Questions about B-29 operational range, VVS, VVS intercept capability if Operation Unthinkable happen.

[bf109xxl]

I have mentioned elsewhere in this thread of a B-29 tail gunner in Korea who told me the computer controlled guns could not track fast enough for MiGs.

I mentioned it in my posting after editing.

 

[GrauGeist]

Ok, I have to agree. It may be useful.

Which exactly? Airfields beyond the range of Soviet tactical aviation would be needed.

The same range - 2000-2500 km.

The Rhine may have to be crossed first.

As I mentioned earlier and in the spirit of the thread, the Soviets need to be engaged in Russian occupied Europe first.

The Allies would most certainly put the medium bombers into the fray along the front, using the heavies such as the Lancaster, B-24 amd B-17 to strike rear areas and the B-29 would come into play striking deep into Soviet territory.

During the war against the Germans, the Allies did not just strike factories, they struck command and control centers, railyards, key infrastructure centers, depots and essential military targets such as barracks, tank parks and airfields.

There is no reason why this would not be the case in this scenario.

As far the Baltic is concerned, yes, there would be quite a few "airfields" available, since the US Navy had one of the largest carrier fleets in history at the time. Carriers stationed in the Baltic and Aegean would provide considerable force projection into Eastern Europe and the F8F (1,105 mile/1,778 km range) and F7F (1,200 mile/1,900 km range) would be the prime movers in fighter protection.

 

[Alan Stevens]

The B-29 Bockscar flew around Kokura for almost an hour, looking for a break in the overcast, as the RoE did not allow for Radar Bombing. There was enough fuel for one attempted run on Nagasaki, that was still partially obscured, but Major Sweeney made the call to drop, even though the designated aimpoint was overcast, and dropped several miles away and the blast was channeled by the Urakami valley, that reduced the bombs effect on half of the city.
On the approach to landing at Okinawa(the extra loitering and a stuck valve on a fuel tank ruled out a return to Tinian) #2 Engine ran out fuel on landing, with the rest about to do so.

Curtis LeMay was quoted as saying that most of the central business district was spared from destruction, and that was a good thing since the two atomic attacks were sufficient to end the war.

 

[bf109xxl]

There is no reason why this would not be the case in this scenario.

I assumed that the number of B-29s was very limited and they would be used only for strikes against the most distant and critical targets in the USSR.
For the rest there was an armada of B-17s/B-24s/Lancs/etc.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Don't forget the P-47N. Range for days, fast and agile at high altitude, and harder than woodpecker lips when it comes to damage.

Then your Soviet fighters get to the B-29's analog-computer FC system which managed a positive kill-ratio against jets.

Claim to kill ratio. Not actual kills. Bomber gunners typically over claim by a factor of about 10 to 1. Any evidence I have seen shows the B-29 was not much better in that regard. If you look at the claims by B-29 gunners you will seem some clearly exaggerated claims.

60 claims to 9 lost. When you compare to the number of Japanese aircraft available they shot down virtually the entire Japanese intercepting force. Note that 74 B-29s shot down or damaged 116 aircraft i.e. over 1.5 EACH.

39 to 4.

80 to 3. An unbelievable (literally) 27 to 1 ratio.

36 to 2.

34 to 3. 41 aircraft shot down or damaged 1.3 aircraft each!

86 to 12.

If you look at the number of fighters the Japanese actually have available these claims cannot be real.

 

[ThomasP]

FWIW

The primary delay in getting the P-82 into service was the decision to adopt the V-1710 engined variant. The P-82B (with Merlin engines) had very little trouble during its development and flight testing, and was ready for production when the decision to switch engines occurred. The decision to switch to the V-1710 engine delayed entry into service by at least 1 1/2 years due to continuing engine troubles - said troubles being a large part of why the airframes were put into storage.

