Post WW2 Opportunities Lost by the Navy

[davparlr]

I had written before that the Navy seemed to have been caught in a WW2 mind set when it came to developing fighter aircraft. To a degree it was understandable. They had a slew of large aircraft carriers including the new Midway class carriers. The Navy was aware of the new jets that were coming but failed to grasp the speed at which air combat would change with the second generation jet fighters, the XP-86 and Mig-15. The first generation jet aircraft were not a significant jump over the latest propeller aircraft (the XP-72 would do 490 mph, and the F5U-5N would do 470 mph) whereas the first gen jets barely made 550 mph, although the hint was there where the XP-84 set a US speed record of 611 mph in 1946. When applied to Naval operations, these new jets had significant problems; first, they accelerated very slow from start which is not good for a limited deck, and, more significantly, landed very fast. These last two were not compatible with the normal operations of aircraft carriers, not even the latest. With limited post war funds, the AF was taking money away from the Navy because it had the only way to deliver the new atomic bomb deep into enemy territory, the Navy decided to procure low risk carrier compatible jets, like the North American FJ1 Fury. The answer, however, was staring them right in the face, but they didn't see it. Right next to the North American FJ-1development, but a year behind, was the XP-86, which would make all other American developing fighters obsolete. But horrors, it was a AF development, with unproven swept wings. It would never be able to take off from a carrier and would be way too fast to land. But they turned away too fast. Catapults were well known by the Navy and would solve the take off problem, and it turns out that the F-86 stalling speed was identical to the F2H-2 Banshee and less than the F9F-4 Cougar, both straight wing aircraft. Low speed maneuverability? Modifying flight control surfaces was a reasonable way to correct any issues. Had the Navy looked forward, abandoning the FJ-1, cancelling either the F2H or the F9F and put the money and effort into the FJ-2 (navalized F-86). It's not unreasonable that the FJ-2 could have flown one year past the F-86, or October, 1948. Two years of corrections of deficiencies and the upgraded FJ-2 could have been ready for deployment, certainly with the Marines and most likely carrier borne, the Navy pilots would be eager and with capable jets would be available to get at the Migs, by late1951, maybe earlier. North American production quantity may have been an issue. In June, 1950, the U.S. Navy was not prepared for an air control war and relied on the U.S. Air Force for that. Can you imagine what the FJ-2s would have made for Naval/Marine aviation in Korea?

As a result, very capable and talented Navy pilots sat on the sidelines of air-to-air combat in Korea, they did provide heroic ground support missions, while AF pilots engaged the enemy fighters. There was only one Navy ace, who flew a night fighter, all the other aces were AF pilots in the F-86. Marine pilot John Glen got three kills flying F-86s.

 

[SaparotRob]

Bless you for this and the other thread.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'd imagine that it wasn't take-off but landing requirements that made Navy planes less capable.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Excellent discussion Dave! I think we have to look into several factors -

As Thump eluded to, you obviously had some operating challenges that hindered naval aircraft development in the post war years. The catapult took care of the issue with take off. As we know early turbine engines took a while to spool up and take off distances were long. Power management during landings would be the biggest issue as well as developing naval aircraft with good low speed characteristics. I think the Navy, because of their special needs and continued development of carrier operations supporting jet aircraft forced them to take a slow pace rather than quickly embrace a navalized version of the F-86. I think the F9F and the F2H gave the navy a sense of security, especially in early jet naval operations. Also have to consider engine development as well.

 

[EwenS]

I had written before that the Navy seemed to have been caught in a WW2 mind set when it came to developing fighter aircraft. To a degree it was understandable. They had a slew of large aircraft carriers including the new Midway class carriers. The Navy was aware of the new jets that were coming but failed to grasp the speed at which air combat would change with the second generation jet fighters, the XP-86 and Mig-15. The first generation jet aircraft were not a significant jump over the latest propeller aircraft (the XP-72 would do 490 mph, and the F5U-5N would do 470 mph) whereas the first gen jets barely made 550 mph, although the hint was there where the XP-84 set a US speed record of 611 mph in 1946. When applied to Naval operations, these new jets had significant problems; first, they accelerated very slow from start which is not good for a limited deck, and, more significantly, landed very fast. These last two were not compatible with the normal operations of aircraft carriers, not even the latest. With limited post war funds, the AF was taking money away from the Navy because it had the only way to deliver the new atomic bomb deep into enemy territory, the Navy decided to procure low risk carrier compatible jets, like the North American FJ1 Fury. The answer, however, was staring them right in the face, but they didn't see it. Right next to the North American FJ-1development, but a year behind, was the XP-86, which would make all other American developing fighters obsolete. But horrors, it was a AF development, with unproven swept wings. It would never be able to take off from a carrier and would be way too fast to land. But they turned away too fast. Catapults were well known by the Navy and would solve the take off problem, and it turns out that the F-86 stalling speed was identical to the F2H-2 Banshee and less than the F9F-4 Cougar, both straight wing aircraft. Low speed maneuverability? Modifying flight control surfaces was a reasonable way to correct any issues. Had the Navy looked forward, abandoning the FJ-1, cancelling either the F2H or the F9F and put the money and effort into the FJ-2 (navalized F-86). It's not unreasonable that the FJ-2 could have flown one year past the F-86, or October, 1948. Two years of corrections of deficiencies and the upgraded FJ-2 could have been ready for deployment, certainly with the Marines and most likely carrier borne, the Navy pilots would be eager and with capable jets would be available to get at the Migs, by late1951, maybe earlier. North American production quantity may have been an issue. In June, 1950, the U.S. Navy was not prepared for an air control war and relied on the U.S. Air Force for that. Can you imagine what the FJ-2s would have made for Naval/Marine aviation in Korea?

As a result, very capable and talented Navy pilots sat on the sidelines of air-to-air combat in Korea, they did provide heroic ground support missions, while AF pilots engaged the enemy fighters. There was only one Navy ace, who flew a night fighter, all the other aces were AF pilots in the F-86. Marine pilot John Glen got three kills flying F-86s.

As you point out the USAAF / USAF had the F-86. But what you don't mention is that it was developed slightly later and grew out of the USN FJ-1 (see below), and that makes all the difference. Being slightly later, and not originally meeting the USAAF specs, it was redesigned to take advantage of the swept wing technology discovered following the German surrender courtesy of Operation Paperclip. It wasn't until Feb 1946 that the swept wing XP-86 mock-up was produced, over a year after the prototype straight wing FJ-1 had been ordered, with the prototype flying on 1 Oct 1947. It only began to enter service from Feb 1949. It attracts a lot of attention for its exploits in Korea but overall there were not that many of them when compared with other types.

I don't believe that the view you expressed is an accurate reflection of the USN mindset in the postwar period at all. There is a range of issues that it fails to take account of. If anything the USN were looking even further into the future than you suggest even the USAF was. And aircraft were only one of the solutions to the problems that they saw.

Firstly the introduction of jets to carriers. In the period from 1943 to 1946 many thought that the jet would never be successfully flown of a carrier, at least so far as the then current state of jet technology was understood.

Take off was not so much of a problem as existing catapults would suffice in the short term but it became a problem by the late 1940s as aircraft weights increased. The ultimate solution was the steam catapult which entered service in 1954.

Another issue that is little considered is the prodigious thirst of jet engines. On airfields you can get almost unlimited fuel supplies by pipeline, train, road tanker as required and still remain operational. At sea the ship can carry a limited quantity and has to be pulled out of the line to replenish its tanks. The problem is well summed up by the fact that an Essex class carrier, the mainstay of the US Fleet between 1945 & 1955, could generate some 500 individual F6F sorties from its avgas tanks but only 228 Banshee flights. But worse the F6F could fly for 4 hours compared to the Banshee's 2.25 hours. When the Essex class was modernised via the SCB-27/27A/27C programmes, their aviation fuel capacity was increased by 30-50% depending on the ship concerned.

And then we have the problem of getting them back aboard that has been touched on. The stall speed issue became a factor, but the most important issue was how quickly the jet engine could spool up to generate power in the event of a last minute wave off. Wave offs were an everyday occurrence in the days of straight deck carriers. With the early jet engines an unacceptable level of pilot losses was anticipated. Of course the ultimate solution was the angled deck. That reached operational USN carriers in Jan 1955.

The first jet was not landed on a carrier successfully until 3 Dec 1945. That was the British De Havilland Vampire on the light carrier Ocean. (I'm ignoring the Ryan FR-1 mixed power aircraft attempts sometimes claimed as the first). The first carrier landings by a USN jet did not take place until 21 July 1946 by a McDonnell Douglas FH-1 Phantom.

The first swept wing jet was not landed on a carrier until Nov 1950. That was the British Supermarine 510, a swept wing development of the earlier Attacker.

What gets lost in the OP is that, after the McDonnell FH Phantom, the next 4 of the USNs jets all derived, eventually, from the same Sept 1944 request for proposals. And they were only intended to get the USN used to operating jets. With the postwar slowdown and problems encountered in developing some of these aircraft and their engines, service entry times became extended. So we have the:-

North American FJ-1 – prototype ordered 1/1/45 with 100 production aircraft on 28/5/45 (later cut to 30). First flight 11/9/46. Deliveries from 3/48. Spent very little time at sea.

