self-aggrandizement at the slightest opportunity. Nothing induced Monty to compromise. Even Churchill once used the word "insufferable" when referring to Montgomery.
Though Eisenhower was Supreme Commander of the Allied forces invading Normandy in 1944, Montgomery had temporary command of allied ground troops for the duration of the assault on the beaches. After the beaches were secure and Ike's headquarters had been established in Normandy, Monty would command all British and Canadian ground forces and Bradley would command the American armies. Montgomery and Bradley were to be co-equals under Eisenhower.
After the D-Day successes, the British government promoted Montgomery to field marshal (a non-existent rank in the U.S. Army). In the eyes of the Brits, this put Monty senior to Bradley and made permanent his status as commander of all allied ground forces on the continent. Thus, when Eisenhower moved his headquarters to Normandy — whereupon his jurisdiction was limited to command of British and Canadian ground forces — the British press and Montgomery bitterly expressed their displeasure at Monty having been "demoted." In fact Monty had not been demoted and had known long in advance that his role would revert to equality with Bradley after the invasion succeeded. This knowledge, however, didn't dissuade Monty from publicly agreeing with the British press and demanding that Eisenhower turn over all ground command to him. Ike stuck to the original plan.
As the war in Western Europe progressed Monty continually demanded to be appointed overall ground commander. Ike politely ignored the demands, but it became increasingly difficult for him to deal with Montgomery on major issues. The Combined Chiefs of Staff of Britain and America had approved, and never changed, Eisenhower's basic "broad front" war strategy, but Monty continuously badgered Ike to abandon the broad front strategy and attack with a single overpowering "narrow" thrust into Germany. Of course, Monty's demands always included himself as commander of the spear-like thrust.
Finally, Ike agreed to let Monty try his single thrust theory and approved his plan to drive 60 miles straight through Holland and enter Germany over the Arnhem Bridge. Eisenhower stopped the advance along the rest of the front and diverted the fuel and supplies to Montgomery for the attack. He also assigned two American paratroop divisions to assist the British forces. Historian Carlo D'Este later characterized Monty's plan as, "…the most ill-conceived major operation of World War II." After he lost the battle, Monty did his best to shift the blame to Eisenhower.
The final command collision happened after the Battle of the Bulge. On December 16, 1944 the German army launched a surprise attack into the American-held forests of the Ardennes along the German borders of Belgium and Luxembourg. The Wehrmacht employed 500,000 soldiers and 1,400 tanks to split the allied forces all the way to the Muse River thereby driving a huge bulge into the American lines. The bloody conflict lasted until the end of January when the American armies pushed the Germans back to their starting point. During the relentless fighting over 19,000 American and 100,000 German soldiers were killed. The British dead amounted to just over 200. It was, by any measure, the largest and deadliest American Army battle of the war. It was also a decisive American victory and the German army never again launched an offensive.
Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery's role in the Battle of the Bulge was to defend the northern shoulder of the Bulge throughout the conflict. He did it almost wholly with American divisions that Eisenhower temporarily transferred to his command early in the battle. While Montgomery held his position, American forces under Bradley and Patton attacked and eventually prevailed.
Towards the end of battle, Montgomery held a press conference, broadcast throughout Britain by the BBC, in which he announced that he had led the British Army to the victory and had saved the day for the Americans. The British press used banner headlines to report that Monty had rescued the Americans from certain defeat.
The American commanders were livid. Thoroughly embarrassed by Montgomery, Winston Churchill rose in the House of Commons to say that American soldiers won the battle and British forces played only a minor role. But nothing could be done to diminish the British media's adulation of Montgomery.
Picking the absolute worst time to further upset the supreme allied commander, Montgomery sent Eisenhower another letter demanding that he be promoted to ground-force commander of all allied forces facing Germany. He had finally pushed Ike beyond his limit of endurance with respect to such blatant insubordination. Montgomery's press conference, the resulting British press reports, and the letter demanding promotion all combined to blatantly suggest to the world that Ike could not handle battle command.
Eisenhower convened a staff meeting at his headquarters, which Monty's Chief of Staff Major General Francis de Guingand attended, and announced that he was relieving Montgomery of command. Ike circulated a cable he would send the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting Monty's removal from office. Unlike his boss, Freddie de Guingand fully recognized that Montgomery would lose in any open confrontation and implored Ike to give him 24 hours to sort out the situation with Montgomery. Reluctantly, Ike agreed.
General de Guingand immediately flew to Montgomery's headquarters in Brussels and informed him that he would be replaced. It had not dawned on Monty that he had finally pushed Eisenhower too far and that he would lose his command. A chagrined Montgomery sat down and penned a letter to Eisenhower which he began with "Dear Ike" and ended with the words, "Very distressed that my letter may have upset you and I would ask you to tear it up. Your very devoted subordinate, Monty."
Eisenhower relented and did not send his cable. The crisis that might have split the alliance was over and Montgomery made no more public demands to be promoted. Nothing, however, would ever reduce the ill-will Monty had spread throughout the U.S. command by demeaning the battle quality of the American soldier.
TO
And to say that Monty was a "thorn" in the side of Ike was putting it lightly.
The following is from the Eisenhower Memorial Commission website, American perspective to be sure, but accurate IMO.....
P.S. Last word on Monty. I won't go off topic from Rommel vs Patton again.
Ike and Monty – Command Collisions
The task of creating the tremendous war coalition of allies for the purpose of invading Nazi-occupied Europe was a matter requiring the cooperation of many governments. But the task of managing the combat operations of that coalition was up to a single individual, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Ike went to great lengths to hold the coalition together. He worked hard to maintain cordial relations with his subordinate commanders as he exercised his duties as Supreme Commander. But Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery of Great Britain created a series of contentious incidents that finally developed into a direct command collision with Ike near the end of the war. The situation came very close to ripping the alliance asunder.