Keep in mind that even if the P-82B had gone into service as quickly as reasonably possible, as mentioned upthread its radius of action for high altitude escort would only be about 1000 miles, while the P-47N and P-51D/H were limited to a max radius of action of ~900 miles.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

No major jet stream action at least in the eastern USSR where all the big cities and industries are.

So they could also go in high 30,000+ feet and use that for their defensive protection.

Losses actually were reduced at lower altitudes

As I have posted in the past losses due to engine issues when down considerably when the bombing altitude was decreased. Alos the effectiveness of the bombing inceaesd.

The problems encountered at high altitude were not solely due to the jet stream. Visibility was a major factor. From the attached paper which I posted previously:

"In examining the reasons for the lack of success it is apparent that Japan's best defense against our tactics has been the weather. Even in the so-called good weather months of December, January, and February only a fraction of the attacks could be carried out by visual bombing Methods. In December only 189 out of 415 sorties, or 45%, permitted visual bombing, in January 180 out of 473, or 38%, and in February 137 out of 734, only a mere 19% of the sorties flown. Based on the fragmentary weather information available to this command there there were approximately five days in each of the months of December, January, and February which would have permitted high altitude visual operations over the Tokyo-Nagoya area. During these months, before night takeoff was feasible, target time over Japan was limited to the period between 1400 and 1600."
hours."

 

[bf109xxl]

Losses actually were reduced at lower altitudes

The table demonstrates something quite contrary - 1.7 vs. 1.5% loss and 52.4 vs. 22.1% damaged in daylight attacks, % damaged by AAA increased drastically. In night raids, altitude was of much less importance generally - they should be considered separately.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The table demonstrates something quite contrary - 1.7 vs. 1.5% loss and 52.4 vs. 22.1% damaged in daylight attacks, % damaged by AAA increased drastically. In night raids, altitude was of much less importance generally - they should be considered separately.

No it doesn't. Overall losses decreased from 5.2% at 30,000 to 3.4% at 26,000 to 27,000 to 1.7% below 20,00 for daylight attacks. The table does in fact separate day from night.
26,000 to 27,000 was where the 8th Af ended up at for the same reason to reduce flak losses and damage.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Claim to kill ratio. Not actual kills. Bomber gunners typically over claim by a factor of about 10 to 1. Any evidence I have seen shows the B-29 was not much better in that regard. If you look at the claims by B-29 gunners you will seem some clearly exaggerated claims.

View attachment 803112

View attachment 803106
60 claims to 9 lost. When you compare to the number of Japanese aircraft available they shot down virtually the entire Japanese intercepting force. Note that 74 B-29s shot down or damaged 116 aircraft i.e. over 1.5 EACH.

View attachment 803107
39 to 4.
View attachment 803113
80 to 3. An unbelievable (literally) 27 to 1 ratio.

View attachment 803109
36 to 2.
View attachment 803114
34 to 3. 41 aircraft shot down or damaged 1.3 aircraft each!
View attachment 803115
86 to 12.

If you look at the number of fighters the Japanese actually have available these claims cannot be real.

I should also add that Craven and Cates state that the total number of fighters assigned to defend Japan was 375 only increased after March 1945. Shooting down 60 to 80 in a single mission out of a total of 375 would be a fantastic accomplishment.

 

[bf109xxl]

No it doesn't. Overall losses decreased from 5.2% at 30,000 to 3.4% at 26,000 to 27,000 to 1.7% below 20,00 for daylight attacks.

We have to consider only losses due to enemy action - losses due to technical failures, etc. depends non-linearly on the number of planes taken into account, and this value was totally different.

The table does in fact separate day from night.