Vought F6U Pirate – prototype ordered 29/12/44 followed by 30 production aircraft. First flew 29/6/49. Deliveries from 8/49.

Grumman F9F Panther – prototype ordered 22/4/46. First flight 24/11/47. Initial production contracts covered only for 47 F9F-2 and 54 F9F-3. Deliveries began 11/48.

McDonnell F2H Banshee – prototype contract 2/3/45. Prototype flew 11/1/47. 56 production aircraft ordered 5/47 with deliveries from 3/49.

But that doesn't mean that the USN was idle. Postwar there were two roles for the navy fighter.

1. Strike escort at ever increasing distances.
2. Fleet air defence.

From late 1945 / early 1946 the USN was trying to carve a niche for itself in nuclear delivery game. That meant new aircraft and new carriers for them to operate from. So from the beginning of 1946 the North American AJ Savage was developed. Ordered 6/46, first flight 3/7/48 and into service in 1949 and initially only capable of operation off the large Midway class until the reconstructed Essex class begin to appear from late 1950. To escort that, and smaller strike aircraft like the AD Skyraider, the range of the F2H/F9F was adequate. And the carrier intended to operate such aircraft was to be the short lived USS United States project, cancelled in 1949, and then the Forrestal class which entered service from 1955.

In 1948 the USN began development of the next generation bomber which became the Douglas A3D-1 (later A-3) Skywarrior with an initial requirement for a radius of action of 1,700+ nautical miles but with speed being the critical design criteria. It was obvious from the start that it would be impossible, with the technology of the day, to produce a long range escort fighter to match the A3D that could be supported off a carrier. For the escort role the USAF had begun to look at the XP-88 from 1946.

Fleet air defence was an even more complicated problem to solve. The advent of guided weapons by the Germans in 1943 had forced a rethink. First longer ranged AA guns like the 6" fitted to the Worcester class cruisers were seen as the answer and then the guided missile, development of which can be traced back to 1944 and Project Bumblebee. That developed into the 3-T programme that bore fruit in the 1950s in the shape of Talos, Terrier & Tartar missiles. But they took much longer to bear fruit than was originally anticipated.

But the advent of the jet had knock on consequences for the fleet fighter as well. Firstly the attacker was seen to be the jet bomber approaching at high altitude perhaps with stand-off weapons. Secondly, longer ranged guns and missiles planned would force the fighter to engage the target further out than in WW2. So it had to be much faster to reach its interception point sooner. And given increasing speeds there was less time when it got there to shoot an attacker down. So air to air missiles began to figure in planning, both heat seeking and radar guided. Thirdly, the area of operations post-war was seen less and less the relatively calm waters of the Pacific and more and more the much rougher waters of the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans which necessitated more radar equipped aircraft. All of these things mean that the shape of the fleet fighter had to change. Simply copying the USAF was not what the USN needed to do.

The above doesn't mean that the USN ignored the technology coming out of Germany. Just like the USAAF/USAF they embraced it. You fail to mention that in June 1946 the USN ordered 3 prototype F7U Cutlass, which if anything was more advanced than the F-86. It did without a conventional horizontal tailplane and its engines were designed with afterburners. It flew in for the first time on 29 Sept 1948. Ultimately it encountered many development problems, not reaching squadron service until April 1954. A modified version then got the Sparrow I missile in 1956.

1947 also saw the USN calling for a fighter study that generated an order in 1948 for the prototype Douglas F4D Skyray (first flight Jan 1951, service entry 1956). 1949 saw orders for the prototype F3H Demon (first flight 7 Aug 1951, service entry 1956).

And lets face it, no one, not even the USAF, was planning for the Korean War in June 1950.

With delays and the poor performance of the early F7U the USN did two things:-

• Took up Grumman's 1950 offer of a swept wing F9F derivative as the F9F-6 Cougar which flew on 20 September 1950 and entered service in Nov 1952.
• Took up North American's 1951 offer of a navalised F-86E, which flew on 14 Feb 1952 as the FJ-2. But demand for the F-86 from the USAF meant that only 25 were built before the end of 1953. When it did arrive in service it went to shore based USMC squadrons because its slow speed handling qualities around the carrier deck left something to be desired when compared to the F9F-6 Cougar. It really had to be further developed into the FJ-3 before it was finally considered fully satisfactory for carrier use in 1954.

Ultimately there were 3 British developments that made the operation of swept wing aircraft from carriers much easier. Those were, in order of development, the steam catapult, the angled deck and finally the optical landing sight. I have timelines for their development I can post for anyone interested.

The years 1945 to 1955 were a period of huge technological change in aviation but particularly for naval aviation. One of the problems was foreseeing how long developments of that technology would take. The question then arose, do you spend your limited funds on what is available today or do you plough it into the technology of the future. When will the next war arise? British policy for example ruled it out until 1956. Korea was a bolt from the blue and a wake up call that forced rearmament.

When you step back you can see a number of similarities with 2022!

 

[EwenS]

As this thread has now piqued my curiosity a bit of digging has produced the following F-86 production data. I was a bit surprised at the low level of production before the Korean War and during the early days thereof. May 1948-Sept 1949 221 P/F86A models followed by Oct 1949-Dec 1950 another 333. Followed by even fewer F-86E models which first flew Sept 1950.

https://finescale.com/~/media/files/pdf/online-extras/sabre/sabretable.pdf

And more context to the period.

The Lockheed XP-80 first flight Jan 1944, production order for P-80A awarded April 1944 with the 3,500 on order at VJ Day cut back to 917. Service acceptance was in Feb 1945 and, but for the end of the war would have been over Japan for Operation Olympic. But it was the P/F-80C that saw service in Korea which didn't fly until 1 March 1948.

Then there was the P/F-84. Prototypes and a production order placed March 1945, reduced to 100 post-war. First flight 28 Feb1946. The deliveries of 15 YP-84A from the production contract didn't begin finish until April 1947 to be followed by the P-84B from the summer of that year. But it was the F-84E version ordered at the end of Dec 1948 and which first flew in May 1949 that was the main model used in Korea.

So to put a question to the OP. Is the USN really so far behind the USAAF?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

As this thread has now piqued my curiosity a bit of digging has produced the following F-86 production data. I was a bit surprised at the low level of production before the Korean War and during the early days thereof.

Not surprising - as we know in the post war years military procurement across the board was cut drastically. The Korean War started June of 1950, the MiG-15 didn't start making an appearance over North Korea until November 1950. From your own chart, look at the numbers into 1951. By the end of 1950 I think you show 554 F-86s produced. As the Korean War was "a wake up call," (Initially no one expected the war to last 3 years) you can see the contract orders to North American start to increase, especially when the "E" and "F" models started entering service. NA wasn't going to start pumping out Sabers unless they had a contract, same for Canadiar.

At the same time look at the numbers of F-86s operated over Korea, I think at any given time you were looking at about 250 F-86s over the peninsula.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

As we know early turbine engines took a while to spool up and take off distances were long. Power management during landings would be the biggest issue as well as developing naval aircraft with good low speed characteristics.

I was thinking more of the heavier, more-rugged airframes required for landing, but this too is a point which, while I hadn't considered it, also comes into play. It wasn't until jets became both more reliable and more powerful that the weight disadvantage could be offset by better engines.

 

[davparlr]

As you point out the USAAF / USAF had the F-86. But what you don't mention is that it was developed slightly later and grew out of the USN FJ-1 (see below), and that makes all the difference. Being slightly later, and not originally meeting the USAAF specs, it was redesigned to take advantage of the swept wing technology discovered following the German surrender courtesy of Operation Paperclip. It wasn't until Feb 1946 that the swept wing XP-86 mock-up was produced, over a year after the prototype straight wing FJ-1 had been ordered, with the prototype flying on 1 Oct 1947. It only began to enter service from Feb 1949. It attracts a lot of attention for its exploits in Korea but overall there were not that many of them when compared with other types.

I don't believe that the view you expressed is an accurate reflection of the USN mindset in the postwar period at all. There is a range of issues that it fails to take account of. If anything the USN were looking even further into the future than you suggest even the USAF was. And aircraft were only one of the solutions to the problems that they saw.

Firstly the introduction of jets to carriers. In the period from 1943 to 1946 many thought that the jet would never be successfully flown of a carrier, at least so far as the then current state of jet technology was understood.

Take off was not so much of a problem as existing catapults would suffice in the short term but it became a problem by the late 1940s as aircraft weights increased. The ultimate solution was the steam catapult which entered service in 1954.

Another issue that is little considered is the prodigious thirst of jet engines. On airfields you can get almost unlimited fuel supplies by pipeline, train, road tanker as required and still remain operational. At sea the ship can carry a limited quantity and has to be pulled out of the line to replenish its tanks. The problem is well summed up by the fact that an Essex class carrier, the mainstay of the US Fleet between 1945 & 1955, could generate some 500 individual F6F sorties from its avgas tanks but only 228 Banshee flights. But worse the F6F could fly for 4 hours compared to the Banshee's 2.25 hours. When the Essex class was modernised via the SCB-27/27A/27C programmes, their aviation fuel capacity was increased by 30-50% depending on the ship concerned.