Both Ike and Monty came from humble origins and earned their way to the top of their respective hierarchies. But there the similarities ended. With his warm smile and optimistic demeanor, Eisenhower welcomed frank discussion and was often willing to accommodate and even compromise in the interest of allied unity. Monty, on the other hand, was stubborn, rebarbative, and prone to self-aggrandizement at the slightest opportunity. Nothing induced Monty to compromise. Even Churchill once used the word "insufferable" when referring to Montgomery.
Though Eisenhower was Supreme Commander of the Allied forces invading Normandy in 1944, Montgomery had temporary command of allied ground troops for the duration of the assault on the beaches. After the beaches were secure and Ike's headquarters had been established in Normandy, Monty would command all British and Canadian ground forces and Bradley would command the American armies. Montgomery and Bradley were to be co-equals under Eisenhower.
After the D-Day successes, the British government promoted Montgomery to field marshal (a non-existent rank in the U.S. Army). In the eyes of the Brits, this put Monty senior to Bradley and made permanent his status as commander of all allied ground forces on the continent. Thus, when Eisenhower moved his headquarters to Normandy — whereupon his jurisdiction was limited to command of British and Canadian ground forces — the British press and Montgomery bitterly expressed their displeasure at Monty having been "demoted." In fact Monty had not been demoted and had known long in advance that his role would revert to equality with Bradley after the invasion succeeded. This knowledge, however, didn't dissuade Monty from publicly agreeing with the British press and demanding that Eisenhower turn over all ground command to him. Ike stuck to the original plan.
As the war in Western Europe progressed Monty continually demanded to be appointed overall ground commander. Ike politely ignored the demands, but it became increasingly difficult for him to deal with Montgomery on major issues. The Combined Chiefs of Staff of Britain and America had approved, and never changed, Eisenhower's basic "broad front" war strategy, but Monty continuously badgered Ike to abandon the broad front strategy and attack with a single overpowering "narrow" thrust into Germany. Of course, Monty's demands always included himself as commander of the spear-like thrust.
Finally, Ike agreed to let Monty try his single thrust theory and approved his plan to drive 60 miles straight through Holland and enter Germany over the Arnhem Bridge. Eisenhower stopped the advance along the rest of the front and diverted the fuel and supplies to Montgomery for the attack. He also assigned two American paratroop divisions to assist the British forces. Historian Carlo D'Este later characterized Monty's plan as, "…the most ill-conceived major operation of World War II." After he lost the battle, Monty did his best to shift the blame to Eisenhower.
The final command collision happened after the Battle of the Bulge. On December 16, 1944 the German army launched a surprise attack into the American-held forests of the Ardennes along the German borders of Belgium and Luxembourg. The Wehrmacht employed 500,000 soldiers and 1,400 tanks to split the allied forces all the way to the Muse River thereby driving a huge bulge into the American lines. The bloody conflict lasted until the end of January when the American armies pushed the Germans back to their starting point. During the relentless fighting over 19,000 American and 100,000 German soldiers were killed. The British dead amounted to just over 200. It was, by any measure, the largest and deadliest American Army battle of the war. It was also a decisive American victory and the German army never again launched an offensive.
Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery's role in the Battle of the Bulge was to defend the northern shoulder of the Bulge throughout the conflict. He did it almost wholly with American divisions that Eisenhower temporarily transferred to his command early in the battle. While Montgomery held his position, American forces under Bradley and Patton attacked and eventually prevailed.
Towards the end of battle, Montgomery held a press conference, broadcast throughout Britain by the BBC, in which he announced that he had led the British Army to the victory and had saved the day for the Americans. The British press used banner headlines to report that Monty had rescued the Americans from certain defeat.
The American commanders were livid. Thoroughly embarrassed by Montgomery, Winston Churchill rose in the House of Commons to say that American soldiers won the battle and British forces played only a minor role. But nothing could be done to diminish the British media's adulation of Montgomery.
Picking the absolute worst time to further upset the supreme allied commander, Montgomery sent Eisenhower another letter demanding that he be promoted to ground-force commander of all allied forces facing Germany. He had finally pushed Ike beyond his limit of endurance with respect to such blatant insubordination. Montgomery's press conference, the resulting British press reports, and the letter demanding promotion all combined to blatantly suggest to the world that Ike could not handle battle command.
Eisenhower convened a staff meeting at his headquarters, which Monty's Chief of Staff Major General Francis de Guingand attended, and announced that he was relieving Montgomery of command. Ike circulated a cable he would send the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting Monty's removal from office. Unlike his boss, Freddie de Guingand fully recognized that Montgomery would lose in any open confrontation and implored Ike to give him 24 hours to sort out the situation with Montgomery. Reluctantly, Ike agreed.
General de Guingand immediately flew to Montgomery's headquarters in Brussels and informed him that he would be replaced. It had not dawned on Monty that he had finally pushed Eisenhower too far and that he would lose his command. A chagrined Montgomery sat down and penned a letter to Eisenhower which he began with "Dear Ike" and ended with the words, "Very distressed that my letter may have upset you and I would ask you to tear it up. Your very devoted subordinate, Monty."
Eisenhower relented and did not send his cable. The crisis that might have split the alliance was over and Montgomery made no more public demands to be promoted. Nothing, however, would ever reduce the ill-will Monty had spread throughout the U.S. command by demeaning the battle quality of the American soldier.
TO
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