I just mentioned that we should mix values for daylight and night attacks for correct statistical interpretation. In night rides the altitude had no significant impact on losses.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The level of B-29 shooters' overclaim of MiGs is too high to judge the actual ratio from their claims. No positives to be seen there. According to Tepsurkaev/Krylov, the Soviets confirm the loss of 2 or 3 of their MiGs from B-29 guns, of which only one can be accurately credited to the B-29, for the rest there is no solid evidence (it could be also credited to the escort), as well as one Chinese one - it was simply reported by Soviet pilots, Chinese losses are unknown to me. Most of the MiGs claimed shot down by B-29 gunners landed on their airfields with a few holes - the damages were rather minimal, there was one emergency landing outside the airfield, the plane was recovered. If necessary we can compare the lists of claims and losses with dates and names, but I think this topic has been discussed here at least thousand times in detail.
Soviet pilots noted that the B-29's machine guns were unable to turn their barrels fast enough for sustained aimed fire - the angular velocity of the fighter's movement exceeded the capabilities of the automatics - as special ed already mentioned above.

Damn, I'd really hoped you were serious about the last word.

USAF documents undercut your point here, as shown in this video:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uq_epYQLKPY

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Ok, I have to agree. It may be useful.

Which exactly? Airfields beyond the range of Soviet tactical aviation would be needed.

The same range - 2000-2500 km.

The Rhine may have to be crossed first.

The Western Allies did that in Mar of 1945.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

As I mentioned earlier and in the spirit of the thread, the Soviets need to be engaged in Russian occupied Europe first.

The Allies would most certainly put the medium bombers into the fray along the front, using the heavies such as the Lancaster, B-24 amd B-17 to strike rear areas and the B-29 would come into play striking deep into Soviet territory.

During the war against the Germans, the Allies did not just strike factories, they struck command and control centers, railyards, key infrastructure centers, depots and essential military targets such as barracks, tank parks and airfields.

There is no reason why this would not be the case in this scenario.

As far the Baltic is concerned, yes, there would be quite a few "airfields" available, since the US Navy had one of the largest carrier fleets in history at the time. Carriers stationed in the Baltic and Aegean would provide considerable force projection into Eastern Europe and the F8F (1,105 mile/1,778 km range) and F7F (1,200 mile/1,900 km range) would be the prime movers in fighter protection.

While I agree with most of this post, I don't think for a minute the USN will be putting fleet carriers into the Baltic. It's far too small, and dangerous because the Soviets have a ton of submarines.

 

[bf109xxl]

USAF documents undercut your point here,

Damn, I'd really hoped you have serious arguments.
I am not interested in American documents - they are completely irrelevant in this case. MiG losses can only be calculated from Soviet documents, which has already been done. In reality, B-29 crews shot down from 1 to 4 Soviet MiGs, of which 1 turned out to be Chinese, and two can be credited to the escort. How many B-29 gunners shot down Chinese MiGs - I don't know, I don't think it was much more.

 

[bf109xxl]

The Western Allies did that in Mar of 1945.

So it'll be easier for them to do it again. Or do you think that the Soviet tank armies will stand still and wait to be bombed?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

So it'll be easier for them to do it again. Or do you think that the Soviet tank armies will stand still and wait to be bombed?

... or: do you think 12th and 21st Army Groups unable to stand up to the Soviets? Remember, logistics matters here.

 

[bf109xxl]

... or: do you think 12th and 21st Army Grou;ps unable to stand up to the Soviets?

I do not think, I am perfectly sure, that these AGs unable to stand up to the Soviets - at least within the first 1-2 month.

Remember, logistics matters here.

Sure. Trouble will start when Soviets reach the Rhine. They are unlikely to cross it. And most likely, they will then be thrown back - they will run out of reserves, logistical problems will significantly increase . But the first strike will be terrible.

 

[GrauGeist]

So it'll be easier for them to do it again. Or do you think that the Soviet tank armies will stand still and wait to be bombed?

The British (including Commonwealth forces) and the U.S. had 100 divisions on hand at the time, plus an additional 10 divisions of remobilized German POWs available if needed.

 

[bf109xxl]

The British (including Commonwealth forces) and the U.S. had 100 divisions on hand at the time, plus an additional 10 divisions of remobilized German POWs available if needed.

Versus >260 Soviet (in equivalent)? Not very impressive.