And then we have the problem of getting them back aboard that has been touched on. The stall speed issue became a factor, but the most important issue was how quickly the jet engine could spool up to generate power in the event of a last minute wave off. Wave offs were an everyday occurrence in the days of straight deck carriers. With the early jet engines an unacceptable level of pilot losses was anticipated. Of course the ultimate solution was the angled deck. That reached operational USN carriers in Jan 1955.

The first jet was not landed on a carrier successfully until 3 Dec 1945. That was the British De Havilland Vampire on the light carrier Ocean. (I'm ignoring the Ryan FR-1 mixed power aircraft attempts sometimes claimed as the first). The first carrier landings by a USN jet did not take place until 21 July 1946 by a McDonnell Douglas FH-1 Phantom.

The first swept wing jet was not landed on a carrier until Nov 1950. That was the British Supermarine 510, a swept wing development of the earlier Attacker.

What gets lost in the OP is that, after the McDonnell FH Phantom, the next 4 of the USNs jets all derived, eventually, from the same Sept 1944 request for proposals. And they were only intended to get the USN used to operating jets. With the postwar slowdown and problems encountered in developing some of these aircraft and their engines, service entry times became extended. So we have the:-

North American FJ-1 – prototype ordered 1/1/45 with 100 production aircraft on 28/5/45 (later cut to 30). First flight 11/9/46. Deliveries from 3/48. Spent very little time at sea.

Vought F6U Pirate – prototype ordered 29/12/44 followed by 30 production aircraft. First flew 29/6/49. Deliveries from 8/49.

Grumman F9F Panther – prototype ordered 22/4/46. First flight 24/11/47. Initial production contracts covered only for 47 F9F-2 and 54 F9F-3. Deliveries began 11/48.

McDonnell F2H Banshee – prototype contract 2/3/45. Prototype flew 11/1/47. 56 production aircraft ordered 5/47 with deliveries from 3/49.

But that doesn't mean that the USN was idle. Postwar there were two roles for the navy fighter.

1. Strike escort at ever increasing distances.
2. Fleet air defence.

From late 1945 / early 1946 the USN was trying to carve a niche for itself in nuclear delivery game. That meant new aircraft and new carriers for them to operate from. So from the beginning of 1946 the North American AJ Savage was developed. Ordered 6/46, first flight 3/7/48 and into service in 1949 and initially only capable of operation off the large Midway class until the reconstructed Essex class begin to appear from late 1950. To escort that, and smaller strike aircraft like the AD Skyraider, the range of the F2H/F9F was adequate. And the carrier intended to operate such aircraft was to be the short lived USS United States project, cancelled in 1949, and then the Forrestal class which entered service from 1955.

In 1948 the USN began development of the next generation bomber which became the Douglas A3D-1 (later A-3) Skywarrior with an initial requirement for a radius of action of 1,700+ nautical miles but with speed being the critical design criteria. It was obvious from the start that it would be impossible, with the technology of the day, to produce a long range escort fighter to match the A3D that could be supported off a carrier. For the escort role the USAF had begun to look at the XP-88 from 1946.

Fleet air defence was an even more complicated problem to solve. The advent of guided weapons by the Germans in 1943 had forced a rethink. First longer ranged AA guns like the 6" fitted to the Worcester class cruisers were seen as the answer and then the guided missile, development of which can be traced back to 1944 and Project Bumblebee. That developed into the 3-T programme that bore fruit in the 1950s in the shape of Talos, Terrier & Tartar missiles. But they took much longer to bear fruit than was originally anticipated.

But the advent of the jet had knock on consequences for the fleet fighter as well. Firstly the attacker was seen to be the jet bomber approaching at high altitude perhaps with stand-off weapons. Secondly, longer ranged guns and missiles planned would force the fighter to engage the target further out than in WW2. So it had to be much faster to reach its interception point sooner. And given increasing speeds there was less time when it got there to shoot an attacker down. So air to air missiles began to figure in planning, both heat seeking and radar guided. Thirdly, the area of operations post-war was seen less and less the relatively calm waters of the Pacific and more and more the much rougher waters of the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans which necessitated more radar equipped aircraft. All of these things mean that the shape of the fleet fighter had to change. Simply copying the USAF was not what the USN needed to do.

The above doesn't mean that the USN ignored the technology coming out of Germany. Just like the USAAF/USAF they embraced it. You fail to mention that in June 1946 the USN ordered 3 prototype F7U Cutlass, which if anything was more advanced than the F-86. It did without a conventional horizontal tailplane and its engines were designed with afterburners. It flew in for the first time on 29 Sept 1948. Ultimately it encountered many development problems, not reaching squadron service until April 1954. A modified version then got the Sparrow I missile in 1956.

1947 also saw the USN calling for a fighter study that generated an order in 1948 for the prototype Douglas F4D Skyray (first flight Jan 1951, service entry 1956). 1949 saw orders for the prototype F3H Demon (first flight 7 Aug 1951, service entry 1956).

And lets face it, no one, not even the USAF, was planning for the Korean War in June 1950.

With delays and the poor performance of the early F7U the USN did two things:-

• Took up Grumman's 1950 offer of a swept wing F9F derivative as the F9F-6 Cougar which flew on 20 September 1950 and entered service in Nov 1952.
• Took up North American's 1951 offer of a navalised F-86E, which flew on 14 Feb 1952 as the FJ-2. But demand for the F-86 from the USAF meant that only 25 were built before the end of 1953. When it did arrive in service it went to shore based USMC squadrons because its slow speed handling qualities around the carrier deck left something to be desired when compared to the F9F-6 Cougar. It really had to be further developed into the FJ-3 before it was finally considered fully satisfactory for carrier use in 1954.

Ultimately there were 3 British developments that made the operation of swept wing aircraft from carriers much easier. Those were, in order of development, the steam catapult, the angled deck and finally the optical landing sight. I have timelines for their development I can post for anyone interested.

The years 1945 to 1955 were a period of huge technological change in aviation but particularly for naval aviation. One of the problems was foreseeing how long developments of that technology would take. The question then arose, do you spend your limited funds on what is available today or do you plough it into the technology of the future. When will the next war arise? British policy for example ruled it out until 1956. Korea was a bolt from the blue and a wake up call that forced rearmament.

When you step back you can see a number of similarities with 2022!

Enjoyed your excellent post and agree with most of your conclusions. I do have a few response.

As you point out the USAAF / USAF had the F-86. But what you don't mention is that it was developed slightly later and grew out of the USN FJ-1 (see below), and that makes all the difference.

Which in turn used a P-51tail, wings, and canopy, and since it is obvious that the fuselage was redesigned, the XP-86 was basically a complete remake of, and little commonality to, the FJ-1.
The Navy must have known of the P-86 effort going on and knew that its performance would make their aircraft designs obsolete. Bias towards Air Force, swept wings, jets led to ignoring what was there for them to see.

It only began to enter service from Feb 1949. It attracts a lot of attention for its exploits in Korea but overall there were not that many of them when compared with other types.

But enough to turn the tide in Korea.

I don't believe that the view you expressed is an accurate reflection of the USN mindset in the postwar period at all. There is a range of issues that it fails to take account of. If anything the USN were looking even further into the future than you suggest even the USAF was. And aircraft were only one of the solutions to the problems that they saw.

You are right. As you mentioned later on, the Navy was highly concerned that the AF was sucking up all of the defense budget on their atomic bomber, a monstrosity of an aircraft, the B-36. This made them desperate to develop an A-bomb carrying plane that would save the Navy carrier force, and this was a mistake. It was the Korean War that saved the Navy carrier force, not the A-bomb carrying aircraft. The nation recognized the importance of a mobile fast response airfield that is independent of any land constraints. Ironically, this incorrect concern is part of the very reason the Navy was caught with their pants down when the war started. They did not have an aircraft that could control the airspace.

Another issue that is little considered is the prodigious thirst of jet engines.

While this is a correct statement, the Navy did fly significant operations with heavily laden F9Fs and F2Hs in support of ground forces, so flying CAP missions with drop tanks instead of bombs would not be unreasonable, they just didn't have the planes to handle the Mig 15. Apparently operations were flying during the day and refueling from tankers at night. Don't know how close the carriers operated to the front lines but they did fly jet missions over N. Korea.

And then we have the problem of getting them back aboard that has been touched on. The stall speed issue became a factor

Not too much of an issue here, the F-86A had a stall speed of 121 mph, the F9F-3/4 was 131 mph, the F2H-2 was 121 mph, the F7U-3 was 139 mph, the FJ-2 132mph (the FJ-22 was almost 2k lbs heavier than the F-86A.) The F-86 stall speed was not out of the range of typical Navy jet fighters.

What gets lost in the OP is that, after the McDonnell FH Phantom, the next 4 of the USNs jets all derived, eventually, from the same Sept 1944 request for proposals. And they were only intended to get the USN used to operating jets. With the postwar slowdown and problems encountered in developing some of these aircraft and their engines, service entry times became extended.

Yes, and learning to operate jets on the carriers were extremely important. When the war ended, however, the AF had a slew of pilots with experience in modern high speed air combat, learning techniques and tactics and enemy weaknesses, while the Navy had a slew of expert air-to-ground pilot and very few air-to-air exposure (some marines like John Glen flew with the AF, don't know if any Navy pilots did). What the Navy could have done was to buy some F-86s (if they were available), painted them blue call them FJ1A and give them to the marines to fly off land bases as they did with the F4Us in the South Pacific. This would have provided some cross training.

From late 1945 / early 1946 the USN was trying to carve a niche for itself in nuclear delivery game. That meant new aircraft and new carriers for them to operate from.

Efforts of the Navy to develop a strategic bomber didn't really catch on. The capable A3D could not compete with the already operational B-47 and the incredible B-52, but still fought on with the AF. Not a good plane to escape from, however (Wikipedia stated that some Navy said that A4D stood for "all four dead"). The beautiful and fast A-5 vigilante was really a non-starter. In June, 1958, with the launch of SSBN George Washington, the Navy got what it was looking for, a viable and critical strategic nuclear capability. By this time the critical necessity of the carrier task force was well established. Soon the tactical effectiveness of the Naval air arm was going to be on display in Vietnam.


.

You fail to mention that in June 1946 the USN ordered 3 prototype F7U Cutlass, which if anything was more advanced than the F-86.

As a fighting aircraft, the horrendous, pilot killing, Cutlass was in no way comparable to the F-86. If the Navy had fielded the Cutlass in Korea, it would have killed more Navy pilots than the enemy. I doubt you could find only a few positive comments about the Cutlass.

.

A modified version then got the Sparrow I missile in 1956.

The Navy did an outstanding job of developing air-to-air missiles. The AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinder were outstanding whereas the AF Falcon missile not so much (but didn't go through upgrades as the Navy missiles to make them more dependable).

1947 also saw the USN calling for a fighter study that generated an order in 1948 for the prototype Douglas F4D Skyray (first flight Jan 1951, service entry 1956). 1949 saw orders for the prototype F3H Demon (first flight 7 Aug 1951, service entry 1956).

The F4D and F11F Tiger were good aircraft but pretty mediocre compare to the F-100/Mig 19. The F3H was a non-starter and was a disappointment. Not until the excellent F8U came out in 1957 did they have a superior fighter. And, in 1961 the F4H was introduce and the AF had no answer for it. And, in the early 60's the Navy was more ready to fight in Vietnam than the Air Force was.

And lets face it, no one, not even the USAF, was planning for the Korean War in June 1950.

Yes. The AF was just fortunate that the North American engineers could convert latest aerodynamics and engines into an outstanding fighter as they had done previously on the P-51.

slow speed handling qualities around the carrier deck left something to be desired when compared to the F9F-6 Cougar

.

I think low speed handling problems are relatively easily to correct by modifying control surface effectivity by maybe size, design, and response times. I think this could have been done much earlier had the Navy grasp the importance of the F-86 performance increase.

The end results though was that during the Korean War well trained Navy pilots were either waiting in the ready room or dropping bombs in help of the Army and Marines while the Air Force pilots were going head-to-head with the best the enemy had to offer and receiving all the glory. It must have been galling.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I think low speed handling problems are relatively easily to correct by modifying control surface effectivity by maybe size, design, and response times. I think this could have been done much earlier had the Navy grasp the importance of the F-86 performance increase.

While you still had the issues with first and second generation turbine engines and their inadequacies with carrier operations, don't forget no one was yet to grasp the MiG-15 threat either, to include the Air Force.

 

[EwenS]

Enjoyed your excellent post and agree with most of your conclusions. I do have a few response.





Which in turn used a P-51tail, wings, and canopy, and since it is obvious that the fuselage was redesigned, the XP-86 was basically a complete remake of, and little commonality to, the FJ-1.
The Navy must have known of the P-86 effort going on and knew that its performance would make their aircraft designs obsolete. Bias towards Air Force, swept wings, jets led to ignoring what was there for them to see.



But enough to turn the tide in Korea.





You are right. As you mentioned later on, the Navy was highly concerned that the AF was sucking up all of the defense budget on their atomic bomber, a monstrosity of an aircraft, the B-36. This made them desperate to develop an A-bomb carrying plane that would save the Navy carrier force, and this was a mistake. It was the Korean War that saved the Navy carrier force, not the A-bomb carrying aircraft. The nation recognized the importance of a mobile fast response airfield that is independent of any land constraints. Ironically, this incorrect concern is part of the very reason the Navy was caught with their pants down when the war started. They did not have an aircraft that could control the airspace.





While this is a correct statement, the Navy did fly significant operations with heavily laden F9Fs and F2Hs in support of ground forces, so flying CAP missions with drop tanks instead of bombs would not be unreasonable, they just didn't have the planes to handle the Mig 15. Apparently operations were flying during the day and refueling from tankers at night. Don't know how close the carriers operated to the front lines but they did fly jet missions over N. Korea.



Not too much of an issue here, the F-86A had a stall speed of 121 mph, the F9F-3/4 was 131 mph, the F2H-2 was 121 mph, the F7U-3 was 139 mph, the FJ-2 132mph (the FJ-22 was almost 2k lbs heavier than the F-86A.) The F-86 stall speed was not out of the range of typical Navy jet fighters.




Yes, and learning to operate jets on the carriers were extremely important. When the war ended, however, the AF had a slew of pilots with experience in modern high speed air combat, learning techniques and tactics and enemy weaknesses, while the Navy had a slew of expert air-to-ground pilot and very few air-to-air exposure (some marines like John Glen flew with the AF, don't know if any Navy pilots did). What the Navy could have done was to buy some F-86s (if they were available), painted them blue call them FJ1A and give them to the marines to fly off land bases as they did with the F4Us in the South Pacific. This would have provided some cross training.






Efforts of the Navy to develop a strategic bomber didn't really catch on. The capable A3D could not compete with the already operational B-47 and the incredible B-52, but still fought on with the AF. Not a good plane to escape from, however (Wikipedia stated that some Navy said that A4D stood for "all four dead"). The beautiful and fast A-5 vigilante was really a non-starter. In June, 1958, with the launch of SSBN George Washington, the Navy got what it was looking for, a viable and critical strategic nuclear capability. By this time the critical necessity of the carrier task force was well established. Soon the tactical effectiveness of the Naval air arm was going to be on display in Vietnam.


.

As a fighting aircraft, the horrendous, pilot killing, Cutlass was in no way comparable to the F-86. If the Navy had fielded the Cutlass in Korea, it would have killed more Navy pilots than the enemy. I doubt you could find only a few positive comments about the Cutlass.

.


The Navy did an outstanding job of developing air-to-air missiles. The AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinder were outstanding whereas the AF Falcon missile not so much (but didn't go through upgrades as the Navy missiles to make them more dependable).





The F4D and F11F Tiger were good aircraft but pretty mediocre compare to the F-100/Mig 19. The F3H was a non-starter and was a disappointment. Not until the excellent F8U came out in 1957 did they have a superior fighter. And, in 1961 the F4H was introduce and the AF had no answer for it. And, in the early 60's the Navy was more ready to fight in Vietnam than the Air Force was.



Yes. The AF was just fortunate that the North American engineers could convert latest aerodynamics and engines into an outstanding fighter as they had done previously on the P-51.



.

I think low speed handling problems are relatively easily to correct by modifying control surface effectivity by maybe size, design, and response times. I think this could have been done much earlier had the Navy grasp the importance of the F-86 performance increase.

The end results though was that during the Korean War well trained Navy pilots were either waiting in the ready room or dropping bombs in help of the Army and Marines while the Air Force pilots were going head-to-head with the best the enemy had to offer and receiving all the glory. It must have been galling.

You are heavily invested in the idea that the USN should not have chosen the F7U in July 1946 but instead should have chosen the an F-86 deriviative. So I have two questions for you.

1. When the USN was seeking a new fighter in 1946 it received 6 proposals (edit - actually 12 designs from 6 companies incl one from NAA. See post below). Vought with the F7U won the contest. But one of the other competitors was North American. What was their submission? Was it based on the F-86 or was it a completely fresh design? If it was a fresh design then clearly the F-86 didn't meet the USN requirement. If it was an F-86 deriviative then clearly the USN believed that on paper the F7U was the better option. Either way the North American option was rejected.

2. Do you really believe that, on the basis of the information they had in July 1946, the USN deliberately chose a dog? Condemning the USN decision in 1946 on the basis of how the F7U turned out following its first flight in Sept 1948 is pure hindsight.

Turning to USN operations off Korea, over the 3 years of the war, the carriers deployed were Bataan (a CVL), 5 CVE and 5 RN/RAN light fleet carriers which spent the majority of their time on the West Coast as part of TF95 and 11 Essex class which spent the majority of their time as part of TF77 on the East Coast. 8 of the 10 tours by the CVL/CVE were with USMC Corsair squadrons aboard and the other 2 were ASW.

7 of the Essex class were in most respects straight out of WW2 and undertook 18 tours in total. The other 4 had undergone the SCB27/27A modernisation programme and undertook 5 tours. Only Essex undertook one in 1951/52 and another in 1952/53 with the others all being after Sept 1952. This is important as it reflects greatly on their capabilities.

SCB-27 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Most of the tours off Korea followed the same pattern, and was based on practices learned in WW2. So a carrier would arrive in Japan from the USA, stock up and sail to Korean waters. 3 or 4 days of strikes (c14 hours/day) would be followed by 1 day of replenishment (see below), then it was back on the line to repeat. After about 30 days of this it would be a 10 day / 2 week break in Japan. Then back to Korea. Rinse and repeat for usually 6 months at which point a carrier would rotate home. In those 30 days a carrier would sail approx 12,000 miles (so an average speed of 16 knots which fits with WW2 practice). carriers were rotated through the operating area so that usually 2 were on station at any one time.

As for replenishment, normal practice followed WW2. Withdraw from combat area at completion of day strikes. Sail overnight to the replenishment area off Ullung Do Island where the waters were more sheltered. The Replenishment group, which would usually consist of 2 oilers, 1 or 2 ammo ships and one supply ship, would be met at dawn. It would take c3hrs to take on an average 300k galls of oil and 150k galls of avgas, then c2 hrs to embark c250 tons of ammo (which would then take 8 hours to manually transfer to the magazines) then maybe once a month c3hrs on the supply ship. Then another overnight sailing back to the operating area. In the WW2 era I've never read of night time replenishment. RAS in daylight with ships 50-80 feet apart is risky enough let alone adding the complication of night.

On the subject of avgas, note the average uplift from the tanker was 150k galls. That represents just under 75% of the capacity of those WW2 carriers. I came across a comment in a report by the Bon Homme Richard covering May-July 1951 (her first time on station) in which, after a 4 day period on the line she uplifted what must have been nearly 100% of her avgas capacity. 212k gals in 4 days of operations. That is just how thirsty those air groups were.


That report has also caused me to rethink the difficulties of operating even the straight wing jets off the WW2 Essex class. This is an extract.

"3. Catapults
During catapulting of F9F's on the H4B catapult it has been determined that an F9F with full main fuel cell, full tip tanks, full ammo, and six (6) rockets should not be launched with less than thirty-three (33) knots of wind over the deck.

For every knot of wind under thirty-three (33) knots, two rockets are removed. Using this yardstick with a wind of thirty (30) knots, the jets do not carry rockets. If the wind falls below thirty (30) knots, jets are not launched until such wind is reached."

The 4 modernised units had significantly longer and more powerful H8 catapults fitted.

So while an Essex class was in theory capable of operatiing at up to 33 knots, fast carrier practice saw them actually operating at much lower speeds. In WW2 the range was 15-25 knots. As noted above the average speed in a month was about 16 knots, with 10-12 for replenishment days.

So I think that you are being a little dismissive of the difficulties of operating even these early straight wing jet aircraft from the carriers. Certainly just adding a few drop tanks instead of bombs is not an option on the Panther & Banshee.

I also have details of the sorties flown by both the USAF and USN/USMC in Korea.

Mission type	USN/USMC No.	USN/USMC % of total	USAF No.	USAF %		Distribution of effort USN/USMC	Distribution of effort USAF
Interdiction	126874	46%	192581	49%		40%	60%
Close Air Support	65748	24%	57665	15%		53%	47%
Counter Air Sorties	44607	16%	79928	20%		36%	64%
Recce	26757	10%	60971	16%		30%	70%
Anti sub patrol	11856	4%	0	0%		100%
Strategic bomber	0	0%	994	0.2%			100%
Total sorties	275842	100%	392139	100%		41%	59%

A number of things strike me about the stats. Firstly just how small a proportion "counter air sorties" form of the total. This emphasises Korea was mostly about supporting the infantry on the ground much more than chasing Migs around the skies. Recce to find the targets, aircraft to interdict the supply lines to the front and finally close air support, bombing the enemy troops down to a few hundred feet of UN forces. Secondly just how much of the burden of Close Air Support fell on the USN/USMC. This is explained by the fact that this was what the USN and more particularly the USMC had trained for in WW2. And finally just what a small part the B-29s played in the whole war.

So perhaps what we actually have is both services co-operating and playing to their strengths, rather than a competition between them as you seem to see it.

You criticise the USN for getting involved in dropping nuclear weapons. As the 1950s went on both services foccussed more and more on nuclear delivery. Virtually every aircraft was modified in some way to drop these weapons at both a strategic and a tactical level. Even your favourite F-86 had nuclear bombs hung off it IIRC. While the size of carriers in the late 1940s was being driven by the big nuclear bomber, it certainly became very useful as the 1950s went on when aircraft size grew dramatically. Dimensionally, if not tonnage wise, todays supercarriers are the same size.

As I pointed out the USN requirement in 1946 was not for a dogfighter. It was for an interceptor. And carrying out that mission is about a lot more than the aeroplane. It involves detection and direction as well. I came across one article that pointed out that the WW2 vintage radars that equipped the fleet were just not adequate to meet the threat posed by faster aircraft. Simply having a better fighter does not reduce the risk to the fleet as a whole.


Incidentally, I came across a comment that the RN also had a problem with the power of its WW2 catapults. When the Supermarine 510 landed on Illustrious in 1950 it had to use RATOG for its subsequent take off. While British hydraulic BH.5 cats fitted to the likes of Eagle and the Centaurs were an improvement over the WW2 era cats, and could cope with Attackers, Sea Hawks and Sea Venoms, the new steam cats were vital for Sea Vixens and Scimitars.

 

[EwenS]

Re point 1 at the top of my last post, I found this about the competition that led to adoption of the F7U. Note post #23. North American were the third ranked contractor for this behind Vought and Douglas,

OS-105 - 1946 US Navy Day Fighter (alternatives to the Vought F7U Cutlass)

I selected some layout of cutlass but some of front view or side view picture still lacking. I looking forward to you guys will post more. [Removed - better copies below - Admin]

www.secretprojects.co.uk

And this about a USN long range escort fighter proposal in 1946, which came to nothing.

US Navy Outline Specification OS-112

This specification called for a penetration/escort fighter. Here is a list of designs which I believe were submitted to OS-112, a specification that produced no actual aircraft. Perhaps Paul can confirm the following from Jared's book, which I do not have (I would appreciate details as to the...

www.secretprojects.co.uk

Post #48 in this thread sets out the evolution of the P-86 for anyone interested.

Straight-wing F-86 Prototype

A single photo of the straight wing XP-86 appears on page 6 of "WARBIRDTECH Series: North American F-86 SabreJet DAY FIGHTERS, Volume 3. The caption reads: The only known photo of the XP-86 straight wing design at mock-up, which was unveiled at Inglewood in June 1945. Only the left side of the...

www.secretprojects.co.uk

 

[EwenS]

I've now found the launch parameters for the H4B catapults on the Essex class pre-modernisation and the H8 on the SCB-27/27A modernisations.

H4B length 96ft. 18,000lb at 96mph
H8 length 150ft. 15,500lb at 105 knots (120mph) or 62,500lb at 61knots (70mph). Options trade weight for speed but 105 knots end speed is the max design capacity.

 

[davparlr]

You are heavily invested in the idea that the USN should not have chosen the F7U in July 1946 but instead should have chosen the an F-86 deriviative. So I have two questions for you.

1. When the USN was seeking a new fighter in 1946 it received 6 proposals (edit - actually 12 designs from 6 companies incl one from NAA. See post below). Vought with the F7U won the contest. But one of the other competitors was North American. What was their submission? Was it based on the F-86 or was it a completely fresh design? If it was a fresh design then clearly the F-86 didn't meet the USN requirement. If it was an F-86 deriviative then clearly the USN believed that on paper the F7U was the better option. Either way the North American option was rejected.

2. Do you really believe that, on the basis of the information they had in July 1946, the USN deliberately chose a dog? Condemning the USN decision in 1946 on the basis of how the F7U turned out following its first flight in Sept 1948 is pure hindsight.

Turning to USN operations off Korea, over the 3 years of the war, the carriers deployed were Bataan (a CVL), 5 CVE and 5 RN/RAN light fleet carriers which spent the majority of their time on the West Coast as part of TF95 and 11 Essex class which spent the majority of their time as part of TF77 on the East Coast. 8 of the 10 tours by the CVL/CVE were with USMC Corsair squadrons aboard and the other 2 were ASW.

7 of the Essex class were in most respects straight out of WW2 and undertook 18 tours in total. The other 4 had undergone the SCB27/27A modernisation programme and undertook 5 tours. Only Essex undertook one in 1951/52 and another in 1952/53 with the others all being after Sept 1952. This is important as it reflects greatly on their capabilities.

SCB-27 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Most of the tours off Korea followed the same pattern, and was based on practices learned in WW2. So a carrier would arrive in Japan from the USA, stock up and sail to Korean waters. 3 or 4 days of strikes (c14 hours/day) would be followed by 1 day of replenishment (see below), then it was back on the line to repeat. After about 30 days of this it would be a 10 day / 2 week break in Japan. Then back to Korea. Rinse and repeat for usually 6 months at which point a carrier would rotate home. In those 30 days a carrier would sail approx 12,000 miles (so an average speed of 16 knots which fits with WW2 practice). carriers were rotated through the operating area so that usually 2 were on station at any one time.

As for replenishment, normal practice followed WW2. Withdraw from combat area at completion of day strikes. Sail overnight to the replenishment area off Ullung Do Island where the waters were more sheltered. The Replenishment group, which would usually consist of 2 oilers, 1 or 2 ammo ships and one supply ship, would be met at dawn. It would take c3hrs to take on an average 300k galls of oil and 150k galls of avgas, then c2 hrs to embark c250 tons of ammo (which would then take 8 hours to manually transfer to the magazines) then maybe once a month c3hrs on the supply ship. Then another overnight sailing back to the operating area. In the WW2 era I've never read of night time replenishment. RAS in daylight with ships 50-80 feet apart is risky enough let alone adding the complication of night.

On the subject of avgas, note the average uplift from the tanker was 150k galls. That represents just under 75% of the capacity of those WW2 carriers. I came across a comment in a report by the Bon Homme Richard covering May-July 1951 (her first time on station) in which, after a 4 day period on the line she uplifted what must have been nearly 100% of her avgas capacity. 212k gals in 4 days of operations. That is just how thirsty those air groups were.


That report has also caused me to rethink the difficulties of operating even the straight wing jets off the WW2 Essex class. This is an extract.

"3. Catapults
During catapulting of F9F's on the H4B catapult it has been determined that an F9F with full main fuel cell, full tip tanks, full ammo, and six (6) rockets should not be launched with less than thirty-three (33) knots of wind over the deck.

For every knot of wind under thirty-three (33) knots, two rockets are removed. Using this yardstick with a wind of thirty (30) knots, the jets do not carry rockets. If the wind falls below thirty (30) knots, jets are not launched until such wind is reached."

The 4 modernised units had significantly longer and more powerful H8 catapults fitted.

So while an Essex class was in theory capable of operatiing at up to 33 knots, fast carrier practice saw them actually operating at much lower speeds. In WW2 the range was 15-25 knots. As noted above the average speed in a month was about 16 knots, with 10-12 for replenishment days.

So I think that you are being a little dismissive of the difficulties of operating even these early straight wing jet aircraft from the carriers. Certainly just adding a few drop tanks instead of bombs is not an option on the Panther & Banshee.

I also have details of the sorties flown by both the USAF and USN/USMC in Korea.

Mission type	USN/USMC No.	USN/USMC % of total	USAF No.	USAF %		Distribution of effort USN/USMC	Distribution of effort USAF
Interdiction	126874	46%	192581	49%		40%	60%
Close Air Support	65748	24%	57665	15%		53%	47%
Counter Air Sorties	44607	16%	79928	20%		36%	64%
Recce	26757	10%	60971	16%		30%	70%
Anti sub patrol	11856	4%	0	0%		100%
Strategic bomber	0	0%	994	0.2%			100%
Total sorties	275842	100%	392139	100%		41%	59%

A number of things strike me about the stats. Firstly just how small a proportion "counter air sorties" form of the total. This emphasises Korea was mostly about supporting the infantry on the ground much more than chasing Migs around the skies. Recce to find the targets, aircraft to interdict the supply lines to the front and finally close air support, bombing the enemy troops down to a few hundred feet of UN forces. Secondly just how much of the burden of Close Air Support fell on the USN/USMC. This is explained by the fact that this was what the USN and more particularly the USMC had trained for in WW2. And finally just what a small part the B-29s played in the whole war.

So perhaps what we actually have is both services co-operating and playing to their strengths, rather than a competition between them as you seem to see it.

You criticise the USN for getting involved in dropping nuclear weapons. As the 1950s went on both services foccussed more and more on nuclear delivery. Virtually every aircraft was modified in some way to drop these weapons at both a strategic and a tactical level. Even your favourite F-86 had nuclear bombs hung off it IIRC. While the size of carriers in the late 1940s was being driven by the big nuclear bomber, it certainly became very useful as the 1950s went on when aircraft size grew dramatically. Dimensionally, if not tonnage wise, todays supercarriers are the same size.

As I pointed out the USN requirement in 1946 was not for a dogfighter. It was for an interceptor. And carrying out that mission is about a lot more than the aeroplane. It involves detection and direction as well. I came across one article that pointed out that the WW2 vintage radars that equipped the fleet were just not adequate to meet the threat posed by faster aircraft. Simply having a better fighter does not reduce the risk to the fleet as a whole.


Incidentally, I came across a comment that the RN also had a problem with the power of its WW2 catapults. When the Supermarine 510 landed on Illustrious in 1950 it had to use RATOG for its subsequent take off. While British hydraulic BH.5 cats fitted to the likes of Eagle and the Centaurs were an improvement over the WW2 era cats, and could cope with Attackers, Sea Hawks and Sea Venoms, the new steam cats were vital for Sea Vixens and Scimitars.

You are heavily invested in the idea that the USN should not have chosen the F7U in July 1946 but instead should have chosen the an F-86 deriviative. So I have two questions for you.

I may have misled you regarding the F7U. It was indeed a terrible aircraft with few fans and a long and bloody development history. But, looking at it in 1946, from a paper stand point, It had very impressive performance potential, exceeding that of the F-86, with significant advantages over the Mig 15. With such potential it was certainly worth pursuing, and had it been operationally available, could definitively dominate the skies over Korea. And with a German Messerschmitt designer contributing to the design, and everybody knew that all those late WW2 German designs of planes and engines were going to be successful, what could go wrong? Well, the F7U. A perfect example that it's a long way from a paper design, or even a flying example, like a HO 229, to a usable aircraft, the F7U which first flew in September, '48, wasn't available to fleet squadrons until April '54, and still killing pilots.

. When the USN was seeking a new fighter in 1946 it received 6 proposals (edit - actually 12 designs from 6 companies incl one from NAA. See post below). Vought with the F7U won the contest. But one of the other competitors was North American. What was their submission? Was it based on the F-86 or was it a completely fresh design? If it was a fresh design then clearly the F-86 didn't meet the USN requirement. If it was an F-86 deriviative then clearly the USN believed that on paper the F7U was the better option. Either way the North American option was rejected.

Apparently North American decided to take an easy road for the Naval completion. From WW2 they already had a very clean aircraft design that was highly successful, the P-51. They must have thought that they could quickly adapt the P-51 with a jet engine to meet the requirements. So the XFJ-1 basically was a P-51, same wings, tail, very similar canopy, with a bloated fuselage designed for a jet engine insertion, which is strange since the contemporary XF-84, with the same engine, was very slender. Navy strength requirements may have impacted the design. Anyway, when the AF came in May, of '45, they figured to tag on with the Navy and the jetified (yeah, I know it is not a word) P-51. In November of '45, when the performance numbers fell short, the AF accepted North American's proposal to use swept wings to meet the AF performance requirements. It came into my mind that it was highly likely they proposed to the Navy the same upgrade as the AF got, claiming they could get 60+ mph increase with the same engine. If they did, and the Navy turned them down, it would have been a major miscalculation. Had they accepted that, they realistically could have easily fielded an FJ-2 and possibly FJ-3 in time for Korea. They would have become major players. I suspect the AF was more acceptable to higher landing speeds since they had been increasing during the war. The landing speed of the pre war P-36 was 75 mph, the B-26C, 135 mph. For the Navy, the F4F-3 had a landing speed of 76 mph, the F8F was 92. At that time they did not know the landing speed of the swept wing P-86 was similar to other Navy proposals.

2. Do you really believe that, on the basis of the information they had in July 1946, the USN deliberately chose a dog? Condemning the USN decision in 1946 on the basis of how the F7U turned out following its first flight in Sept 1948 is pure hindsight.

No. Though a high risk design, it had the potential of jumping the field for 2nd​ generation fighters. However, the unknown "unknowns" came to bite them hard. My complaint is that the Navy had to know after October of '47, when the XF-86 had been flying, that their fighter aircraft developments, due mainly to the unsuccessful F7U, were out classed by a much faster with equally slow landing speed AF fighter. They could have pursued the FJ-2/3 and could have got the FJ-2 in the fight with the Marines ashore. They did not. Not until the Mig 15 showed up did they realized they had to make up ground fast.

Turning to USN operations off Korea, over the 3 years of the war, the carriers deployed were Bataan (a CVL), 5 CVE and 5 RN/RAN light fleet carriers which spent the majority of their time on the West Coast as part of TF95 and 11 Essex class which spent the majority of their time as part of TF77 on the East Coast. 8 of the 10 tours by the CVL/CVE were with USMC Corsair squadrons aboard and the other 2 were ASW.

7 of the Essex class were in most respects straight out of WW2 and undertook 18 tours in total. The other 4 had undergone the SCB27/27A modernisation programme and undertook 5 tours. Only Essex undertook one in 1951/52 and another in 1952/53 with the others all being after Sept 1952. This is important as it reflects greatly on their capabilities.

I'm not sure of what the point is here.


I know diddly squat about the operations of aircraft carriers. I do know that FJ-2/3s fall quite well into the mix of similar Navy jet fighters in weight and stall speeds of the Korean War era. And since aircraft carriers only care about deck space, take-off weight and speed, and landing weight and speed, and since the FJ-2/3 is comparable to other Korean War Navy jets, especially the F2H, and certainly the F7U, which was their hope. And, since these other planes were used quite regularly, except the F7U, I don't see any change in operations.

So I think that you are being a little dismissive of the difficulties of operating even these early straight wing jet aircraft from the carriers.

I don't know if handling faster but similar, weight, size, approach speed, etc., swept wing aircraft would be any different than the straight wing jets that were already operational in a war time environment. Most of the issues of handling jet fighter from the current carriers were basically addressed prior to the Korean War.

Certainly just adding a few drop tanks instead of bombs is not an option on the Panther & Banshee.

One sited said that on F9F-2B could carry either a 1000 lb bomb or a 150 gallon tank on its inboard pylon. Grumman F9F Panther Jet

A number of things strike me about the stats. Firstly just how small a proportion "counter air sorties" form of the total. This emphasises Korea was mostly about supporting the infantry on the ground much more than chasing Migs around the skies. Recce to find the targets, aircraft to interdict the supply lines to the front and finally close air support, bombing the enemy troops down to a few hundred feet of UN forces.

This should not be surprising. If you took this data from Vietnam, I am sure you would see the close air support and counter air have the same ratio. However I think you would also find the counter air ratio between Navy/Marine and AF much closer since the Navy and Marines had competitive aircraft, F-4s, F-8s, where as they did not have competitive aircraft in Korea.

And finally just what a small part the B-29s played in the whole war.

The B-29s were not designed for close air support, and, due to unhappy experience in Europe, maybe banned from it. North Korea had, and still does have, very few high density/value targets the B-29 was designed to attack. The B-29s quickly wiped those out. Forced into night bombing by Mig 15s, aiming was problematic. However, the ability to drop an atomic bomb was invaluable .

So perhaps what we actually have is both services co-operating and playing to their strengths, rather than a competition between them as you seem to see it.

While they were indeed cooperating, don't underestimate the rivalry between the AF and Navy. Having grown up in Pensacola, about a mile from NAS, and ending up in the AF, I am quite aware of this rivalry. Throw in the fact that the AF was getting all the funds it wanted, and having the super-carrier, USS United States, being cancelled, there was no love lost between the services..

You criticise the USN for getting involved in dropping nuclear weapons. As the 1950s went on both services foccussed more and more on nuclear delivery.

And that led to missed opportunities by the AF.

Ultimately there were 3 British developments that made the operation of swept wing aircraft from carriers much easier. Those were, in order of development, the steam catapult, the angled deck and finally the optical landing sight. I have timelines for their development I can post for anyone interested.

This significantly improved combat effectiveness and safety. The Brits were seemed to be looking ahead more so than the Americans.

The years 1945 to 1955 were a period of huge technological change in aviation but particularly for naval aviation. One of the problems was foreseeing how long developments of that technology would take. The question then arose, do you spend your limited funds on what is available today or do you plough it into the technology of the future.

Yet the Navy was willing to take a major risk with the advance technology F7U, but passed on a much smaller risk of jumping on the AF funded F-86.

 

[SaparotRob]

This is a great thread! Thanks davparir and EwenS.

 

[Graeme]

Early US Navy swept-wing research with the Bell L-39...

Bell L-39 Wing Sweep Evaluation

Early in 1946, BuAer had solicited proposals for a high-speed (jet) day fighter defined by Outline Specification 105. Cdr A.B. Metsger was t...

thanlont.blogspot.com

That concluded the Navy's participation in the program. According to Cdr Metsger: "Our flights, including simulated carrier approaches and landings, assured us that sweeping the wings would not adversely affect carrier operations. We had the data in time for our (day fighter) competition evaluation."

 

[EwenS]

I may have misled you regarding the F7U. It was indeed a terrible aircraft with few fans and a long and bloody development history. But, looking at it in 1946, from a paper stand point, It had very impressive performance potential, exceeding that of the F-86, with significant advantages over the Mig 15. With such potential it was certainly worth pursuing, and had it been operationally available, could definitively dominate the skies over Korea. And with a German Messerschmitt designer contributing to the design, and everybody knew that all those late WW2 German designs of planes and engines were going to be successful, what could go wrong? Well, the F7U. A perfect example that it's a long way from a paper design, or even a flying example, like a HO 229, to a usable aircraft, the F7U which first flew in September, '48, wasn't available to fleet squadrons until April '54, and still killing pilots.

Apparently North American decided to take an easy road for the Naval completion. From WW2 they already had a very clean aircraft design that was highly successful, the P-51. They must have thought that they could quickly adapt the P-51 with a jet engine to meet the requirements. So the XFJ-1 basically was a P-51, same wings, tail, very similar canopy, with a bloated fuselage designed for a jet engine insertion, which is strange since the contemporary XF-84, with the same engine, was very slender. Navy strength requirements may have impacted the design. Anyway, when the AF came in May, of '45, they figured to tag on with the Navy and the jetified (yeah, I know it is not a word) P-51. In November of '45, when the performance numbers fell short, the AF accepted North American's proposal to use swept wings to meet the AF performance requirements. It came into my mind that it was highly likely they proposed to the Navy the same upgrade as the AF got, claiming they could get 60+ mph increase with the same engine. If they did, and the Navy turned them down, it would have been a major miscalculation. Had they accepted that, they realistically could have easily fielded an FJ-2 and possibly FJ-3 in time for Korea. They would have become major players. I suspect the AF was more acceptable to higher landing speeds since they had been increasing during the war. The landing speed of the pre war P-36 was 75 mph, the B-26C, 135 mph. For the Navy, the F4F-3 had a landing speed of 76 mph, the F8F was 92. At that time they did not know the landing speed of the swept wing P-86 was similar to other Navy proposals.



No. Though a high risk design, it had the potential of jumping the field for 2nd​ generation fighters. However, the unknown "unknowns" came to bite them hard. My complaint is that the Navy had to know after October of '47, when the XF-86 had been flying, that their fighter aircraft developments, due mainly to the unsuccessful F7U, were out classed by a much faster with equally slow landing speed AF fighter. They could have pursued the FJ-2/3 and could have got the FJ-2 in the fight with the Marines ashore. They did not. Not until the Mig 15 showed up did they realized they had to make up ground fast.

How could the USN know in Oct 1947 that an F-86 deriviative would be a better bet than the F7U? It had nothing to compare it to until the F7U flew for the first time on 29 Sept 1948. Even then it would take some time for the real story to become apparent. But we still have no idea exactly what NAA offered the USN in 1946 as it seems to have been lost to the mists of time.

You also assume that a navalised F-86 in 1948/49 would have the same performance as the USAAF F-86 that saw service in Korea from late 1950. That will undoubtedly be untrue. Navalising a land based aircraft always comes with some cost.

F-86A-5 - Engine J47-GE-13 5,200lb st. Weight empty 10,093lb. Weight take off:- 14,108lb. Speed 679 at SL, 601mph at 35,000ft.
F-86E-5 - Engine as above. Weight empty 10,555lb. Weight take off:- 16,346lb with drop tanks. Weight combat:- 13,791lb. Speed 679 at SL, 601mph at 35,000ft.

More powerful engines were retrofitted later.

And for the FJ-2 - Engine J47-GE-2 6,000lb st. Weight empty 11,802lb. Weight gross:- 18,790lb. Speed 676mph at SL, 601mph at 35,000ft.

Additional airframe weight over the F-86E (which was used as the basis for the FJ-2 and was already heavier than the F-86A) of 1,247lb (12% over the E on which it was based) went into fitting folding wings, beefier airframe to withstand the forces of catapulting and arresting, fitting arrester hook, changes to undercarriage (wider track) change from 6x0.5" to 4x20mm. To maintain the performance of the F-86A/E it required an extra 800lb st (15%). The more powerful engine was decided on after the two prototypes had flown and before production machines started to come off the line i.e. sometime between 27/12/51 and autumn 1952. The question then is when did the more powerful engine become available.

The USAF didn't get an F-86 with equivalent power until the F-86F-1 took to the air in March 1952. It had the J47-GE-27 of 5,950lb st fitted.

So the extra thrust does not seem to have been available until early 1952. To me that means that a navalised F-86 produced in 1948/49 would have been heavier but would have had to make do with the 5,200lb st of the early versions and therefore would have suffered some performance degradation when compared to the early F-86.

I'm not sure of what the point is here.


I know diddly squat about the operations of aircraft carriers. I do know that FJ-2/3s fall quite well into the mix of similar Navy jet fighters in weight and stall speeds of the Korean War era. And since aircraft carriers only care about deck space, take-off weight and speed, and landing weight and speed, and since the FJ-2/3 is comparable to other Korean War Navy jets, especially the F2H, and certainly the F7U, which was their hope. And, since these other planes were used quite regularly, except the F7U, I don't see any change in operations.

That was apparent from your comment about carrier refuelling taking place overnight. Operating aircraft from a carrier is just not the same as operating from a land base with 6,000-10,000 feet of runway and acres of run off area when something goes wrong. Flying from, and working on, a carrier flight deck is one of the most dangerous activities going. Just ask the pilot and deck crew of the USS Carl Vinson injured in the F-35C loss in Jan 2022. The question is do you want to learn about operations from carrier decks or not?

There is an almost symbiotic relationship between a carrier and its aircraft. Changes to one affect the other. Never was that more apparent than immediately after WW2 and the advent of jets. Look at how HMS Victorious designed in 1936 around the operation of 36 Fairey Swordfish biplane torpedo spotter reconnaiasance aircraft and Blackburn Skua monoplane fighter/dive bombers evolved over time and a major reconstruction to survive until 1967 when she was operating near supersonic Sea Vixen fighters, Blackburn Buccaneer strike aircraft plus Gannet AEW3 and helicopters (31 in total). Same with the USN Essex class. They began as a 1939-41 design around the then latest types (F4U Corsair, TBF Avenger and SB2C Helldiver) and finished up in the mid-1970s as small Attack carriers (F/RF-8 Crusader, A-1 Skyraiders, A-4 Skyhawk, A-3B Skywarrior and E-1 Tracer). Or Midway which began life in 1946 with F4U-4 Corsairs and SB2C-5 Helldivers but ended up in 1992 operating F/A-18 Hornets, A-6E/ KA-6D Intruders, EA-6B Prowlers, E-3C Hawkeyes & SH-3H helicopters. See the growth in Midway's flight deck in that period and the changes in layout.

And that is only the visible changes over the period. New larger lifts, more powerful catapults, strengthened flight decks and add in radar development, guided missiles and nuclear weapons for good measure. While aircraft in the 1930-50 time period had a relatively short service life, carriers had to adapt as they were too big an investment to be ditched every few years.

I don't know if handling faster but similar, weight, size, approach speed, etc., swept wing aircraft would be any different than the straight wing jets that were already operational in a war time environment. Most of the issues of handling jet fighter from the current carriers were basically addressed prior to the Korean War.



One sited said that on F9F-2B could carry either a 1000 lb bomb or a 150 gallon tank on its inboard pylon. Grumman F9F Panther Jet

As I noted my figures came from an actual post operation report from the carrier concerned in May-July 1951. As I noted the SCB-27/27A carriers that operated in Korea with the more powerful catapults would probably have been able to launch a Panther much more easily. But their tours in Korea were in a minority.

https://mikesresearch.com/2020/06/28/grumman-f9f-panther-jet/

This should not be surprising. If you took this data from Vietnam, I am sure you would see the close air support and counter air have the same ratio. However I think you would also find the counter air ratio between Navy/Marine and AF much closer since the Navy and Marines had competitive aircraft, F-4s, F-8s, where as they did not have competitive aircraft in Korea.



The B-29s were not designed for close air support, and, due to unhappy experience in Europe, maybe banned from it. North Korea had, and still does have, very few high density/value targets the B-29 was designed to attack. The B-29s quickly wiped those out. Forced into night bombing by Mig 15s, aiming was problematic. However, the ability to drop an atomic bomb was invaluable .



While they were indeed cooperating, don't underestimate the rivalry between the AF and Navy. Having grown up in Pensacola, about a mile from NAS, and ending up in the AF, I am quite aware of this rivalry. Throw in the fact that the AF was getting all the funds it wanted, and having the super-carrier, USS United States, being cancelled, there was no love lost between the services..

I am well aware of the rivalries between the USN and the USAAF. That doesn't mean that such things don't get put aside in times of crisis to be picked up again afterwards. And also what happens in the field is often very different from the politics that go on in Washington or Whitehall.

And that led to missed opportunities by the AF.








This significantly improved combat effectiveness and safety. The Brits were seemed to be looking ahead more so than the Americans.

The USN and the RN were both facing the same problems in the immediate post WW2 with regard to the development of carriers and their aircraft. And for both money was tight. The spirit of co-operation that had built up in WW2 where both sides learned from each other in carrier design and operations, was continued into the post war years with an exchange of ideas and personnel. The problems for Britain were perhaps more pressing as the British WW2 era carriers were smaller and less suited to operating jets. While we had successes in terms of the steam catapult, angled deck and optical landing sight, not everything worked out that well, like the rubber deck.

The issue of catapults is a good example. With the prospect of heavier aircraft to launch America was working on a cordite powered catapult. At the same time Britain, which had developed such kit in WW2, developed the steam catapult. The prototype was trialled from 1950 in HMS Perseus, which visited the USA between Jan and Mar 1952 to demonstrate it to the USN. It represented such an improvement over what the USN was planning that it was immediately adopted. The first operational steam catapults, which were built in Britain, went into the SCB-27C conversion of USS Hancock from Jan 1954.

In the same time period Britain invented the angled deck, but with the idea shared, the USN took it and turned it into the first hardware in the Sept-Dec refit of the USS Antietam. Antietam then visited Britain in May 1953 to demonstrate it to the RN. The first 3 British carriers so fitted completed in April-Oct 1954, a few months before the next US carrier completed with it (USS Shangri La in Jan 1955).

In 1955 the three successful British inventions come together for the first time with the completion of HMS Ark Royal (IV) in Feb, USS Forrestal on 1 Oct and HMAS Melbourne on 28 Oct.

Yet the Navy was willing to take a major risk with the advance technology F7U, but passed on a much smaller risk of jumping on the AF funded F-86.

Well they had a plan. While adopting your approach might have reduced the risk, it seems to me that it would not necessarily have provided what the USN sought in the first place. In an era of extremely fast technological change it is always a problem to decide where to aim and to determine in advance just how long it would take to get there. Ask most people in 1939 about the A bomb and it would have been seen as pure science fiction. But just 6 years later it was used in action for the first and, hopefully, last time.

 

[SaparotRob]

Great stuff!!

 

[EwenS]

Finally found some more information on the USN 1946 fighter competition. They issued Outline Specification OS105 for a single seat multi engined aircraft on 28 Dec 1945.

NAA offered a design, RD-1386A (brochure dated 1 April 1946), with forward swept wings and a conventionally swept rooster tail. It was to be fitted with two 24C-4A afterburning engines fed by cheek intakes. Estimated speed at sea level 672mph with afterburning and 617mph at 20,000ft with military power. Rate of climb at sea level with afterburning was 8,780ft/sec. Combat radius 300 miles.

They offered an alternative design RD-1386B with three 24C engines, two forward and one aft. The forward pair would exhaust at the wing trailling adge. The aft engine would use a flush intake on the fuselage belly and exhaust under the tail. It had conventional swept wings and tail.

This is taken from Norman Friedman's "Fighters over the Fleet. Naval Air Defence from Biplanes to the Cold War". Unlike some of the other competitors, there are no drawings.

The 24C-4A engine was the Westinghouse J-34 which was developing around 3,000lb st at that time which would be boosted by the use of the afterburner. The designs from all the companies seem to have used the same basic engine.

When ordered the Vought V-346A design, powered by two afterburning J34-WE-32 generating 3,370lb st and 4,900lb st with afterburner, promised 542 knots (624mph) at 35,000ft, 464 nautical mile combat radius (with extra fuel) and an initial climb rate of 16,500ft/min. But it was heavier at 23,638lb and more expensive ($1.081m each)

So a development of the P/F-86 doesn't even begin to meet the criteria laid down by the USN for its new fighter. It was single engined, slower and more importantly from the USN perspective, much slower to climb. Note in particular that the climb rate being offered was more than double that of the P/F-86. Even in final F7U-3 form it achieved an initial climb rate of 13,000ft/min. And, looking at the weight that they accepted, they were definitely looking forward to carriers equipped at least with the H-8 catapult, as the H-4B on the unmodernised Essex class couldn't have coped with that proposed weight. So the first carrier to undergo that modernisation was the Oriskany which had lain incomplete since the end of WW2. She was reordered to the new design in Aug 1947 and not completed until 25 Sept 1950. So that gives some feel for the timescale that the USN were working to. There was no rush to get a swept wing aircraft into service and therefore no need to accept an interim solution. As I said before, no one expected the Korean War.

F-86A-5:- Engine: One General Electric J47-GE-13 turbojet with a maximum sea level static thrust of 5200 pounds. Weights: 10,093 pounds empty, 14,108 pounds takeoff, 13,791 pounds combat. Performance: Maximum speed 679 mph at sea level, 601 mph at 35,000 feet. Initial climb rate was 7470 feet per minute at sea level.

 

[Shortround6]

A lot of this Era was dominated by engine development.
Who was promising what and when.
Who was actually delivering on the promises, or at least was coming close.

US jet engine development had been fragmented during the war years and the army had controlled contracts to certain companies and the navy had controlled controlled contracts to others.
Westinghouse was a "navy" company although there was some cross over.
Picking winners out of this bunch must have been very hard.
The Allison J-35 stagnated for several years at one power rating until several jumps in power were made fairly quickly at the same time reliability and overhaul life was rapidly increasing. This was an example of how hard it was to pick winners.

Westinghouse went through 4 engines from the end of WW II to the mid 50s and largest and last finished off Westinghouse as an aircraft engine maker.
Westinghouse might not have been too bad in 1944-47 but they weren't building anything that really stood out and the later engines were running late and not performing as promised..

The centrifugal engines were giving the best performance during the 40s but most people thought they were interim engine's about to be blown away by the axial compresser engine's. It just took a few years longer than most people expected.

The J-47 first ran in June 1947 and first flew in May 1948 making it something of a late comer.